

History
of the
Family v. Kleist

Part Three - Biographies until 1880

Fifth department.
Life of the Field Marshal Count Kleist von Nollendorf

of

Georg von Kleist,
(1st edition of 1887)

With a portrait and three cards.

reissued by

Sigurd von Kleist

Hamm

2025

Note on the translation:

This is a machine translation from 2025 of the German edition from 2024.

<https://www.v-kleist.com/FG/Nollendorf/Nollendorf.pdf>

SYSTRAN was used for the biography and the notes of the original. The long-term goal is to provide a translation of all biographies of the family history for the numerous family members in the USA. This requires proofreading the machine translation, which has not yet been possible.

The table of contents shows the pages of the German 2nd edition. The page-numbers of this edition are almost similar.

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Foreword to the 1st edition

Kleist von Nollendorf is one of the few heroes of the wars of freedom who have not yet found a biographer.

Unfortunately, even this work can only offer piecemeal results. Only the idle hours of an eventful official activity could be devoted to it, so it was not possible in the given time to completely exhaust the printed source material.

On manuscripts, the author mainly had at his disposal a not extensive estate of the Field Marshal, which Countess Kleist von Nollendorf, born of Gustedt, made available and tried to complete through research at his old war companions in the most benevolent Weise.

The war archives of the Great General Staff were closed to the author after a short period of use by his transfer from Berlin, for this very reason no research was carried out in the Royal State Archives, and the files of the Ministry of War Archive contained only a very sparse material, which was used at the relevant location.

Thus, as the time for the production of the family history is running out, the biography with all its shortcomings and Lücken must be put into print.

The author is not flattered to enrich the history literature through them. He believes, however, that she is sure of a friendly welcome among the members of his large Kleist family, and finds his reward in the hope that she will help to awaken and strengthen the soldiers and men's virtues in the descendants of this family, who so highly decorated the field marshal, and to keep them all awake in the king's loyalty.

Metz, 1886.

Georg von Kleist.

Preface to the 2nd edition

In the re-publication of significant parts of the Kleistsche Familiengeschichte, published up to 1887, in today's writing with the possibility of inserting new findings into annotations, I also decided to include this volume in this work, although from today's perspective the scope of this biography is considerably too extensive in relation to the other biographies.

On the other hand, the new publication should also allow access to the biographies as documents of their time of origin. Without this volume, the overall project would therefore have remained incomplete.

Supplements are in italics or bear an annual note.

Attached is the text of a lecture by the author, Georg von Kleist, "From Dresden to Nollendorf. August 1813." from 1889.

The spelling isn't adjusted in this band.

Sigurd von Kleist

To the author:

Georg Friedrich von Kleist (25 September 1852 at Gut Rheinfeld, Pomerania – 29 July 1923 at Gut Wusseken near Hammermühle, Schlawe district in Pomerania), son of Major General Fedor Benno Constantin, Haus Wusseken (III 892), became a lieutenant in the infantry in 1869 after his training in the Cadet Corps. As a result of an injury in 1870, he switched to cavalry. In 1877 he became a lieutenant and in 1878 a general staff. cavalry-captain In 1883 he was promoted to. In the following years, the creation of this book falls. In 1887 he became a major in the General Staff of the 3rd Division and in 1892/1893 a regimental commander of the 1st Division. Brandenburg Ulanen. As a lieutenant colonel in 1895, he became head of the General Staff, 1896-1898 colonel and head of the Department of War History. In 1899 Kleist became major general and in 1901 inspector of the 1st Cavalry inspection. In 1902 he became lieutenant general, in 1903 commander of the 38th Division and in 1907 inspector general of the cavalry. In December 1914 he had to resign his command because of a heart condition.

Since 1907 he was chairman of the family association, and from 1910 to 1918 he was a member of the Prussian House of Lords for the von Kleist family.

He was the author of books on military subjects:

The officer patrol as part of the cavalry's strategic mission. - 2nd edition, 1891

Maneuver instruction for the cavalryman, Berlin, 1895

He was co-author of the Handbook for the Army and Fleet, Encyclopedia of the Sciences of War and Related Areas, Berlin, Leipzig, Wien, Stuttgart 1913

For the Kleistsche Familiengeschichte, he has written a number of shorter biographies in addition to this Buch. He also wrote the 1920 "Overview of the participation of the von Kleist family on the (1st) World Wars".

Sources Used

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Treitschke, Deutsche History in the 19th century I. V.

Freiherr von Zedlitz, Die Staatskräfte der Preußischen Monarchie unter Friedrich Wilhelm III.

Twelve heroes from the German War of Independence. Magdeburg, 1842.

Wagner, Staatslexikon und Gesellschaftslexikon. Biography of the Field Marshal.

v. Liliencron, General German Biography. Kleist von Nollendorf von Freiherr von Meerheimb.

Military - Weekly from 1823, (Necrolog, page 2578) and 1817.

Military Conversation Lexicon of 1836.

Carlyle. Carlyle. Frederick II

Bronsart von Schellendorf, The Service of the General Staff.

E. Vehse, Geschichte des preußischen Hofes, Adels und der preußischen Diplomatie.

Kretzschmer, Leben Friedrich Wilhelm III.

v. Massenbach, Memoirs on my relations to the Prussian state, etc.

Same one. Considerations and information on the events of 1805 and 1806.

E. v. Höpfner, The War of 1806 and 1807.

C. Freiherr v. d. Goltz, Roßbach and Jena II. Supplement to the Military Weekly 1883. 2. and 3. Booklet.

v. Weltzien, Memoirs of the Royal Prussian General of the Infantry Ludwig v. Reiche.

v. Ledebur, experiences from the war years 1806 and 7.

v. Seydlitz, Diary of the Royal Prussian Army Corps under the command of Lieutenant General of York in the campaign of 1812.

Gallery of Prussian Characters, Berlin, 1808.

Droysen, Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen York v. Wartenburg, 1851.

Fain, manuscript from 1812. Presentation of the events of this year as a contribution to the history of the Emperor Napoleon.

M. Bogdanovich, Imperial Russischer Major General. History of the campaign in 1812.

Franz Roeder, Grand Duke Hessian Colonel of the General Staff. The Napoleon War against Rußland in 1812.

Robert Ker Porter, The Russian Campaign in 1812.

Robert Wilson, Secret History of the Campaign of 1812.

Military weekly 1837, letters from Curland 1812.

v. Bagensky, History of the Kolberg Infantry Regiment.

v. Bärensprung, History of the 5th Cuirassier regiment.

Gneomar Ernst v. Natzmer, Aus dem Leben des Generals Oldwig v. Natzmer, *Vol. 1, Berlin 1876.*

Archive of the Royal Prussian Ministry of War, March of the detachment of Major General Kleist from Schlesien to Insterburg in April 1812.

C. v. Plotho, *Der Krieg in Deutschland und Frankreich 1813 und 1814.*

G. H. Pertz, *Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neidhardt v. Gneisenau.*

Varnhagen v. Ense, *Das Leben des Generals Grafen Bülow v. Dennewitz.*

Same one, *Gebhard Leberecht v. Blücher.*

v. Maltitz, *Life of the Field Marshal Count v. Wrangel.*

Baron of Meerheimb, *The Battles of Bautzen on 20 and 21 May 1813.*

Th. v. Bernhardt, *memorabilia from the life of the Imperial Russian General of Infantry, Carl Friedrich Grafen v. Toll.*

Graf v. d. Groben-Neudörfchen, *Handwritten communications.*

General v. Voß, *Handwritten communications, mainly concerning the Battle of Kulm. Both were commanded as adjutants at Kleist during the same period.*

War Archives of the Great General Staff:

Acta 1st Letters to Colonel Kleist, Knesebeck and others.

2. Reports to York. March/April 1813.

3. Reports from the infantry of the Royal Prussian II Corps d'armée per month June 1813.

4. Messages from the enemy and orders received by II. Corps per September and October 1813.

5. Reports by General von Kleist on the state of the North German Federal Corps. 18 April to 19 June 1815.

Aster. Aster. *The Battles and Battles of Leipzig in October 1813. II Tape.*

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G. v. H, *The Battle of Leipzig.*

v. Hofmann, *On the History of the Campaign of 1813.*

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Beitzke, *History of the Year 1815.*

v. Ollech, *General of the Cavalry v. Reyher. Supplements to the Military Weekly, as a history of the campaign of 1814.*

v. *Ollech, History of the Campaign of 1815, Berlin 1876.*

R. Fr. Eylert, *Character Traits from the Life of the König of Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm III.*

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Wilhelm Müller, *Political History of the Modern Era. 1816-68.*

Paul Bailleu, Prussia and Frankreich from 1795 to 1807, Diplomatic Correspondences, 2nd part 1800 - 1807, Leipzig 1887

Bernhard Schwertfeger, Geschichte der Königlich Deutschen Legion 1803—1816, Erster Band, Hanover und Leipzig 1907

J. v.Pflugk-Hartung, General v. Kleist as commander 1815, in research on Brandenb. and Prussian Geschichte, 1910, pp. 147 ff.

Family history of Kleist - Count Kleist of Nollendorf

-- 7 --

J. v. Pflugk-Harttung, The Prussian Army and the North German Federal Forces under General v. Kleist 1815, Gotha, 1911

From the Time of Need and Liberation of Deutschland in the Years 1806 to 1815, ed. Gustav v. Diest, Berlin 1905, in it letters from General v. Thile to his wife in the years 1812 to 1815

Manuscripts in archives of and to Count Kleist von Nollendorf

Archive of the Kleist family in the archive of the city of Hamm

5 letters from Count Kleist of Nollendorf (after 1787 to 1817) to von Witzleben, 9 sheets, handwritten, partly with a patent seal, the letter from Berlin of 4 May 1808 bears the red patent seal with the original coat of arms of the von Kleist family; the letter from Merseburg of 28 July 1817 bears the red patent seal of the Kleist of Nollendorf, which was raised to the county in 1814

7 Letters from Count Kleist von Nollendorf (1799 - 1816) probably to von Witzleben, 13 sheets, handwritten.

1 Brief from Count Kleist von Nollendorf (10 April 1806) to the Lieutenant General von Blücher - 1 sheet handwritten - on the occupation of East Frisia and the use of Blücher by the König for the transportation of one of Kleist.

Letter of 13 June 1815 from König Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia to Graf Kleist von Nollendorf - 1 sheet handwritten - in which the König overturned the verdict for the deserter Lieutenant von Trauwitz due to Kleist's use

Aachen City Archives (from Kalliope)

*Kleist, Friedrich von an Krauseneck, Wilhelm Johann, Oberst
place of origin Aachen*

University and State Library Bonn (from Kalliope)

*VON Kleist von Nollendorf, Friedrich Heinrich [author] AN Unknown (a lady) [addressee]
o.O. 1 letter usable Deutsch Deutschland 7.9.1822*

Bavarian State Library München (from Kalliope)

*VON Kleist von Nollendorf, Friedrich Heinrich [author] AN Woldermann, ... von (President of the Chamber Court, Berlin) [addressee] Im Lager von Mietau 1 Br., 1 pp., 4' 7.10.1812 Autogr.
Kleist von*

Munich City Library (from Kalliope)

Letter from Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm to Kleist, Friedrich dated 05.04.1820

Frankfurt/Main City and University Library (from Kalliope)

VON Kleist von Nollendorf, Friedrich Heinrich [author] AN Unknown [addressee] o.O. 1 letter

usable Deutsch Deutschland 1819 Autogr. F. v. Kleist

Dortmund City and State Library (from Kalliope)

*VON Kleist von Nollendorf, Friedrich Heinrich [author] AN Unknown [addressee] Merseburg
1 Br., 1 pp., 4' useable Deutsch Deutschland 8.11.1818 Atg Nr: 5056*

Stadtarchiv und Landesgeschichtliches Bibliothek Bielefeld (aus Kalliope)

*VON Kleist von Nollendorf, Friedrich Heinrich [author] AN Unknown [addressee] o.O. 1 letter
usable Deutsch Deutschland 4.7.1806 H letter 5*

Berlin State Library

Letter from Potsdam 22.4.1806 to Excellence ...;

Friedrich von Kleist an Unbekannt, Neuwied 8 May 1815

Friedrich von Kleist an Unbekannt, Trier 31 May 1815

Friedrich von Kleist an Friedrich Wilhelm von Mauvillon, Merseburg 10 May 1820

Letter Berlin 9.1.1822 to a Freund Handwriting Department Collection Darmstädter - 1918.131

Royal Museum of Mariemont

Letter Berlin 22.3.1806 to Mr. General (presumably Blücher)

3 pages

Landeshauptarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt (Magdeburg)

*Act of the Oberpräsident of the Province of Saxony of 1816: Acta for endowment to Count
Kleist of Nollendorf - granted endowment of the domains Stötterlingenburg and Wilperode
(Section XII Gnadensachen No. 1)*

The file contains documents signed by Count Kleist von Nollendorf.

Letters from Merseburg

*Act of the Government of Magdeburg of 1823 on the collection of money for the monument
(Rep. C 28 IfNo. 1991)*

Privy State Archives of the Prussian Cultural Heritage Berlin

Summary Private correspondence, especially

Criticism of the Altenstein memorandum of 1807;

official correspondence: military action due to the mobilization of 1812 (copy) 1805-(1812)

Scope (running meters) 0.01 Duration 1805-(1812)

to Blücher, 25 March 1806: handover of Wesel Fortress to the Franzosen

Correspondence with Haugwitz, Charlottenburg July/August 1806

to General Levin Baron of Bennigsen for awarding orders, March - July 1807

to the Kgl. General War Department, 23 March 1812

to König Friedrich Wilhelm III., Dessau 27. 4. 1813: Sending of a letter of a Saxon Generals

to v. Jordan, Merseburg 3 May 1816, for awarding a golden sword decorate with brilliant-cut diamonds

to Bernstorff, Merseburg 11 May 1821, application for retirement

Colored coat of arms and pedigree as Johanniter knights in Prussian: X.HA Rep.9 No.771

Berlin Court of Appeal

General (1823) unpublished will from Berlin-Brandenburg Signature: Rep.4a No.9381

Westphalian Archives Office

Heinrich Friedrich Karl Reichsfreiherr vom und zum Stein

Dating: 1803?

Sender/Author: Prussia, Louis Ferdinand Prinz v., recipient: Kleist

Louis Ferdinand Prinz von Preußen to [Friedrich Heinrich Ferdinand Emil v.?] Kleist Subject: Directions to pass on military and political measures to an unnamed general in the prince's opinion

Dating: 1812

By: Goltz, Alexander Wilhelm Freiherr von der

Characteristics of various Prussian generals by Alexander Wilhelm v. der Goltz concerned: Julius August Reinhard v. Grawert; Johann David Ludwig Graf Yorck v. Wartenburg; Friedrich Heinrich v. Kleist; Eberhard Friedrich Fabian v. Massenbach; Karl Friedrich v. Corswant

Dating: Sep 4, 1814

Sender/Author: Stein, Recipient: Kleist v. Nollendorf, Friedrich Heinrich Graf

Subject: Demonstration by Saxon officers in favor of their König

Also contains: Kleist to Johann Adolf v. Thielmann, Aachen, 5 Sept. 1814, copy by Kanzleihand

Dating: Aug - Sep 1814

By: Kleist (v. Nollendorf), Friedrich Heinrich Ferdinand Emil Graf v.

Recipient: Stein

22 Aug. 1814 concerning in particular: Hessian Army Corps; Rhine Navigation; Liège

30 Aug. 1814 concerning in particular: return of a memorandum [Ferdinands v. Varnbüler] on the fortification of the boundary; critique of the conditions in Baden; hopes for positive impact of Stein on the Congress of Vienna

5 Sept. 1814 concerned in particular: Measures against the Saxon Army Corps because of its demand for the reinstatement of the Saxon König; General Philipp Friedrich v. Müffling; General Johann Adolf v. Thielmann

Thuringian State Archives

Grand Ducal House Archive A XIX (Grand Duke Carl August) > Classification: Correspondences

No 66, 1816, Letters from Friedrich Graf Kleist von Nollendorf, concerning the setting of a monument to the Duke of Braunschweig not far from Naumburg, 3 Bl.

Austrian National Library Wien

Kleist von Nollendorf, Friedrich H. F. E. L. a. s. av. couv. 1 f, 1 p. 10. 1. 1818, Merseburg; to Karl Friedrich Graf von Brühl; old collection (B. Werner) 1818 Signatur 11/46-1. Han Autogr.

Library of London

Kleist (Friedrich Heinrich Ferdinand Emil).

*Count of Nollendorff; Adjutant-Gen. to Frederick William III of Prussia. Letter, etc., to Prince Lieven, 1807. Germ. Add. 47300 Af. 9**

Correspondence, etc., with Sir H. Lowe

1814, 1815. Ms. Add. 20114 ff. 23, 27 Add. 20192 ff. 108, 189, 198, 208, 212, 235 Add. 20197 ff. 12, 36 b

CORRESPONDENCE and papers of Col. Henry E. Bunbury

Instructions to, for an armistice with France, 1813. Add. 37051 et seq. 43-54

Memoir as to a plan of campaign 1815. Copy. Add. 37052 f. 89

1,815th Add. 37052 ff. 59, 69, 73 to Sir H. Lowe

Terms of Armistice concluded by, with France, 1813. Copy. Add. 37051 f. 60

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Letter from Kleist von Nollendorf to d'Auvray, Frederic Auguste, 1766-1846, Neumark, 13 June 1813.

Letter from Kleist von Nollendorf to Sack, Johann August, 1764-1831, headquarters Trier, 7 June 1815.

Hessian State Archives in Darmstadt

Fischbach Archives

Two letters from Count Kleist of Nollendorf from 1806 and 1820 to Princess Marianne of Prussia

Two letters from Count Kleist of Nollendorf to Prince Wilhelm of Prussia in 1817 and 1821.

Austrian State Archives

45 volumes of the House Archives, correspondence of Emperor Franz II (1813-1814)

45-1-8 2 Letters from Lieutenant General von Kleist to Emperor Franz II (1813)

Leipzig City History Museum

Wittenberg, 20 September 1808

Frankfurt, 8 May 1811, 20 September 1811

Weimar, 7 December 1813

Erfurt-Büßleben, 19 December 1813

Eislitz, 2 October 1813

Aachen, 15 September 1814, 4 January 1815, 24 February 1815

Merseburg, 3 October 1818

Berlin, 22 April 1819

Merseburg, 26 April 1819, 30 March 1820, 8 May 1820, 2 January 1821

Leipzig University Library (from Kalliope)

Friedrich von Kleist an Unbekannt, Merseburg 23 November 1819

Friedrich von Kleist an Unbekannt, Merseburg 4 March 1821

Deutsche's Literary Archives, Marbach (from Calliope) Cotta\$Verv.\$Autogr.

Friedrich von Kleist

Peterwitz 7 July 1813

Merseburg 16 September 1817

State and University Library Bremen (from Kalliope)

Friedrich von Kleist an Unbekannt, Merseburg 5 January 1816

Saxon State and University Library Dresden

Friedrich von Kleist to Karl Friedrich Franciscus von Steinmetz, Memel 27 May 1807

Saxon State Archives, Dresden

Stock 10365 Manor Liebstadt 2555, 2565, 2576, 2776

17 Epistles from 15 August to 12 December 1814 (Aachen 15, 20, 24, 29 August, 5, 12, 21 September, 13 October, 1, 4, 20, 26, 27, 30 November, 7, 12 December 1814) from the Field Marshal Graf Kleist von Nollendorf to the General of Thielmann

Correspondence between Carl Adolf of Carlowitz and General Kleist von Nollendorf 1816-1822

Stock 10025 Consilium No. Loc. 06472/01

Letter from Count Kleist of Nollendorf to the Royal Saxon Privy Council, concerning his appointment as commanding general between the Elbe and Weser, 1815

Basel UB (Calliope)

Letter from Friedrich Heinrich Ferdinand Kleist von Nollendorf to Ludwig Gottfried Blanc

Merseburg, 24 March 1817. - 2 Bl. (1 p. described),

Autograph collection Karl Geigy-Hagenbach CH-001880-7-000267434

St. Gallen KB Vadiana (Calliope)

Letter from Friedrich Heinrich Ferdinand Kleist von Nollendorf to August, Prinz von Preußischen

1,814.05.14

Robert Alther Collection CH-001880-7-000146776

Goethe and Schiller Archive / Klassik Stiftung Weimar (Kalliope)

Brief from Friedrich Heinrich Ferdinand Emil von Kleist von Nollendorf to Unknown 1820. - 1 piece, 1 sheet

Stock Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von / Autograph Collection; Signature: GSA 33/398

Mainz University Library (Kalliope)

Letter from Friedrich von Kleist and Prince August of Prussia to unknown

o.O., 01.01.1817 [Jan 1817]. - Letter fragment with signature

Autograph collection; Signature: Ms 85-11



Friedrich Emil Ferdinand Heinrich Graf Kleist von Nollendorf

Königl. Preuss. General-Feldmarschall.

Kleist von Nollendorf.

The heroic figure of Field Marshal Kleist von Nollendorf towers high above the members of his family.

Surely the noble singer of spring, the deathly hero whom Lessing called his Freund, his Tellheim, lives in the memory of posterity, probably the family counts a poet among its own who possessed the gigantic creative power of a Shakespeare; only one has ascended the peak of glory, only one has lived a full man's life, created a whole: the victor of the Battle of Kulm and Nollendorf.

It is not of the ordinary, this battle at the foot of the Saxon Ore Mountains. A particularly gloomy strategic and political background makes them emerge like the first victorious ray of light, splitting the clouds of misfortune, doubt and wavering. "On the day of Kulm, the laurels of Dresden withered; the wavering coalition stood again."¹

At a critical moment, by bold decision, to have given the campaign of 1813 the decisive turn to a good outcome, that is what makes Kleist a man of history with one stroke, and even if he would not have shown all the qualities of a great general in so many battles and battles.

We do not want to judge whether we should give him all the support of the triumvirate Blücher - Gneisenau - York or just give him a second place, as his own modesty always chose him for himself — in versatility and above all as a human being, there is no doubt for us, he surpasses all his great contemporaries!"

¹ Treitschke, *Deutsche History I.* 484

The general course of events is consistently given according to this source

I. Youth and the First Years of War.

Friedrich Heinrich Ferdinand Emil von Kleist was born on 9 April 1762² in Berlin, where he received his first education in his parents' home. His father (Friedrich Conrad III, 493) was Geheimrath and dean of the cathedral abbey of Brandenburg, his mother Luise Dorothea Juliane née von Schwerin, daughter of the Lieutenant General Reimer von Schwerin.

Furthermore, we learn nothing about the parents' home and the first years of youth of the field marshal. Only the names of the witnesses at the christening ceremony in St. Mary's Church on April 26 have been preserved, according to the son, and we will not fail if we conclude from the same that the father has taken a very respected position in society and had contact with the highest courtly as well as diplomatic and military districts in Berlins.

The baptismal witnesses were:

1. The Prince of Prussia.
- 2nd Duke Ferdinand of Braunschweig.
3. Borck Minister of State.
- 4th Count of Reuss.
5. Cabinet Minister of Hertzberg.
- 6th Count of Borck.
- 7th General von Buddenbrock.
- cavalry-captain 8. Heinrich by Kleist.
9. Lieutenant Ferdinand von Kleist.
- 10th Princess Amalie of Prussia.
- 11th Countess Wartensleben.
- 12th Countess of Eickstaedt.
13. Mrs. Oberst-Leutnant von Blumenthal.
14. Ms Hofmarschallin von Rothenburg.
15. Mrs von Lütcke.
16. Mrs von Köhler.

At the same time we will tell ourselves, when reading through this list, that our hero will have come into contact with important and influential personalities in his young years, that these many relationships had to animate him vividly on the one hand, and on the other hand will have also helped to facilitate his progress later on and represented for him perhaps the measure of "happiness", which literally every young person and especially a soldier needs in order to make a career.

After all, it seems like a prelude that the court, diplomacy, and army united to baptize the future Hofmann, diplomat, and general.

If one now considers that the stay in the capital and residence city of Berlin playfully brings a certain general education to the youth-receptive mind, one is entitled to assume at

² 1st edition 1863. The author also mentioned 1862 in his short biography in the *Handbuch für Heer und Flotte* 1913. (2014)

the end that Kleist grew up under conditions in which rich facilities found opportunity to develop beautifully and gloriously.

We know from the old master Goethe how very favorable external conditions give the young genius wings, and must regard Kleist as decidedly preferable in this respect.

These assumptions of the first edition about childhood are contradicted by some facts, which were largely already apparent from the simultaneously published short biography of the father.

He took over from 1754 to relieve his mother the administration of the paternal estate Stavenow. After their death in 1758, he continued the administration until the brothers concluded an inheritance agreement on 15 June 1763, which led to the takeover of Stavenow by his younger brother Friedrich Joachim.

In his marriage to Luise Dorothee Julie of Schwerin, he lived unhappily. He divorced her "because of her poor performance and waste." She then married Major Carl Alexander du Trossel, of the artillery, who shot himself in 1778.

Dieudonné Thiébault In the professor's memoirs there is a longer section on Mrs. von Troussel, in which he also reports on the first marriage and the financial difficulties of Friedrich Conrad. After the divorce, he retreated to relatives in Mecklenburg. He left the care for the children to his divorced wife.³

The elder daughter later married a Colonel Ludwig du Trossel.

At the end of his life, his father lived in Leipzig, where he died on 19 February 1808.

Back to the text of the 1st edition.

At that time, the scientific education of knightly youth was very poor. The boys left the school bench or the tutor when they had acquired the most necessary everyday knowledge and devoted themselves only to chivalrous exercises.

This was also the case with the young Kleist, at the age of 12 he came as a page to the court of Prince Heinrich of Prussia, who had always been very kind to his family and now took over his further education. The rugged opposition, in which the prince found himself to his royal brother, and which cast its shadow on the Rheinsberg court camp, will probably have escaped the youthful trusting sense, which sees only the good in the world, whereas the lively spiritual life of the prince standing in the middle of the French Enlightenment had to encompass the young.

With regard to the military, a better role model for the prospective soldier could probably not be thought, except for the great Frederick himself, as Prince Heinrich, of whom his König said that he had never made a mistake as commander of an army. This praise was not entirely unconditional. But if the prince was really a ditherer, as the König sometimes accused him of, he may in this regard resemble the cautious York, never a Daun.

Kleist remained in Rheinsberg for three years. The proximity of Berlin allowed him to remain in constant contact with his parents' home, and as early as New Year 75 to 76 he spent three weeks of vacation in the same house, which the prince had granted to the "Ensign", as he calls him. With the sister "Minette" he changes cheerful letters.

It was then customary to join the army at the age of 14 or 15. Kleist might have stayed longer in the prince's wake if the outbreak of the War of the Bavarian Succession had not

³ Dieudonné Thiébault *Friedrich the Great, His Family, His Friends and His Court, Part 3, Leipzig 1828, pp. 42 ff. (2009)*

Supplements on Thirty Years at the Court of Friedrich the Great (von Lehndorff), Karl Eduard Schmidt-Lötzen, Mitteilungen der Literarische Gesellschaft Masovia, Lötzen 1909, pp. 218, 316 (2010)

accelerated his admission into the army. He was on 2 July 1778 at the age of 16 Portepee-Ensign in the infantry regiment of *Lettow*⁴ and moved with him into Bohemia. His regiment belonged to the army commanded by his master, the prince.

It is well known that in this so-called potato war only very insignificant ventures came here that offered no opportunity for awards. After all, it was a laborious campaign in bad weather and bad paths, in illness and inadequate food, in which you could gain some experience when you opened your eyes.

Kleist remained in the field until spring 1779. There is often the depiction that Kleist was transferred to the regiment of Pfuhl after the war. The Bülow and Pfuhl regiments are the same, however, only the heads had changed. Then he visited the Académie des nobles, built by the great king, which had the task of training usable officers and is a precursor of today's war academy. At that time it was under the direction of Tempelhoff, whose best pupils included Kleist. His serious diligence, supported by important abilities, was not ignored, and so Kleist, although promoted to second lieutenant on 2 April 1783, was appointed adjutant the following year.

Kleist remained in this position for six years in Berlin. As is apparent from his letters, he was already proficient in the French language at that time in outstanding Weise, a skill which became, one might say, indispensable to him in his later life. In Berlin Kleist also experienced the end of the Friderician period with its historical parades and maneuvers on the Tempelhof field, to which, as in our days, the military intelligence of all European states flowed together, he saw the greatest man of the century rise from a lonely and lovelier height into the grave, he heard from the west the voices, which at the same time announced the approach of a new time in a touching and frightening way.

It was a beautiful and interesting time for the Prussians of the time, this linger at the height of the sun of glory at the same time as the view into the enormous spiritual movement, on whose hand the 19th century entered the arena, in some respects similar to our present days.

Kleist, like his König,⁵ liked to incorporate the philanthropic views of his time into his philanthropic heart, but the brutality of the revolution remained hated forever.

In this period he married Hermine Caroline Charlotte von Retzow, born in 1767 to Mors, daughter of Wilhelm Leopold von Retzow on Ruhlsdorf near Berlin, director of the Kurmark knighthood, member of the General-Landarmen- und Invaliden-Versorgungsdirection (died May 14, 1803) and one of Thiele.

The wedding ceremony was probably in 1786, in Ruhlsdorf by the local pastor. The exact year cannot be determined, since the church records of the place were destroyed by the enemy in 1813.

Kleist was about 23 years old when he founded his own house, his wife 4 years younger.

⁴ *The regiment in question, No. 46, was called from 1757 to 1776 of Bülow, from 1776 to 1779 to 1795 of Lettow and from 1779 to 1795 of Pfuhl.*

Addition 2014: in the 1st edition of Bülow, in the short biography of 1913 corrected.

In the Saxon State Archives, Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, there is a process, "that of Richter and landowner Johann Gottlob Clauß against the Royal Prussian. Standard-bearer of Friedrich Ferdinand von Kleist 'Satisfaction demanded' from December 1778 because of an excess, violence and insults that occurred in Nössige. According to the content of the interrogation of the cadet, he is 17 years old, is called Friedrich Heinrich Ferdinand von Kleist, is born in Berlin and belongs to the regiment of Lettow. Place of birth and first name match, only "Emil" is missing. The age is half a year too high. It can be assumed that the process is correctly assigned to the hero of this book. (Stock 10485 Manor Porschnitz No. 146).

⁵ Treitschke, Deutsche History I

His marital happiness was, unless external circumstances — war and illness — temporarily clouded it, a permanent, loving and tender husband. The fact that he christened his two children "Hermann" and "Hermine" is an external sign of the delicate attention he paid to his wife.

It was probably his intention to take care of his family when, in 1787, he arrived in Halberstadt in a petition to the König for the expectation of the monastery of St. Bonifacii and Mauritii, which was then granted to him "in the confident trust of his more distant application in service". Kleist had thus already become known at the highest point as a capable officer.

As early as 1784, probably as a result of the ties in which his father was associated with the cathedral, he was enrolled in the chapter on Brandenburg and had enjoyed the protection of Frederick Augusts of Saxony.

When war with Österreich threatened to break out in the spring of 1790, the General Staff was increased by a few posts and Kleist, who had been trained by attending the academy, was appointed lieutenant quartermaster in the academy.

In his new position, he marched with the corps of Prince Frederick of Braunschweig to Schlesien, where the Prussian army gathered. The Treaty of Reichenbach, however, quickly ended this military expedition, and Kleist returned to Potsdam, where the headquarters of the General Staff was. Even then, the same men belonged to him, who subsequently made a name for themselves. So there was no lack of mental stimulation. All members of the General Staff had, at least in 1789, a place on the Marshall's Table.⁶

In 1792⁷, for the third time since Kleist belonged to the army, the call sounded into the field. This time, however, it was to be more than a military walk.

The French National Assembly needed the war, which is why it brought it about, but also the knightly Frederick Wilhelm liked to pull the sword to stand up for his royal brother of Frankreich. The army considered itself insurmountable after its easy and glittering successes in Holland, and the prospect of chastising a nation in which not even the oath of the flag was held sacred was a tempting one for it.

What a pity that a weak and at the same time country-hungry policy could not take the simple decision to now use all forces to crush Frankreich with certainty, not to mention more far-reaching German-national plans.

Thus, since the eyes were directed towards Polen, hardly half of the Prussian army was raised against Frankreich. Distrustful and upset, as the two allies were against each other, no common action could be expected towards a single goal. Then there was the thoughtful conduct of the war by Duke Ferdinand of Braunschweig, who was unable to see that the system of the last years of the Seven Years' War was not at all appropriate here, who, by means of a fanatical manifesto inspired by emigrants, provided a service to the revolutionary government and, on the other hand, could not decide on any decisive step.

Individually happy everywhere, the Prussian army withdrew after the Valmy canonade. The left bank of Rhein was lost, Custine took Mainz with a handful of people and occupied Frankfurt.

Kleist attended the campaign in the Champagne as General Staff officer of Prince Hohenlohe, the latter, who in 1806 resisted all the flattery of the French generals and left his principality, only to be Prussian general, among the Prussian army leaders despite

⁶ Bronsart von Schellendorf, the service of the General Staff, page 13

⁷ 1st edition: 1793. *Valmy 20 September 1792.* (2017)

Prenzlau one of the most capable.

Although there were no particularly glorious actions in this campaign, Kleist was still able to show cold-blooded and determined, as well as military focus. Schnell, he earned the full trust of his general, on whose use he was promoted to captain on 22 October.

But the year should not end without giving Kleist the opportunity to really excel. At the end of November, the Prussian troops that had returned over the Rhein marched again to expel Custine from Frankfurt and later retake Mainz.

On 2 December, there was a battle at Ober-Ursel, two miles northwest of Frankfurt.

The Hohenlohe Corps proceeded on this day from Reiffenberg to Ober-Ursel, crossing the Taunus on a forest path, which was shown by a forestry official. Towards dawn, they came across enemy outposts in the forest, which retreated. When then the Tete of the avant-garde under Major General Franz Casimir von Kleist reached the edge of the forest and wanted to debouch, enemy troops of 5-6 battalions and 10-12 squadrons marched about 1200 feet from the forest, able to prevent the debouchee of even stronger troops. The latter had occupied a hill, which was crowned with hills.

The hunters of the avant-garde now occupied the Waldlistere at first, as at the same time an enemy battalion advanced in the clearly recognizable intention to occupy a hill, the chicken head, which lay in front of the right wing of the hunters.

The captain of Kleist, who was in the avant-garde, immediately recognized with a sure eye that the possession of this hill was the condition for the Debouchiren and quickly led 2 hunter companies and the Fusilier battalion of Renouard there on his own initiative. These troops arrived at the same time as the enemy and threw him back down the mountain in a short run.

General Houchard gave up preventing the further advance of the Prussians and withdrew. Frankfurt was taken over on the same day.

The captain of Kleist, who picked his first laurels here, strangely meet! under the eyes of the much-mentioned commander of Magdeburg, was lucky enough to be able to convey the news of this battle to the König itself. Pour le mérite He was awarded the Order.

Even the very critical Massenbach⁸ admits that the Captain and Quartermaster Lieutenant of Kleist during the entire campaign fulfilled his duty to a high degree and on that day performed an essential service and therefore deserved a reward.

This first small success is soon followed by the Rhein - crossing of the Prussians at Caub, but first is defeating Mainz, which is well equipped and defended after a long siege only falls to hunger, July 22, 1793.

At the same time, the Austrian General Wurmser advances against Elsaß on the Upper Rhine. The Prussians march into the Pfalz, every time the enemy ventures, he is defeated, so on 14 September at Pirmasens, on 30 November at Kaiserslautern, in between on 13 October in association with dm Österreichern the Weissenburg lines are stormed. Partial successes everywhere, but no result overall.

Finally, after Wurmmer's defeats, the Pfalz had to be evacuated, because the Prussians, weakened by detachments to Polen, could not keep them alone. The König itself had gone there.

The campaign had been rich in effort, especially for the commanders and their supporters.

⁸ The description of the Battle of Upper Ursel is taken from: Massenbach, *Memoirs about my relations to the Prussian state. Supplement 2017: Memoirs on the History of the Prussian State under the Governments of Friedrich Wilhelm II and Friedrich Wilhelm III*, Volume 1, Amsterdam 1809, pp. 152 ff.

Kleist had developed a restless activity.

The third campaign, that of 1794, was just as victorious and just as unsuccessful. Möllendorf won again at Kaiserslautern, again the Prussians had to clear the left bank of Rhein, because the Austrians went back and Britain did not pay the promised aid. The already wavering coalition was destroyed by the Polish Handel.

Kleist took part in the campaign in the staff of Möllendorf. He had come to know and appreciate him during the last campaign and asked for an adjutant⁹ when he received the command of the Rhein Army. Kleist acquired not only the trust, but also the friendship of the aged hero. Field Marshal Möllendorf, now 70 years old, had served in the Seven Years' War with outstanding distinction. He was considered the best of the Prussian generals, as which he always proved himself victorious within certain limits. It was an honor to be called by him, but Kleist made himself very useful through the knowledge of the enemy and the theater of war he had gained in the preceding campaigns. His knowledge of this relationship was a real treasure;¹⁰ even here he was the one who had to conduct all the negotiations with French generals. Unfortunately, nothing is known about his direct participation in the campaign, and of his private life, it is only to mention that he has trouble getting through with his salary, as all the grants from the father seem to be missing.

But already on January 10, 1795, he became in his position as an inspecting adjutant, and in addition, the König waived him the batch and stamp fees of the "confessed preacher" at the Moritzstifte in Halberstadt, while he could not relieve him of the Annatengeldern, which belonged to the orphanage, against his request. Kleist also reported his appointment as a major to Prince Heinrich and did not fail to point out that the instruction he received at the prince's court had earned him this rapid professional advancement.

The prince, pleasantly touched by this attention, emphasized in his reply that it was wrong not to believe in the cognition of men. This one case of gratitude makes him forget many ingratiities. Writing is characteristic of the prince.

In 1796 Kleist received the Order of St. John, which he had already applied for ten years earlier, but had been decreed by Prince Ferdinand that he had to stand back as one of the youngest.

Frederick Wilhelm's brief government, but accompanied by many external successes, came to an end. It had brought an increase of 2,100 square miles to the state, agriculture and trade flourished, the army had maintained the Friederician war glory in all battles and battles.

Sadly, it had not been increased in proportion to the enlargement of the country, sadly it overestimated its slight and yet always only tactical successes, sadly 40 percent of Polen were among the 10 million who populated the "most German state".

Above all, Prussia had given up on itself and its tradition by ceasing to be the champion of Germanism. His power was weaker internally and externally than at the death of Friedrichs the Great.¹¹

So Frederick Wilhelm III took over the government.

At one of his first reigns Kleist seems to have been especially involved. The König had a detachment of the guard regiment moved in front of the home of the Countess of

⁹ 5 November 1793 Inspector-Adjutant at the Field Marshal of Möllendorf

¹⁰ Notifications from the General of Voß to the Field Marshal's son.

¹¹ Compare Treitschke.

Lichtenau in the Cavalier House of the new garden at Potsdam and announced her arrest by the Colonel of Zastrow and Major of Kleist.¹²

While Frederick Wilhelm reformed the ambiguous court society, he transferred to his father's faithful servants and also to Kleist the goodwill that he had for them. He promised to let an endowment of South Prussian goods promised by the high-blessed König come in if at all possible. In 1798, further negotiations were held with Reszawen and Koskoski in the Warthashen district pay a visit because of a good Gotzcanowo, which complex, if managed well, would yield several hundred thalers.

Kleist then also received the estate, but shortly after taking possession for 9000 thalers. sold again.

At about the same time, his wife inherited the estate of Rohrbeck near Königsberg in the Neumark from the court marshal of Thile.¹³ It was so devastated that after the payment of the inheritance due to the other siblings, little advantage remained. He owned it for a short time, during which time he did much to improve the parish's earnings, and sold it to the captain of the Osten before 1805.

With the year 1799 began a very instructive activity for Kleist, which lasted until 1803 and provided the basis for his practical military training. He had never led a company, so it was all the more necessary for him to receive a battalion, as happened now. The grenadier Battalion, which consisted of the Kunheim and Arnim regiments, was based in Berlin. At the same time, on 9 November 1799, he was transferred to the Infantry Regiment of Arnim No. 13.

The organization was then such that each infantry regiment consisted of 2 Musketeer battalions of 5 companies, 1 Musketeer battalion of 3 companies (replacement battalion) and 2 grenadier companies.

The grenadier companies of two regiments, one of which gave the commander, were then combined into a battalion, which had its special staff and garrison, a completely independent constitution at all.

The budgets of the grenadier companies: 14 non-commissioned officers, 5 playmen, 10 marksmen, 160 commons were 34 heads higher than those of the Musketeer companies, and thus had a grenadier battalion the for peacetime very handsome strength of 56 non-commissioned officers, 21 playmen, 680 commons incl. Sagittarius. In addition, 1 artillery sergeant, 17 artillerymen and 8 carpenters joined for the battalion guns.

The grenadiers were a material with which something good could be achieved, and soon Kleist, who with all the freshness of his youth entered the new area of troop training, gained the reputation of leading the best battalion.

He understood it by proper pairing of Ernst and kindness, rigor and leniency, high demands and paternal care to educate his troops to a discipline that was more or less foreign to the then stick and beating time.

¹² V, Vehse, Geschichte des preußischen Hofes, Theil, p. 67.

Supplement 2011: Apology of the Countess Lichtenau against the accusations of several writers, Part 1, Leipzig and Gera 1808, pp. 147.

The colonels of Zastrow von Kleist and Major do not seem to have been members of the Guard. It is probably Friedrich Wilhelm Christian of Zastrow (born 1752, + 1830), since 1794 Adjutant General of König and since 1796 Colonel, and our Kleist von Kleist, although there were certainly more majors in the time. His use by the Field Marshal of Möllendorf speaks for this, which is also mentioned in connection with the arrest.

¹³ In 1769, the last Margrave of Schwedt had repurchased the three estate shares and left Rohrbeck to his court-marshal of Thile. His widow, a native of Ziethen, bequeathed it to her niece in 1798. Collection Duncker, text to Rohrbeck. (2008)

We now know very well that the brittle form breaks in the friction of war when it was empty and hollow, the only and only outer band of the connection. It is necessary and never to be dispensed with, but it must be fulfilled by the Geist of voluntary subordination, who likes to follow the orders of his superiors because he absolutely trusts them.

That was the discipline Kleist sought and achieved. And more than that! He had the gift of increasing the trust of his subordinates in a love and devotion that attempts the impossible with confidence when the beloved leader demands it.

This factor plays an important role in the war, and not least Napoleon has played the trump card of its demonic persona with great success in many battles.

Of course, there can be no question of comparing the so disparate, since the motives for the same phenomenon were as different as possible for both. —

II Adjutant-General to His Majesty.

Kleist devoted four years to the refreshing practical activity, which was later one of his favorite memories, because his consciousness told him that he had created blessings.

On 30 April 1803, the trust of the König in his immediate vicinity as acting general adjutant of the infantry summoned him. His predecessor, Major von Holtzmann, died on the 3rd of the same month.

One immediately gets the impression: this was the right choice, a person in the simple and modest sense of the König, "who was serious and faithful, pious and righteous, just and true, in the manner and manner of a German man, who possessed all the virtues that make up the pure and good man." ¹⁴

Kleist, with the spotless nobility of his convictions, with his legality and modesty, was indeed created to be a dear confidant to the king, and yet spiritually important enough to understand the time with its demands, theoretically and practically sufficiently trained to deal with the questions of the military organization expertly. Yet restrained in his judgment, without the ingenious recklessness so unpleasant for the König, with which great pioneering minds let their ideas burst out.

According to the characters, one cannot help but assume that Kleist was already very close to his king. Therefore, if only Scharnhorst has become truly dear and teuer to him,¹⁵ the emotion that animated the König — and over time more and more — for Kleist will have reached the limit of friendship.

Evidence of such an outcome may be inferred from the König's unbounded trust in the general for the rest of his life.

Kleist remained in his responsible position until 1807 and resigned only when illness forced him to do so, certainly against the wishes of the König.

The influence of the General-Adjutant could possibly be a significant factor. Just as in the Civil Administration the so-called Cabinet Councils formed the bureaucratic link between the crown and the heads of the various branches of administration, so the army also had no uniform head and was dependent on the mediation of the General-Adjutant in all organizational matters.

The last word in the Council on political and military matters was thus pronounced in the immediate vicinity of the König.

It is clear from this that a general-adjutant could have reshaped the army organization, averted the disastrous operations of the later war and had a favorable influence on politics himself if — if he was a genius who, despite all obstacles, may only express his victorious thoughts in order to see them carried out immediately. That was not Kleist, we would like to confess it, such ghosts do not produce a century in many ways.

It is therefore wrong, as is often the case, to demand that Kleist should have been a leader both in the organization of the army and in the management of operations, "as he would have been called to do, with the authority and trust of the König behind him." One is probably not mistaken to attribute to him the greatest ability of all the General-Adjutants and also of the members of the Upper War College for the education and leadership of troops. But how can one expect a young major, who had only a small merit, to act against the authority of the old war-seasoned generals and marshals, who even subordinated his own verdict to the König. Would he have tolerated or even approved such a danger? Oder

¹⁴ Treitschke I, 146

¹⁵ Treitschke I, 147.

has ever let itself be dominated by König?¹⁶ Kleist did what we could when we refrained from regarding him as a great genius. No one could avert the catastrophe under the given circumstances, and only the forms under which it took place could have been modified. —

Frederick Wilhelm's task was difficult and varied. His good will was accordingly great. Yet he has not gone beyond unsuccessful attempts at reform in his first ten years in government. From a military point of view, they failed because of the military-bureaucratic caste spirit and because of the organization of the upper military authorities, which has already been indicated above.

Frederick the Great had been his own Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff, as had many others. However, this relationship could not be easily transferred to each of his successors. In the need to possess a supreme military authority, Frederick Wilhelm II had created the Upper War College, a type of war ministry, but without a unified head and without direct lecture to the king, whose effectiveness was far from the great name that its members bore. In 1803, the Duke of Braunschweig was president, Möllendorf vice president.

Under the college, but only in a loose connection with the same, were the departments in whose four the administration of the army was handled. All of them needed the general adjutant to bring their affairs to the floor. And if these were technical details of artillery or engineering, there was no other way to bring them up than through that. Such a ratio could not be advantageous for the army, even with the great versatility of the General-Adjutant.

The general quartermaster's staff, a corps of 31 officers, had the same situation.

Of the general adjutants of the time to be discussed here, Kleist has now developed the greatest activity, at times probably alone had the lecture at the King. Colonel von Köckeritz was above all a personal adjutant, loved the peace and hated the innovations. Nothing outstanding has come to the attention of the Colonel of Boelzig. These were the three adjutants in 1803 that were eligible.

Major von Kleist found a rich field for his activities.

In his study "Roßbach and Jena", Freiherr von der Goltz buried the old entrenched view, as if the armed forces had only rested on their laurels and every spiritual life had stood still. Rather, as he proves, much thought and writing has been done around the turn of the century, and it is precisely in 1803 that the main works for reorganization fall: the army.

The König itself dealt primarily with the same, Kleist had the special processing. Like the König, he supported those who thought reorganization was necessary and wanted to create something at all, and, although with little success, he fought against the influence of the unwieldy Geusau and his old patron Möllendorf, who handled most of the new projects with the stereotyped: "This is too high before me."¹⁷ Certainly a classic saying for the vice president of the Upper War College.

Initially, projects from Lecoq, Knesebeck and Courbière were examined, of which the most important was the Knesebeck project. He wanted to open the officers to the citizens' ranch and introduce a kind of manifold system. People should also be given bread. Only the last demand was now passed.

In 1804, a rifle commission met, at which Kleist also had the unit. Incidentally, without success, although the then Prussian rifle was the worst in Europe. Thile had presented a

¹⁶ Treitschke, Deutsche 19th century

¹⁷ Treitschke, I, 153.

rifle designed by him.

In 1805, Rüchel again took up the Knesebeck idea of establishing a rural militia of 50,000 troops and knew how to enforce it with the help of Kleist. When the line-up was finally ordered, the mobilization of 1805 intervened disruptively. —

König was an eminently peaceful country, and it seemed to him an injustice to disturb his happy country in its peaceful development. He was also in the uncomfortable position of being on a bad footing with Frankreich, without being assured of Rußland's aggressive policies.

Thus, for him, a wavering policy, a neutrality, resulted, which was the most ungrateful of all political systems.

The conqueror himself, with his cheeky march through Prussian possessions, helped Prussian politics to make an energetic decision. Injured in his Portepée honor, Frederick ordered Wilhelm to mobilize and pushed his troops to the southern border. Napoleon could have been deprived of some of its successes, but the anxiety of Haugwitz helped him to the Schönbrunn Treaty. Prussia disarmed, while the enemy stopped at full strength on its borders.

Kleist was in despair at the indecisive, wavering, downright anxious politics. He considered war, or at least an appearance commensurate with the might and dignity of Preußens, to be the only thing noth tue.¹⁸

Köckeritz took the view that a König did not have the right to jeopardize the existence of its state, which only a republic could do.¹⁹

Once again, the swords remained in the vagina. After the disarmament, the Upper War College carried out studies on the experiences of mobilization and found, among other things, an increase in grievance, which was already a very significant factor in terms of regulations. The colonel²⁰ of Kleist declared that the König had been very reluctant. König would have thought that it should have been given proposals for the abolition of officer horses and other impediments. His view, according to Kleist-unununununstrammelt communication, was that the organization of the army must be brought closer to that of the French.

This view, which was so right, was based solely on the views of the König, while the Upper War College had reached the opposite result, namely that it was against the Geist of the Prussian army to take the tents from the regiments and the officers the riding and packing horses, and also that the method of catering of the French army could not be successfully imitated without bakery and flour transport. Möllendorf was now specifically asked to comment on these issues, but did not finish them before the war began.

However, the König initiative resulted in a new infantry regiment, which was formed into three field battalions and a depot. The shooters were increased by regiment from 100 to 140, a very correct measure that should have been given only a further extension.

Incidentally, this reshuffle was not yet complete at the start of the war, and only General Rüchel carried it out on his corps at the last minute, which of course could only do harm.

In February 1806, a lieutenant colonel and general-quartermaster-lieutenant von Ochs

¹⁸ Reiche's Memoirs (edited by Weltzien) I

Addition 2014: Untertänigstes Pro Memoria of 16 October 1805 (v. Kleist), Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, issue 1, the Prussian war preparations and operation plans of 1805, Berlin 1883, p. 73.

¹⁹ Treitschke I, 161

²⁰ Since 20 May 1806.

from Cassel, who regretted that he had not been able to go into Prussian service, wrote to Kleist, among other things, that the size of the army should be reduced and the infantry better trained in shooting.²¹ Scharnhorst also submitted a draft to the Duke of Braunschweig and Kleist between March and August, but this went far beyond the Knesebeck project and therefore had even less chance of being taken into account than this. He wants to get the Volksheer, 660,000 men on their feet. Nothing further tells us about this draft, only Knesebeck'sche appeared again, in that 14 days before the mobilization, the already intended 1805 formation of the reserve troops was ordered, of course, too late.²²

Everywhere good and right thoughts, lively mental activity. All that the later reorganization brought with it, to the blessing of the fatherland, was intellectual property even before the war

Unfortunately, a radical reform was carried out by a determined, self-confident will, so despite all the good thoughts, despite the hard work, progress was made only in minor respects.

A fundamental revolution in the army constitution, which alone could have made it resilient, would also have required a transformation of the entire state; and if the army and with it the nobility were thrown the whole odium of collapse, it happened unjustly only because it was the first pillar of the system that collapsed, and because its tragic catastrophe so distracted the eyes of contemporaries that they forgot to investigate the root causes of the state's demise.

It is not the job of these lines to elaborate on Preußens's demise, or to follow closely the events of the war in which the proudest war glory was buried, as Kleist acts little and only suffering in the same way as his position entailed. However, it seemed important to specify the latter in more detail in order to assess whether, as individual writers do, Kleist was really entitled to demand decisive influence. —

Since the Paris Treaty, König has been determined to pull the sword at the earliest opportunity. When Napoleon secretly offered the Prussian province of Hanover to the Welfs, he mobilized and sent an ultimatum to Napoleon, which meant war. Nevertheless, the war was considered safe, but only 130,000 men could be found, to which 19,500 Saxons joined. Only 100,000 men were actually deployed in the decision at the Saale.

As inadequate as the number was, so unfortunate was the organization of command. The Duke of Braunschweig was given the supreme command of the whole army, and especially the main army, and, in addition to his chivalry, had probably the most ability to face a Napoleon with success. But he lacked initiative and confidence to a significant degree. It was therefore only too agreeable for him that he could pass on some of the responsibility to the König, which was present at the headquarters, and wait for the impetus for vigorous action that would be given to him, for example, by the War Council.

König had no intention of influencing the leadership, and it did not do so directly until the calamity left its generals headless. His presence at the headquarters was only intended to reinforce the Duke's orders.

The Duke, however, had Scharnhorst as his boss. However, like Kleist, he was young and modest in his appearance and belonged to the army as a former Hanoverian only too short to have their full confidence.

²¹ Letters to Kleist S.

²² Von Kleist Excerpts from two letters dated 9 June and 6 July 1806 are reproduced in Scharnhorst, Part 1, Bis zum Tilsiter Frieden, Max Lehmann, Leipzig 1886, pp. 389 (2015)

In the headquarters of the König was the now over 80-year-old Möllendorf, which together with several other generals was to form the War Council. In his staff Grolman. Furthermore, the former General-Adjutant Major General of Zastrow, like Möllendorf, did not understand the newer tactics. The theoretician Phull, Kleist and the diplomats Haugwitz and Luchesini. Besides, Her Majesty the Queen with part of the court. General von Geusau, who was not up to his task, held the position of Quartermaster General.

A quite handsome number of advisers are obtained if all the above-mentioned figures are added together, and in most cases the above-mentioned men, to whom the higher military commanders, such as Hohenlohe, Kalkreuth, etc., have also joined, have formed the War Council.

The inconclusive nature of such consultations in cases where there is not already a certain opinion and will was evident from the outset in Charlottenburg. There, during the army's march, a huge number of meetings were held to deal with the very important question of what to do now. The König wished to hear quite a lot of views, and so one Rath chased another, one memoir chased another.

The insight into these uncertain conditions in the overhead line could only give the discerning Kleist the gloomiest prospects, and while the army moved into the field with full confidence, and men like Blücher, Rüchel, Gneisenau, who saw only their good troops, approached the upcoming events with confidence, Kleist was filled with anxious forebodings.²³

Faced with the Möllendorf and Zastrow, who still believed that the Prussians only had to show their face to be victorious, he was unable to impose a more serious view of the situation, which would have led to the opponent being judged higher, i.e. more correctly, and thus to avoid some mistakes.

Already in Magdeburg, where the headquarters initially went, he had a very unfavorable view of the situation, but had almost given up on convincing the other generals of Ernst of the situation. His voice didn't penetrate, as he said.²⁴ "It is believed that we only need to be seen, so the Franzosen are already going away."

From Magdeburg, the headquarters went to Halle on 13 September and to Naumburg on 20 September, where it remained until 4 October. The troops departed on the 15th from Magdeburg to Naumburg.

In Naumburg, one counseling session after another paid a visit on the operations to be undertaken.

First of all, the question of whether offensive or defensive was negotiated, it seems, more abstract than in the context of the war situation. On 24 September, at the first conference in the Duke's home, no agreement could be reached. Kleist and Rauch opposed the Duke and wanted the defense, which was indicated according to the situation. Phull and Scharnhorst were present.

On the 25th, the conference was resumed in the morning at the Duke's and in the afternoon at the König's home in the presence of Möllendorf. The König was initially also against the Duke's view, but was persuaded by him, so that the offensive was decided.

But there was still doubt about the path to be taken.

One would like to ask again: should Kleist, in the multifaceted opinions, put his head on

²³ Von Kleist Excerpts of a letter dated 27 July 1806 are reproduced in Scharnhorst, Part 1, Bis zum Tilsiter Frieden, Max Lehmann, Leipzig 1886, pp. 394 (2015)

²⁴ Reiche's Memoirs I

the fact that one remained on the defensive? As an insightful soldier, did he not have to keep quiet in order for a decision to be made at all, where he saw how great the lack of decision was?

On 4 October, the König and the Queen of Naumburg departed for Erfurt in the afternoon, where the Duke of Braunschweig had already gone before, and Prince Hohenlohe and General Rüchel had been invited to a conference on the 5th.

Kleist and Rauch arrived in Erfurt as early as the 4th, as did Hohenlohe from Jena. His boss, Massenbach, felt the need in the morning for the first two to discuss his views on the further operations. In the afternoon the Duke of Braunschweig arrived. Since Rüchel was not anticipated until late at night, Hohenlohe took Phull and Kleist and his staff to the Duke to hold a preliminary conference and at least do something. When they arrived, Braunschweig was very upset at the tables and didn't let a word get out of it.²⁵

The Duke had apparently abandoned the offensive he himself advocated.

After Rüchel's arrival, the intended war council found pay a visit on the 5th morning, namely with the king himself. The result of the same and a conference on 6 October was the decision to wait. But it was also influenced by the still-pending diplomatic negotiations, the failure of which should not have been misled.

When the time needed to advance an army with sufficient security over the Defileen of the Thuringian Forest had been missed, the news of the advance of the Franzosen on the Nürnberg-Leipzig road gave rise to the return march instead of the intended offensive.

The army no longer reached the Elbe's protective line, but was turned back and beaten.

At first, the advance troops of General Tautentzien were pushed back at Schleitz and the General, who saw Saxony threatened, wrote to Kleist and begged him to mediate the descent of the West Prussian Reserve Corps from Magdeburg Elbe upwards in order to safeguard Dresden and all of Saxony.

On the 10th, the troops division of Prince Louis Ferdinand near Saalfeld was thrown and the high-hearted prince died on horseback.²⁶

This initial unfavorable news, the reversal, the indecisive stance of the upper army leadership undermined the trust and confidence of the troops in troubled Weise.

Nevertheless, nothing was lost after Clausewitz on the eve of Jena and the army was in an advantageous strategic position.

In any case, it was easy to unite the separate army remnants on the 14th, and this simple idea could have been close to the Duke of Braunschweig. If only the news about the enemy had been a little better! In the face of a Napoleon who was now well known, however, the carelessness of the army leadership was inappropriate under all circumstances.

However, the army remained separated into two main groups and was beaten individually.

Much has been said about whether or not the Landgrafenberg near Jena could be abandoned to the enemy without a fight. The possession of the mountain did not decide on the battle. The winner is whoever beats the opponent, where the opponent is standing. The decisive factor in Jena was less in the terrain than in tactics. The Prussian and Saxon infantry are crushed in all their individual battles. The attack on Fourteen Saints is merely an infantry attack, without preparation, without the participation of the other weapons. Impeccably advanced, but then followed by standstill and waiting in the fire of well-

²⁵ Marwitz II, 9th

²⁶ Kleist had the sad satisfaction of being able to make a living by extraditing the prince's body.

covered tirailleurs. That was death.

No other force in the world would have stood as admirably in Scheibe as here the Prussian infantry. But she was helpless and could not defend herself against the French tirailleurs with her outdated forms. The inability to do anything about the devastating enemy fire upset the team.

Rüchel's assault failed in the same circumstances. If "the Leuthen Austrians" had stood in front of him, he would certainly have thrown them over the edge. He could not pass the test that Napoleon, with its best army, gave him.

Kleist did not attend the Battle of Jena. He was with the king at Auerstädt, where on the 13th in the court of Auerstädt they discussed the operations of the following day. It had come later in the evening when the order was issued, for, as usual, the Duke went through his ideas extensively with Phull and Kleist, then talked with many generals about his plan, and only then suggested to the king the measures to be taken.²⁷

The duke wanted to return the main army over the Unstrut on the 14th and did not remotely think of a battle. He was living in complete ignorance of the Napoleonic era, of modern warfare.

The Schmettau division was to march to Kösen and keep the riverbank heights of the Saale on this side. Behind this lateral cover, the army was to march north in long columns on quite difficult paths and cross the Unstrut at Laucha and Freyburg.

The König and the Duke rode their staves to Schmettau on the morning of the 14th, so they felt that the advance of the army might be called into question by a flank movement of the enemy. The condition of success was that the division arrived at Schmettau Kösen in time and kept the heights of the Saale shore and was not involved in a battle. This happened, however, as the lively avoust had long since crossed the Saale with his Tête as the Prussians approached. The main army could not continue the ordered northern march, but had to face up, like the marching to Verdun Franzosen of 16 August 1870, when the III. Army Corps touched her. It was not unfortunate for the main army that it had to give up its march, had it only with the 50, 000 men it brought into the battle, the only 33, 000 strong opponent, developing from Defileen and fighting with its back on a river course, would have given it chances enough to hit him delicately.

That this did not happen is largely due to the leadership, which lacked determination and unity and more or less stopped after the wounding of the commander-in-chief.

The battle was mainly about the ownership of Hassenhausen. A good half a mile from the Saale crossings, it was the most important, almost only base of the Davoustinian Corps, which without this village could not have moved freely on the plateau of Kösen nor even held at all.

Lost Hassenhausen meant the loss of the left bank of the Saale and the battle itself.

On the other hand, the Prussian army could not continue its march as long as Hassenhausen was in possession of the enemy.

We see them therefore also making great efforts to find the place. Two divisions, Schmettau and Wartensleben, are deployed here. But here again the unwieldy tactical form is perishable, which does not have nearly enough suppleness for the local battle, in which the Franzosen Meister in particular.

When the great assault of the two divisions failed, just at this moment, the Duke was shot through both eyes and General Schmettau was wounded for the second time and now

²⁷ Scharnhorst's account of the battle of Auerstädt near Goltz: Roßbach - Jena.

fatally.

The König took over the command, but the Field Marshal Möllendorf, every single leader, every wing adjutant and general staff officer - also made orders, which cannot be surprised, since the army had not been accustomed to a sure and certain command by the Duke of Braunschweig.

Scharnhorst could have supported the König as the leader for the further leadership, but he was on the left wing since the beginning of the battle, where he led the battle happily and believed he could not leave it.²⁸

Kleist was also usually not near the König and looked here and there to help to the best of his ability.

So König had only young officers for the Order Service around it or those who shied away from the responsibility of a town council.

The leadership's indecision had a particularly debilitating effect on the numerous good cavalry, which would have been called upon to play a large, perhaps decisive role. It was presented by professionals, but even more so by unprofessionals who wanted to help, in a disgraceful way and could not come to joint action. The generals themselves lacked the initiative, the ABC of cavalry leadership.

So this battle was lost, in which we could have had great success despite our tactics.

The last reserve, Kalkreuth, was no longer used to keep it intact to take in the defeated troops. An episode from the war of deduction is also mentioned:

The regiment was sent to Rehausen for admission. The regiment first wanted to pass through the village, but already saw troops pulling out and positioned itself behind it. After his task was accomplished, it pulled out in great order. "It was all the more honorable for the regiment that this resolute stance was taken, because it saw not only the irregular flight of the troops of the right wing passing by, but at the moment when it wanted to line up behind Rehausen, it had been thrown into turmoil by the receding General, Count Wartensleben: "What do you want here? Does the regiment also want to be beaten and roughed up?"

In due course, Colonel Kleist had arrived and had given the regiment the order on behalf of the König to keep the post occupied.²⁹

The Prussian army was all but destroyed. The König, which alone retained a clear verdict, quickly saw it. He went on the 15th via Mattstadt, Ettersberg to Sömmerda, on the 16th early to Sondershausen.

From there he ordered General Hohenlohe to collect the troops near Magdeburg. He himself went with an Escadron Wobeser dragoon another 2 hours via Nordhausen, Wernigerode to Magdeburg, on the 18th from there via Wollmirstedt, Rathenow, Oranienburg, Bernau to Küstrin, where he arrived on the 21st to organize behind the army. Unfortunately, there was enough to do.

On the 27th we find the headquarters in Driesen, Grolman arrives there, then in Arenswalde.

We don't know where Kleist left the König. He was sent to Napoleon to respond to the peace proposals brought by Bertrand.

²⁸ Scharnhorst describes his view of battle in a letter to Colonel von Kleist dated 20 October 1806, written in Leere. Scharnhorsts Briefe, volume 1, Privatbriefe, München and Leipzig 1914. (2009)

²⁹ Höpfner, 1264. The War of 1806/7.

However, his mission was unsuccessful in the face of the conqueror's outrageous demands. He returned to his master after the negotiations broke down and accompanied him to Prussia.

That's how far it came! Napoleon did not say too much on 15 October when it imposed a contribution of 159 million francs on all the provinces on the Vistula. The whole kingdom was lost in one fell swoop.

We find Kleist in the beginning of 1807 first in Königsberg, later with the Königs in Memel. A change in the organization had not yet occurred and the management by the General Adjutants showed the same shortcomings as before. That is why she was no less arduous and Scharnhorst admits that Kleist and Lottum did an infinite amount under the circumstances.

Kleist apartment in Königsberg was not empty of visitors. Every figure of importance did not fail to visit him, like Marwitz, who is agitated by the still-present "Schlendrian" of the old days. Every officer who had a request for any degenerate first approached him. "Anyone who knows the man also has confidence in him, and so I did not hesitate to let him report me."³⁰

Fragments from religious and private correspondence during this period are preserved and reveal the versatility of the business that had to be done and eventually became so overwhelming that his health suffered.

We cite a few examples to create a picture of his activities at that time.

First, there is a correspondence with the major and wing adjutant of Bronikowsky about a backup battalion that was to be sent to Memel to cover the crossing over the outflow of the harbor. General Rüchel, contrary to Kleist's opinion, considered this occupation necessary and also demanded that only serviced people should be hired in the battalion, which the König refrained from. Incidentally, a sign that Rüchel was still very much in the old minds.

Several letters from Knesebeck, who is buried in Bialystock in the Russian headquarters, show a friendly relationship between the two men, who should later bear big names. Knesebeck criticizes the Russian operations and then says very aptly at one point in Napoleon: "I ask our good friends, however, not to be misled by reports and postillions again. It is important to remember that this man is used to making his accounts of the Persian border."³¹

As a rule, Knesebeck sends an official letter and a private letter to Kleist at the same time.

In a letter, he strongly recommends that England be persuaded to land 20, 000 men in Hanover and Münster, where there is great ferment, and to recruit there or at least send money and weapons.

In Prussia, meanwhile, they must continue to draw the blood from their opponents in small battles, but avoid a main battle. He also had Tolstoy express this view, being the most reasonable of the Russian generals.

Incidentally, the Under-Generals were excellent; there was only one leader of a high Geist missing, another six months of war practice, and then the Franzosen was beaten.³²

³⁰ Experiences from the war years 1806/7. A time and life picture of Aug. X. Fr. v. Ledebur. Berlin 1885. P. 272.

³¹ Great War Archives General staff. Acta. Letters to Colonel Kleist, Knesebeck and others.

³² Great War Archives General staff. Acta. Letters to Colonel Kleist, Knesebeck and others.

It shouldn't be that long. On 7 and 8 February, Napoleon's allies repulsed attacks at Eylau, especially with the intervention of the small Prussian corps Lestoq. But, as a result of Scharnhorst's efforts during the winter campaign, the new tactic had also been adopted and the König itself issued a detailed instruction about it. Kleist had made suggestions for the catering and training system.

Napoleon wished to end the campaign to separate Prussia and Rußland and sent General Bertrand with peace proposals. König was determined not to renege on its vowed allegiance to Alexander and make no separate peace. But he wanted to see a halt to operations, so that Russian reinforcements in the process of being deployed could have time to get there.

He therefore sent Kleist from Memel on the evening of 17 February, in order to gain the time particularly desired by Bennigsen through negotiations. Arriving in Königsberg, he learned that Napoleon had withdrawn under the pretense of Eylau that he was negotiating with Prussia.

Kleist therefore initially stayed in Königsberg to see whether it was Ernst with the retreat and did not resume the trip again until he was again ordered to do so, with a letter in which every word of separate peace was strictly avoided.

König had also informed the Tsar that it would not make a separate peace.

On 21 February, Kleist arrived at Napoleon's headquarters in Osterode, where he handed over the royal handwriting. In the ensuing long conversation, the Emperor tried to obtain certain statements from the Prussian negotiator and to convince him of the sincerity of his good attitudes towards Prussia.

"The emperor had," Kleist writes to the König, "if I may express myself in this way, to make me understand the effrontery that it was very possible to hold the Prussian troops back in such a way that they had nothing but figurines."³³

Moreover, the Emperor wrote on 26 February, while the König did not reply until 21 April.

Kleist had simultaneously negotiated the exchange of prisoners during his mission and presented the following list:

, Etat des officiers Francais et Prussiens proposé par Mr. le Col. le Kleist, aide de camp de Sa Maj. le Roi de Prusse pour être échangés ainsi qu'il suit Mars 1807

1st General of Division Victor... Blücher à Hambourg,

2. 'de brigade Saultrier... Tauentzien en France.

Tauentzien was held back by Napoleon. Blücher was freed. Napoleon had no idea what grim hero he was calling back against him. —

Kleist also became acquainted with Gneisenau, who was in Königsberg in the winter of 1806/7 and met him more frequently in the house of Princess Luise, married Radziwill, sister of the fallen prince Louis Ferdinand. All the distinguished men of that time, such as Stein, Hardenberg, Niebuhr, Humboldt, Clausewitz, gathered around this highly-minded couple of princes.

In March, Gneisenau bid farewell to take over the command of Colberg, where he would soon fill the world with his war glory. He remained in correspondence with Kleist, to whom he wrote on 18 June with a transport of prisoners of war:

³³ Hoepfner, 1806/7. III, 273rd Supplement 2012: Paul Bailleu, Prussia and Frankreich from 1795 to 1807, Diplomatic Correspondences, 2nd part 1800 - 1807, Leipzig 1887, pp. 586.

"I've now made the enemy a little head-shy. In five affairs, three of which were extremely bloody to the enemy, I killed, wounded and captured perhaps 4,000 men. If he does not receive reinforcements and leads me, as I have asked him to do, only 2000 General Lieutenant of Blücher, I will vouch that we will drive the enemy away from here altogether.

Your Highly Benevolent Goodness will not mind if I send another letter to my poor depressed wife. I'm here to avenge her."³⁴

Killed in action In the meantime, the bravely defended Gdańsk, the Battle of Friedland was lost, the faithful comrade-in-arms had made a separate peace. Thus Prussia was defenseless in the hands of the victor. On 28 June Kleist dispatched three officers from the headquarters in Pictupönen with the news of the armistice to Colberg, Graudenz and Schlesien.

On July 7 and 8, Frederick Wilhelm had to sign the Peace of Tilsit, which robbed him of half his lands and left the remainder in the enemy's hands.

Deeply distressed at the fall of the beloved fatherland, Kleist now joined an exhausted health. Now that the war was over, he believed he could justify asking his König for an indefinite holiday. On July 23, 1807, he wrote to a Freund from Memel about the motives, which also made it desirable for him to give up his position, that he had come to the realization that he could not do anything here (as a general adjutant) and that it was his duty against the family to do something for his health. He describes Knesebeck as his likely successor. "He (Knesebeck) can also do more good than I can. I am already being interfered with by an Aigreur from the König side who, since I was the only opposition party and I predicted quite truthfully, must accuse him constantly."³⁵

In the time in which Scharnhorst began the reorganization of the army, Kleist was therefore not on duty and thus did not cooperate on the same. Perhaps he would not have promoted it, because he doubted whether Scharnhorst would always do the right thing in the complete ignorance of the Prussian state military facilities. In order to supplement Scharnhorst in this regard, he therefore arranged for Lottum to be admitted to the Commission. —

Also with York, who was later to find a loyal, his only Freund in Kleist, the latter entered into a relationship during this time. They had met before. In the autumn maneuver of 1803, when the König awarded Colonel York the Order pour le mérite by the Light Infantry, Kleist informed him on the parade of König of his merciful intentions, whereupon York asked whether the announcement was reliable and whether he could invoke Kleist. When he said yes, York went to the König and asked for a different reward.³⁶

Now York informed him that General v. Köckeritz had confidentially asked him if he wanted to be the heir to the throne. He refused, however, by means of a letter which he enclosed.

Kleist from Memel replied on 17 August 1807:

"With the most binding thanks, I remit to you, esteemed General, the essay I have communicated to you. Head and heart shine out of it, and I have read it with true interest

³⁴ Great War Archives General staff.

³⁵ Leave papers. Supplement 2009: The letter is printed in Scharnhorst, 2nd part, Max Lehmann, Leipzig, 1887, p.642. The letter is listed in the directory of the collection of autographs leave by the late Prussian General-Leutnant J. von Radowitz, Part 1, Berlin 1864, p. 153.

³⁶ Droysen, York. I, PP. 116

and pleasure to those who produce equal opinions. Incidentally, I sincerely wish that the König's Majesty will read this essay, it contains many avis au lecteur for him, as well as for the old Köckeritz, — everything alone does not help. Your faithful..."

"We refrain," Droysen writes, "from commenting on this cry of pain from the thoroughly faithful and patriotic Kleist."³⁷

When Kleist had given up his position, he went to Berlin. Faster than one expects and hopes, the long-awaited calm in the district of his family gave him back the lost powers.

At this time, his father died on 18 February 1808 in Leipzig. As a result, Kleist was registered by the Priegnitz mortgage registry as a fiefdom on Stavenow, Pranslin, Dargard, Semlin and accessories. *After the death of his uncle Friedrich Joachim (III. 494) in 1803, there had been long-standing inheritance disputes, which ultimately led to the sale of Stavenow in 1819.*

In Berlin, Kleist was moved away from the focus of political affairs and was not forced to comment on all issues. There are therefore very few comments from him, but it is clear from those comments, as well as from his personal behavior, that he was not a friend of the French and that he was not one of the warring factions either. Rather, he was completely at the standpoint of the König, who wanted to avoid a too early breakaway — whether it also wanted to take his heart off — and avoided it for the salvation of the fatherland. In 1809 and 1811 he was also against the war.

Treitschke citirt Heinrich von Kleist's Verse aus dem Gedicht an den Erzherzog Karl 1809:

"It is not the victory that Deutsche demands,
Helpless, as he is already standing on the abyss;
If the battle only unflares like a torch,
The value of the body that goes to the grave!"

None of the voices of the time that have come upon us characterize the mood of the warring party and of the majority of the nation more sharply than Heinrich Kleist words, which penetrate the soul like swords.

How mightily does his treatise conclude: What is the point of this war? "A community needs to be built that the savages of the South Sea would flock to protect if they knew it. A community whose existence does not survive a German breast and which is only to be buried with the blood from which the sun darkens." Oder has never been more terribly preached about hatred of enemies than when he has Germania proclaim their children:³⁸

"Rescue from the yoke of the servants,
That, minted from iron ore,
One Hell's Son's Rights
Laying over our neck;

³⁷ Droysen, York. I, P.197

³⁸ Treitschke, I, 315.

**Protecting temples from devastation;
Unserer Fürsten Heil'gem Blut
Submission and worship:
Poison and dagger of the anal brood!**

**To act freely on German soil
Let us, according to the custom of Alten,
Of His blessing even we rejoice:
Oder our tomb to be him!"**

What a fate it was for the already so hard-tested König to have to turn a blind ear to these voices of his beloved country children and, disregarded by the best, if not the most discerning, to have to leave the sword in the vagina in the fulfilling of his responsible profession. Frederick Wilhelm III was never bigger than on this thorny martyr's path.

The faithful cleric followed his royal master on the path of self-denial without dithering. König knew his allegiance, so he entrusted him with the thankless task of policing the young officers present in Berlin in their stance against the French authorities. Regrettably, this was necessary, because every conspicuous act of a Prussian officer was instantly used by Napoleon to make political money out of it and embarrass the government of König. On 25 October 1807, Gneisenau was able to say: "But my Freund, what is career advancement, what prospect for us? If the misguided behavior of some officers against French uniforms is enough to keep our provinces in compensation and demand the death of these officers, what happened to Prussia? I've told you enough with this. Our poor König was ill-advised, and now his subaltern officers are making him unhappy, etc."³⁹

The Cabinets Order, with which the König Kleist instructs his new mission, is:

Königsberg, July 31, 1808.

My dear Colonel von Kleist! I have decided, in response to the recent report of the striking behavior of some of the young officers of my armed forces who are there and who have given the opportunity to have a collision with the Franzosen, that you, who know them most closely and who are able to exert pressure on them, should be given the task of inspecting them in this respect, and if one or the other, as was the case recently with the two v. Rochow, should, by your behavior against the governor and another French officer, give themselves cause for similar collisions, to give them serious ideas on this matter in my name and thereby to counteract this generally harmful behavior vigorously, at most also to instruct the same to have another place of residence in my evacuated provinces; all, however, with regard to the unfortunate situation of these young men and the sparing of their deserves an offended sense of honor.

In such cases, by the way, you have to hold the necessary consultation with the Minister of State of Voß and Colonel of Lützow, because this is connected with the business entrusted to them."⁴⁰

³⁹ Pertz, Gneisenau, I. The letter is not addressed to Kleist.

⁴⁰ Leave papers.

Kleist, with his skillful manners, his great kindness and skillfulness in the French language, was certainly the most suitable person here, too, to establish the unfortunate external agreement with the French leading districts in the interest of the general public. Silently, he underwent the fatal duty.

He went to St. Hilaire, which called itself pomphantly: "général de division, comte de l'empire, commandant la plan de Berlin et la moyenne marche".

On 1 September, he introduced him to Marshal Soult, who resided in Charlottenburg and invited him to dinner on the 11th. From then on, all matters passed through Kleist, so that he appeared like a Prussian commander of Berlin. By the way, everything was still in Civil, even the performance at Soult was done in a tailcoat.

Just how deeply one had to bend under Frankreich is also shown by a decree of the cabinet, which Scharnhorst informed Kleist on 27 September for transmission to the Berliner officers, according to which raisonnements were banned beyond political circumstances.

Another illustration of Preußens's powerlessness is provided by two letters Kleist-to the König, which are excerpted here.⁴¹ In the first, Kleist announced that he had been to St. Hilaire and Soult according to the order and would have been received well, but that nevertheless the expansiveness that makes the passport grant would probably not be eliminated. Soult even seems not to want to return an officer on leave, but to force everyone to remain in the French-occupied districts where they are. He wants to justify this by the measures taken by Prussia in Pomerania and claims that there are orders for the conscription of vacationers and the recruitment of recruits who have a hostile feature. Blücher has used live rounds on field guards and outposts outside Colberg (Soult says). This would be all the more striking because perhaps at this moment Prince Wilhelm K.H. had signed a treatise in Paris, according to which the evacuation of the country could take place immediately and the order to do so was perhaps already on its way. He (Soult) does not believe that this course of action is consistent with your intentions. Majesty would match. It could harm the whole thing, etc.

On 29 September 1808 the second letter followed.

General Denzel, who was unknown to Kleist, came to him yesterday on behalf of Soult and St. Hilaire to inform them that officers were holding meetings for the purpose of the court about their comrades and their behavior during the campaign. These meetings would be indecent, even punishable under the prevailing circumstances and could not be tolerated. He was to suspend them and store the files with him if the officers in question were not transported to Frankreich.

Kleist replied to Denzel that he probably meant the tribunals set up by Sr. Majesty the König to examine the conduct of the officers, which would have no effect on the French authorities. Colonel v. Lützow had received the appropriate orders to contact him in order to gain sufficient knowledge of the matter. If other meetings were to be held, Kleist would shut them down. Denzel said that it was only a matter of the tribunals, but that he could not go to Colonel von Lützow, because he was only supposed to make confidential statements to Kleist. Kleist then asked for something in writing in order to be able to tell Lützow, whereupon Denzel replied that some things were only suitable for oral discussion

⁴¹ Leave papers.

and that he was only authorized to do so. However, he asked that the tribunals be suspended. Lützow would probably respond to his wishes with regard to Kleist's character as a general adjutant.

Finally, he asked Kleist to go to St. Hilaire and reassure him about the discontinuation of the tribunals. He had already told him himself that they did not deserve the attention of the French authorities to the extent that they were not so much courts as commissions of inquiry. But St. Hilaire would stand by the fact that he and the Marshal would not tolerate the same.

According to Kleist, he would have no choice but to inform Lützow, who will probably interrupt the proceedings. Kleist then announced that St. Hilaire had given an officer, Lieutenant Bishkuh, detention in Spandau because the same clumsy and dirty speeches about the journey and meeting of the two emperors. He would have explained to the general the clumsy behavior for lack of education.

The König replied on 17 October that Kleist's statements had been very useful, but that since they had helped nothing, the Colonel of Lützow had no choice but to stop the meetings. The lieutenant Bishkuh would have to blame himself for the consequences of his bad behavior.

In the meantime, Davoust had received the commandant of Berlin and received Kleist on 9 November. The convention with Frankreich, according to which all royal provinces were to be vacated and all friendly relations were to be restored, was concluded, so that the uniform was allowed to be worn again in Berlin.

With reference to this, Kleist was made aware that the non-use of this permission could have harmful consequences and that it would be appropriate for the officers to visit Davoust now.

It was probably the limit of what we could be expected to do in this respect.

The year 1808 ends with an increase in rank. Kleist was appointed on 22 November Major General and commander of the Lower Silesian Brigade.

General Kalkreuth congratulates him on this, but says that not all advances have made him Freude, because the Parthian kinship - professional advancement is the mole in the terrace that eventually makes them fall. In accordance with the expectations that he always cherishes, he wishes Kleist to help bring the grieving Borussia back to the old level. His wish has come true. It remains to be seen whether he was right in his complaints about the kinship career.

Kleist took his new military position for the year 1809 and the following years to Frankfurt, where he seems to have lived on the Breitenstraße-Ecke, in the house of the merchant Beyrich, while he held an official apartment in Berlin.

It is a peculiar coincidence that also leads the Nollendorfer to Frankfurt a.O., which is so closely linked to our family history, where Heinrich was born by Kleist and Ewald exhaled his hero soul. —

In the new Prussian army, it was essential to awaken the virtues of war, to rekindle the extinguished fire of enthusiasm and to instill confidence in the troops.

Kleist helped to bring this about and did a lot to awaken the new spirit. He was one of the stars to which the eyes of the young generation were directed, who wanted to eradicate the shame with their blood.

The Austrian War of 1809 and the year 1811 fall into the Frankfurter period, in which, as has already been touched upon, the awfully difficult question approached Prussian policy,

whether to join Rußland or Frankreich. In both cases, König ruled out the state's blessing. Kleist also voted against the war and against the annexation of Rußland, as stated, when Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and others took leave and in part entered Russian service. For him, this behavior resulted in a harsh and unfavorable assessment on the part of a Gneisenau and Clausewitz, which also went over in their biographies and woes us because it unjustly condemns the insightful Kleist.

York was also not from the warring party. He visited Kleist in 1809 on a business trip to Sommerfeld to transform the old Jäger Regiment Frankfurt. The friends felt that the wisest and safest thing to do was to wait calmly. Challenging the enemy at his own risk was considered true nonsense by Kleist.

During this time, York was the tactical teacher of the Prussian infantry, who introduced them above all to the peculiarity of the scattered type of fencing. It is likely that he and Kleist will have balanced their views on what was then the most important chapter of infantry tactics. —

Of Kleist's private circumstances, it should be mentioned that in May 1809 the revenues of Aurich amounted to 68 Thaler 2 groschen per month.

By the way, he must now own some capital, since he can charge 270 Thaler Pfandbrief interest in Königsberg in January 1810.

On 8 October 1810 he was arrested for dargen.⁴²

Of other correspondence from this period, only letters exist in which it is about paying the debts of young officers.

In 1812, the Lower Silesian Brigade included the following troops:⁴³

Westpreußisches grenadier Battalion,
1st Westpreußisches Infantry Regiment,
2nd Westpreußisches Infantry Regiment, East Prussian Jäger Battalion,
1st Westpreußisches Dragoon Regiment, Neumark's Dragoon Regiment,
2nd Schlesisches Hussars Regiment.

⁴² S.-A. III, 36th Kratz.

⁴³ Int. z. Mil. W. Bl. 1845, page 450.

III The Campaign of 1812.⁴⁴

So approached the disastrous year of 1812.

His demon and his system did not leave the vastly lacking emperor in silence. They drove him into the almost limitless Rußland to illuminate the darkness of this country, which was still mysterious to Western Europeans at the time, with the war torch of a new Alexander platoon.

But not fame and success was to reap the gigantic, only unbearable hardship, superhuman misery, complete destruction were reflected to the horror of contemporaries in the glazed snowfields of the Muscovites Empire. —

Away from the great theater of war, a small corps of good Prussians, who had not been able to avoid Friedrich Wilhelm as auxiliary troops, went into the field with the hated federal comrade, 20,000 troops under the orders of Grawert, York and Kleist. This corps had been formed by regiments from all provinces.

In April, a corps of troops was assembled under Kleist in Schlesien, which was later to step under Grawert's command and join him with Macdonald, Duke of Taranto, to form the 10th Army Corps of the Great Army.

The corps consisted of:

- 2 battalions 1. Schlesischen Infantry Regiments,
- 2 battalions 2. Schlesischen Infantry Regiments,
- 1 fusilier battalion,
- 1st and Fusilier Battalion 2. West Prussian Infantry Regiment,
- 1/2 12-pound battery,
- 1st, 3rd, 4th Flour transport column,
- 3rd, 4th Bread transport column

and a reserve of 56 horses. The recently mobilized troops lay in extensive cantonnements on the right bank of Oder between Oels and Wartenberg. Kleist traveled the same and found the Trains in particular, as far as horses, wagons and harnesses were concerned, in bad shape. He sought to remedy this evil as far as possible and even used the time to lift the warlike capability of the troops under his command, although he was not afraid, in the interest of service, to punish a lieutenant colonel with eight days' imprisonment and to enter him for farewell.

We emphasize this case in particular in order to show that Kleist was not only the kind and mild superior whom the historians describe him as with fondness, but also very vigorously pursued if necessary.

To facilitate his task, his Majesty of the König conferred on General Kleist, for the duration of his detachment, the most extensive powers, namely to affirm and enforce martial law, and to decide on life and death on the spot even without martial law, for which Grawert remarked in a letter to Kleist that such a power could not be in any better hands than in the his Kleist could also report under 7 May to Grawert to Königsberg that the troops were in good condition and animated by the best spirit. This report was made

⁴⁴ The campaign of 1812 is discussed in more detail than others, because the relevant printed literature could be almost exhausted. Also, the detail of the same is less commonly known and therefore more worth mentioning.

Supplement 2013: The participation of the Prussian Hülfskorps in the campaign against Rußland in 1812, ed. Großer Generalstab, Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, No. 24, Berlin 1898

from Oels, where Kleist had moved his headquarters from Wrocław.

Here, on the 13th, an order dated from the 3rd from Paris was received from the Prince of Wagram, without delay to start the march to Plock.

As a result, Kleist intended to march on Kalisch on Kolo on the 17th, where the best Warthe crossing was, and then on Klodawa-Gostynin on the 27th. Plock. However, the Major of Thile, who had been sent by him to ensure food and to avoid friction with foreign troops, soon reported that the corps of the Duke of Abrantes of Kalisch was on the march on Plock, so that Kleist postponed his departure to the 22nd to get behind Abrantes.

In the meantime, cavalry had also joined him. He set out with 5500 men (of which 1000 men cavalry), with 4 guns and 140 training cars., Since the food seemed unsafe as a result of the strong troop marches, each man carried four pounds of bread with him apart from the iron stock.

No problems arose until Kalisch. However, the magazine of Malanov, which was intended for the 27th edition, proved to be completely empty, and in Kolo on the 28th the supplies were far from sufficient. The French prefect's *Versorgung* for Kleist was forcibly taken by the French and Italian artillery train, which marched immediately in front of the corps, and the dragoon command sent to cover the magazine was driven out with the bayonet.

However, the requisitions now required from the countryside proved to be profitable, so that the transported supplies were attacked only slightly. It turned out that there was no shortage in the countryside. The poor state of food was only due to the boundless disorder in the arrangement of the marches, in which no one knew anything of the other, and in the autonomy of the troops at the reception. The harbingers of the upcoming events were already evident here.

On 31 May Kleist arrived in Plock and had to buy bread for the march. He gave his bakers to the French administration, but always other troops, who marched through, received the bread. The horses only received rye, hay and straw were completely lacking. The condition of the horses, which was a very good one, began to suffer, because they were not used to rye and the *Rauhfourage* can not be spared.

Since the food would probably not reach the German border, Kleist asked the General of Grawert to have supplies laid for him in Soldau. He also added a letter to his Majesty, in which he "writes freely about the state of things." Grawert spoke to him in the following words:

"The day I will see myself united with Your Excellency will be a day of celebration for me. It was a very unpleasant task to make such a degenerate-wise peace march through a foreign country, where one is annoyed with all nations and nothing was provided for with order except in Kalisch. A man who was not reasonably powerful in the French language and who soon spoke softly, soon lively with the lords, would not have come off the mark.

I have done my utmost, but I have become so hoarse from one French Commission to another that I can really say that messengers are running so hoarse that I can hardly speak.

How fortunate that Your Excellency has given the Theil troops who were to join me in Schlesien a different direction. God knows, I wouldn't have known how to get her through without the whole thing being totally ruined.

It is with real pleasure that I can tell Your Excellency that not the slightest significant excess has occurred so far.

Ms now finds only some bad guys left behind."

On 4 June, the Corps of Plock departed again, Major of Thile with the Fourier ahead. The first march went to Bielsk, the second on the 5th to Biezun, on the 6th the corps reached the Prussian border again, and indeed in good condition, except for some departure on horses.

Kleist had meanwhile received the order of the Viceroy of Italy from General Charpentier, not to march on Königsberg, but to set himself in motion on the 8th in three columns against Insterburg and Gumbinnen.

He started the march in the commanded direction on the road over Jedwabno. His previous measures were met with His Majesty's satisfaction, as shown by the following cabinet order:

"I have received your reports from the 29th of last month, the 1st and 3rd of this month and I am pleased to see that you have eliminated the many and varied problems you encountered on your march by means of appropriate orders and have achieved the cantonnements beyond the Weichsel without a major accident. I am happy to express my particular satisfaction with this and I trust you that you will also be able to overcome the obstacles to your further march with equal happiness. The testimony you give to the troops under your authority is doubly laudable in the circumstances in which the march was to be made, and if, as I have no doubt, they also made themselves worthy of the same during the further march, I leave it to you to express my pleasure at it and also to testify to the officers whom you have made known to me, who have so assiduously supported the execution of your orders.

Charlottenburg 18. 6. 12.⁴⁵

On 18 June, the corps arrived in and near Insterburg. Napoleon reviewed part of it that day, as well as the French forces, Franzosen, Italians, Polen, and Rhine bundlers gathered in the area, and was greeted with vive cries of emperor as the emperor rode along the frontline. The fact that the Prussians were silent as he approached their ranks clearly surprised him. Nevertheless, he told Kleist much flattering and was delighted by the beauty and good attitude of the troops. During the march, he had some of his grenadiers come to see how excellently the Prussians were trained. When the proud guards grumbled, he ordered them to look, that was also part of the service, they should take a pattern on it.⁴⁶ He was also surprised to find no oppressed horses among the hussars, which prompted him to make a reproach to his generals about the many oppressed horses of the Franzosen.⁴⁷

As here in Insterburg, Napoleon had also visibly distinguished the Prussian troops in Königsberg, which could not be without influence on the mood of some of the leaders. Incidentally, the tone in the officer corps was excellent, and a significant step forward from the past. On 20 June, Kleist finally united with the main corps, which was marching from Königsberg to Tilsit, a strong day's march in Tilsit. Kleist took up quarters in Krippoten a. Ossa. A second cabinet order, which was later received by him, assured him once again of the royal satisfaction. The same was expressed externally by an extraordinary gift of 1000 thalers.

Kleist now came under the direct command of the General of the Infantry of Grawert. This officer had been particularly desired by Napoleon as commanding general, because

⁴⁵All the above information about the march of the Kleist Corps of Troops is taken from the War Ministry Archive.

⁴⁶Droysen, York, Volume I. 353, Natzmer I, 67.

⁴⁷Seydlitz, diary of the York Corps.

the same "saw in the emperor and his actions something superhuman, and in the generals Davoust and Macdonald the disciples of a prophet". It was therefore to be assumed that he would be a compliant subordinate of the latter, just as Macdonald was especially skillfully chosen for this difficult command. Noble military attitude, fine social decency and deep knowledge of human nature made him a highly pleasant superior. Against Prussian officers, he was so kind and accommodating that French colonels often had to wait when he told a Prussian anecdote.⁴⁸

In addition to these two figures, the character head of the second commanding general of the Prussian auxiliary troops, York, seems sharp-edged and harsh, and soon should become not only the soul, but also the leader of the same. As Droysen describes him: "serious, strict, tough, energetic and sharp as chopped iron. His body despite severe wounds and fractures firm, strong, elastic; his gaze bold, penetrating, friendly never; his will iron; his whole being powerful, domineering, obliging to breeding, to the duty of the highest competition of all strength. In it was an unshakable hold of all that was endangered. It was especially important to keep the troops feeling that they were Prussia and their König. No glance should be aberrant, seek foreign applause. York has never been more rugged, only a Prussian general."

That is why it did no harm to the good cause that, beside York, there was another man who was not carved from such hardwood as that to whom a noble humanity, aided by the diplomatic habit of earlier years, paid a visit to soften the brushes of his chief general, and at least to maintain more binding relations with the headquarters of Marshal Macdonald. The period of examination of foreign rule in Prussia had brought many immensely hard minds to the top of the resurgent movement, for only what was iron-firm had resisted the high pressure of humiliation, still steadily under the terrible burden. We thank them for the best, they have become the pillars of the liberation work. But it also required more flexible elements that combined the brittle to a good sound and protected the all-too-sharp from getting sharp. Their merit for the common cause of the fatherland is therefore no less great, and if York is rightly awarded the laurel for the fortunate leadership of the campaign of 1812, then here, as often in the course of those wonderful events from the youth years of our grandfathers, the humanly sympathetic figure of his friend Kleist, besides the Eisenmann York, emerges.

The general was officially commander of the infantry and had the brigades Below, Horn and Raumer under him. In reality, this division, which was the result of the seven-year war and separated the weapons, had long since been abandoned, and the infantry never fought alone and in this composition under Kleist, which is why the Ordre de bataille des Naheres is not discussed.

His staff consisted of the

Major von Perbandt of the General Staff,

Major von Schon, adjutant,

Major of Thile II of the General Staff,

Lieutenant of Rüdiger, aggregated to the General Staff,

À la suite Leutnant of Voß,

À la suite Lieutenant of Bojanowsky.

In the meantime, the declaration of war had taken place, the Prussian corps went over the

⁴⁸ Droysen, York I, 3

Memel by Tilsit using a pontoon bridge, and Macdonald sought to cheer on the zeal of the allied troops by the following order of the day: ,

"Prussia! Rußland wants war! It has already begun. The great army of which you are a part sees you with pleasure in their ranks, our sublime monarchs trust your bravery, they turn their eyes to you to applaud and reward them.

Macdonald, Duke of Taranto.'

The Marshal's corps, which included the 7th Division of Grandjean (Polen, Westfalen, Baiern, Illyrians, Italians, Franzosen and Portuguese), was the leftist wing of the great army and was charged with advancing against the Düna to push the forces standing on the right wing of Russia back from the links of the great army so that they could unfold undisturbed to cope with the huge work that had been waiting for them. This resulted in the need to gain a certain distance, about as far as the Düna forward terrain and then to assert this. The initial offensive task then turned into a defensive one, which was probably the reason for Napoleon to put the Prussians at this point, where once the requirements of total devotion to the emperor's sky-storming vigor were not so high, and it was also more possible to preserve the independence and indivisibility desired by his king than in the gear of the great operations.

On 27 June, the corps was gathered at Baubeln and was thoroughly patterned by Macdonald. On July 1, it reached the town of Rosiena.

The enemy had not been seen except for a few cossack pulks, but the march had been intolerably tiring as a result of hours of stagnation in narrow districts. The reason for these inconveniences was Napoleon's order to carry food for 20 days, for which the trains were insufficient and thousands of farm wagons had to be requisitioned, which extended the columns to infinity.

The area you have passed through so far made a sad impression. All the inhabitants had fled, only Israelites were left in the devastated and devastated villages. Numerous settled in the area and lords of all trade, they welcomed the arrivals as friends, as with them the looting and robbery stopped.⁴⁹

Near Rosiena, a camp was built on a height, for the establishment of which several villages were consumed, which offered suitable material with their wooden buildings. There was nothing to be had in the village apart from the found provisions magazines. The horses had to be fourished green.

From Rosiena, on July 4, stronger detachments were advanced in several directions, Kleist with 4 battalions, 4 squadrons and 1 1/2 batteries to Schawle, where he found supplies, unfortunately no hay and straw. These detachments were also intended to support the insurrection that it was hoped to set in motion with the help of Polish officers, as seems to be without noteworthy success.

On the 10th, an order was received from Napoleon, which Macdonald ordered to have the Grandjean Division take action against the Düna, to conduct the Prussians under Grawert on Riga. At Memel, 7000 troops were to be assembled under York.

In pursuit of these orders, Kleist reached Janischkele on the 16th, on the 17th as an avant-garde of the Grawert Corps. Mankans at Salati. The majority followed on the 18th over the Muscha.

On the 17th, the Lieutenant of Dargitz (1st Dragoons) from the avant-garde of Kleist on a cosack pulk, which was chased off after a short, fierce fight. As the first spoils in this

⁴⁹ Mil. Week. -1837 issue. Letters from Kurland.

campaign, 17 captured cossacks remained in the hands of the dragoons.

On the 18th Kleist arrived at Gros Sczerrauxt and Constantinowitz with the Füsilier battalions No. 2 and 6, the East Prussian Jäger battalion, 2 squadron hussars and 1 riding battery Brunowiszky. On the 19th, the Battle of Eckau took place.

General Grawert proceeded with a new avant-garde over Bauske on Eckau, Kleist was to march on Draken in proportion to a right-wing side detachment of Brunowiszky.

When Grawert's avant-garde had passed the Aa near Bauske, it encountered advance troops of General Lewis near Karlshof, but they withdrew after a light battle on Eckau and settled there for defense. Grawert developed his troops on this side of the corner outflow, but did not step to attack in the front to wait for Kleist's intervention.

When he came across the enemy, he had given the latter the order to abandon the direction of march on Draken and, after crossing the Eckau, to turn downwards to the more mentioned place of the same name in order to delegate the enemy there by pressing on his left flank.

Cavalry-captain Kleist had received this order from Schenk after boiling at Lambertshof and was able to reach the area of Eckau just before dark. At 7:00 a.m., he fired the first gunshots. The enemy now also fronted him and used the mass of his artillery against the impending flank attack.

It was, as I said, late, and if anything else was to be achieved, the attack had to be quick.

Kleist proceeded without a stay. He had the manor of Eckau taken by a company of Jaeger and the Tirailleurs of his Fusilier battalions, and thereby reached out to the main corps, as the latter's gunmen had seized the bridge. It now debouched Grawert's cavalry and riding artillery and supported Kleist, who now went against the village of Eckau and threw everything in front of him. The cavalry entered the enemy infantry several times, but could not intervene decisively because the enemy cavalry was superior and fought them off. After Grawert had now still pushed infantry, the enemy was comprehensively attacked and thrown in quite a resolution, also partially pushed on Mitau. 1 flag, 3 ammunition cars and 319 prisoners remained in the hands of the victor. On the enemy side, about 6,000 men had fought, this side loss was 100 heads. Kleist's detachment had done the main work.

This first and happy battle in this war made a very good impression on the troops, as well as on Macdonald, who was full of praise over the Prussians. He would have liked to have pursued the enemy right under the walls of Riga. Such persecution, however, did not correspond to Grawert's systematic view of war, which in its operations loved to criticize the example of a caterpillar, which only had feet in front and back and therefore had to retract the rear part before it could extend the head again. The image is not so bad, and applied without pedantry, probably to heed. Here, of course, in the persecution, such careful warfare was not appropriate. But Grawert had no intention whatsoever of doing great deeds. He just wanted to find and seize an opportunity to restore respect for Prussian weapons. That's why he had taken command despite his age and sickness.

This purpose was now attained, and he wanted to leave as soon as circumstances paid a visit.

Kleist received the red Eagle Order II "in recognition of his brave and insightful behavior proven at Eckau". Class, from the Emperor of the Franzosen also the Legion of Honor. He never wore it, but hung it over a bust of Napoleon, which happened to be in his parlor.

The corps crossed the Kurland border on the 19th. It began a better time for the troops,

who had spent almost a month outdoors traversing a desert country. A correspondence from those days said that they thought they had been transferred to Deutschland.

The next day, the march towards the confinement of Riga began. The bulk went as far as the Missa, Detachments to Tomosna and Mitau, where there was great turmoil, as the General Lewis had given the rabble the magazines that could no longer be salvaged. Colonel von Raumer created peace, so the crew probably weighed in.

It was now across from Riga, whose suburbs were burning. The commander was Lieutenant General Essen I. He had declared the city in a state of war when he heard of the crossing of the border and ordered the inhabitants to supply themselves with provisions for four months, and had also made other preparations for a siege. Every homeowner who left town had to leave two healthy people in their house. Numerous fire-fighting facilities were set up and large quantities of straw from the surrounding area were brought in to cover the streets in the event of bombardment. To support the commander, a commission was formed of three merchants, three officials, three traders.

In the absence of artillery, citizens were trained to serve. An optical telegraph maintained a link with the Admiral of Marien's English gunboat flotilla, which lay beneath Riga.⁵⁰

Gneisenau speaks about the fortifications of Riga in his memoir of June 1812, about his stay in Rußland.⁵¹ Riga was an excellent place and important as a failure gate against the ties of Napoleon. Hence Macdonald's detachment. However, not enough had been done for the fortress. Although the ramparts were repaired and a rather bad bridgehead was laid on the left bank of the Düna. Above all, however, no advantage had been gained from the swampy and lake-rich terrain, which surrounds the city as a belt of almost two miles. Only six paths lead through this terrain to the city, which almost all characterize themselves as Defilen and each could have been closed by a single work. Then Riga really would have been a fallback port.

The Defils of the left bank were left to the enemy, the Prussians, who in turn could deliver them with weak detachments. However, the connection within the Cernation line, which extends to 9 miles, was an extremely unfavorable one due to the same terrain conditions, and the defender, who is always available for the operation on the inner line, could attack the individual posts at will with superiority and always be fairly sure of a unique first success.

Initially, the crew of Riga was weak, but was later significantly reinforced and could have been raised to a considerable level by the depots between Riga and Petersburg. General Essen was a determined man and had a good Chief of General Staff on his side. Despite all this, Riga has never become essential.

When asked to surrender on July 28, Essen said in his letter that he would not have responded at all if he could believe that a Prussian general of his own accord would have made such an imposition on him.⁵²

General Grawert decided to create his stores and depots in Mitau and accordingly led his main corps, with which Kleist was also located, to the large Mitau–Riga street, where a warehouse was moved to Oley. The camp leaned to the right against the large road, to the left against the Kaugerkaler morass. Several bridges were built over the Missa. A detachment manned Oley in front of the camp, outposts advanced to the cancer pitcher.

The right wing of the Cernation line reached the Düna near Dahlenkirchen. Lieutenant

⁵⁰ Bogdanovich, 1812.

⁵¹ Pertz, Gneisenau, II.

⁵² Napoleon: Fain, 1812.

Colonel of Horn detained Bausker Straße with a detachment. On the left wing, Schlock served as a base, where Lieutenant Colonel von Jeanneret commanded. Other roads did not lead to Riga on the left bank of the Düna. The right and left wings were four miles away from the main, and an intermediate post was placed in Verzende-Forstei and Plakan to connect with the former. So this peculiar blockade, which paid a visit the fortress free movement with the hinterland, was completed, but it was initially only a closure of the Ausfallthores Riga, and that had been done.

Further up, the division had reached Grandjean Jakobstadt, where Macdonald also took his headquarters. A regiment was advanced against the small fortress of Dünaburg.

The General Essen had not been unaware of the weakness of the Prussian corps, which, by the way, held Grawert together very correctly in the main. He decided to act by enclosing the wings against the connections of the latter and thereby to move it to retreat.

This intention led from 3 August to a series of small battles.

Until that day, there was a certain calm, so that the troops could establish themselves in their camps. On August 3, the birthday of Sr. Majesty of König was celebrated with all solemnity. The whole camp had been turned into a garden. Through the huts, avenues of tall fir trees were drawn, the intermediate parthies were furnished with winding paths and lawn seats, in the middle was a temple, also built of fir trees, in front of it a pyramid with the name of the König and matching inscriptions. This is where the officer corps celebrated.

In the morning, the whole corps was gathered in front of the camp, field service and parade held, and a high was brought to His Majesty. The cannons also shot salute. Riga and the British Flotilla responded.

In the evenings, games and amusements of the teams were paid a visit, the people received double portions. The whole camp was illuminated, and everywhere the powerful sounds of "Heil you in the wreath of victory" breezed through the air.

They were reluctant to go into the field against Rußland, but the Prussians in front of Riga had the feeling of being victorious again after so many defeats. The next events were also likely to increase the confidence of the troops.

On August 5, stronger forces along the seashore attacked Schlock; gun barrels at sea and gun boats on the Aa supported the attack. Schlock had to be cleared, as did St, Annen. Lieutenant Colonel von Jeanneret left for Cliewenhof. Enemy gunboats followed on the Aa.

For admission, the Eckau estuary and Paulsgnade on the Eckau were occupied from the Gros. On the 6th, the enemy pushed the left wing detachment back even further over Wollgund on Zennhof, while a weak attack on Oley was rejected.

The enemy had approached Mitau with concern, so that decisive measures had to be taken.

General Grawert therefore gave Kleist command of all troops standing near Mitau and on the left wing. He decided to attack the enemy in the morning of the next day.

Under him commanded Colonel von Raumer and Lieutenant Colonel von Jeanneret. At his disposal were 5 battalions, 5 squadrons, 2 half-riding batteries and 6 foot guns, which troops were still scattered.

We give the course of the battle according to Kleist's own report.⁵³

⁵³ Seydlitz, Diary I, 215 (excerpts).

".... according to the order I received, I went on the 7th of the morning 1/2 4 o'clock with two battalions of the 3rd. Infantry regiments, 1/2 riding battery and the Jeanneret's Detachment in the same way again, to drive the enemy out of the occupied posts again and free Mitau from the imminent danger of capture.

After the troops advanced two Werste on the imaginary path (from Zennhof to Wollgund), they met the first enemy veterans, and soon afterwards also important infantry posts. The enemy advance troops were thrown back in the firefight and occupied the Lisiere of the forest opposite Wollgund, and then the artillery preferred. The majority of the infantry now also debouched from the forest, the enemy left only weak forces in the front. "However, we were fired at lively by the gunboats near Wollgund and with some success with heavy guns. Unexpectedly, sideways, in our back, a fierce gunfire began between our tirailleurs still in the forest there and the Russian hunters who had gone forward again (they had initially tried to flank, but had been pushed back and as it seems no further observed). The enemy had concealed more forces there than was initially suspected, and our earlier bent back right wing, which was to secure the communication with Zennhof, was not only partially pushed back, but was itself in danger of being completely bypassed, since the Fusilier Company of the Regiment No. 1 had already shot up its supply of pocket ammunition. Uncertain about the further possible occurrences in the woods, I therefore withdrew my right wing in Echelons, but let the left maintain its position, in order to remain Meister of the street to Paulsgnade, where I met the colonel of Raumer with the 1st. Battalion 6th Regiments, 2 squadron Dragoons 2. Regiments and with 2 guns to my reinforcements expected. The 1st Battalion 3 Regiments I gave orders to go into the forest and advance in support of the tirailleurs. Although the enemy stubbornly resisted, the above-mentioned 1. Battalion, as well as the Tirailleurs of this regiment, formed under the command of the Master of Gayl, by the judicious and good command of the Major of Steinmetz, to set back the enemy completely, the Master of Steinäcker and the Lieutenant of Wnuck being distinguished by a glorious and resolute behavior." This is followed by the mention of a captain of Chamier. Kleist never forgot to recommend his subordinates to higher places if they deserved it. The Russian hunters now cleared the forest completely. It goes on to say: "We advanced anew against the position of the Russians between the forest and the outflow and threw them as far as the Cliewenhof Forestry, although the fire of the cannon boats, which could not go back as quickly as the land troops, did us some damage. Several individual homesteads, which the Russian infantry tried to defend with great effort during their retreat, were quickly taken with the bayonet by the bravery of our troops." Shots fired in the back of the previous detachment confirmed that there were still gun barges back on the Aa, with which Raumer was probably standing in the fire. Kleist therefore stopped at Cliewenhof, since the gunboats could also have landing troops, and only allowed the departing opponent to be followed by small detachments.

"The Raumer's detachment arrived at Cliewenhof at 10 a.m. and brought the certain message that enemy cannon barrages were still back, which it had marched past. In order to do the greatest possible damage to them, no terrain object was more suitable than the forest itself, which lies close to the bank of the Aa.

In all the buildings close to the water, I had both the lower containers and the floors filled with infantry and used all the openings and newly made gun holes.

Two cannons stood to the left of the building close to the river, but were removed from the face of the approaching enemy by a fence; four guns stood to the right of the buildings and down to the right hunters and tirailleurs along the shore.

The gunfires followed in themselves at a distance of 500-800'. A fiery fire broke out and it

took 10 minutes for each vehicle to pass. Although our artillery did not succeed in drilling one into the ground, the loss of people and rigging must have been extremely significant, which was confirmed after news was later collected."

Of the land troops, 50 prisoners were taken. This side loss: 9 men dead, 2 officers, 43 men wounded, 8 missing.

Forstei Cliewenhof, 10 August 1812.

Kleist initially stopped with his detachment to protect the left flank. When on the 9th and 10th the Russians cleared Schlock and St. Annen on their own initiative, both places were reoccupied on this side. —

On 13 August, York arrived in Riga and took over from Grawert. To him, too, the position of the Cernirungs Corps appeared in the same unfavorable light in which it was depicted earlier; the spatial separation through the terrain, the need to have to unite backwards in an attack, the distance from the next French troops were unpleasant circumstances. A hussar post in Friedrichstadt, which was to maintain the link with Jakobstadt, had been lifted by Cossacks, who now worried the right flank of the Prussians. York formed a mobile column to secure it in this direction and had the positions of its troops reinforced by fortification facilities. The Riga garrison had grown to 14,000 men across from him.

Napoleon was unhappy with the inaction on the left. 30,000 men stood in arms off Riga, only to see the duna thrust into the Baltic Sea.⁵⁴ He meant the whole Macdonald Corps.

York and its Prussians could not do more, and although Macdonald scoffed at the "warhead war," the arduous service in difficult terrain and exposed positions deserved cheaper recognition. In any case, he was an excellent school for the troops, who returned home with a much stronger sense of self.⁵⁵

Meanwhile, the siege park under General Campredon approached the Cernation Line, and the first Echelons arrived at Ruhenthal near Bauske. The commanding general's concern for his connections and flanks was thus greatly increased.

General Essen learned of the arrival of the park and decided to forestall a siege by pushing back the line of denial, possibly by lifting the siege park.

Demonstrating with Oley and Schlock, he attacked the Lieutenant Colonel of Horn with 12 battalions in the early 22nd and took Dahlenkirchen. Horn had only 1,300 troops and withdrew after heavy resistance on Plakan. He received reinforcements here and occupied on 26. Dahlenkirchen again without battle.

On the news that the Russians were also going ahead again on the left wing, Kleist set off on Wollgund with the troops still gathered at Zennhof, but his appearance was enough to expel the Russians.

Schlock was again occupied at Kleist's instigation. Grawert seems to have taken a different view on this point and wanted to give up the post as too exposed. In order to secure the camp at Oley, however, it was necessary to keep that road occupied.

Throughout the remainder of August and almost the whole of September, a monotonous warehouse and outpost service was paid a visit without interruption through combat, combined with bulwark work. It was already getting cold, they made themselves earth huts and provided them with ovens made of clay and bricks. As expected, they smoked very much and often a part of the camp became a robbery of the flames. The inhabitants of Liefland were not friendly and supported the Russians.

⁵⁴ Napoleon: Fain, 1812.

⁵⁵ Droysen York I

The troops began to suffer from disease, the effective on 25 September was 451 officers, 13,669 men, 44 guns.

General Essen had refrained from further ventures because he felt numerically too weak. On the 23rd, however, General Steinheil, who had landed at Reval, arrived in Riga with 10,519 troops, which completely changed the situation. Steinheil had received the order to purge the lower Düna with his troops and 20,000 troops, which the occupation of Riga was to hand over to him. Essen was only able to surrender 11,600 men with 12 guns under Lewis, and was in understandable upset that, as the older general, who also knew the terrain and the enemy, he was not only not given command, but also expected to surrender the largest part of his troops. The operations could not gain from such circumstances.

So Steinheil had 22,000 men, but was very weak in artillery, as he himself had brought only a battery and an artillery company. The Prussians could pay a visit their superiority in the defensive, on which they were now dependent. They were also stronger in cavalry.

The point of attack was viewed differently in Riga, which is why the forces were divided and 1900 men were conducted on Schlock, 1000 men on Oley. With 18,000 infantry, 1,300 cavalry and 23 guns, Steinheil sat down on Bausker Straße with the intention of directing his operations against the siege park.⁵⁶

Essen had described Mitau as the more important operation object.

Only the lord of the left bank, facing a double-superior enemy, had already become impossible for the Prussians to carry out a siege. The siege park was only an impediment, for which York had to fight honorably, and which could possibly cause the downfall of the Prussian corps. For General York was bound, at least limited, in his movements by the park that had been driven up near Bauske and Ruhenthal. He was not only allowed to adjust to tactical expediency, but had to fight so that he covered the park.

On the 26th, the Russians attacked the Lieutenant Colonel of Horn. York instantly realized that it intended to go further and took that detachment back behind the Missa. With the Centrum, the Gros, he also performed a reversing movement that approached the same Ruhenthal. Kleist, with his left wing, was ordered to be ready to march.

Detainees soon gave accurate news of the opponent's intentions.

Gradually, as the situation cleared up, York continued to draw its troops together, initially considering Eckau as a point of settlement.

Kleist was ordered to hand over a battalion to the Gros, to call the battalion from Schlock, to occupy the bridgeheads north and northwest of Mitau and to enlighten by cavalry in all directions.

York itself marched to Eckau, where he could just take in the departing Horn. The bridges over the Eckau were demolished. However, the Eckau did not constitute a sufficient obstacle and York, if he beat behind the Eckau, could be pushed away from Bauske. He also did not want to fight with the tired troops on that day, especially since Kleist was still detached.

York therefore went back to Bauske. That's where the Hünenbein Brigade was supposed to get.⁵⁷

On the 28th morning, York found itself in unpleasant tension. From Hünenbein, every message was missing, Kleist knew still at Mitau, able to be attacked simultaneously by

⁵⁶ Bogdanovich, 1812.

⁵⁷ Droysen, York I, 375. York had asked for support from Colonel Leutnant of Hünenbein, who commanded a 7th Division brigade and was currently in Friedrichstadt. The same had been promised to him.

Oley and Schlock. He took the war-like decision to give up Mitau and to call all forces to the decision. Major von Thile had to convey to Kleist the order to straighten out Aa upwards with York.

The siege park was still at Ruhenthal against York's orders⁵⁸. Now it was too late to set it in motion. York decided to go to Ruhenthal with the corps and defend the park to the last man.

The 130 guns were assembled as a wagon castle for defense, the troops set up for battle. It began to snow and lacked bread.

The enemy did not follow through Bauske, so that on September 29, at 7 a.m., Kleist was able to unite unhindered with York. The former had left Mitau at 4 p.m. in the afternoon and was marching through Sessau, Kulpenhof and Neubergfried. For lack of horses to move on, he had the 24 pounders set up at the mouth of the river nailed and thrown into the river.

Mitau was occupied by the Russians.

York had now united 18 battalions, 10 squadrons and 44 guns, and Hünenbein reported that he had arrived at Szerrautx a mile beyond Bauske with 3 Polish battalions, 2 squadrons of Prussian hussars and 1/2 battery.

The enemy should have a corps at Bauske, one at Gräfenthal. There, he assumed that he wanted to go on board, according to the prisoners' statements. According to Bogdanovich, it was General Bellegarde with 2 regiments of infantry and 6 guns, who had been sent from Steinheil over Zemalen to bypass York's strong position in the left flank.

York decided to use the separation of the Russian corps and to take the offensive itself. Hünenbein was supposed to keep the enemy busy at Bauske. He himself wanted to cross the Aa at Mesoten and throw himself at the corps at Gräfenthal.

When this movement started at 2 o'clock, it was reported that the enemy was crossing the Aa by a furth near Gräfenthal.

York allowed the main column to proceed in the motion it had begun, and only General Kleist, with five battalions, two squadrons and a 1 1/2 battery on the left hand side, went downstream to throw the enemy back. A disposition that was bold, as it divided the troops on both banks.

Kleist met the enemy only a mile downstream at Kiopen. It began to darken, so that a participation of the cavalry and artillery was not to be expected. Nevertheless, Kleist decided to attack with three battalions. The rest of the troops remained in reserve.

Major of Borcke took with the Fusilier Battalion 3. Regiments, supported by tirailleurs of the 5th, the village of Kiopen. Three Russian battalions behind the village rushed to the rescue, but were killed by the 5th. Thrown regiment. Tirailleurs of the 6th, brought forward from the reserve, grabbed them in the flank.

The enemy condensed his lines. Kleist had a superior opponent in front of him, who again made an attack to recapture Kiopen.

Kleist resisted vigorously and also received unexpected and very effective support. After all, when York realized the extent of the battle from the fierce fire, he had Colonel v. Raumer proceed with three battalions on the right bank in support of Kleist.

Despite the darkness, Raumer reached the area of the battle by being guided by the gunfire, walked with his people through the Aa, the latter, as the water reached up to their

⁵⁸ Droysen I, 377. It is not clear when and to whom a relevant order was issued.

hips, carrying cartridge bags and sneakers over their heads, and appeared surprisingly in the backs of the Russians.

The latter then gave up the battle and withdrew, leaving 300 prisoners in Kleist's hands. The loss on this side was 8 officers, 250 men.

By the way, Hünnerbein had occupied Bauske without battle, Steinheil had returned to Eckau.

The next day, Aa was proceeding downhill on both banks. The enemy stood only on the right and held a position Sallgallen — Lautschkrug. Kleist bombarded them from the left bank with artillery. Then, in the afternoon, as the infantry advanced in front, and parts of Kleist through the Aa in the flank, the enemy cleared the position and departed on the way from Oley over the barrel. According to German sources, Kleist commanded General Lewis here and the day before and had about 10 to 11,000 men on hand.

The situation had now been completely reversed. York was united with all its forces on the inner line. The opponent was divided into three groups, five miles apart.

Steinheil near Eckau, Lewis on the baroque and a corps from the fortress, which is said to have commanded Essen itself, in Mitau. Incidentally, he had captured only 4 cannons and taken 150 prisoners here, but destroyed some magazines, as well as the furs requisitioned from Kurland for the troops. York wanted to find the enemy near Mitau and beat him, detaining the rest of the corps. However, the enemy evaded combat at all points. On 3 October, the Prussians were again in possession of the former territory.

The hostile enterprise had failed with a loss of 4 to 5,000 men, including 2,500 prisoners. The Prussians had lost 1,080 men.

There, in order to give the troops peace, initially took a less exposed position behind the Aa and Eckau.

These battles did not make a good impression on Macdonald, who was not always convinced that the Prussians, and especially York, were docile comrades. Officially, these days are called "the Battle of Banste".

The Emperor of Rußland was not very satisfied with the expedition and rebuked the T. Healing of Forces. Steinheil marched Düna up to Wittgenstein.

These battles brought York and Kleist, who already appreciated each other in earlier times, in mutual respect and friendship again a step closer, even the former did not refrain from entering his brave underleader again for a decoration, although since the award of the last two months had elapsed. his As a result, Majesty issued the following order.

Potsdam, 18 OCTOBER 1812.

"From the account given by the Lieutenant General of York des Monats of the battles which took place from 26 July to 1 September, I have seen with satisfaction the substantial contribution which you should once again make to the fortunate outcome of these battles. I therefore take the pleasure of awarding you, as proof of my appreciation, the red Eagle Order I. Classe, which takes place next to you, and soon I have ordered the Chancellor of State to give you a gift of 2000 Thalers, which you, since the troubled circumstances do not allow me to show you more gratitude, may accept as a characteristic of my recognisability for your effort.

Friedrich Wilhelm.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Leave papers.

The Red Eagle Order 1st class was a high decoration for a major general. If, for example, we want to be surprised that, as has been the case once before, a gift of money is present, we must remember that in those days money had a very special value, financial misfortunes did not spare even the wealthy and the wealthy, and a bag full of hard thalers in the hand was a great convenience. König wanted to do everything in its power to help at least its senior and deserving officers overcome the need of time.

York received 4,000 thalers, for the wounded 3,000 thalers were given. Prince Ferdinand of Prussia congratulates Kleist on having behaved so gloriously and brought the Prussian name back to honor.

The Russians had believed in the re-capture of Kurland, York not only prevented it, but also protected the siege park, and only with Prussian troops. Trust in the general and his masterful leadership had grown tremendously high among his subordinates.

The emergence of such strong enemy forces at the lower Düna, however, prompted Macdonald to move his headquarters to Stalgen and take direct command of the Prussians. He brought along some troops of the 7th Division and had Ruhenthal Park repaired.

Disputes between York and Macdonald, which were very unpleasant and in part stemmed from their divergent views on the use of the troops, started as a result of the close contact. More than that, however, catering matters became the cause of the same. Until now, the Preuße Ribbentrop was Intendant of the 10th corps. The same was now replaced by the Franzosen Bergier, as a result of which the Prussians were disadvantaged or believed themselves to be disadvantaged.

It is especially Kleist's merit to have stood here mediating between the two generals and to have at least prevented an open break.

The distribution of troops remained broadly the same. York wished to keep the forces together more, but Macdonald reoccupied all former posts, although it was clear that they could not be held in an assault.

Kleist commanded again at Zennhof, where he had 2 regiments of infantry, 3 squadrons and 2 batteries at his disposal.

On 17 and 18 October, there were renewed attacks on the Lieutenant Colonel of Jeanneret, who was pushed back to Wollgund.

Kleist therefore proceeded concentrically against Wollgund in 2 columns the other day and pushed the Russians, who showed 3 to 4 battalions and some squadrons, back after light combat.

12 gunboats had proceeded on the Aa, but could not reach the battlefield, because on the Prussian side a river barrier was built in the form of a stake, which they could not overcome.

A small battle also paid a visit near Dahlenkirchen.

Macdonald understood himself now to a less fragmented lineup and took the left wing back a bit. Overall, the first battle line should be behind the Eckau, the reserves behind the Aa, outposts on the right Eckau shore.

He divided the whole Cernation Line into two sections:

Section I, General v. Kleist:

Infantry Regiments Nos. 3 and 6,

1st Battalion 4th regiments,
Fusilier Battalion 2. regiments,
Fusilier Battalion 3. regiments,
4 squadrons hussars 3,
1/2 riding battery,
1 1/2 foot battery

the Eckau from the outflow to Forstei Annaburg incl. Bridgeheads, Paulsgnade, Immhof, Lillgruß, Hauptquartier Paulsgnade. As the extreme left wing, the Fusilier Battalion 3. Regiments can be advanced against Schlock, so no longer stand in Schlock.

II. Section, Oberst-Leutnant v. Hünenbein: die Eckau aufwärts von Annaburg Forstei ab.

York took up residence in Mitau. It had now become very cold and the troops began to suffer from the cold. They procured furs.

On 23 October, the first 3,500 were sent to the Fusilier battalions. On the 31st, another 3500 arrived, taking into account regiments 5 and 6, which were still in linen trousers.

Seydlitz explains: Two soldiers from the 6th Regiments had taken canvas at 15 degrees Celsius. Drawing attention to the honorable nature of their behavior, they quietly unraveled their coats and showed their uncovered legs. The clothing of the 1st Battalions 6th The regiment was so poor that Kleist took the same thing to Mitau for restoration.

Incidentally, the skirmishes on the right wing continued. On the left was more quiet, but the frost made the marshes passable, making the outposts more endangered, even individual people lost.

On November 7, Essen suggested that York should defect, as Napoleon was defeated by Moscow.

Overall, the first half of November passed without significant incidents, but full of hardship for the troops. Macdonald had set himself up very nicely in Stalgen in the manor of the Earl of Lubow and was barely visible. The troops did not know him, a joker had invented the name "Duke of Terrain" (Taranto) for him.

York remained gallid and reluctant to him.

But he was also not satisfied with Berlin. For months, the reward for the troops failed to materialize and "Regiment No. 6 is literally without pants." In Berlin pour le mérite itself, on the contrary, one was very satisfied with the achievements of the corps, as witnessed by the transfer of 50 orders, and the sending of several thousand thalers as gifts and for the wounded was already an important effort for the Royal Treasury.

Simultaneously with the onset of the frost, which caused the thermometer to drop to 18 degrees, a change of command occurred in Riga. The sickened food was replaced by the Marquis Paulucci.

While this also sought to initiate negotiations with York, he attempted at the same time to achieve some successes on the battlefield and advanced troops to the east of Eckau. Marshal Macdonald decided to attack this corps and possibly cut it off from Riga. General Bachelu, to whom the management of the company was handed over, could not do anything in operations lasting several days, although the mostly Prussian troops fought with bravery.

The corps resumed its former positions.

Complaints about food and beverages increased from all sides. On November 25, Kleist announced that a large part of its troops had not received any *Versorgung* from the media for several days. Even York's headquarters had received nothing. York made representations, Macdonald did not address them, but rather responded in a tone that upset the general.

Commenting on this discord, Count Henckel v. Donnersmarck, the rapporteur of the König, said that a change of command would be good if the corps were not to grow up to endless chicanery. The General of Kleist, if he were given command, would be the only one who could restore the old track, which is so necessary to preserve the corps, for he has always been on very good terms with the Marshal, without forgiving himself in the slightest.

Of course, the consequences of this division had to be borne by the troops.

So they went into December.

Almost every day there were small squabbles with the enemy, on whom the news of the great army had to have an electric effect.

The season became harsher and harsher, the cold almost unbearable. The earth huts with the clay kilns proved to be only a weak protection against such a winter and the field guards had to lie outside.

Gradually, the Prussians also began to rumor the blows that had affected the great army. The Russians were sympathetic to the idea that the defenders of Riga were still regarded as enemies.

York had also received various news reports about Napoleon's situation, which Macdonald may have been frequently new. As a rule, he handed it over to the Colonel of Roeder, his boss, or Kleist, to send to the Marshal. Macdonald coolly absorbed them without taking them into account.

On December 17, York wrote to him and asked the corps to repatriate some marches, as the Russians, now advancing from all sides, were already threatening the retreat.

At the same time, Murat's late order to withdraw arrived. Macdonald should go back quickly, sacrifice Bagage and Trains if necessary, or eventually leave the troops and save only his own person. The bearer of the order, Major v. Schenck, said of the great army, "La cavalerie est sans chevaux, l'artillerie sans canons et l'infanterie gélée."

The marshal decided to go to Janischky on Mitau-Tilsiter Strasse; all bagage was to be sent to Memel.

As already mentioned, Paulucci had tried to start negotiations with York. York had heartily rejected all proposals, but also asked for his dismissal in order to emerge from a situation in which the mind and the heart were in conflict. Under the knowledge of Roeder and Kleist, he sent his adjutant, Major v. Seydlitz, to Berlin to ask for directives.

The Prussian corps had great importance at that time, and it is understandable that some sought to win it over as much as others feared losing it. Without York, who commanded 2/3 of Macdonald's corps, this, the only intact corps, meant nothing. On the other hand, the Russians also arrived at the border only with completely illuminated cadres. York could complete Frankreich's defeat, or halt Rußland's advances.

The Prussian cabinet avoided drawing the consequences of this situation and left it to York to act according to circumstances.

Incidentally, the request made by the French Emperor at that time for an increase in the number of troops was a welcome opportunity for Prussia to gather troops in Schlesien.

Thus began the retreat of the Prussian corps, which was to reach a world-important conclusion, and which would have become eternally memorable in the war history through its pains and deprivations, if the simultaneous catastrophe of the great army had not taken all interest for itself.

But our good troops deserve us to pay homage to the efforts they made to rescue Prussian honor from the snowy terrain of Rußland and from a morally extremely critical situation.

When the troops arrived, the cold had reached 24°. The snow lay wave-high in the rough terrain. It was only slow forward because of the infinite number of sleds, which had to be carried with food. You couldn't count on finding anything else in the country. Everything was devastated, even in the only town of Szawle, which was on the road to be passed, there was nothing left. The closeness of the Russians made it necessary for the troops to be held together so that almost without exception they were bivouacked. Those who slept without fire froze. The bread was frozen to stone. They made soup of it with snow and schnapps.

Some village, near which troops bivouac, disappeared from the earth's surface, the roofs gave the storage straw, the wooden building material migrated into the fire. Early in the dark it went away, and only in the night was it stopped again, and several night marches were carried out.

The Prussian discipline overcame the friction of this retreat, unshaken, the force arrived at the border. So much prejudging the meaning of this.

The march began on 18 December. The wagons and heavy artillery preceded under cover on Memel and were thereby diverted to Weise from the main retreat.

On the 19th, Division Grandjean left. With him Macdonald and a Prussian department under Massenbach. On the 20th Afternoon under the cover of darkness York with 7500 troops, 300 hussars and 32 guns. With him Kleist. The guard was made by Colonel von Hünenbein.

After a night march of 4 miles, a bivouac was moved into at Calbe at 4 a.m. On the 21st In the evening, they competed again and marched 5 miles. On the morning of the 22nd Miskuzie was reached.

The enemy, General Lewis, followed from Mitau slowly without pushing, but showed a hostile detachment in Kurszany and required the formation of a right-hand side detachment under Major v. Steinmetz, which had a small battle with cossacks.

On the 23rd Szawle was reached. York healed here, according to the expedient orders of Macdonald, his corps to facilitate and accelerate the march in 2 columns. The right under Kleist was to go via Kurtowiany and Waigow, the left under York via Podubiez and Kelmy. The first places were reached by the two columns on the 23rd.

On the 24th March to Waigow and Kelmy, four miles.

The area is hilly and full of hollow paths. Some cars were already lost, here in the snow-filled Defileen it was even worse. Kleist's carriage (sled) column alone was already a mile long. The cold reached the highest level, the efforts were terrible. The side column of Maj. v. Steinmetz, which joined Kleist in Vaigov, had stopped for only 3 hours within 26 hours and had to leave again after 4 hours with Kleist, who was to unite with York.

This occurred on the 25th in the Weise, when York's top met Kleist's rearguard and sat behind her. Between them were 600 Kleist carriages. York's guard was still 3-4 hours back. The same was true of the advancing forces of General Lewis.

Thus, in a column several miles long, in a narrow hollow path, they moved to Kolniany, and Kleist's vanguard encountered superior enemy cavalry 1 mile from the site.

General Diebitsch commanded the same. He had believed Macdonald's troops by and, contrary to expectations, arrived with a relatively weak division of troops between Macdonald and York.

Kleist stepped forward to reconstruct. He had 4 battalions, 1 battery, 2 squadrons at his disposal. The enemy, although only cavalry, which one could not know, had taken a line-up from which he could not be expelled, despite the good will which the troops had preserved despite all the physical exhaustion after 8 hours of march. All the more so because the columns on this side, wedged into narrow defils, could not develop. Without hope of success and only with the certainty of sacrificing a lot of people, the otherwise always ready to attack Kleist renounced the battle without York's assistance Command to be initiated.

Diebitsch sent General Renne⁶⁰ to him to start negotiations. Kleist did not reject him, as the negotiations gave him time to allow the troops to march and put them in a tactical position more favorable to the battle. Incidentally, the Russian generals had already been instructed to separate the Prussians from the Franzosen if possible and then to parliament.⁶¹

Whether Kleist personally negotiated with Diebitsch, especially on that day, is not certain. Records of the son, according to oral statements by the then lieutenant, later General v. Voß, say: "Kleist first concluded a convention with Diebitsch. The officers watched from afar as he approached Diebitsch. When he returned, he said: "Conditions have determined me to conclude a convention with the Russian general, then — looking at the officers sharply — I do not want to hope that anyone among the gentlemen suspects a move that is incompatible with my honor." It may well be that we are talking about a meeting with General Renne and that Lieutenant v. Voß is already talking about a convention which was only about the opening of negotiations.

Meanwhile, York and Kleist's troops united at the Vorwerk Kiaukalek. York formed the fray in two meetings and then stepped forward to speak Diebitsch.⁶² At the latter was Clausewitz. It had become evening by now.

Diebitsch said that he had troops with him and that he could not stop York. But the Russian generals would have orders to make any kind of friendly agreement with the Prussians that they wanted.

It was agreed to make a march on the 26th, which Diebitsch was to present again. That's how it happened. When the first cossacks were encountered, friendship was made among the troops.⁶³ The hostilities have now ceased. A Russian staff officer led the column, 1 officer and 20 cossacks accompanied the top to prevent clashes.⁶⁴

In the evening at 9 o'clock Bartashishki was reached and in extreme fatigue a bivouac was occupied. The Trains had not been able to follow all of them.

The latter were waited for on the 27th and therefore only left at noon. On very snowy paths again a very strenuous march.

On the 28th, the corps arrived with 13 battalions, 16 squadrons and 32 guns, so none had been lost, Tauroggen.

On the 29th was calm. The troops had made 30 miles in 8 days, a great achievement under

⁶⁰ Bogdanovich, 1812.

⁶¹ Bogdanovich, 1812.

⁶² There.

⁶³ Droysen, York I, 471.

⁶⁴ Bagensky, History of the 9th century. Infantry regiments.

the prevailing conditions.

In Tauroggen, the Corps was made aware that the great army had been completely defeated and roughed up, that Niemen had receded and that Tilsit had already been occupied by the Russians. As a result of this news, young officers wanted to go over to the Russians at night.⁶⁵

From Macdonald came the order to march on Pictupons. On the other hand, Colonel Lieutenant v. Clausewitz reached Diebitsch with the definitive proposals. A decision had to be made. York could not be in doubt about the mood of the troops. He also received an encouraging customer from Massenbach's detachment.⁶⁶ In the evening 10 o'clock came the lieutenant v. Wernsdorff, adjutant of the first dragoon regiment, and delivered a letter from the Emperor of Rußland. He assured York that his entire regiment and all the troops under Bachelu longed for the moment of liberation and looked to their generous leader with confidence. York replied, "You young people have good words, but my old man's head is shaking."

Pertz writes that Kleist was the only one against whom York would have had no mistrust or ferocity,⁶⁷ and by whom he was appointed to conclude the convention after a long period of vacillation. Admittedly, given Kleist's nature and friendship with York, it is virtually impossible for him to have spoken of "pathetic" after the negotiations were concluded, referring to York's wavering demeanor, as the same source suggests. In its position of trust in York, and taken even for a convention, as the first to initiate negotiations, Kleist will surely have used all its clout to bring about the decisive act, and it is therefore possible that König later said of it: "I have known him for a long time as a man of honor. What he's done now, I'll never forget."⁶⁸ However, statements such as those mentioned above are excluded from him, just as York can never have offered "an image of whining".

In any case, York arranged a meeting with the Russian generals at the Poscherunschen Mühle on the 30th morning, and he also deserves the glory with the responsibility.

This is how the famous convention was signed, which declared the Prussian corps neutral until its König's decision was taken. Major v. Thile was dispatched with the message to Berlin. König was already prepared for such an outcome, because the wing adjutant, Count Henckel, who arrived in Potsdam on 2 January, had already announced that York was in danger of being cut off from the Russians and perhaps had to conclude a cease-fire.⁶⁹

At the same time, a letter was received from Alexanders, which offered an alliance not to rest with the insurance until Prussia had regained its 1806 size.

When York's glorious deed became known, the cheers in Berlin were tremendous, but the König could not approve of it, because 12,000 Franzosen were still in the capital and only 1,750 Prussia.

König immediately wrote to Murat and to the envoy, St. Marsan, to prepare them for the incident and to blame Macdonald, who had placed too much distance between himself and York and wanted to sacrifice himself to save himself.

⁶⁵ Bärensprung, Geschichte des 5. Cuirassier regiment.

⁶⁶ There.

⁶⁷ Gneisenau II 485

⁶⁸ Oral communications from General v. Voß to the son of the Field Marshal.

⁶⁹ This and the following announcements are taken: Natzmer, From the Life of General Oldwig v. Natzmer.

When the surrender was officially announced, König sent its wing adjutant, Lieutenant Colonel of Natzmer, to Kleist with orders to take command and arrest York. "It was with astonishment that I received the news of the convention of my troops concluded by the General of York.

I hereby appoint you commanding general of the Corps, instruct you to arrest General v. York, but also to suspend General v. Massenbach from duty until he has fully justified his disconnection from the Marshal Duke of Taranto with me.

Since the Sr. Majesty mobile corps is entirely at the disposal of the Emperor of Frankreich, I can only refer you back to the orders of the König of Naples, his current deputy, and expect from your proven wisdom and faithful dedication that you will try to make up for what happened. Charlottenburg, January 5, 1813.

Frederick Wilhelm. To Major General v. Kleist."

On that day, however, König was already determined to rise.⁷⁰ Natzmer was secretly instructed to go to Murat and make known to it König's intent to prosecute York.⁷¹ But then he should not go to York, but incognito to Russian headquarters and offer an offensive and defensive alliance.

The order to Kleist was later published by the papers at St. Marsan's request, whereupon York issued its well-known statement. In addition, Schack was sent to the latter with the announcement that the above-mentioned order was only given in appearance. Placing Kleist in York's place in the bogus Cabinetsordre should make troops understand that König is fully satisfied with their stance.⁷²

Anyone who is aware of the legally fair nature of König can appreciate what it may have cost Friedrich Wilhelm to play this double game. The decision to do so may have been the greatest sacrifice he made to his beloved Prussia.

Murat was very pleased with the statements made to him by Natzmer and, in turn, sent him a letter to General Kleist asking him to join him as soon as possible and that he would meet him.

Macdonald, whom Natzmer also spoke, poured out all his bile over York and Massenbach to him, for he, too, had, as already indicated, acceded to the Convention on a communication from York which gave him complete liberty in this regard, and had secretly departed Macdonald with all his troops.

By the way, Macdonald showed himself to be very chivalrous by sending the whole baggage. He gave tearful assurances that if he were not French, he would never wish to command troops other than Prussian.⁷³

On 1 January, York crossed the Prussian frontier with loud cheers and moved into Tilsit, where he initially remained.

On January 4, Kleist traveled to Wilna at Alexanders headquarters. The Schulz government council had raised 600 Thaler travel money for him.

What was actually his mission has not been fully known. All we know is that the Emperor received him with great distinction and promised to advance half a million paper rubles

⁷⁰ Bernhardi's preface to Natzmer.

⁷¹ Brief by Oldwig v. Natzmer of 24 June 1851 on his mission, research on Brandenburg and Prussian history, Volume 21, Leipzig 1908, p. 228 (2012)

⁷² Natzmer, Oldwig v. Natzmer.

⁷³ M. -W. -Bl., 1837.

(130,000 thalers) to the Prussian corps' establishment against York's receipt. He also received a letter from Alexanders to König on 5 January for concern.⁷⁴ In the same sentence, it is said: "Alexander seizes the first favorable moment to say to the king that, despite the painful events of the past year, his sentiments have remained unchanged.

He would not be satisfied and would not lay down his arms until Prussia had regained its old glory and power. He hoped that York had acted in the spirit of König with the convention. If yours. Your Majesty, seizing this single moment, you are acquiring the immortal glory of saving Europe by, at the same time, giving Prussia its power again."⁷⁵

On January 11, Kleist returned and brought with it, through all that he had and had promised, a significant strengthening of his trust. Thus the Grand Duke of Constantin, who lay sick in bed, had also received Kleist with the words: "Kleist, Freund or enemy?" and then hugged and kissed him. He had then informed him that the Tyroleans were also on the move and that a favorable picture of the situation of the good thing unfurled. Kleist also sent York the most flattering remarks of the Emperor, the Grand Duke, Field Marshal Kutuzov, and gave him the letter intended for König.⁷⁶

On the same night, Schack left for Berlin.

Natzmer had meanwhile also fulfilled his mission to Wilna, on 19 January he arrived back in Berlin with Alexanders's declaration of accession.

So everything was arranged according to your wishes. York actually retained the supreme command, but offered it to Kleist, which reportedly rejected it, saying that it fully endorsed the Convention and was as punishable as York. Incidentally, there were some minor problems, for example, when the commander of Pillau sent all the reports twice to York and Kleist, because he did not know who to follow.

York, however, was fully acquainted with the real views of König and did everything in its power to bring the liberation work to fruition. General v. Bülow joined him, and Prussia became a military workshop.

On the 26th, Maj. v. Thile returned from Berlin with orders to report to York, not Kleist. There could be no doubt about what König wanted. York sent him and Kleist back to Emperor Alexander to make arrangements for the continued use of his corps.

As a result, a general movement forward was paid a visit in early February. Kleist entered the Elbing area with part of the troops and crossed the Weichsel in mid-February.

It has been said before what the campaign of 1812 meant for the army. We cannot be grateful enough to Providence that it postponed the wake-up call to liberation until the hour at hand, if only because the army would have been reluctant to miss the excellent school of this campaign.

It had also been highly significant for Kleist. Let's look back at his activity in the same place!

He is a day out in the field and heals all the rigors of the force. He decides in the Battle of Eckau, in the first of the campaign. In the Russian venture over Schlock against Mitau in the 20s of August, he receives the supreme command over the left wing and throws back the advanced enemy vigorously. In the battles to secure the siege park, he again pulls the lion's share through the battle at Kiopen, which he leads independently.

Wherever he appears, he freshly and without much reflection touches the enemy, but not

⁷⁴ Bernhardt, great memories

⁷⁵ Natzmer I, 104th

⁷⁶ Droysen York I

with the horns, but deliberately by using some of his powers to attack the flanks and having the artillery, if available, prepare the attack. He makes appropriate and extensive use of the dispersed type of fencing.

You never see him wavering, victory is attached to his flags! He is the trusted comrade of York and knows how to resolve the disagreements between him and Macdonald without flirting with the Franzosen. He does not create the Legion of Honor.

When York is faced with the decisive decision, it comes to the convention and uses its own person to take responsibility.

The small campaign in front of Riga, so insignificant in its activities, becomes for him, who is almost always independent, a high school of war and troop leadership. He offers him the opportunity to draw his König's attention to his leadership and to gain the full trust of the army, of which he will later be appointed as the first leader.

Finally, Macdonald may have been given a verdict. Prince Ferdinand writes to Kleist:⁷⁷ "That the Duke of Taranto, who gave the emperor a detailed account of the various incidents, so had the royal troops, of his (Kleist's) military knowledge as well as of his undaunted valor, made the greatest praises, thereby indicated that among the foreign troops, so in various wars he had under his orders, never found any in which all officers so done their guilt, and saw no foreign troops who stood so obedient and in such excellent discipline as the royal troops."

⁷⁷ Leave papers.

IV The Campaign of 1813.

What feelings do you arouse, great year of uplift! How devoutly and shaken by holy showers the youth hears when he hears for the first time the customers of the fatherland of humiliation and humiliation, of foreign domination and glorious liberation! How does it draw the man back again and again to the story of those days, to the old, hundred times read and yet eternally new events, from which a Born of fatherland love flows so inexorably, that one can bathe oneself by oneself party bickering and squabbling, of all petty selfishness healthily in the sight of a sacrificial devotion, as humanity has only rarely raised above itself.

Verily, it is precisely at this part of its history that our people have a treasure of everlasting values. Let us not let him rest in the darkness of our libraries, like the Nibelungen gold in the depths of Rhein, but let us call it out loudly into the country, among the young, as our fathers used life and good, family, prosperity, peace, security, happiness and future, all that they possessed in moral and material power — for an idea, and only the choice was between liberty and doom.

It is a crime to describe the fates of the ancient Egyptians in schools on the broadest possible basis, when there is not enough time to give young people the best of our patriotic history so warmly and forcefully to the receptive heart. Oder is the idealism that classical antiquity preaches about higher in internal values than that of our freedom fighters? No, and three times no! —

Fortunately, we live in a time of rebirth, in which we reflect on what truly defies us and also strives for new paths in school. That is why we want to look into the future of our new Deutschland with hope!,

We have the mystery of permanent greatness in our history.

A people with a history like ours cannot go under unless they give themselves up. —

Preußens survey is not to be described here. In beautiful pictures, designed by the master hand of our contemporary historians, she lies rolled up in front of our eye.

We therefore move on to the warlike events of 1813.

The Prussian troops, who stepped under the command of the Russian commander-in-chief, Count von Wittgenstein, slowly advanced on Berlin in association with the Russians. The weakest French departments, which were still in the field, moved behind the Elbe, where by the influx of depots etc. from the hinterland, under the Viceroy Eugen, Augerau, Reynier and Davoust already a more considerable force was assembled. The left wing of the latter was near Magdeburg, the right wing extended to Dresden.

On the Elbe, the fortresses of Magdeburg, Wittenberg and Torgau were occupied, the latter exclusively by Saxony under Thielemann.

In the advance of Prussia to the Berlin, Kleist led its troops over Prussian Stargard, Cossabude, Schlochau, Hammerstein manor. Maj. v. Thile was sent ahead to make arrangements in and near Berlin for the accommodation of the corps.

Before entering Berlin, however, a complete reorganization of the whole Yorkian corps was paid a visit, whereby the distribution of the troops again according to the ordre de bataille was carried out. By the way, Kleist's troops were in good condition, only the artillery lacked some manning as well as service.

On 1 March, Kleist was appointed lieutenant general. On 17 March, the Yorksche Korps entered Berlin. Kleist should have been at the head of the infantry. However, he was still in Breslau, where he was recently appointed king.

Towards the end of the month, the Franzosen took their right wing back to Leipzig, which was supposed to be the gathering point for the army that was forming. The Russians occupied Dresden.

Wittgenstein heard of stronger troop movements to Magdeburg and subsequently advanced his army in this direction against the Elbe.

In this movement, Kleist arrived as the avant-garde of the York Corps on the 26th. Treuenbrietzen with 3 battalions Colberg Regiments,

3 battalions 2. East Prussian Regiment,

4 squadrons Brandenburg Hussars, 1 riding battery,

1 foot battery.

While the army moved on to Magdeburg and Wittgenstein moved his headquarters to Belzig, Kleist was commissioned to renew his division of Wittenberg, which had until then only been observed by the Russian General Diebitsch. The same should then come under Kleist's command.

Kleist was instructed to consider itself self-sufficient under Wittgenstein and report directly to him, but to send a copy of all important information to his commanding General v. York.⁷⁸

From Treuenbrietzen, which is only four miles from Wittenberg, Kleist, accompanied by General Diebitsch, undertook a reconstruction of the fortress and drew up a plan for its close enclosure.

He refrained from an assault or violent assault, which he initially thought of, near the heavily occupied Magdeburg. Likewise, he could not think of shelling the square at first, because the howitzers belonging to his artillery were not yet close and were still standing in front of Spandau. The Russian 23rd The battery he was carrying was short of ammunition.

The reconstruction also revealed that the Elbe bridge, which is located just south of the city, could not be fired upon. Direct actions against the same people should have been carried out in the gunfire. So if they were to be destroyed, all that remained was an attempt to do this by venting vehicles with combustible substances.

Civilians intercepted said that the occupation was 12,000 strong, mostly Italians, and that entrenchments were still being worked on. In Leipzig, the Vice-König of Italy would be standing with the guard, 12-14000 men would have marched from Torgau to Magdeburg.

Since its right flank was now sufficiently secured by troops against Magdeburg, Kleist deployed its troops further forward on the 28th, so that the outposts stood close to Wittenberg. The headquarters came to Marzahne.

From the military detachment of General Diebitsch, the Cossack regiments came to Bülzig, Euper and Trajuhn. The same gave outposts against Wittenberg under the occupation of Teuchel and Wiesigk. The 23rd and 24th Russian Jäger Regiments came to Zahna and Rahnsdorff. Of the Prussian troops:

The Brandenburg Hussars in support of the Cossacks to Woltersdorf, Thießen, Mochau and Schmilkendorf. Patrols against Coswig.

Füsilier Battalion 2. East Prussian Infantry Regiments Jahmo, Grabo, Weddin. Füsilier Battalion Colberg Infantry Regiments Köpping, Köpenick and Zerndorff. Half a riding battery Weddin. Half a riding battery Rahnsdorff.

⁷⁸ The following is taken from the War Archives.

All these troops were to be under the command of General v. Diebitsch and possibly to gather on three warning shots to be given by the same on the alarm sites at Köpenick and Jahmo. A cossack post was to be given to Belzig, a hussar post on the way there. The remaining troops were under the command of the Lieutenant Colonel von Steinmetz, namely: 2. East Prussian Infantry Regiment:

1st Battalion Kerzendorf, Boßdorf, Alarmplatz: Weddin.

2nd Battalion Kropstaedt, Liesenitz, Werkzahna, Alarmplatz: Liesenitz.

Colberg Infantry Regiment:

1st Battalion Marzahne, Zeuden, Pplückauf. |

2nd Battalion Feldheim, Danna. Alert location: Marzahne.

Batterie No. 3 Schmögelsdorf. |

Russische 28th Schwabeck battery. |

This dislocation is a very wide one. Kleist had carried it out deliberately, because only food was provided by the municipalities and one had to count on being in front of Wittenberg for a longer time.

But Wittgenstein ordered to dislocate more closely, namely 5-6 houses per battalion, which would correspond to our village bivouacs. Kleist should also send a detachment of cavalry with cossacks against Magdeburg to prevent the fouragization from there and to prevent the looting of their own country. Kleist asked York to do this detachment on his own, as he had very little cavalry, which was also promised. At the same time, the arrival of the howitzers from Spandau was promised.

Kleist received the news once again that stronger forces were marching on Magdeburg and that the Emperor was expected in Frankfurt and Mainz, as well as a strong army from Frankreich.

He said that Leipzig was vacated, that there were some Polish Nobel Guards in Erfurt, and that in Wittenberg there were 2,000 to 2,500 troops, Franzosen, Polen and Italians. Everywhere, they hope for the arrival of allies.

Kleist recognized on the 30th again the city from close range. She could probably be shot at by the vineyards on Berliner Street, but she seemed vulnerable only on the Coswig site, "if it mattered to import her." "I don't think this was possible," he reports, "but it involved a great deal of effort on the part of people, which one must probably wish to avoid if it is possible to gain the left bank of the Elbe by another means."

"If circumstances dictate to Wittgenstein to storm Wittenberg and the crew would have become stronger, I would have to have reinforcements as a reserve. The attack claims all my troops. The containment is now as simple as possible without the daily harassment." Kleist then announced in this letter of the 30th that tomorrow he would send the wing adjutant of Natzmer, who arrived today, to Torgau "to commend our cause to General Thielemann."⁷⁹ A rather lively correspondence with the latter general, interrupted by reports to the König, started. A number of Thielemann's letters to Kleist — nearly all of them — are in the papers left behind. It was not originally intended to publish them, as they offer only a marginal interest, especially if the link is missing. Now, however, in the recently published book "Aus dem Leben des Generals Oldwig v. Natzmer"⁸⁰, the

⁷⁹ Up to this point, the War Archives of the Great General Staff.

⁸⁰ Aus dem Leben des Generals Oldwig v. Natzmer, Gneomar Ernst v. Natzmer, Volume 1, Berlin 1876, pp. 114 ff. (2010)
see also General Johann Adolph Freiherr von Thielmann, Herman von Petersdorff, Leipzig 1894. (2017)

correspondence issued by Kleist in this matter is reported, so that it is now possible to reproduce all the correspondence almost without any gap. In these circumstances, the author did not think to refrain from including them in the text.

The letter which Kleist Natzmer gave to General v. Thielemann for his apprehension read as follows:

"Highly well-born Lord!

Especially the most revered Lieutenant General!

From the quay. Russ. commanding general of a corps d'army Mr. Count of Wittgenstein Excellency, I have upon my departure from Berlin to my destiny, a correspondence of content known to me for promotion to yours. Excellence, which I have given myself the honor of receiving from the quay. Soot. Lieutenant von Meiendorf.

The one from yours. Excellence I have unceremoniously promoted the answer given to Count v. Wittgenstein; I am not aware of the content of that answer, but I am confident that your answer will be given. Excellency it will not be misinterpreted if, on the grounds and in the wake of the letter of Count v. Wittgenstein during his absence, I give me the honor of making you openings to which only the purest sacred purposes are subject, and the yours. I would like to take on excellence with the confidence that the previous acquaintance with you, to which I attach great importance, would probably give me some expectations. The great events in the north have brought about the opportune moment in which Deutschland's destiny may be raised with Ernst and warmth; a beautiful club is already arranged to work vigorously to ensure that it is favorable that the just cause of the Deutschen is observed and that the affairs of the are not further subjected to foreign violence and foreign influence.

To achieve this beautiful purpose, the troops of my König have met with the Sr. Majesty of the Emperor of Rußland, like yours. Excellence will not be unknown, united, and is already a significant corps about to go through Elbe, to offensively take action against the general enemy, the enemy of German liberty, and to assert the most sacred rights against him.

But the success of this endeavor depends on the Corps crossing Elbe as soon as possible, which must no longer be done if much is to be gained.

Now, if I wish it to be yours. Excellence would like to be able to participate actively in this on your part, yes, if, in reliance on our previous acquaintance against the same, against a German man, I make this wish loud, then you do not want to misunderstand me, pure is my purpose, as well as the same is founded on higher causes, of which yours is. Excellency of the Presenters of this letter will have the honor of providing further oral information.

It's the wing adjutant that arrived at my headquarters yesterday, my König, Major of Natzmer, who remains attached to me throughout the war, and whom I can safely call yours. Excellence send, in order to consult with the same not only about the best possible means of achieving the superior purpose, but to give the same direct knowledge of the sentiments of Sr. Majesty in the subject of this great time, as well as, no less, in the subject of your person.

I am well aware that in the circumstances prevailing between us, which unfortunately have not yet been fully stated, it is difficult to reconcile the duties of the soldier with those of the German man. Yours. Excellence, however, I would like to draw attention to the steps we took at the moment of the decision and, at the same time, to point out that, if we had seen the duties of the soldier alone and had not taken account of the Heil of the fatherland, as well as the good of Deutschland, we should probably not now have such

joyous hopes and expectations in Deutschen's heart.

Approve yours. Excellence now also the assurance of the highly respectful and friendly devotion with which I have the honor to persist

Yours. Excellence

Headquarters of Obedient Servants

Marzahne, March 31, 1813. v. Kleist,

Lieutenant General.¹⁸¹

Thielemann was commander of Torgau from 24 February, which fortress he had provisioned well and if possible heavily occupied with troops. He hoped to preserve both fortress and force, and was a fierce opponent of the Franzosen.

His König had not yet decided which party to take. He ordered Thielemann not to enter any foreign troops in Torgau and had Torgau declare in Berlin at the end of March that it would do nothing against the allies.

Natzmer now orally requested Thielemann to join his troops with the allies to command them as well as a division of Prussia or Russians within the allied forces. In his report⁸² to the König, Natzmer said that he was received with great kindness and openness. Thielemann wanted to let him ride without blindfolded eyes, which Natzmer did not accept. He showed him letters from Davust, Durutte and you Fresne (? Dufresne) with the words: "Read, and you will see that I have spoken to you as I think." He commissioned an officer with 16 hunters and pioneers to sail two large ferries down the Elbe and be captured. As a result, we were able to build a bridge.

He said he wouldn't let in a Franzosen and wouldn't fail. Blücher could march as close as he wanted. The König of Saxony had gone from Planen to Regensburg, (according to Thielemann) determined to leave the French party as soon as the armies were over the Elbe.

All Saxon troops were redeployed in Torgau, 8-9000 troops, mostly new. Two cuirassier regiments and a battalion guard on foot followed the king. No Saxon man was involved in the French.

On 2 April 1813⁸³, Thielemann wrote to Kleist: "I am convinced that yours. Excellence by pp. Natzmer of my wish not to give the most distant reason to engage in hostilities among our mutual sovereigns, were sufficiently informed, and in order not to leave your troops in uncertainty about the procedure I observed, have undertaken to report to me that I intend to practice my young artillery team shooting from the ramparts tomorrow and some following mornings, and to execute my infantry in the firing on Sundays after 11 a.m."

On 2 April, Kleist gave up his wide cantonnements, probably as a result of Wittgensteins's orders, and concentrated his troops in Biwaks near Thießen, Euper and Trajuhn. He took his headquarters in the first mentioned place.

Clashes with the enemy had not occurred, only some men from Sappeurs departments had been captured, who fetched wood for pallisades in a forest near the fortress. Since then, this has not been done. Incidentally, the commander did his best to repair the works and create new ones. The crew was now estimated at 3,800 men, mostly Polen, and only 40 horses. Wittgensteins troops cantonized Elbe down the river.

⁸¹ Natzmer I, 114th

⁸² Natzmer I, 116th

⁸³ Natzmer I, 117.

The inaction before Wittenberg pledged little to Kleist, and he repeatedly asked York to give him a different command if the avant-garde became a permanent observation post, for example. York would like to plead with Wittgenstein for him to have a different sphere of influence. "I am happy and willing to be used to everything, but this assignment would not fit for me, which yours. Excellence itself, and I am assured by your friendly attitudes against me that my just request should be fulfilled."⁸⁴

Kleist then received from Zerbst a description of the general situation with the request that he, for his part, would remain an idle bystander in the operations.

Meanwhile, under Diebitsch's leadership, a bridge was built between Torgau and Wittenberg over the Elbe near Elster by York's troops at Roßlau.

The crew of Wittenberg continued to behave calmly, only they tried again to retrieve wood into pallisades from a forest, whereupon they were taken by the Fusilier Battalion 2. East Prussia. regiment was prevented. The enemy had 3 dead and 5 wounded. The next day, the attempt, this time with 200 men, was renewed, it was April 5. However, Kleist had set up a hiding place in the Coßwiger Haide, and the crew lost 30 dead as a result of the Fusiliere fire. Prisoners were only made 4 men, as the Polen did not take any mercy. There was no loss at all on our page.

Kleist was very pleased to receive our first Möckern weapon success. The same one only makes him fear again that he might be late for action.

On 6 April, the commander had the suburbs of Wittenberg burned down, a measure that was useless in Kleist's opinion and could only record the hatred of the inhabitants.

According to a letter from Thielemann to his König de dato 8. 4. 10⁸⁵, Kleist also had a meeting with Thielemann on 6. and he found him "in all its parts on the way to fairness, moderation and justice." The applications had been renewed. So far, he has still maintained a neutral state.

The critical moment for the Torgau fortress and his behavior will come in a few days when Marshal Kutuzov passes through the Elbe, which is to take place near Dresden, Meißen and Mühlberg. On April 5, Thielemann wrote to Kleist:⁸⁶

"Today they receive more vehicles, and Mr. von Wnuck, who escorted the prisoners, immediately takes the most appropriate measures on his return journey." Kleist reports to the König on the same date:

. "Your. Royal Your Majesty will have been informed by the Major and Grand Adjutant of Natzmer of the circumstances in which I entered with the Saxan Lieutenant General Thielemann. As a result, today Lieutenant Colonel Brause was sent to me as a parliamentarian to introduce me to the detrimental effect that several proclamations by General Blücher to the Saxons and Cottbuser must have on the good Saxons, since these proclamations contained some things that will be sensitive to the King of Saxony, and although they did not change his good decisions, they might stop them.

Lieutenant General Thielemann gives a definite assurance that his König will declare itself for the general cause, but that he wants to do so voluntarily and not be compelled to do so; that all the surroundings of the König, especially the Minister Senfft and General Langenau, would be well-disposed and would feel just as warmly the need to take action against Frankreich as he and General Lecoq, who had also already gone on to become

⁸⁴ War Archives of the Great General Staff.

⁸⁵ Natzmer L, 121st

⁸⁶ Leave papers.

kings, would speed up his declaration.

General Thielemann, however, believed that that proclamation would be offensive to the king, as it should contain some that might offend him. However, since he (Thielemann) is particularly concerned that nothing would disturb the good cause, he urged me to ensure that something was done to alleviate the bad impression, since the Saxons, as he assures us and as is also evident everywhere, are very attached to their prince and can only be won by him.

I would venture to say that an earlier article in the Königsberger newspaper, in which it was said that 'most of the Saxon provinces have come to the Albertine line by usurpation and that the Ernestine people have the legitimate claims to Saxony, ' has made König and the people suspicious'.⁸⁷

The proclamation was, by the way, frequently disapproved, such as by Hardenberg and Scharnhorst, and because of the Cottbus state Saxony was very sensitive, as it did not think of issuing the same to Prussia.

The König also agreed with Kleist, saying⁸⁸, "Thank you for reporting to me on the links you made with the Saxon lieutenant general, v. Thielemann, and I fully agree with you on the inexpediency of rash proclamations, which is why I have already indicated the need." The following is a letter from Thielemann to Kleist dated 8 April 1813:⁸⁹

. "Your. Excellence made me so great a Freude through the pleasing message (? from the battle of Möckern, for example) that I hope to receive my full recovery.

Mr. v. Roeder, Adjutant to General v. Scharnhorst, is with me to make more urgent requests, but Colonel-Lieutenant v. Brause of Sr. Excellence is also coming back to General v. Blücher, with whose answer to my ideas I cannot help but be satisfied.

May God, for the sake of the most sacred thing, want us to be united soon, very soon. Receive yours. Excellence from the warmest of hearts, the insurances of the most heartfelt respect from your faithful Baron v. Thielemann."

On the 12th, a second meeting of the generals was paid a visit in Prettin, which Kleist reported to the König:

Thießen, 13 April 1813.⁹⁰

"Your. I report to the Royal Majesty that I had a conversation yesterday with the Saxon Lieutenant General von Thielemann. It was with pleasure that I convinced myself of his good way of thinking and of his sincere desire to take part in our great struggle quite soon. He gave me the holiest assurance that if his Majesty of the König of Saxony would not have declared himself certain of the party to be taken, if the great Russian army had arrived at Elbe, he would have wanted to take this step at this moment.

In this respect, General Thielemann seems to wish that an officer of some rank should be sent to him at this time to demand a categorical answer from him, whether he wanted Torgau and thus the whole Kingdom of Saxony to be treated as hostile or as countries of a friendly and allied monarch. On both sides of Elbe, there were large armies, waiting only for his declaration to be made, to act appropriately quickly.

The lieutenant general of Thielemann gave me the hope that he would not wait a moment after this request to make the following statement:

⁸⁷ Natzmer I, 122nd

⁸⁸ Leave papers.

⁸⁹ Leave papers.

⁹⁰ Natzmer I, 125th

"He should be assured that the Kingdom of Saxony will retain its integrity and that Torgau will never be occupied by troops other than Saxon. On the other hand, he immediately wanted 8-9 battalions of infantry, 10-12 squadron cavalry and 16 guns from the Royal Saxon Army to join the Imperial Russischen or Royal Prussian troops and handed them over for free disposition. In the same way, he wanted to allow all marches through Torgau to the Allied troops as soon as they were not in the place itself." If this statement by Mr von Thielemann as military governor of the whole of Saxony has been made, there is no doubt that his Her Majesty the König of Saxony not only approved it, but also concluded a formal offensive and defensive alliance.

It seems to me not improbable that this really very specific and open procedure of the General von Thielemann is based on a higher command and that he is at least very well informed of the attitudes of his sovereign. It is not to be believed that the enemy may be unaware of General Thielemann's steps. He had already made his attitude quite clear to Marshal Davoust, who also replied that he spoke like a Prussian general, to which he replied, although he was not such a general, he was a real Saxon, who knew no other interest than that of his König and fatherland.

Even more clearly, General Thielemann seems to have spoken out about his way of thinking by sending me today a Saxon engineer officer, who partly created the works of Wittenberg himself, and should therefore go to my hand with Rath.

I did not fail to report back to the Count of Wittgenstein on this discussion.

Yours. I dare to make the very submissive impression to Her Majesty that, just as I have had the opportunity to get to know General Thielemann, I consider it very important that a man should be chosen for the negotiation with him who does not believe that he has to press the issue with threats. The general possesses, in addition to many very good qualities, a high degree of ambition, which is very easy to irritate, but also just as easy to offend.

In general, I think I have noticed that General Thielemann wishes to see all the Prussian negotiations conducted.

Yours. I report to the Royal Majesty that I expect the specific orders of Count Wittgenstein every day, whether I bomb Wittenberg, whether I take it by storm or whether I should open the tranches properly and then shoot a breach.

I have made the necessary arrangements for all cases. If the Count Wittgenstein should declare himself for the formal siege, it would, of course, want to be lacking in some cases for eternal duration. I particularly lack an experienced engineer officer."

Thielemann was in a critical situation. The court, despite all his urging, failed to make the desired statements, so that he still had to try to hold the allies. On April 13, 1813, he wrote to Kleist:⁹¹

He is already in the habit of being confidential and open, he wants to relieve himself by some heart effusions.

Winzingerode would have sent a passport for Brause to Regensburg. He should make stronger oral representations than he can in writing. Stein, however, did not allow the trip and sent Brause back to Winzingerode. An adjutant, von Minckwitz, sent to Regensburg cavalry-captain 10 days ago with Prussian and Russian prisoners, was also sent by Stein to Winzingerode.

"Are these means to an end? I assure myself that neither threats nor revolutionary means will require me to change my course of action and dissuade me from the path of

⁹¹Leave papers.

moderation and justice.

My conscience is my Richter and sets me free, yours. Excellence will be my witness according to justice.

Now more than ever, I believe that I must be careful, and as eagerly as I wish to throw off the ignominious yoke of Frankreich, and to be active in this, I am not inclined to let my compatriots kick me and my poor country in the dust.

I have received the passport with gratitude because of the deliberate negotiation with Wittenberg, but the following concerns still arise on reflection:

1. Will the Franzosen hardly let a negotiator in to Wittenberg, but in no case let him out again, and I risk even the life of a good and honest man.

2. If I myself wanted to make this request to the Governor, he cannot do anything at my word."

He then suggests to Kleist that it should go to the governor itself and recommend that, if the garrison leaves freely, Saxan troops be allowed to occupy, but does not believe in success.

Major von Rouvroy would have arrived at Kleist by now with the very mediocre plan, the detailed one being on the Königstein. Thielemann then offers his tools for removing Wittenberg, e.g. engineer officers.

Kleist responds:

Thießen, 16 April 1813.⁹²

Receive yours. Excellency, thank you most sincerely for your writing, which contains such good news, which delighted me all the more because it confirms what I wrote about the behavior of Minister Stein in the same way. Believe your own. Excellency to me, this conduct will certainly not be approved either by the Emperor of Alexander, nor by the King of my Lord, on the contrary will be greatly disapproved. The Count Wittgenstein was so upset that he sent an officer to the Emperor for our sake and urged him to impose tighter limits on the Minister Stein. In confidence, I'll send yours. Excellency also attached to the copy of the received reply of the König to the idea, which I issued to him after the conversation with Colonel Brause; the same will see from this how little the König agrees with the premature proclamations. It is only to be regretted that these heated people, by their inconsequential actions, harm the whole thing without being punished for it. — I hope, however, that the time will soon come when an ensemble comes into the matter and these gentlemen will be forced to act differently. —

According to a piece of news that came to me, there was a battle on the part of Bavaria and Franzosen at Haldensleben, because the former had returned — and the latter wanted to prevent it. Heaven give that this may be true. Such a beginning finds imitation, and then the thing gains an advantageous shape for us.

The Count Wittgenstein will arrive here today, the decision will be taken because of Wittenberg and then immediately implemented; I confess that the fate of the city is very close to my heart. It is not possible that, when degenerated one way or the other, it should not suffer significantly — therefore, my most fervent wish remains to get rid of the guests on such a degenerate that the city does not perish; however, I do realize that this may be difficult to accomplish and I agree with you. Excellence agrees completely that something must happen that will happen. Receive your... etc." Thielemann to Kleist:

⁹² Natzmer I, 127th

Torgau, 15 March 1813.⁹³

Thielemann thanks for the answer he received from the Major of Rouvroy and is pleased to be able to attach some messages that are desirable as contributing to the general consensus.

"General Heister arrived in Dresden on the 12th, evening, in Regensburg with a letter from Sr. Prussian Majesty to my König, and brought to the Minister Stein instructions of conduct, about which the Minister Stein expressed himself so comically that one cannot really be gracious to the man. In other words, Dresden has shown a great deal of moderation and all other proclamations are prohibited."

In Eilenburg yesterday, Thielemann spoke with Winzingerode and was very satisfied. However, he was disturbed by letters from Regensburg. The seizure of Cottbus has long caused concern in Bavaria, so that everything turns more than ever to Wien.

He continues to propose an attack on Wittenberg; it will make the best impression on public opinion, the inhabitants want it themselves.

Nothing new has happened about Rhein, so far 70,000 men. Ney is holed up at Würzburg and has 18,000 troops, Bertrand alone, coming from Illyria, has 40,000 troops in 4 divisions, the first of which has already passed Augsburg and consists of good old troops in addition to the 4th. By contrast, the 2nd and 3rd have only young people and numerous desertions.

Negotiations have not progressed and have not led to the desired conclusion. After all, the neutrality of Torgau was a great advantage for the allies, and the direct support of Thielemann with bridge material etc. came to them very much paid a visit.

Incidentally, the same trust was not universally shown as Kleist gave him. Thus Gneisenau writes of Altenburg on 14 April, when Kleist had approached him about the proclamations:

"Thielemann has personal purposes and wants to keep the possibility open until the last moment to take a new path or to justify his previous one.

Thielemann, who seems to be so devoted to Deutschland's cause, has long had his master's authority to deal with the troops under his command according to his insight and discretion. I know this from a reliable source. The future will reveal this closer and yours. Excellence show with which deceitful man your.. Excellence."

There is no need for the König's reply from Prussia to Kleist's report of the 13th:⁹⁴

Breslau, April 17, 1813.

des Monats "I have probably received your interesting report of the 13th about your conversation with the Lieutenant General of Thielemann and just now, the one of the 14th with the copy of a letter he issued to you. An agreement was reached immediately with the Emperor of Rußland Majesty on the content of the first, to the effect that the imaginary general's request was to be fully satisfied. As soon as the army now in march arrives at Elbe, which will be the 24th, or if you can agree with General Thielemann, even earlier, you will send an officer of some rank, whom I leave entirely to you to choose, to this general to demand a cathegorical answer from him, whether he wants Torgau and therefore the whole Kingdom of Saxony to be treated hostile, or as the countries of a friendly and allied monarch, and to sit down, on both sides of the Elbe, there are numerous armies waiting only for his declaration, in order to act appropriately, quickly.

⁹³ Leave papers.

⁹⁴ Leave papers.

Perhaps you think it is a good thing, and if it is possible, I myself consider it advisable for you to submit yourself to this remark.

You can guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom of Saxony except for the old Prussian parts of the land that were wrested from me by the Tilsiter peace, and that Torgau should never be occupied by troops other than Saxon troops, if the General, on the other hand, immediately lets 8-9 battalions of infantry, 10-12 squadron cavalry and 18 cannons from the Royal Saxon Army join mine or the Russischen troops, and hands them over for free disposal, also all marches of the Allied troops through Torgau paid a visit as soon as they are not in the place. By the way, you must treat the general with the respect and delicacy that his character commands and that you yourself propose. You can, if you find it necessary, give him the definite assurance for his person that I will take him into my service in his current rank in the event that his rules of measure should receive the disapproval of his König. The steps taken by the Minister of Stein, of which you mention, do not have my applause. You have to try to neutralize them as much as possible, which I hope you will succeed in, because they are more about form than matter. Incidentally, I hereby inform you of a copy of the letter to your correspondence which I have left to the König of Saxony Majesty through the General von Heister and to which I now await the reply. You can bring it to General Thielemann's attention. You will report the success of this important assignment to me immediately. The 24th this I will be in Dresden. Frederick Wilhelm.

In the Citirte Letter to the König of Saxony, Breslau, 9 April 1813, the same is called upon to join the common cause. Saxony might be treated as an opponent. —

Leave papers. The period of inaction before Wittenberg should now come to an end. Kleist had a meeting with Wittgenstein at which the generals tried to agree on further measures.

The strength of the crew was now agreed on 4,000 men, 60 Uhlans and 20 guns. Nevertheless, a siege would cost 1,000 people, which unfortunately was not to be consumed. Moreover, since a designation of the city would not be politically advantageous because of the capture of the König from Saxony, Kleist had the idea of persuading General Thielemann to do as we had done with Pillau. Only Count Wittgenstein disagreed and wanted it burned and besieged.⁹⁵

I guess he wasn't wrong. The negotiations could still drag on indefinitely, and although the previous standstill of operations in Wittenberg had not had much significance, his ownership became increasingly important as the allies continued to advance against the Saale. The blockade could not reach any targets in a short time and was only carried out on the 12th, i.e. for a few days, on the left bank of the Elbe. On that day, a Russian detachment of two regiments of infantry, a heavy battery and a pulk of Kosaken had arrived there from Dessau for the purpose and had entered under Kleist's command.

A formal siege could only succeed in a certain time, and for the time being not only did it lack all the material, but also an older engineer officer, who was only in prospect of Kleist at his request in the person of Major Markoff. Von Kleist His staff had so far only been reinforced by the Captain v. Reiche,⁹⁶ a knowledgeable and highly regarded officer.

A storm seemed promising in the spirit of the troops, but loss-making, as has often been suggested. After all, arrangements were made for the same and the troops were prepared by a field service, at which the speech of the field preacher Greim aroused the greatest enthusiasm.

⁹⁵ Great War Archives General staff.

⁹⁶ Formerly lieutenant general. His memoirs have been used as a source.

So the bombardment remained. At the same time, however, batteries had to be built, and in order to secure the construction, to make it possible at all, it was necessary to take the suburbs of Wittenberg.

Wittgenstein ordered this for the night of the 16th to the 17th and then lived with the Prince Heinrich of Prussia in the battle.

Kleist set the attack at 3 a.m., and a cannon shot was to signal the start. All troops entered the gun and followed in reserve unless they were primarily used. The assault took place on the western and northern suburbs, from the Elbe to the Berliner Street, and specifically the 1st. Battalion Colberg and the 2nd East Prussian Infantry Regiment the section of the Rothen Marck from the Elbe to the Belziger Thor an, 2nd Fusilier Battalion Colberg the suburbs south of the vineyard to the Berliner street.

On most points, the attack came as a surprise, the guards were more or less taken by surprise, and the terrain up to the ramparts fell almost without a shot into the hands of the attacker.

It was only in the section of the Rothen Marck that the opposition was fierce. Here the General Bourdet stood with two battalions, Natzmer says 800 men, the lieutenant colonel of Steinmetz; it is said that he would have wanted to make a break-out himself. The battle burned out here very vigorously and lasted until the other noon. The defender was initially superior and also had the advantage of the terrain for himself. A bottle served as a special support for him. It was only when the Prussian divisions, which had advanced sideways, threatened the flank and spine of the exposed Bourdet division that it retreated to the fortress.

The attackers now lay everywhere opposite the ramparts of the fortress, only a particularly strong building, the poorhouse, which had not been cleared in time, remained in the possession of the enemy. Kleist didn't storm it because it had to fall if you kept the suburbs occupied.

The troops had behaved excellently, showed Muth and discipline in equal measure, the officers in this first battle of the campaign so obviously sought the risk that Kleist, when he praised the attitude of the troops, asked them not to expose themselves so.

The two Fusilier battalions had distinguished themselves the most, but also suffered the most casualties, Fusilier Battalion Colberg 1 officer dead, 7 officers, 60 wounded.

The crew had lost 1 lieutenant colonel, 1 captain and 120 men, mostly Polen, to prisoners, but also lost them considerably. The night of the 17th to 18th was quiet, so that the batteries could be built undisturbed, namely two large à 11 and 12 guns, two small à 2. Captain von Reiche had accompanied the construction of the first large battery. Cavalry-captain Before the bombardment began, the Strantz representative was sent to the city as a parliamentarian to issue a request to the commander and the magistrate.

Kleist told the Baron de la Poype, division general and governor of Wittenberg,⁹⁷ that after the recent events and especially the crossing of Elbe, Wittenberg was not only besieged by all pages, but also the whole country was occupied beyond the Saale. As a result of the orders received from General Graf Wittgenstein, he proposed that he vacate the city under honorable conditions. The unfortunate fate of the city, if it were taken by storm, the bloodshed on both pages would make him lend his ear to the sentiments of humanity.

"The honor allows to clear the place that has never been counted among the fortresses."

In addition:

⁹⁷ Leave papers

"To a noble magistrate of Wittenberg.⁹⁸

The commander of Wittenberg will be asked by me to surrender the city.

By making such a matter known to a high-noble magistrate, and thereby giving me the honor, I leave it to the discretion of the latter to participate in it and to enable the commander to make my request heard.

I intend to do so for the good and the best of the city and its inhabitants, who must be endangered if I am forced to make use of the forces at my disposal, IN ORDER to assure myself of the city, which in no case can be left in the possession of the enemy.

A high-noble magistrate wants to heed this and believe me that it will hurt me if it should not be possible for me to combine with the achievement of this purpose the well-being of the city and its inhabitants, which is truly dear to me in all respects; should the commander in his current situation and since he must not count on any replacement, not want to take into account my request, then he is to attribute to him only the misfortune, which the city can suffer.

I will just repeat that I want to prevent any accident in the city and that I will be delighted if a high-class magistrate helps to ensure that the city is handed over as I have requested."

The moment after the successful storm on the suburbs was certainly chosen happily to call on the fortress.

General de la Poype, however, replied dismissively:⁹⁹

"I am amazed to hear you speak the language of a Russian ally. Prussia is the ally of Frankreich, my emperor has let me know nothing else.

I can't negotiate with any Prussian general under Count Wittgenstein's orders.

By the way, I would like to say to Count Wittgenstein that I will defend the post entrusted to me to the utmost."

The bombardment of 27 guns began at 9 a.m. and continued until the afternoon. It also burned in some places, as grenades and incendiary bullets were used. However, the damage was not great, as also not to be expected otherwise, since only field guns were available. The fortress did not answer almost at all. In any case, the shelling was inconclusive with regard to the surrender and was not renewed.

It had also been possible to convince oneself by sight that the quality of the works was a very good one, especially the deep water ditches made the success of a storm very doubtful. The crew had also shown a good attitude.

Wittgenstein then decided to prepare the siege seriously, and Kleist and its troops retook the old cernation position. But only for a short time. Already on the 19th he received the order to leave two battalions in front of Wittenberg and to march with his corps to Dessau and Roßlau. He subsequently left the 1st and 2nd Battalion 2 East Prussian Infantry Regiment, the Hussars-Escadron Major Eisenschmidt, the riding Battery No. 3 and a Cossack Regiment returned to Wittenberg, transferred the occupation of the bridgehead at Roßlau to the 23rd and 24th Russian Jäger Regiments and the heavy Battery No. 21 and marched with the remainder of the troops on 21 April to Dessau. Here he will have received the following letters. Thielemann to Kleist:

Torgau, April 22, 1813.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Leave papers

⁹⁹ Leave papers,

¹⁰⁰ Leave papers,

"It is with a truly inalienable pleasure that I have the honor of yours. Excellency to notify that the König of my Lord was unfailingly awaited in Prag last night.

The very precise plan of Wittenberg was delivered to me by the Governor of Königstein, and I am sending it through an engineer officer to Major v. Markoff at this moment. (?) The guns, mortars and ammunition are already on board and ready to leave at any moment. I expect yours. Excellence the written assurance of the return of the gun and the plan, as well as Wittenberg is taken, but I also make myself undertake, until then, all the necessary ammunition to my gun to deliver" etc.

Torgau, April 23, 1813.¹⁰¹

Thielemann informed Freude that the König was leaving for Prag tonight. The French envoy has left the court and remains in Regensburg. All troops that Majesty in Regensburg, are already in Böhmen via Pilsen on the march to the Saxan frontier.

"Confidentillement the announcement that Österreich should be quite decisive."

Austrian troops in Böhmen are heading for the frontiers. Popular appearances have already taken place against Ambassador Narbonne in Wien.

The closest relationship seems to exist between the Viennese and Saxan courts. For this reason, and because of the proximity of the König, he could not take the slightest step without his permission and would not send the gun until his decision. Wolkonsky to Kleist, 11/23 April 1813:¹⁰²

He has the task of summoning Thielemann to Dresden as soon as possible on behalf of both majesties and sends the relevant invitation letter for transmission. At the same time, he encloses a copy of a letter from the Emperor to Kleist, the original of which was initially sent to Wittgensteins headquarters and must therefore be received by Kleist somewhat later than the copy which follows here:

Bautzen le 11. /23. 4. 1813. ¹⁰³ Mr. le Leutenant-Général Baron de Kleist.

"Au moment où tous les corps de l'armée sont arrivés sur l'Elbe; au moment où ils vont passer ce fleuve, mes principes sont toujours les mêmes".

L' indépendance des Etats, le bonheur des nations, voilà le grand objet de nos entre-prises. Toutes les parties de la Saxe, que les armées combinées out traversées, ont pu se convaincre de ces intentions. Elle a été vivement reconnue partout. Chaque ville prouve par son enthousiasme qu'elle ne voit que des libérateurs là où elle attendait un vainqueur. Dans un pareil état des choses, il est de notre devoir à chercher autant que possible à éviter l' effusion du sang Allemand: je verrai donc avec plaisir, Mr. le Baron, que vous portiez de ma part, à Mr. le général Thielemann le Kommandant de Torgau, les mêmes paroles que vous êtes chargé de lui adresser de celle de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse. Notre cause est la même, notre système indissolable, j' approuve donc d' avance, tous les arrangements, dont vous con-viendrez avec Mr. le général Thielemann. C' est à lui à se décider, s' il veut que la Saxe soit traitée en royaume conquis, si Torgau doit être pris de vive force, si le pays doit connaître les rigueurs, qu' entraînent les sièges; ou bien si obéissant à la voix de la raison et d' un patriotisme e' clairé; a l' intérêt même de son sovereign, il veut accéder à vos propositions. Une pareille conduite ne pourra que l'honorer. Elle a sa faveur l'opinion générale de ses compatriotes. — En vous renouvelant en consequence les autorizations, qui pourront donner le poid nécessaire à vos démarches; j' en apprendrai le succès avec un

¹⁰¹ Leave papers,

¹⁰² Leave papers,

¹⁰³ Leave papers.

plaisir fondé sur mon désir sincère de voir la Saxe entière, rendue à des principes, qui doivent assurer la tranquillité présente et son bonheur avenir. Sure, monsieur le général, je prie Dieu qu' il Vous conserve en sa sainte et digne garde. Alexandre.'

After Natzmer (I, 132), a final Kleist meeting with Thielemann took place on the 24th. The same had to be done by nature, because the allied army had now arrived at Elbe, had already crossed it in part, and thus the moment had come when Thielemann wanted to be called upon to make a definitive statement "by an officer of some rank". Kleist underwent this mission, as the König wished, stating after Thielemann's account, "since it is militarily impossible to leave behind a fortress with a garrison of 11,000 troops in an uncertain state on the basis of the operations now underway, I (Thielemann) should declare myself, and in conditions such as those I have declared as a faithful servant of your servant. Majesty only ever wants to keep interests in good hands."

I replied, "That revolutionary steps on my part certainly cannot be counted on, but certainly so long as yours. Majesty, to let the government of the fortress rest for me, that no hostile measure would be taken on my part, and that the fortress would therefore be regarded as neutral."

"Kleist, this brilliant-minded man who hates all revolutionary measures, I was able to regard as confidential the openings he made to me: whether coalition powers could believe that they could explain Wien, if they themselves applied everything, to put Deutschland in a revolutionary state."

The negotiations on this point were concluded, and without the hoped-for result. Thielemann also did not follow the invitation to come to Dresden by holding up behind the will of his monarch, without which he could not engage in anything. One may now be more inclined to doubt Thielemann's sincerity and to agree to judgment in Gneisenaus. But it remains too hard, "he was weak, but not a villain," one would like to exclaim.

The desire to do something unusual for the German cause was lively in him, indeed he dominated him; but before the decisive act he carelessly lowered his arm.

On April 12, he almost certainly promises, in some circumstances, even without König's assistance, to have his troops join allies; when those circumstances occur, he again advances the König's person, who does not allow him to act independently.¹⁰⁴

He compromises himself in a not harmless Weise, but pays a visit to draw the conclusions of his actions, to take his mind out of the noose again, when it is too late.

Among Kleist's papers is a characteristic of Thielemann, of which it is not apparent whether it is written for a third party, for example for the König, which culminates in the following three points:

1. The cause of Deutschland is the holiest for Thielemann, soon to be loyalty to the prince.
2. Thielemann wants to wait and see if he can win the approval of the König. Should König's actions interfere with the operations, he will know how to take his party. Should König declare itself to be Frankreich, it believes that the bond between prince and Unterthan has been torn.
3. Thielemann does not believe he has the displeasure of the Emperor and the König, he will bear the condemnation of heated minds.

The German cause is certain of General Thielemann, but he will receive it only as a prudent man, who will happily renounce all personal consideration for advantage and

¹⁰⁴ Letter from Thielmann to Kleist, Torgau, 23 April 1813, History of the Wars of Liberation, History of the Spring Campaign of 1813 and its Prehistory, Volume 1, Albert von Holleben, Berlin 1904, Annex 25 (2012)

honorary testimonies, if the estate is acquired through it. —

We don't want to continue to sit on him in court. Its outcome is also the story's critique of its wavering behavior.

His König, as he moved back into Napoleon's camp, appalled him, and Thielemann had to go to his allies as a supplicant, not as a giver as he had known and wanted, and make the shaping of his future dependent on their mercy.

"I am destitute," he writes in Torgau, May 10, 1813,¹⁰⁵ "the König of Saxony made peace with Frankreich on its own without all its servants knowing. If it were time for you to come here in a few hours, I would still be able to hand over the fortress, but I was caught up in such a way that there was nothing I could do. If you cannot come, everything is lost, the generals are against me, I leave the army, the fatherland, everything and flee to you to die with you." A drama if it had had a tragic end! Value to arouse our sympathy, but no more. Anyone who wants to follow in the footsteps of a York must above all have an iron will. —

While Kleist was facing Wittenberg, the war situation had changed significantly towards the beginning of the year. The energy and organizational talent of Napoleon had succeeded in stomping an army out of the ground — one can almost say, which, although largely unfamiliar with war, was nevertheless commanded by experienced generals. He led it over the Rhein and united there and in Würzburg 40000 old troops under Bertrand, as well as the Rhineland-Palatinate contingents with the same. In the further course of action after Thuringia, he intended to use the Viceroy of Italy to achieve the handsome strength of 180000 men.

In contrast, the allies only managed to get 98,000 troops, an inferiority that could not be completely compensated by the Geist inherent in the Prussian army; moreover, they were not led by any Napoleon.

Blücher and Scharnhorst urged that as much terrain as possible be gained forward, because what one had now, one might not need to conquer afterwards. It was also necessary to disrupt the concentration of the Napoleonic forces to the best of our ability. Thus the Prussian corps had penetrated into the Anhalt and Altenburg languages, and behind them the Russians were in Dresden, when Napoleon stepped up towards Leipzig to insure itself of Saxony and Elbe, Saxony also in so far as König still maintained an ambiguous position.

On April 24, when Napoleon invaded, Kleist was ordered to march from Dessau to Halle. Two companies of the East Prussian Jäger Battalion were assigned to him. The remaining troops outside Wittenberg were still behind. They were to be replaced there by the Russian brigade of Major General von Harppe and then followed.

The containment, respectively However, the siege of Wittenberg was to be taken over by General v. Bülow, and he was therefore also entrusted with securing the Elbe crossing at Roßlau. Bülow von Kleist marched there and became acquainted with the fortress, which he was to besiege, in that he took the 4th to replace the hussar squad that had been left behind. Escadron 2 West Prussian Dragoon regiments with 1/2 battery were detached there. The Brandenburg Hussar Regiment will therefore appear again in full in the battle in a few days.

According to orders received, Kleist marched from Dessau on the 25th and will have arrived in Halle on the 26th. Wittgenstein gave him the task of covering the right wing of

¹⁰⁵ Pertz, Gneisenau II Tape.

the army and keeping Halle as long as possible. In Schkeuditz, he would be taken in by Yorkish troops in the event of a retreat.

Bülow, standing near Roßlau, would secure the link with Berlin and block Wittenberg, Wittgenstein himself would deliver a battle with the main army near Leipzig.

According to these directives, Kleist arranged for him to lay his bulk in cantonnements near Diemitz and Mötzlich close to the east of Halle and to advance his outpost cavalry into the Dölau, Nietleben and Passendorf lines on the left bank of Saale. Halle itself as well as the crossings of Giebichenstein, Trotha and Glaucha were manned by infantry, Schkopau near Merseburg with a Cossack detachment. From the enemy, it was learned through patrols that a column of Eisleben was marching towards Halle. These were troops of the Viceroy, who advanced on this way as well as from Alsleben to the union with Napoleon on the left bank of Saale to Merseburg.

The next day, Kleist's outposts (Cossacks) were attacked and returned to the right bank of Saale after lively banter. You had to prepare for a serious attack on the 28th.

Kleist therefore had the main bridge at Halle protected by a bridgehead, which the master v. Rohr made by slight entrenchment.

Soon the enemy showed up. His infantry crews appeared at the heights of Nietleben, where the columns marched and about 8,000 men from the Corps Lauriston developed into battle. However, the attack took place only in the afternoon of 28 April. It was directed against two points, against the bridgehead and against a furth near Wörmlitz, nearly 1/2 mile south of Halle.

The attack was prepared by a fire of 24 guns. The latter inflicted tangible casualties on the two Russian fighter battalions that held the Furth, while the Colberg¹⁰⁶ regiment, which had occupied the hills, suffered little.

Kleist's artillery, which was three times inferior to the enemy in number of guns, was taken away considerably. 5 guns were dismantled.

The straw yard burned in the town.

Despite the artilleristic superiority, the attacker failed to gain the Saale crossings. The Russians held the Furth, and a major assault on the bridgehead was rejected by the Colberg Regiment. The fight lasted from 3 to 8 a.m. The enemy withdrew his advanced divisions back to the heights of Nietleben, where he remained overnight, so that Kleist anticipated the renewal of the struggle for the next day.

It is said that¹⁰⁷ many unsolicited students took part in the Battle of Theil, which is said to have prompted Napoleon to suspend the university.

Kleist had informed Bülow during the battle of the assault on Halle, which led the latter to advance its troops in Dessau to Köthen. York, on the same notice, moved the Horn Brigade closer to Halle, expecting a renewal of the fighting as well.

In addition, he detached 2 battalions, 1/2 squad and 4 guns under Major v. Lobenthal to Merseburg to hold this Saale crossing and thereby secure Kleist's left flank.

¹⁰⁶ Lied der Füsiliere des Regiments Colberg, gedichte beim Ausmarsch im Frühjahr 1813, verse 2

Who didn't want to go to field,
If Father Kleist leads us,
Who wouldn't stand in limbs,
If Zastrow command!

...

Blätter für Pommersche Volkskunde, Volume 1, Stettin 1892, pp. 13 (2009)

¹⁰⁷ Kretschmer, Leben Friedrich Wilhelm III. II, 49.

The latter concentrated all his efforts at Halle in anticipation of the 29th. However, the same did not happen, a sign of how much on the 28th the resistance of the small corps had impressed the enemy. In contrast, Lobenthal was founded by Macdonald (2nd corps). In a brilliant battle, the Prussians held the far superior opponent here until 5 p.m. Lobenthal then withdrew in order on Schkeuditz, where he later merged with Kleist.

After Merseburg had lost what he learned from a pencil note from Reiche¹⁰⁸, he had to give up the Halle, which had become untenable, and retreat in the direction he had been ordered to. Standing in Schkeuditz behind the Elster, his corps formed a bent-forward right wing against the allies near and south of Leipzig, which was protected from the south against oppressive attacks by the Elster and, if the enemy of Halle pushed ahead ahead, always had a connection to the main army.

With Bülow, however, the connection now threatened to be broken, because Halle was heavily occupied and entrenched by the enemy. As his movement on Köthen indicated, this general intended to support Kleist near Halle by sending a detachment under General v. Oppen there and going with his bulk to Radegast near Zörbig, three miles from Halle. However, the Enlightenment cavalry informed General v. Oppen in good time that Halle was already in enemy hands, whereupon he also turned to Radegast.

The 2nd West Prussian Dragoon Regiment observed the enemy from Gröbzig and Zörbig.

In Schkeuditz, probably on the morning of 1 May, Kleist was ordered to march to Leipzig and stop there.

As a result, he led his corps to Lindenau an der Elster, close to the west of Leipzig. Here, he had the bridges prepared for a possible transition, if necessary, especially with a view to a withdrawal in combat. As a destination for the same, he was given roots, so that he had to march through the city of Leipzig.

The action of Napoleon had made necessary the concentration of the allies, which took place on 1 May, except for the Bülow and Kleist near Zörbig, south of Leipzig on the right bank of the Elster, to the extent that the main army could be united in a day march on the Elster. The individual corps stood near Zwenkau, Borna, Frohburg, Kohren and Altenburg, the avant-garde corps of Winzingerode near Lützen, advanced to the left bank of the Elster.

In contrast, Napoleon alone had 84,000 troops on hand in the Weißenfels-Naumburg line, 18,000 marched from Jena and 36,000 approached the general point of unification in the action of Merseburg on the outskirts of Leipzig in such a way that they were only two miles away in Günthersdorf. Wittgenstein could only take 70,000 men to battle, but he decided to attack the Franzosen. Scharnhorst, in view of the superiority of the allies in cavalry, had considered a fight in the plain of Leipzig to be advantageous, but Wittgenstein led the army into the more difficult terrain west of Zwenkau, in which the cavalry has not come into its own. The general wanted to fall into his flank on the assumption that the enemy would continue his advance on Leipzig on 2 May.

This plan was in itself a happy one, nodding the execution. The troops furthest away from the Elster had a march of four miles to the river and again a mile to the position on the left bank of the Elster, in which the army was to march and also marched later, right wing Werben, left wing Domsen, where the river crossing was to be made. It is clear from this that it was not customary to gather the troops in one day and bring them to the enemy in good time. Wittgenstein therefore let the whole army go to the Elster on the 1st, which was

¹⁰⁸ Reiche, especially for the siege of Wittenberg at Kleist command, returned to York when Kleist withdrew from Wittenberg.

reached by the troops at night.

Now, however, it had to be possible to come to the enemy early on other days and bring everything to the spot, but the march was so unhappily arranged by the disposition that it was only completed at 11 o'clock, although the crossing over the river bridges had begun at dawn. Miladorovich's corps never made it to the battlefield, the Russian Guard only in the dark. Groß-Görschen The greatest bravery of the Prussian troops could only convince them, as a gain of this hot day, that they had become equal to the Franzosen in the struggle, even surpassing them in death. —

Kleist marched on the slaughter day morning 4 o'clock from Lindenau and took a position 3/4 miles west of this place on the so-called Sandberge, a relatively important elevation, which in an extent of a good 1/4 mile the large road Merseburg - Leipzig blocks at right angles, right-handed based on the lowlands of the Luppe and Elster.

A small stream formed a good front obstacle for the entire extent of the position, along which lay the villages of Rühmarsdorf and Lindnaundorf.

The position was at that time an excellent one and Kleist was therefore also able to accept the assault of the Lauriston's Corps, which was 18,000 strong. At his disposal (to Plotho):

Russische troops under Major General Roth.

The Cossack Regiments Ilowaisky, Radinof, Seliwanof, Grodno Hussars Regiment, The Hunter Regiments No. 23, 24, 25, 26, Heavy Battery No. 21, Riding Battery No. 23. Prussia under Lieutenant Colonel von Zielinsky.

1. and 2. Battalion Leib-Infanterie-Regiments, 1st Battalion 1 West Prussian Infantry Regiment, Fusilier Battalion 2. East Prussian Infantry Regiments, 2 companies East Prussian fighters, 1 riding battery, 4 squadrons 3. Hussars.

The enemy attacked three times, unsuccessfully, then, lightly at his strength, he extended his right wing and threatened to take the feeble Kleist Corps in the flank and roll it up.

As a result, before a crisis on this wing occurred, Kleist withdrew its troops in full order from the position and in general from Lindenau. He had to descend into the free plain and measure a distance of 3/4 miles before he found a base in the terrain (here the Elster line). Such a retreat required firm leadership. If the enemy had a superiority in cavalry, he could have found considerable difficulties. But no such solution was available. Kleist arrived at Lindenau unpresed by the enemy and prepared the latter for a longer stay by defending the Elster bridges and the Ramstadt Gate.

The position on the Sandberg had the advantage, in addition to its strength, that it could not be seen and the opponent could not recognize how many troops there were.

Napoleon was also located on Merseburg - Leipziger Straße. The vigorous opposition that Kleist Groß-Görschen put to General Lauriston encouraged him to believe that he would meet the allies near Leipzig, and it was only the thunder of cannons that taught him where to seek their main forces. Once clear about the situation, he prepares with proven Meisterschaft the win and carries it, even ahead of the battlefield, also away. The lack of cavalry and above all of a usable but already asserts itself here. Napoleon is poorly oriented, which rarely happened to it in the past. The shortage became even more sensitive when he made victories with great sacrifices and was unable to exploit them.

Kleist only cleared Leipzig at two o'clock and reached eleven o'clock in the evening without losing any roots. Although it can be assumed that he boiled in the afternoon when the enemy did not follow him beyond Leipzig, it was an extremely exhausting day.

It was of great importance that he had stopped the enemy for so long, because Lauriston,

in possession of Leipzig, was able to touch the allies in the most sensitive Weise when he withdrew over the Magpies and also directed his march to Zwenkau on 3 May, when it was too late to intervene there or rather further south at Pegau.

Kleist left Kosacken-detachments near Paunsdorf to observe the enemy.

He had not failed to report the evacuation of the important town to Wittgenstein. This news arrived just as the battle at Groß-Görschen was at its most intense. It, in conjunction with the numerical overweight of the enemy recognized in the battle, caused the commanders to give the order to retreat.

Kleist also had Bülow informed of the course of the battle at Lindenau¹⁰⁹ and of his retreat on Wurzen by an adjutant, where he stated in almost accurate estimates his opponent to 20000 men.

The allied forces went back to Borna to gain the Elbe Line via Colditz, Dobeln and Meißen. Undefeated! The retreat was not able to detract from their moral element.

After all, it must be desirable to prevent the enemy from persecuting him. Already when the König had passed the Magpies, he issued an invitation to Kleist to make diversions in the enemy's flank and back. One could not foresee that the enemy would not push ahead. The command was:

Groitzsch (near Pegau), 3 May 1813.

"Yesterday's battle between Lützen and Pegau exhausted the forces of the army to the point that they must leave their position today and march on Elbe via Borna and Nossen, Bagage via Chemnitz (?). After the appointment with the Russian General Command, you must now retreat to Mühlberg, and I trust that your activity and talent will make it difficult for you to advance by diversions in the enemy's left flank, any occasion that may be advantageous to you. Elbe will be defended for as long as possible unless other orders follow. In regretting the loss of unprecedented brave troops, I note that everything is now being staged inside the country in the strongest defense."¹¹⁰

Wittgensteins Chief of Staff d'Auvray said on the same day that Kleist would like to go back if the enemy so requested and then to Mühlberg. He also wants to collect accurate news about Torgau and inform Bülow of all incidents. If possible, something should be done with cavalry in the enemy's back and flank.

It has not been established, but it can be assumed, whether Kleist has acted on these two requests. Plotho also said that Kleist's cossacks at Paunsdorf had noticed as soon as Lauriston left to march on Zwenkau, and had blown up right through the city on Merseburger and Zwenkauer Strasse, where they had caught many stragglers. It is very reasonable to conclude that these were actions ordered by Kleist as a result of the directives given to it. —

The main army was to go back to Elbe. When the enemy did not push, Wittgenstein believed he could hold the line of the gully, but then gave up this thought. This gave rise to a series of orders and counter-orders that, more than anything else, very quickly and surely undermine the confidence of the troops in the leadership.

Thus, on the 5th alone, Kleist received three different marching orders, so that he shouted out to Bülow the cry of pain: "Heaven wants to take care of us, we seem to be deserted by commanders and people." Bülow, too, has been driven forward and backward these days unnecessarily.

¹⁰⁹ This is how it is commonly called, although the actual battle did not take place at this place.

¹¹⁰ Leave papers.

Groß-Görschen The leadership had already shown itself incapable of bringing the troops with a sure hand to uniform use on the battlefield of, now in the field of operations it appeared to fluctuate. A bad start to such a serious war.

It was a great misfortune for the Prussian state that in the Treaty of Kalisch it only committed itself to the position of 80,000 troops, while Rußland promised to raise 150,000. Thereafter, not only were England's subsidies calculated, but also the power-to-performance ratio of the two Stempel allies imposed. What is it that Rußland did not achieve this figure until the autumn of the first year of the war, while in Prussia a people's army rose from the almost inexhaustible Born Scharnhorst organizations, three times stronger than the figure of 17. Inhabitants of the poor, plundered, overthrown country? Who found out about it? Where was the press, which even carried the customers of the 271,000 troops that König Friedrich Wilhelm gathered under his banner this summer? Who was able to control the Russian data, where even the strength figures of standing armies with their eternal fluctuations are so inaccurate?

Prussia has always done much of the main work, but Rußland was given the forehand with the Treaty of Kalisch, and it was therefore his right to give the commander-in-chief.

A ratio, as also in the appearance of the shiny Alexander next to the modest Friedrich Wilhelm came to characteristic expression.

Thus Wittgenstein was given the command that the fortunate campaign of 1812 had brought up. A native Deutscher, like his quartermaster Diebitsch, he understood the Prussian national movement and showed it his sympathy. He was honestly committed to moving the operations forward and ridding Deutschland of the intruders. But what was all this to help if he did not prove up to his task, where we Prussians in Blücher were dealing with an army commander of God's grace and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau next Napoleon were the first strategists of their time? — The Battle of Gross-Görscheu was a great loss for the allies, except that they had to give their best man, Scharnhorst. Napoleon remained the insurmountable, which he had been, Saxony fell willlessly into tyranny and brought him a reinforcement of his troops, which was very much desired especially in cavalry, Thielemann was deposed, the whole Elbe line with Magdeburg - Wittenberg - Torgau came into French ownership. —

The Allies had left Dresden voluntarily to march on Bautzen.

Kleist had, coming from Dahlen, on the 5th. Mühlberg reached and after crossing the river the bridges burned down. When the enemy arrived on the 7th, it was already on the right bank. Here (after Plotho) four reserve battalions under Major v. d. Goltz are said to have joined him.

His further retreat, in the context of a guard of the Blücher Corps, went via Großenhain (10 May), Königsbrück (11 May) to Burk near Bautzen, where he took the position on the 13th, which he defended so gloriously in the forthcoming battle.

Almost always one was in contact with the enemy, so had also on the 11th an outpost skirmish.

At Bautzen, Kleist reunited with the York Corps, to which he actually joined

belonged. And York also asked to keep Kleist with him now, because without it and without Bülow, he just

had gathered about 5,600 men at Kreckwitz. His request was unsuccessful. Kleist himself had the following strength on 14 May:¹¹¹

¹¹¹ Great War Archives General staff. Acta, reporting to York

2 battalions of body infantry regiments..... 1264 men,
1st Battalion 5th Infantry Regiments..... 347 "
Fusilier Battalion 2. East Prussian Infantry Regiments 348
1/2 East Prussian Jäger Battalion..... 188 "
4 squadrons 3. Hussars regiments 451 "
1 riding battery..... 124 "
1 foot battery..... 94 "
Summa 3016 men.

The four reserve battalions are not listed here.

The arrival of General Barklay brought the allies a reinforcement of about 12,000 men. Wittgenstein had about 90,000 men available again.

They had decided to keep the Russian and Prussian troops united, even at the risk of Berlin falling into enemy hands. Likewise, after initial opposition from Friedrich and Wilhelm, the monarchs agreed to adopt another battle. One could not expect the high aspire to a fee of the army, which also made itself known in the many rearguard battles not mentioned here, a retreat without firing to Schlesien, had also to expect an unfavorable effect on the popular mood, if one gave up such a large area without sword stroke and also hoped to persuade Österreich earlier to join, if one maintained the field longer.

The consideration for Österreich was also decisive for keeping close to the Austrian frontier, which, however, also best secured the important armaments in Schlesien.

The allies decided to deliver a defensive battle in a position near Bautzen, which was reinforced with field jumps.¹¹² The Czar, his most influential councilors for Bautzen Knesebeck and Diebitsch, was decisive for the conduct of the war. More promising would have been the decision to use the armies created for the offensive to attack the opposing emperor, as long as Ney was detached, who was to proceed with Lauriston on Berlin. The Allies, however, gave Napoleon, who was unclear about the whereabouts of the Prussian main forces until the 14th, enough time to correctly recognize their position at Bautzen and to assemble his corps with infallible certainty from their divergent or even separate marching lines for a united strike.

On May 19, he was with 4 corps in the semicircle around Bautzen, the Guards behind, Ney and Lauriston in the approach to Königswartha, Weißig, Reynier on Hoyerswerda, all three with the direction on the enemy right wing

At the last hour, the Czar made an offensive decision. He wanted to set it back in order to prevent Ney's union with Napoleon. The York Corps (excluding Kleist) and Barklay de Tolly, who were given this assignment, were to be back to battle. The two generals had about 20,000 men. It's hard to see how they're going to solve their mission. Great fame and great loss were the only success of the unequal battle.

The position of the allies was on the right Spree - bank, but did not follow the arc of the river, but crowned the more significant heights, which run roughly in the line of the chord to that arc. Only the right wing stood near the river; in the center, and on the left wing, it was held only by advance troops, who were not to defend it seriously. So it was more or less indifferent that the Spree was in front of the frontline if you didn't want to go on the offensive. The position itself granted good artillery positions, but had no other advantages.

¹¹² For Bautzen, Meerheimb, the battles of Bautzen, is mainly used.

It was divided several times by watercourses, which disturbed the connection in the transverse direction. It was far too extensive for an army of 85-90,000 men and, most sensitively, had not had its retreat line at a right angle behind it. For the defense of the position, Wittgenstein issued a cumbersome disposition in which all possible cases were provided for. Unfortunately, the attack of the enemy, as it finally took place, did not fit any of them. Thus, already on the first day, the underpass became independent in the various partial battles, which played out separately from each other.

The advance troops, who were to hold the Spree Line but take up the main battle in the main position rearward, were the Russian Corps of Milodarovich and the Corps of Kleist. The former had to safeguard the Spree line above Bautzen as far as the village of Öhna, Kleist from Öhna to Nieder-Gurkau by a position near Burk and by the occupation of Nieder-Gurkau with the Gottlobsberg, both village and hill on the left bank.

At his disposal on that day were:

the four Russian hunter regiments who had fought under him several times:

8 battalions, the old battle regiment Colberg: 3 battalions,

1 Fusilier Battalion (2nd East Prussian),

the two East Prussian Jäger companies: 1/2 battalion,

Body hussars (Prussia) I } 9 squadrons, Grodno hussars (Russians) |

2 Prussian, 2 Russian,

12 1/2 battalions, 9 squadrons, 4 batteries, in Summa 4800 men.

Of these troops, the Colberger Fusilier Battalion had occupied Nieder-Gurkau and the Gottlobsberg, and the Grodno Hussars were standing by to support it. The remaining troops held the position at Burk.

Napoleon proceeded with 4 corps to seize the Spree crossings or to establish them, Soult on Nieder-Gurkau, Marmont between this place and Bautzen on Öhna, Macdonald on Bautzen, Oudinot on the leftist wing of the allies. He should be forceful in his approach, to make his opponents believe that Napoleon will attack the left wing. The deception was also made possible by the fact that the considerable progress made by Oudinot led the Emperor Alexander to provide troops to the already strong left wing, in and of itself, beyond the cost and at the expense of other points. Kleist faced first the 6th. Corps (Marmont) in action. The same was in 3 divisions 20000 men strong and carried 80 guns. Marmont pulled up 40 guns at Öhna and, under the protection of this powerful battery, had four trestle bridges built, which will have been about 60 feet of voltage. These were soon completed, with the Division Compans first disappearing and attacking Burk.

If Kleist really were to keep the Spree line here, he would have to stand on the riverbanks, or go on the offensive when a part of the French troops was defiliated. However, he was obliged to maintain his position at Burk, and an offensive counter-attack was not in the higher intentions, because Gneisenau's proposal to proceed in this way in the afternoon was rejected.

Kleist was located in Burk about 1000 m from the Spree, so it could only bombard the crossing with artillery and not very effectively.

In Burk, the Russian fighters were eight battalions in number, but with very little effect. They behaved with great bravery towards the attack and inflicted considerable losses on the enemy. However, his superiority was too great, the same always brought fresh troops into the fire line and the artillery of Öhna shelled the village. The Russians had to give way.

Behind the village, at the height of the actual position, was Kleist's artillery and the Colberg Regiment. Kleist ordered him to make a counterattack.

Major v. Zastrow, the commander of the regiment, ordered the Fusilier battalion to the right, the second battalion to the left, and the first battalion between the two. The tirailleurs of the wing battalions were to go beyond the village and pursue or capture the thrown defenders with fire.

The attack, which was carried out almost without shooting, succeeded completely. The enemy was thrown back to the heights of the banks he had risen, conquered the burning village and a crowd of Franzosen was pushed down in the stubbornly defended houses by the acrimonious Colbergers. Only 3 officers and 100 men were captured. The village was now occupied by parts of the first battalion and the volunteer hunters, and the regiment took up positions on the right and left, settling behind small hills and in some quarries. In particular, the hollow passages leading down to Nieder-Gurkau on the one hand and Bautzen on the other were observed or kept under fire.

The remnants of the Russian hunter regiments were gathered by Kleist as soutsies.

A standing firefight unfolded, which the opponent always nurtured anew, and which was very loss-making for both parts. On the French side, the Bonnet Division entered the fray at a time which was not to be determined, which had passed the bridges behind the Division Compans and was generally used to the right of the latter.

Kleist kept in the fierce fire from midday to evening beside its batteries, the pleas of its surroundings: not to expose itself like this, dismissive, saying, "Shall I command what I do not do myself?" Several of his adjutants were wounded.

The intolerability of the standing firefight caused repeated partial advances on both pages. But without success. In the quarries, the attackers were greeted with stones, if the time for loading was too short, so tells the story of the Colberg Regiment.

Major v. Zastrow also made an advance once again at the head of the second battalion to throw the enemy down into the Spreethal. The same failed due to the devastating fire of the enemy's dense lines. Two squadrons of Russian cuirassiers also allegedly attempted to drive the enemy out of his position by attacking him. Progress was no longer achieved, but Kleist had held its ground in what was described as a "brilliant" battle, from 3:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.

Marmont gave up on taking them. He pulled the first committed Division Compans out of the fray and directed them to Bautzen, where they supported Macdonald's assault. Through the Bonnet division, however, he bypassed Burk and occupied Nieder-Kayna, which was halfway behind the Kleist position.

The same was now untenable. Kleist pulled out via Bankwitz after the main position.

Bautzen had also been abandoned.

The Kleist battalion in Nieder-Gurkau had had to clear the left bank of the Spree when the fourth corps (Sault) marched on, but this could not pass over to the right bank, because apart from the battalion, the Brigade Zieten, which was sent by Blücher, had arrived there and kept the Debouchee under the most effective fire. The Grodno hussars found an opportunity to attack.

Napoleon was pleased with the day's successes. He was Lord of the Spree - Transitions and had approached the two corps Ney and Lauriston the battlefield at a critical point for immediate intervention. Reynier could arrive before evening.

The next day, Napoleon wanted to attack again with its right wing (Oudinot), to hold back

the center and to do with the left the decisive push, which the then preceding centruin could increase until the destruction of the enemy.

For the 21st, the allies decided to wait for the opponent's measures, saying the leaders should act accordingly; one could not know how Napoleon would attack.

How weak is the defense here! She willlessly accepts the law of her opponent. Rathless, with her hands and feet chained to the ground she wants to defend, she stands there and lets everything pass over her. Should it give the army's art more difficult tasks than the simple, clear, winning offensive? Not higher, but more complicated. —

Nothing happened in relation to Ney's impending approach. Barklay had only 5,000 men to counter his march and also found little support in the terrain. He renounced a defense of the Spree line and only had the bridges broken off.

His avant-garde against Klix did not wait for an attack, Barklay himself united his troops immediately on the windmill hill near Oleina with the clearly recognizable superiority. Here too, the Russians did not take up a battle, but withdrew to the Schafberg near Baruth. The enemy had shown five divisions.

Thus, Ney also owned Preititz, where there were only slight detachments of Russian fighters who were expelled by the Souham division. The situation became extremely critical with the loss of Preititz. This place was almost entirely at the back of the Kreckwitz Heights, the enemy was closer to the retreat road than Blücher. The latter general, however, when Barklay cleared the windmill mountain, had sent three battalions, two squadrons and a half-battery under Major of Alvensleben to occupy the place, in true recognition of the importance of Preititz, but was also determined to keep the Kreckwitzer heights to the last man.

By the time Alvensleben arrived, however, Preititz was already occupied by the enemy. At the same time, however, Kleist's corps arrived at such an important point with the same mission as Alvensleben.¹¹³ At first, only the Colberg Regiment and four guns.

Kleist had been in reserve behind Purschwitz and was perhaps still 4,000 strong. When he received the order to occupy Preititz, he advanced through Klein-Bautzen and then, in conjunction with the Alvensleben detachment, on the north bank of the Klein-Bautzen stream, proceeded against Preititz. In total, eight guns entered action, six infantry battalions led the attack. The Souham division, sixteen battalions strong, was thrown away, initially averting extreme danger. In this attack, the Prussian troops had a front almost opposite to the actual battle line.

Alvensleben was ordered back to Kreckwitz, and Kleist took over the occupation of the place.

After some dithering, Ney reorganized three divisions to attack Preititz, all in divisional crowds. In the first meeting, Division Delmas, left beside, threatening the right flank of the Prussian, Division Albert. In the second meeting, Division Ricard.

Kleist realized, with the right eye, that it would be more important to secure the line of withdrawal directly than to have the only force available for that purpose — its corps — roughed up here.

He did not accept the superior assault, but went back to the height of Belgern, which was located northwest of Wurschen, offered a good position after he had once again fronted south of Preititz.

In the meantime, Blücher had decided to vacate the Kreckwitz heights, which he had held

¹¹³ Unable to specify who Kleist receives the related command from.

in the fiercest fight against Napoleon's Center. The monarchs had also recognized the dangerous situation of the army and ordered its retreat.

Ney was still able to achieve great success and perhaps force the allies onto Löbauer Street. However, he did not go against his instruction on Wurschen, but swung right to the Kreckwitz heights and achieved the same when on the other page the last Blücher troops cleared them.

Strong artillery and cavalry covered the withdrawal of the center of the allies, as well as the leftist wing, which had a win over Oudinot gained. Von Kleist Then the position chosen for Belgium proved to be very appropriate for admission. The Horn Brigade was also used in the same building.

Kleist took over the guard. After clearing the last position, he had Wurschen kept by the Fusilier Battalion Colberg, which fired the last shots that day. The persecution already stopped.

The losses on both pages were very large. 15,000 allies, 25,000 Franzosen had become incapacitated. The battle at Burk had been one of the bloodiest. The Colberg regiment, which was not strong enough, had — on both days — 21 officers and 576 men.

The allies had reason to rejoice, despite the loss of battle, in having emerged happily from a weir as a critical situation. The troops, in turn, had fought valiantly over all praise.

Napoleon's successes were far from commensurate with the sacrifices made. His excellently designed battle plan was largely unsuccessful as a result of Ney's flawed leadership. And he couldn't even mention trophies in his victory bulletin. "What," he cried grimly, "no result, no trophies, no prisoners after such a butchery?"¹¹⁴

What happened in distant Rußland had come less to the knowledge of the army, and there had also not been a battle against the hated mortal enemy, as was the case with Burk. The Battle of Bautzen brought Kleist real war glory for the first time, and in the army as well as in the people there was talk of the heroism with which he fought there.

The two monarchs received him with high praises, and even during the battle, Czar Alexander, in admiration of his bravery, is said to have given him his applause and thanks. May 20th made our hero great, and we are happy to have met him, as he stands with iron steadfastness in front of him despite great losses of superiority; but more significant for the whole was his correct behavior on May 21st, in which he again proved his commander's gaze at the shiniest.

His König awarded him the Iron Cross First Class.

Neudorf near Reichenbach, 10 June 1813.

"In the battle of the 20th of Mts., you distinguished yourself so gloriously by the steadfastness with which you rejected the stubborn attacks of the enemy that I take pleasure in publicly acknowledging your new merit by awarding the accompanying sign of the first class of the Iron Cross."¹¹⁵

Despite the multiple favorable circumstances that supported the withdrawal of the allied army from its critical situation near Bautzen, a part of the Russians had to take the Löbauer Straße and regained the actual retreat road on Wurschen the next day. In the further march the Neiße, the Queis and the Bober were crossed. All these river lines came to pay a visit the allies and offered them favorable barrier guard positions. But Napoleon's persecution was not vigorous, not least because of a lack of cavalry. Also, his thinking and

¹¹⁴ Treitschke I, 459.

¹¹⁵ Leave papers.

costumes in this campaign always took the direction to the Berlin, so that he was here as later several times in this campaign not quite in the matter. —

Kleist crossed the Neiße with his corps on 22 May near Ludwigsdorf and moved into a camp behind the river. On the 23rd, together with the Russian General Tschaplitz, he formed the Arrieregarde and reached Oberwaldau. In his position at this place, he was attacked on the 24th and stopped the enemy for several hours. Then he fought off to Siegersdorf am Queis. There he was taken in by York troops and marched on to Bunzlau after destroying the Queis Bridge.

He arrived in Hainau on the 25th and Liegnitz on the 26th, while Blücher crossed the division Maison.

In the meantime, a change in command had occurred. Wittgenstein, who was unable to achieve success on German soil, laid him down in Barklay de Tolly's hands and now took the command of the left wing under him, while Blücher commanded the right.

The verdict on the new commander-in-chief, who was also a Deutscher, is different. All critics agree that he was not a great strategist, but some call him a great tactician, a battle general, others deny him this, especially any initiative. Thus, in the battle near Bautzen, after his retreat to Baruth, he was said to have been unheard of, even though Kleist had offered to take the heights of Oleina together with him again.¹¹⁶ He was inactive, however, but probably in agreement with the monarchs, who otherwise would hardly have given him the upper command.

The worst thing was, and so the change in command could become very pernicious, that Barklay did not want to know about further resistance on German soil and felt it necessary to return the army adequately far to its sources of aid in order to strengthen and reorganize it. On Hardenberg's counsellor, the König of Prussia decided to separate its corps from the Russians and to turn southward rather than join the Russians in further backward movements.

When you turned to Schweidnitz, however, you gave away the brands and Berlin, almost the entire monarchy, but a part of Schlesien, where a large Landwehr organization was to take place, was still safeguarded and you kept a better link with Österreich.

Already, the Russians wanted to cross Oder when Napoleon's offers of a cease-fire prevented the allies from splitting. The whole army went on the 28th over the Striegau water, on the 29th to Peterwitz, on the 31st near Schweidnitz to the entrenched camp of Pützen.

Nothing could be more desirable to the allied cause at this moment than a ceasefire, which gave Prussia time to develop its full strength and to assure itself of Russian and Austrian assistance, to draw on Rußland Österreich's reinforcements, and to end its armaments, and then to seal the peace or decide the war by intervening with arms.

Napoleon also gained, but not to the extent that its allies did. He also really hoped for peace, because he nodded and was sure to master the people's forces rising against him, while Prussia saw in the cease-fire only the postponement of a holy cause, which had to be fought through until a clear, safe decision.

Already on the 27th, negotiations had begun in Pläswitz by the two authorized representatives, Coulaincourt on the one hand and Count Schuwaloff and Kleist on the other. At noon on 1 June, after several consultations, a 36-hour ceasefire was concluded with 12 hours' notice. Nevertheless, French troop movements from Breslau to Ohlau were

¹¹⁶ at Pertz, Gneisenau.

still paying a visit. The plenipotentiaries were suspicious that it was perhaps intended to surprise the army and warned, since they received from Coulaincourt even insufficient or no information, the initially standing Russian and Prussian generals, as well as the General Toll in the large headquarters, to bring the matter to the monarchs.

Here in the headquarters on the 3rd In the afternoon, they learned about the occupation of Breslau and for this reason had the army return to Strehlen from the now threatened Pülzen camp. As on the 4th Shuwaloff's and Kleist's news arrived, it was all the more evident how necessary the caution had been and still could not resolve all concerns.

On that day, however, a definitive ceasefire was concluded for six weeks in Poischwitz, later extended from 20/7 to 10/8.

In order to maintain it and to settle any disputes, commissioners were appointed, including Kleist.

On 1 June, a new division of the army was ordered, with which Kleist became the head of an independent, the second, army corps. Hort commanded the first, both belonging to Blücher's Silesian army.

We give the division and strength of the Kleist Corps for June after the war archive (excerpts).¹¹⁷

Report from the infantry of the Kgl. Prussian 2. corps d' armée under the command of Gen. -Lt. v. Kleist pro Juny 1813.

1st Brigade (Ob. u. Flügel-Adjutant v. Klüx).

3 battalions 1. WEST- e -inf. Regiment, its fighter-depot.

4.”

3 battalions 2. WEST- e -inf. -regiment., " "

2 companies of the Rifle Battalion (Silesian-)

To the service 82 Offz., 377 Untffz., 100 Spiell., 4854 Gemeine, 32 Surgeons.

2nd Brigade (Major General v. Zieten).

3 battalions 1. Schlesien Inf Regiment, its fighter-depot.

3 " 2. " " " "

4th Battalion 2nd " " "

2 comp. from the Schützenbtl., its Jäger detachment.

For service 80 Offz., 312 Untffz., 88 Spiell., 3361 Gem., 24 Surgeons.

Reserve Brigade (Ob.-Lieut. v. Tippelskirch interim).

Three battalions of regiment guard. Normal infantry battalion.

Four volunteer fighter companies.

1/2 Guard Hunter Battalion, its Hunter detachment.

Bodyguard " "

1. Easter test Gren.- " " "

WEST- e " " " "

Schlesien " " " "

¹¹⁷ Kriegsarchiv Acta, reports from the infantry of the Kgl Prussian 2 corps d' armée pro Juny, 1813.

For service 130 Offz., 447 Untffz., 137 Spiell., 5412 Gem., 39 Surgeons.

Total infantry strength 292 officers, 15088 combatants.

Daily list from the cavalry of June 16, 1813.

Divided at the 1st Brigade:

2 squadrons 2. Schlesien Hussars, Jäger detachment of the regiment.

2" Schlesien Uhlans, " "

At the 2nd Brigade:

1st Schlesisches Hussars Regiment, Jäger-Detacht of the Rgts.

At the Res. Battle Brigade:

A squad of Schlesien National hussars.

Cavalry Reserve:

Gardes du Corps regiment.

Light Guard Cavalry with Guard Volunteer Esc.

East Prussian Cuirassier Regime with Volontair-Jäger-Esc.

Brandenburg " " "

SCHLESISCHES " " "

Neumark-s Dragoon Regt. " "

The total strength of the cavalry, excluding the last regiment, was 137 officers, 3,475 men.

The strength of the artillery was 57 officers, 1,724 men.

The overall strength of the corps is therefore:

486 Offz., 20287 Mann.

The distribution of artillery was as follows:¹¹⁸

1. Brigade 2 — 6-pound foot batteries,

2. " 2 — 6 "

Res. " Guard foot battery No. 4,

6-pound foot battery No. 9.

Res. -Cavalry. Brigade Guard Riding Battery,

Riding battery No. 10.

Reserve artillery:

3 — 6-pound foot batteries,

3 Riding batteries No. 7, 8, 9,

1/2 — 12-hour battery,

3 Park columns,

¹¹⁸ Plotho, 1813 I. Supplement XXI.

1 Craft column.

With this, all cuirassiers had been assigned to the 2nd Army Corps, as well as the Guard, which was previously divided and now appears united in a brigade.

For this purpose, Kleist received 16 battalions and 16 squadrons from the Landwehr during July and thus had under 40 1/2 battalions: 16 from the Landwehr. York received on 45: 24, that is more than half, a circumstance that aroused his ire.

The 16 squadrons were formed into 4 regiments, namely Landwehr-Kavallerie-Regiment No. 1 (Graf Reichenbach), No. 2 (v. Prittwitz), No. 7 (v. Schmidt), No. 8 (v. Kleist).

The Landwehr battalions of four and four also formed a regiment with the numbers of 7-10 and were thus assigned regimentally to the brigades. According to the number, the bosses were: v. Falkenhausen, v. Larisch, v. Below, Prinz Christian von Pleß.¹¹⁹

On July 12, Kleist was appointed commanding general, on the 20th the new military division was completed, on the 25th the newly formed Corps of Blücher was visited.

The arrival of the Landwehr led to a change in the division of June, but the troop parts remained the same. When it departs for Böhmen, the Corps will appear in four brigades, numbered 9 to 12:

9th Brigade. Chief: Major General v. Klüx,

Commander: Oberst-Leutnant v. Schmalensee.

Tenth Brigade. Chief: Major General v. Pirch I,

Commander: Colonel Leutnant v. Jagow.

11th Brigade. Chief: Major General v. Zieten,

Commander: Colonel Leutnant v. Carnall.

12th Brigade. Chief: General Leutnant Prince August of Prussia,

Commander: Colonel Leutnant v. Funck.

Spare cavalry. Major General v. Roeder,

Commander: Colonel Leutnant v. Wrangel.

Reserve artillery. Colonel Leutnant of Braun.

Bernhardt calculates¹²⁰ the strength at the end of the armistice to 41 battalions, 44 squadrons, 14 batteries or 42035 men and 112 guns, namely 33000 men infantry, 6500 horsemen, 2500 artillerymen.

A handsome force in the hands of the young general.

Kleist pursued with keen interest, as far as it knew, the negotiations that filled the period of the cease-fire. Without Österreich, history shows, a promising battle against Napoleon could not be fought, and so everything was done to bring the Hofburg into the coalition camp. Kleist was so confident that it needed the Emperor Franz Joseph and his army that he thought it more appropriate to make peace under reasonably acceptable conditions than to continue the struggle alone with Russia's allies.

He probably, like a large part of the men at the top, did not yet have the awareness of the elementary popular power, which had unleashed the laws of the last years as well as the

¹¹⁹ Supplement to the Mil. -W. -Bl. 1,845th P. 416/18.

¹²⁰ Bernhardt, Toll III. 511.

events, and thought like a wise house father, who holds the accomplishments sufficiently, while Gneisenau and Clausewitz resumed their old plans for a desperate struggle of isolated Preußens and preferred to perish, rather than make peace. —

In the calm of the ceasefire, Kleist also gained the leisure to deal with its family affairs. Unfortunately, we do not have a single letter from the correspondence of the spouses. During the war, the wife and children probably lived uninterrupted in Frankfurt.

Kleist was particularly embarrassed by the thought that when he died, he did not take enough care of his own. Already in May (27.) 1812 he wrote to a high state official, whom he addresses "Excellence", that he had to lay down great sacrifices and attack his small fortune in order to procure his field equipment. He asked that if he died, his family would be supported in any degenerate and claimed that — as he had heard — Blücher, Gneisenau,¹²¹ Goltz and others had received support. He would therefore also like to recall such an event, as difficult as it would be for him to act as a supplicant (client). As we know, 2000 thalers were given to him as one-off support.

In September (24.) 1812, when he was standing in front of Riga, Kleist again apparently wrote to the same person, invoking his pledge to take care of him. He, in turn, had heard that His Majesty had favored some public servants, including Beyme, in purchasing estates, and believed, without immodesty, to be able to say with a legitimate sense of self that he was no less worthy of such a concession than that. Only the concern for his family drove him to the steps, because it was a painful feeling to always have the end in mind with the thought of leaving the family in a beleaguered situation.

Now, before the war restarted, Kleist came back to this issue and (July 20 from Peterwitz) made a direct request to König to transfer to it a spiritual estate with the same proceeds in place of the district earnings which it received from the treasury at the mercy of the König at the rate of 817 thalers per year. He specifically asked for the estate Althoff at Breslau.

The König responded to this request. He relieved the 817 thalers from the state treasury and transferred him (de dato Landeck 15 August 13) the estate Althoff with 768 acres 168 Ruthen and, at 4% calculated, a yield of 1243 thalers. 13 Sgr. 9 1/2 horse. The additional revenue against the district revenues would remain with Kleist.

Minister Hardenberg, who also wrote privately about this award, calculated the value of Althoff at 34,000 thalers with 1,200 thalers. Pension. The Privy Cabinet Council of Albrecht had been working hard to bring this about. He had "not wanted to rest until Kleist's wish was fulfilled", and presumably did his own to it.

The family was thus taken care of in some Weise, and Kleist could look forward with greater impartiality to the events to come. —

On 7 August, the 2nd Army Corps, together with the Russian Guards and Wittgenstein Corps, set out to march on Böhmen and unite with 130,000 Austrians to form the main army, which according to the Trachenberg War Plan would number 230,000 troops and 700 guns. The Prussian troops had welcomed the end of the armistice with cheers, and the people left behind in the small Silesian army almost saw with envy the Kleist Corps as the main army, because there the greatest blows had to fall and the greatest victories had to be gained. Perhaps the Silesian army was late at all and found nothing more to do!

This beautiful concern was an unfounded one, soon it should become clear that the Silesian headquarters was the driving force of the whole coalition and only his energy and his fervent patriotism could succeed in the work of liberation.

¹²¹ The parallel with Blücher and Gneisenau seems strange in Kleist's modesty, but those mentioned were not yet what we know them to be.

The Prussians and Russians who were to join the Bohemian army commanded Barklay. Under the 8th order of the König, Colonel Leutnant v. Grolman became command to him, who as chief of the General Staff actually belonged to the Kleistschen Korps. In this context, he took part in the march of the main army to Saxony and the battle of Dresden and only shortly before the battle of Kulm resigned to Kleist's staff, in order to have its full trust. He was a born soldier, as brave, bold and determined as he was tenacious and level-headed. He had been an active collaborator in the reorganization of the army, and in particular he was the source of the Supplement to the Officers Act. He knew the war from the campaigns of 1809 to 12, which he had fought in part in Spain. After Grolman's resignation, Colonel von Tippelskirch was led as Chief of the General Staff, Grolman as Chief of Quarters.

For the march to Böhmen, Barklay had created six columns, blending Russians and Prussians. Kleist commanded the 3rd, which went through Frankenstein, Glatz, Reinerz and Königgrätz.

The milestones of the Kleistsche headquarters were: 8th August Frankenstein, 9/10. Reinerz, 11th Oppochna in Böhmen, 12. Kulehna, 13. /14. Chlumetz, 15. Nimburg (Elbe crossing), 16. Schidelakowitz, 17th Liebesnitz, 18. Hostin.

On the 19th, the Moldau was crossed at Weldrus and the union with the main army was established in the Budin camp. Kleist himself went to Raudischek near Budin. Here he received the following order in counsel, which shows more than anything else the high position Kleist took in the respect and appreciation of its König.

Neudorf, 11th August 1813.

"I have decided to let the Crown Prince participate in the forthcoming campaign under your eyes and have therefore decided that the prince should remain with your army corps and in your headquarters. I have particular confidence in you that war will become especially instructive in the same area as yours, and that it will win the greater views of the same as I wish. I therefore ask you, as far as time and circumstances permit, to concern yourself with this purpose, and to give the Crown Prince quite a lot of opportunity to investigate and practice in matters of war. Therefore, give him daily, or as often as it may be, commissions of all degenerates, real or imagined, in order to acquaint him with the nature of the service of all pages, demand His oral or written accounts of the performance of the same, and complete the usefulness of these exercises by your teachings thereon. It will certainly not escape your diligence to guide the experiences gained by the Crown Prince in such a way that they encompass the important and essential throughout, and gradually elevate Him to the higher standpoint for judging the war. This position cannot be achieved without precise knowledge of the formation and composition, use and performance of the army. I hope, therefore, that the Crown Prince will not be lifted over those foundations too quickly. Given the important impact that the experience of this war could have on the Crown Prince's entire future, I could give you no greater evidence of my trust than by putting the leadership of it in your hands.

Friedrich Wilhelm.¹²²" The Crown Prince, then 17 years old, wrote a few days later:

Nimburg, 16 August 1813.

"Mr. General: You will have seen from Mr. v. Luck's letter that we are here near you and will probably join you tomorrow. I sincerely wish you the opportunity to bear witness to my Freude that König allowed me to take part in this beautiful battle under the leadership of a man as worthy as you, General.

¹²² Leave papers.

Your Freund

Friedrich Wilhelm, Crown Prince.¹²³"

Thus the forces were gathered, which were to fight the giant struggle against the oppressor of the freedom of princes and peoples.

In the Margraviate, Bernadotte was under Schwarzenberg with 130,000 troops of the Northern Army, in Schlesien Blücher with 100,000 troops, in Böhmen the main army, which was also under the guidance of the monarchs Generalissimus of the Coalition.

The inhabitants of the afflicted German country watched these masses roll forward to a goal, to the army of the opponent, with great amazement, as Toll's war plan of Trachenberg so simply and accurately prescribed. In the face of this immense power, it was hard to believe in failure. Its superiority, however, was only marginal, much lower than coalition pages believed, and was roughly offset for Napoleon by its ownership of fortresses. Nor was the nature of the troops very different, and only the allies' cavalry was undoubtedly superior to their opponent. Victory still wanted to be won, and as we know, his goddess initially showed herself to be brittle.

Returning to the Bohemian army, we find the same gathered on the 19th August at Eger. On the 20th, it advanced to the foot of the Ore Mountains. Kleist stood in front of Brück, Wittgenstein in front of Teplitz, the Austrians on the road from Komotau to Marienberg.

For the 21st, the crossing over the mountains was envisaged. It was probably postponed to the 22nd for lack of news about the enemy. A lost day. The troops kept mostly quiet, only detachments were stopped and advanced into the passes. The Kleistsche Korps advanced close to the base of the range to Groß-Johnsdorf, right and left page detachments to Ober-Leutersdorf and Ober-Georgenthal.

Without any further news arriving, the crossing finally took place on the 22nd, in the general direction towards Leipzig. So why not right away?

Wittgenstein proceeded on the right wing over Nollendorf, Peterswalde and drove away from Gieshübel a division of Gouvion St. Cyr after a fierce battle. Kleist's avant-garde under Zieten raided a Chasseurpiket in the morning behind Johnsdorf, but otherwise encountered no opposition. The corps came as far as Saida and took up camp near Pürschenstein.

After Kleist came the first. Soot. Grenadier division. The Austrians reached Marienberg with the main forces.

Following the news that Leipzig was free of the enemy and that Napoleon and its main forces were still at the foot of the Lusatian Hills, it was decided to make a right-wing turn with the army and march on Dresden via Frauenstein, Dippoldiswalde. Von Kleist As a secondary reason for such an operation was the removal of Wittgenstein, which, separated by mountain ranges five miles wide (as the crow flies), seemed to be abandoned to a quite uncertain fate. Support could not be brought to him, however, but the army management had created this situation by their disposition itself.

The decision to march on the right was bold, we are reminded of the march on the right of the third army to the north, to the Sedan, in 1870.

Here, in 1813, the decision was not only bold, but also dangerous. It is known that the main difficulty for an army which changes its direction of operation, and especially when it makes such a sharp turn as here, is to dislocate its connections and to transfer the entire

¹²³ Leave papers.

apparatus of army and stage driving without stalling and crossing over to the new marching lines, which are usually reduced in number.

When the German army leadership did this in 1870, when it turned with superior force on the trail of a morally no longer intact adversary — into the Defileen of the Argonnerwald, it was supported by the excellent streets of Frankreich in completely different Weise than at that time Schwarzenberg from the road network of the Ore Mountains, and was also better informed about the enemy than this. In addition, a Meister of strategy led the moves on this difficult chessboard and then mated an emperor.

That was not the situation here.

It is important to linger and familiarize oneself with the routes of the Ore Mountains, because they are a main factor in the assessment of the operations that will now follow, in which Kleist should also take decisive action.

A larger number of rivers and streams originate on the northwestern crest of the Ore Mountains and, following the slope of the Saxon Vogtland, flow into the basin of the Mulde, a few of them into the Elbe. They are followed — or at least joined — by the road network, which is almost exclusively developed in a northwest-southeast direction.

Cross connections were not necessary on the ridge itself, in slightly lower steps they would repeatedly come across the river valleys, which had to be bridged as well as the mountain ridges between them. Pirna is also the only city that attracts traffic, ahead of Dresden.

Therefore, while a not inconsiderable number of military roads considered usable at that time cut through the mountains by the shortest route, there is only one better cross-connection, the road from Marienberg via Saida, Frauenstein to Dippoldiswalde. The same was assigned for the right-hand march to the Kleistsche Korps, which covered it without trains with its 40000 troops in a length of three miles, that is, on a route from Dippoldiswalde to Saida. But since you could not get forward by this one road, you had to use on dirt roads what was possible. The main mass of the Austrians was conducted via Mulda and Pretschendorf on Dippoldiswalde.

The march was endlessly tiring, the artillery especially came forward only with great effort, the advance could only take place very slowly.

On the 24th In the evening, however, the movement was carried out with a large part of the troops, the army stood with the front against Dresden.

Wittgenstein Sedlitz west of Pirna, before him Gouvion St. Cyr in Dresden.

Kleist (23rd in Reichenau near Frauenstein) reached Reinholdshagen east of Dippoldiswalde.

The Austrians stood between this place, Beerwalde and Hökendorf. The left wing corps Klenau arrived in Freiberg. In two days, the army had thus averaged a total of four miles, a feat which, under the prevailing conditions, would have been a good one had it not been for some of the troops still standing far back in the mountains, or even in Böhmen.

Happiness, however, seemed favorable to the allies. It was learned that Napoleon had marched against Blücher to Schlesien. As everybody knows He failed to cause him to battle, while Blücher beat Macdonald on the Katzbach a few days after his reversal. Dresden was therefore only lightly staffed, and it was decided to take it.

60000 troops, half Wittgenstein's, half Kleist's corps and some 20 battalions of Austrians were to be used, the main forces stopped at Dippoldiswalde, Klenau in Freiberg rest day (!).

Wittgenstein was instructed to use the main road via Mügeln, a corps was to leave behind

to blockade the Königstein and the Elbe fields there. Kleist was conducted via Maxen and Lockwitz, the Austrians via Possendorf.

If, on the part of the allies, it was believed that, in the absence of Napoleon, it would not have had to deploy all its forces, then the wish to wind the troops out of the Defileen as soon as possible should have led to the decision to march immediately in order to make room for the rear. In addition, Dresden was fortified, so that it could be maintained for a time even by weak forces. And in all of this, a disposition that only lets the troops arrive in front of Dresden at 4 p.m. It had to be clear from the outset that success could no longer be achieved on that day. With a day, however, at the same time a night is always lost and in 24 hours a Napoleon was able to do a lot.

Dresden, however, was unconsolidated since 1810, the ditches were filled, instead of the bridges embankments were filled, in part already, where there were formerly chest walls, houses were built. In the Neustadt, the fortifications were best preserved, and as Napoleon after the battle of Groß Görschen ordered their renewal, soon defensible lines were created again.

Now, however, unforeseen Weise attacked the left bank of the Elbe, only for six days, only since Napoleon had learned of the invasion of the Russians and Prussians in Böhmen, had he also had the old town and the entrenched camp in front of it worked. Not much had happened, but the works were still defensible and a support for the battle.

This was known, and yet one was uncomfortably surprised when confronted with them and undecided as to what to do. When attacked immediately, the city fell despite the fortifications. Gouvion St. Cyr was too weak to defend the extensive lines. The population had already lost everything, the König had fled to the other shore in the Neustadt.

War council was held. Emperor Alexander was the focal point of the latter. Over the deliberation, it became too late to attack. The same was postponed to the next day and more troops were to be called in.

The troops bivouac in front of the city, Kleist with the 10th and 11th. Brigade near Leubnitz, 9th and 12th as well as the Reserve cavalry near Maxen, Torna headquarters.

Napoleon was only 3 1/2 miles east of Dresden near Stolpen. You might have seen his watchfires. He sent some of his troops to reinforce St. Cyr in Dresden and left there the next morning. By detaching the Vandammesch Corps on Königstein, he prepared a very effective flanking of the main army, which could completely question its connection with Böhmen.

Napoleon arrived in Dresden at 9 a.m. and led the deployment of the troops himself. The rest of his army also gained time to arrive, because the actual attack by the allies was also set for the afternoon on the second day, in order to allow the still demanded troops time to arrive.

Nevertheless, the battle began in the morning on the initiative of the troops. They were too close to each other to be able to remain inactive.

Wittgenstein, proceeding on Pirnaer Straße, sought to seize some farmsteads of the Pirnaer suburb. Kleist had the 11th under General v. Zieten take action against the Great Gardens and the 10th against the Dohnaer Weg from its two brigades on the spot. Both also found one bezel each, No. 2 and 3, opposite. To their left, the Austrians fought for the village of Löboda.

However, the occupation, which had increased towards the previous day, was already noticeable, and it did not escape the allies that strong troop detachments descended from

the north bank heights to Dresden-Neustadt. Under these circumstances, the mood of the council of war against the assault reversed, and only the König of Prussia, which did not want to leave with 200000 troops simply because Napoleon had arrived, carried out the assault by giving the signal.

It was done with great vigor, but unfortunately not on the French right wing, but rather on its strong left wing.

The enemy used 30 battalions behind good bases. He also managed to Wittgenstein across the street. However, he had to leave the large garden, which he held with 12 battalions, to Kleist, who took him step by step with his 11th. Brigade conquered. The landwehr, who came here for the first time in the fire, showed a good attitude.

On the left wing of the Allies, the Austrians took the bezel No. 4 at the Falkenschlage.

There, as here, the actual line of defense, which found a firm footing in the 8-foot-high and defensive garden walls, which encircled the suburbs, was now found. They could not take them and had no specific order to do so. The attackers began to feel their losses in the now oscillating firefight at close distances.

Napoleon, which had now gathered enough forces, thought the moment had come for its intended offensive. He multiplied his batteries as far as the room paid a visit, and then let out of all, city exits, fresh troops break out to counter-attack.

Ney retook Lünette 4 and pushed the Austrians back to Räcknitz, Mortier threw Wittgenstein to beyond Striesen, which place with the help of Kleistschen 9. Brigade was taken back and claimed. However, the enemy was not able to take back the large garden completely. Kleist held half of the same seat last night and also had its 12th position at Strehlen. Brigade ready to assist. These like the 9th had arrived at noon.

The battle in the large garden had been a very violent one. Kleist appeared several times among the combatants to encourage them. The seriously wounded commander of the 11th. Regiments, Maj. v. Sack, he personally ordered to be bandaged, as this brave officer did not want to leave the battlefield. The troops here gave their general the name "Father Kleist."

On the evening of that day of battle, the Allied Headquarters again held a war council and, since the König of Prussia was still against retreat, issued a half-measure to await Napoleon's measures with the army on the heights off Dresden. A success was still to be achieved with a superiority of 50000 men, but the opponent could not be left to take the initiative. But when news arrived overnight that Vandamme had crossed the Elbe at the Königstein and was threatening the retreat, Schwarzenberg's eyes turned only backwards. He set part of the left wing on march in the evening. The battles of the 27th, which became so pernicious to the Austrians, took place only to secure the retreat.

On the evening of that day, König Friedrich Wilhelm also had to realize with a heavy heart that the shortage of food and ammunition and the poor condition of the army were causing the withdrawal.¹²⁴

Thus, since Grolman's proposal to leave southbound for Freiberg was not accepted, it went back to the Defileen of the Ore Mountains, which were filled with everything that goes behind a large army of called and uncalled Weise. This began in the night of 27 to 28 October. Rain fell, which in itself made the already inferior routes even worse.

Only one large continuous street was available for the retreat without restriction, the one via Dippoldiswalde, Altenberg to Teplitz.

¹²⁴ The battle of Kulm and Nollendorf: a lecture, Ottokar Weber, Prag 1897 (2013)

The second large road from the Elbthal to Böhmen ran via Pirna, Berggieshübel and Peterswalde to Kulm. It caused a detour for the bulk of the army if they wanted to use it and was also already threatened by vandalism.

In between lay the path of Dohna Lockwitz via Bärenstein, Fürstenwalde, the Geyersberg or Grays also go to Teplitz.

All the rest was a meager dirt road, especially bad in wet weather.

A direct push by Napoleon alone could not be so pernicious. He could finally only march in the mountain defils and was therefore easily stopped, cavalry he could not use outside the paths to bring the enemy to a halt, for example from the flank.

It was different with Vandamme. The same man used a previously constructed Colonnenweg from Königstein, which was also usable for artillery, and sat down on the Pirna - Kulm road. He then had no further to Teplitz like the allies and had to be there earlier than this, because he could march faster. His movement could be of the most perishable consequences. Rarely has an army found itself in such a critical situation as here the Bohemian one.

It is a lasting credit to Eugen from Württemberg that it has clearly identified this threat. As everybody knows He was standing with his corps not far from Königstein. When on the 26th morning his outposts with troops reported that the corps Vandamme was going over the Elbe, he occupied the Pirna Plateau with his 7,000 troops and kept Vandamme in check, who had turned his eyes even more on Dresden on this and the following day.

The next night, the prince went back to Zehista to be closer to the right wing of the army and also to stand on the great road. Here General Ostermann joined him with the 1st Russian Guards Division and took command as an elder, but Eugen remained the soul of the leadership.

From Schwarzenberg, the order arrived, if the road to Gieshübel had already been moved by enemy detachment, to march to Maxen and join the main army.

It must be made up for the fact that the withdrawal of the disposition was to take place on three roads, namely the Prussians and Russians under Barklay via Dohna, Zehista to Peterswalde, the majority of Austrians via Dippoldiswalde to Teplitz, two Austrian corps via Tharand to Freyberg. However, the two outer streets were already partly in enemy hands or threatened, so that the generals in question thought they had to deviate from the disposition. As a result, while the Austrian left wing took a poor but clear path across Pretschendorf, General Barklay decided to direct the bulk of his troops to the main road to Dippoldiswalde as well. He did not realize that the road over Peterswalde was so important, worth with all his army remnants just to battle their possessions, that his main task was to secure the right flank of the army by all means and sacrifices. Pay a visit that he still pushed more troops onto the already overcrowded middle street.

Happy Weise made Grolmann aware of how worrying it would be if Napoleon were to follow this path, in which everything was wedged together, and achieved that at least Kleist's corps was allowed to go via Maxen to Glashütte and Fürstenwalde. "Grolmann rushed to inform General Kleist of this change in policy and used this opportunity not to return to Barklay, where he felt he was a stranger. From that time on, he stayed as a volunteer with the Kleistscher Korps."¹²⁵

A danger was thus distracted, but always it was the generals Graf Ostermann and Prinz Eugen still free to go to Maxen, because the condition that the way through Gieshübel was

¹²⁵ Mil. -W. -Bl. Supplement, October 1843.

no longer open was true. It was really marching to Gieshübel and Peterswalde detachments of Vandamme.

In a heated conversation with Zehista von Ostermann, the prince managed to get him on the road to Peterswalde. Ostermann, who did not want to expose the guard to such a daring enterprise, demanded to be able to leave first and then marched, without letting himself be held and without taking up such a desired reception position for the prince, to Kulm, where he arrived unpicked.

Eugen followed the Guard with the cavalry and artillery, a measure very appropriate in the given terrain and situation. He himself took a stand against the Pirna Plateau and the Kohlberg, on which Vandamme had settled on the 27th, to secure the withdrawal with his infantry corps. The cooking of the garden resulted in a stay which Ostermann should have avoided. It was already seen that hostile columns were heading for Gieshübel with the clear intention of blocking the way for the departing corps. Cooking down, engaging Eugen's corps in a definite fight for its withdrawal and then not even taking it in, was a case of incomradeship, as he could only be excused by a disturbance of the mental functions at Ostermann, which is also assumed.

The guards, as already mentioned, still got through well. The enemy was so weak at Gieshübel that it made way, so to speak, respectfully. By the time Eugen arrived, General Dumonceau had assembled his entire division. The corps was all but blown up. 2500 men arrived, resounding, Peterswalde. The barrier guard was initially lost.

During these events on the right wing, the army made its return march. She did not emerge unshaken and with considerable losses from the battles at Dresden. Cannons and prisoners remained abundantly in Napoleon's hands, and even in the position of the Prussians there were still-standing rifle pyramids. From Kleist's headquarters, it is also reported that some Landwehr battalions would have been close to dissolution during the retreat, not by the fight, but "by hardship and deprivation, as well as poor clothing condition.

As is known, the withdrawal of allies had on 27. Started in the evening. Napoleon was expecting the fight to be renewed for the 28th and was surprised by the withdrawal. He then sent some of the troops to follow, but the allies had gained a small lead with their main forces. Wonderful Weise had made progress at all, because just as the first withdrawing troops arrived in Dippoldiswalde, the Austrian column magazines arrived there, which had not been held back by mistake, and increased the crowding to the extreme.

In order to secure the withdrawal, Wittgenstein and Brigade Klüx (9th) of the Kleistscher Korps were to remain at the heights near Leubnitz and then withdraw to Dippoldiswalde. Wittgensteins Corps should also take the middle road. He marched off first. Klüx followed after he had repelled an attack on Leubnitz, which took place from the large garden. In Dippoldiswalds, the Austrian army's guard also reached the evening.

Kleist departed for Maxen on the road which had been obtained by him through Grolmann via Lockwitz. Zieten followed as an Arrieregarde after he had stood for a time at Berthen. Kleist stayed overnight with his three brigades at Hausdorf near Maxen, as close to Dresden as the troops in Dippoldiswalde, but much more endangered by Vandamme, who was already behind him.¹²⁶ The main mass of Austrian troops and the Russian-Prussian reserves reached Altenberg. Except for the threatening rapprochement

¹²⁶ In the marching table made of the leave papers, Glashütte is mentioned as a stage for this day. Maybe the corps' corps with headquarters reached this place.

between Vandammes, the retreat had been relatively favorable, as Napoleon did not press for it at all. Needless to say, a considerable decline in the scattered and latecomers found pay a visit. There was a shortage of food, and often in the bad ways the guns had to be moved by crews when they had become stuck.

It was fortunate for the Allies that Napoleon immediately resumed the guiding idea for this campaign, Conquest of Berlin, an idea that cost him four lost battles. Therefore, he did not exploit his victory as usual and soon brought some of his powers in the new direction. In this campaign, he showed an uncertainty and volatility in his intentions that had never been reproached before. He wasn't quite well these days either. However, he had no idea of the unfortunate arrangement of the withdrawal of the allies, nor of the state of their army. Otherwise, he would have exploited the situation more, and could have gained considerable advantages from merely pushing for it.

He, however, only slowly followed Murat on Freyberg, Marmont on Dippoldiswalde and St. Cyr on Maxen, expecting Vandamme to reap the rewards of the triumph. The fact that he could somehow be caught in the flank or back even in his approach in the Thal was beyond calculation.

Napoleon went to Pirna on the 28th and more or less turned its interest away from the defeated army.

At the headquarters in Altenberg, it was decided to retreat further behind the Eger on the 29th. All Russian and Prussian troops excl. Wittgenstein would initially go to Teplitz. The fate of Eugen, and as it looked at all on Peterswalder Straße, was unknown and was in right worry and unrest about the outcome of the retreat. There was no knowledge of many army remnants where they were.

Here, the Austrian General Staff was given the not easy task of leading the extraordinary amount of troops gathered at Altenberg down into the Thal in the shortest possible time. It was so arranged that the Austrian troops should all march over Zinnwald and Eichwald. All Russian and Prussian troops were to use the Defilee of the Geyersberg¹²⁷, over which a long road, coming from Fürstenwalde, ran. But the same thing had to be achieved by a worse transverse route.

This pass was also to be used on the same day by the Kleist near Hausdorf, i.e. 3 1/2 miles from Geyersberg, and then marched to Teplitz. It was absolutely unthinkable that under the prevailing road conditions, Kleist achieved this march goal, even if the Defilee of the Geyersberg was clear until its arrival, which was not to be expected.

It would certainly have been possible to lead at least infantry further west than via Zinnwald down into the Thal and thereby relieve the Geyersberg pass more.

On the left wing, Klenau was to march from Pretschendorf to Waltersdorf. In the mountains would have been Wittgenstein with Klüx, which Army section on the 30th should take an barrier guard position at Altenberg.

The cost of this day, the 29th, was initially borne again by the corps of the Prince Eugen, who defended the Nollendorfer Heights for two hours with his feeble troops. He then pulled out fighting on the busy road to Kulm. Here he could have found a favorable defense position if he had been received, but only at Priests, soon behind Kulm, he found support, thanks to the intervention of König Friedrich Wilhelm. At Priesten, the Stradabach cuts through the road at an approximately right angle. Only 1/4 mile further west the road from Geyersberg empties. It was therefore the last position that could be

¹²⁷ At any rate, this is also the case with Graupen, D. Verf.

taken to secure this debouche. Vandamme was close to fulfilling part of his mission.

The König of Prussia was highly deserving of the existence of the Bohemian army and the victory of Kulm was possible.

While Emperor Franz departed for Laun on news of the advance of the Franzosen, the König attempted to bring Ostermann to a halt through Major v. Natzmer and General v. Knesebeck, whom he sent in succession, which he finally succeeded in doing.

He then rushed to the battlefield, which he reached between 9 and 10 o'clock, and discussed with Ostermann the measures for the resistance. He then stayed close throughout the day to intervene if necessary.

The Eugen Corps had not been pressured by Vandamme and had reached the receiving position, in which the prince now, although not officially, took command of the assembled 12,000 troops.

Vandamme's superiority was not yet evident, as some of its troops were still back, and Vandamme also attacked the leftist Russian wing, on which the terrain favored the Russian people's stubborn bravery.

Eugen stopped by 5 a.m., then its forces were exhausted, the Franzosen gained ground, the Krisis entered. But the decision is still being postponed, and a cavalry assault is stopping the Franzosen. Now three divisions of Barklay arrive, and Vandamme, expecting reinforcements himself, will refrain from further attacks for the day.

Eugen has left 6,000 troops behind, and its troops must pass through the 1st Grenadier division. —

The descent of the Barklac troops from the mountains was successful despite the bad paths. A part had been immediately conducted to the battlefield, a part to Teplitz. The majority of Austrians had also arrived happily in the Thal.

Only the troops initially located with the enemy had far from achieved their marching objectives.

A complete destruction of the Bohemian army could no longer take place, one breathed with relief at the headquarters — but the troops still in the mountains were in a dangerous position. For her stepped on 29. In the evening, the Krisis, which had to come to a decision on the 30th.

In such a situation, in the most threatened, was the Kleistsche Korps. The same thing had happened after a guard battle at Glashütte against advance troops of St. Chr and after a march of three miles, despite great efforts, only in the evening, Count Groben says: after a difficult night march, the area of Fürstenwalde arrived and occupied field camps there, the guard was between Liebenau and Glashütte. The Corps, by the way, thanks to the excellent disposition of its leader, had suffered almost no losses on the return march and was even still in possession of all its coaches. However, Kleist had not been able to comply with repeated requests to him to arrive on the battlefield on that day.

At first, an orderiy officer of the König, Count Schweinitz, had already been sent to Kleist in the morning, when the battle at Priesten started, with the order to "descend as quickly as possible over the Geyersberg into the Thal near Teplitz, in order to serve Count Ostermann as a soutien and possibly take Theil at the battle."¹²⁸

Schweinitz did not meet the general until 3 p.m., between Glashütte and Fürstenwalde. Furthermore, as he rode over the Geyersberg, he was able to tell him from his own

¹²⁸ Bernhardt, Toll III. 210. The depiction of the battle of Kulm most closely follows Bernhardt.

experience that this passport was so traversed and barred by the large number of Russians, vans, provisions, broken guns, etc., that even if time permitted, the Kleistsche Korps could no longer wriggle through at night. Strange Weise asked, Bernhardi continues, one of Kleist's adjutants: "whether there were any enemy troops advancing on the road from Peterswalde to Nollendorf?" "What did the König orderiy officer learn about this?" and Schweinitz replied that this was not likely to be easily ascertained by patrol guards from Fürstenwalde, as we do not know why.

"Kleist himself asserted that he could not march on from Fürstenwalde without resting his tired troops for at least a few hours beforehand, and he wrote to General Knesebeck in the same vein through Schweinitz, who went back: he would indeed speed up his march as much as possible, but an uninterrupted continuation of the same was impossible; moreover, he would not be able to arrive at Teplitz before night, when everything had to be decided, even if he wanted to deny his exhausted, starving troops the very necessary rest; but he would certainly expose his army part to the greatest danger if he wanted to march in the dark through the difficult terrain and the bottlenecks blocked by carts down into the Thal." Certainly a very correct assessment of the situation. A second order from the König to send at least one brigade down could not be complied with for the same reasons.

Late in the evening, Colonel von Schöler, sent by the monarchs, arrived with the order for the next day. This order was the result of a consultation that the König had cultivated with Schwarzenberg and the Emperor who had come from Dux to Teplitz. Since it was almost only about Russians and Prussians, Schwarzenberg was heard little.

On the whole, the monarchs were satisfied that the army had been freed from its critical situation; however, there was great concern for the troops who were retreating, especially for Kleist, since it was now known that he would not be able to pass the Geyersberg Pass well the following day.

It was clear that the position had to be held by Priests in order to allow Wittgenstein and the Austrian guard to be safely debouched. An assault could be even more successful; and if it was even possible to direct Kleist, which had no direct way out of the mountains, into the enemy's flank or ridge, the unfavorable situation could perhaps still be transformed into a favorable one for the allies. The further you deported Vandamme, the easier it was to debouchiren from the mountains, and why not put Kleist in a daring company where its situation could not get any worse than it already was?

Such considerations led to the idea of directing Kleist towards the enemy's flank and ridge, a certain path was not prescribed for him and could not be commanded from the green table, even more appropriately, from Weise. This had to be left to the discretion of the Führer on the spot, as the paths in the mountains were like, and as the situation at Kleist could also change at any moment. At Natzmer, there is news that Colonel v. Schöler had definitely declared the direction on Nollendorf; from a military point of view, however, the Bernhardian view to the contrary is likely to have the same effect, and a position at Eylert also speaks in favor, although this writer's announcements are not considered reliable.

Eylert writes in the chapter "Self-Confessions of Friedrich Wilhelm III."¹²⁹ "Everything is in God's Blessing! I know that for sure, and I have learned that. In 1806, 7 and 8, the blessings were on us and everything failed. In 1813 and 14, his blessing delighted us and everything succeeded.

¹²⁹ Character Traits from the Life of Friedrich Wilhelm III by Eylert, Volume 1, pp. 200.

Even mistakes that were made, violations that occurred, misunderstandings that prevailed, confusion that arose, in a rare combination of happy circumstances, turned out to be our best and produced the most unexpected, happy consequences, so we were surprised and amazed.

In the folk legend, even in historic works, the victory at Kulm, which was important in its aftermath, was to be ascribed to my insight and order; however, the situation is quite different. My federal comrade, the Emperor of Alexander, and I stood on the castle hill near Teplitz on the day of the battle and overlooked the entire battlefield. The wagon bowls swayed and began to lean towards the advantage of the French army when, at noon on the heights of Nollendorf, Kleist and his corps arrived at the very moment of the decision and brought about the victory. This was by no means an ordered plan,¹³⁰ but a fortunate coincidence that led the General v. Kleist, after the unfortunate affair of Dresden, fleeing (?) from the Franzosen to make his way through Böhmen to Schlesien, just at the moment when the aid was needed. We and he knew nothing about each other, nothing was agreed.¹³¹ But that he did not come to a decision sooner, not later, not further to the left, not further to the right, but in the right hour and on the right spot, that was help and salvation from God. My thanks and my Freude were therefore all the more pure and intimate, and I will not let them wither and corrupt by being attributed to me, which is not due to me, but to him alone and his honor."

When Schöler was already with Kleist, it is said that coming from Barklay, at 3/4 11 o'clock, the Leutnant v. Voß followed, which announced that the allies would attack the General Vandamme on the 30th, which could possibly have made Kleist's situation less difficult. This message only strengthened Kleist's plan for the next day.

It would not have been necessary to encourage bold action on the part of the overhead contact line. When Colonel von Schöler arrived in Fürstenwalde, Kleist had already made the decisive decision to march on Nollendorf.

It is actually pointless to investigate the genesis of this decision, and it may never be unequivocally established from whose head the ingenious thought first arose. The deed is that in the war, which commands execution and bears responsibility. He deserves the glory, rightly so.

However, since several historical works specifically remain with this object, it is inevitable that we too will convey our view in all modesty here.

According to our official customs, it would have been Grolmann's job, insofar as he acted as Chief of the General Staff¹³², to lecture the General on the situation of the war and then to illuminate the various paths the Corps could take, according to their advantages and disadvantages. The commanding general then had to vote. There is really nothing to prevent why, in this case too, the course of business was not as described above, if not a statement by Grolmann itself, which we will make later.

If we now look at the general who was approached with the task of taking a decision that would have extremely serious consequences for himself and his corps as well as for the state and the army, we find that in this most difficult situation of his life he was 50 years old, i.e. at the height of his physical and mental powers. For us, he also does not suddenly and unknowingly appear from the crowd of generals, who were never known before, and who at most once, as he found in Bautzen, were briefly mentioned in the story — for us,

¹³⁰ The previous presentation and the following show to what extent this is incorrect.

¹³¹ The previous presentation and the following show to what extent this is incorrect.

¹³² The actual boss was absent D. Verf.

who accompanied him on his military expeditions from Rhein to Champagne, from the Thuringian Forest to Königsberg, from Schlesien to the Düna and from the Düna back to the Saxon Ore Mountains, he is a proven soldier and army leader, rich in experiences of the war. Almost only with luck, in misfortune with skill and quiet security we saw him lead his troops. A situation such as that which had caused him here the deficient warfare of his commander-in-chief, could probably make him serious, but not despondent, could not trot the calm clarity of his will. However, the situation was a very difficult one. A blocked road in front of him, an enemy corps behind him. Heading further west, late arrivals to the battle in which he is to intervene, turning towards Osten, sure collision with a strong foe, unconnected with the troops fighting in the Thal, perhaps a life-or-death battle between two fires. This latter possibility has also been close enough. Napoleon had Vandamme followed another 2 divisions of the Young Guard under Mortier, but the departure of the order in question was delayed until the 30th century. In the afternoon, so that it could no longer take effect. By the way, Kleist had the news that the Strait of Pirna was free.

Kleist chose the most dangerous route via Fürstenwalde on Nollendorf in a meeting with Grolmann that took place without witnesses. Grolmann responded to this plan with the flames of his entrepreneurial spirit, or knew how to recommend it to the general in the most lively way. With pleasure and glad confidence, as his nature and his position paid a visit him, he strode to carry out the bold enterprise, while the general, in earnest silence, considered his responsibility before God and the Fatherland.

When Kleist and Grolmann finished their deliberations, the former joined the generals, who were personally appointed to receive orders on the occasion of the difficult situation, and declared his intention to march on Nollendorf. This decision was generally received with enthusiasm. Kleist, however, made leaders aware of the risks facing the corps, especially that new troop movements from Dresden (on Pirnaer Strasse) could become very sensitive to it. He urged them all to overcome the danger through prudence and prudence and, in the fortunate case, to spoil the enemy.

Colonel v. Schöler received the corresponding notification. "I'm going to back the enemy over Nollendorf. Tell that to the king and the emperor."¹³³ Schöler left with this message that night. He took with him, as he had been instructed, the young prince Friedrich of Oranien from Kleist's entourage, in order to avoid the same from the apparent danger.¹³⁴ Likewise, but only the next morning after departure, with the same message, the Leutnant of Voß returned to General Barklay. After Kleist announced its decision, the disposition drafted by Grolmann was issued, which is found in the records of Count Gröben in the following form and is probably not completely reproduced.

"The corps leaves at 1/2 4 o'clock and continues on the highways to Teplitz, marching off to the right via Nollendorf. The 10th Infantry Brigade is following the backup cavalry. Then the 11th and 12th. Infantry Brigade, all close.

The guard is at Fürstenwalde at 4:00 a.m., after leaving an observation post at Glashütte, and goes to Peterswalde,¹³⁵ observing the Strait of Dresden, and then slowly following the main corps.

The reserve artillery is distributed among the brigades.

All baggage stops, only the horses are taken.

Lieutenant Colonel v. Blücher has the avant-garde with his hussar regiment and seeks to

¹³³ Count Groeben, handwritten communications.

¹³⁴ So the Crown Prince wasn't with Kleist.

¹³⁵ First, in the ratio of a left-hand side detachment.

surprise and destroy the enemy artillery park.

An accomplished officer takes a squad from Nollendorf to Aussig and calls on the French corps, which has been detached there, to surrender.

At the Breitenauer Kreuzweg is the gathering place."¹³⁶

When the commanders of the troops learned of their commander's intent, several officers told Grolmann that he had probably made this great decision.¹³⁷ "Grolmann firmly rejected this, however, saying that the general himself had this idea and that Grolmann could only encourage him in the same way." Thile, whose records Bernhard: citirt, goes on to say that the general never made any comment on this point in later times. With Kleist's almost proverbial modesty, this would be yet another sign that the decision belongs to him alone.

Natzmer also recounts (I, 153) that Grolmann, to whom all flattery had been opposed, had taken a glass at dinner in Fürstenwalde and applied the following toast:

"Gentlemen, let us stand up and drink health on the honored general's behalf; heaven may crown the heroic decision he made to march on Nollendorf with the happiest success. It is a decision that has come solely from the chest of our revered general, in which no one else has any part." Only this once in the entire campaign would Grolmann have spread the general's health. The final sentence of his speech is explained by the preceding questions.

Bernhardi also states that Kleist sent his König a pencil-based report, starting with the words: "The situation I find myself in is desperate, etc. In these circumstances, I have decided to march on Nollendorf in the morning and to cut my fist with the sword; by asking Your Majesty to support my efforts by attacking me simultaneously, I ask Your Majesty to attribute the effects of this step, if it should fail, not to me but to those who have put me in this desperate situation."

The breakthrough with the sword in the fist has pretty much come despite the happy outcome, and in the case of unfavorable outcomes, destruction, at least dissolution of the corps was imminent. The term "desperate," as this word is usually needed, for the position of the Cliché Corps was not entirely unjustified. With this in mind, Bernhardi says that Kleist has been "very blameless" and has been "nagging worried" about what is to come. His authority is hard to disagree with.

According to the Gröbenschen Announcements, however, this impression was not the general one. He writes: "Anyone who has ever thought of the Leonid flock in the evening before the Termopylae has a model of the evening at the Kleistsche Headquarters. "No brave look circling on the walls, no dark one rooted on the ground, in a cheerful yet solemnly earnest mood the hero sat with his entourage and enjoyed the simple supper."

Nor do we want to mention Kleist's own account, which is written in its plain Weise:¹³⁸ "Meanwhile, the enemy had invaded Böhmen over Peterswalde with an army corps, had had a stubborn battle with General Ostermann, which made it doubtful whether my corps would remain open to travel over the Geyersberg. Several messages I received about this route agreed that it would not be possible to pass it the following day with columns. This together led me to the decision to march from Fürstenwalde on Nollendorf and attack the enemy from here."

And finally Schöler said¹³⁹: "He was sent to Kleist in order to persuade this general, if at

¹³⁶ For the entire corps, if it were to be blown up, for example.

¹³⁷ Bernhardi, Toll III, 235 nach Thile

¹³⁸ Natzmer I, 153 et seq

¹³⁹ Bernhardi, Toll III, 234.

all possible, to move into the spine of General Vandamme. This movement did not seem possible, but the description that Colonel von Schöler had to give as an eyewitness about the state of affairs brought the decision to maturity, which acquired the name Nollendorf for the General Kleist with such great right.

On 30 August, Kleist and his entourage rose from the camp after a short night's rest, but the march did not take place at the early hour ordered, but at 5 a.m. At first, the distribution of the reserve artillery to the brigades caused, one did not want to have such a long artillery column together without interruption — some stay, also arrived late Lieutenant Colonel v. Blücher with the brown hussars, who was to take over the avant-garde, because he had been at the guard and had stood against Glashütte.

The sun must have risen long ago when you set out, but as a result of the rain of the past few days, the mountains and Thal lay in thick fog.

Lieutenant Colonel of Grolmann had made it undertake to lead the column across the range via Streckenwalde to Nollendorf and fulfilled his word. When the Tête had reached Streckenwalde, for example, a messenger was dispatched by Colonel von Schöler von Graupen with the message that this pass had been freed from all deadlocked excavation, was now passable and had not yet been reached by the enemy. In any case, Schöler had found him free on his night ride to Teplitz with the prince of Oranien and hurried to get to know him from Kleist. A Bergmann of Ober-Graupen was the messenger of the embassy.¹⁴⁰ From Streckenwalde to Nollendorf it was half a mile, to Graupen it was a whole mile. The battlefield would also have reached Kleist killed in action via barrel before the decision was made, and the request to go flank or back to the enemy was not an order that should have been followed. If the general was a security commissioner, he could access and still choose the safe route. Fearful natures, which in an instantaneous upwelling of the blood rise to a bold decision, lose the confidence, the longer the decisive moment is waiting, the more and like to use a favorable opportunity, which allows them to pull the head out of the noose again. Kleist just asked, "What now?" "I think it's Alten," Grolmann replied. The march continued without interruption.

Close to Nollendorf the fog gave way, the lovely Teplitzer Thal was sunlit at the feet of the Prussians.

General Zieten, who had marched with 7 Fusilier battalions and 4 squadrons to Peterswalde, had not encountered any enemy there and later followed Nollendorf. At about 8 o'clock the Tête of the Corps had arrived at Nollendorf, at 10 o'clock the same was rested there, except for Zieten as everybody knows and the Brigade Klüx (9th), which was located at Wittgenstein. However, 3 battalions were also present here, a total of 25. It was a good start to the day that the hussars of the avant-garde captured a column of 30 ammunition vans near Nollendorf, which carelessly marched after Vandamme with 100 men covered.

Kleist let the troops know the war situation so that they could behave accordingly in difficult cases. He let them know that it might be necessary to fight through and referred to the Horkaberg near Kulm, which is visible from afar and crowned by a chapel, as the direction of general action. Beyond Kulm, the gun battle was maintained, and troop columns could be seen moving forward on the large street.

Kleist ordered the following marching order:¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ Handwriting Announcement by the Count Groeben.

¹⁴¹ Hofmann, 1813. 178. The marching order is not complete.

**The Silesian Hussars Regiment,
1 riding battery,
Tenth Brigade,
1 heavy battery,
24 squadrons of backup cavalry with 2 riding batteries,
11th Brigade,
12. Brigade with a heavy battery (from the reserve).**

Everything should move up close to shorten the march column and allow rapid development, the infantry should march in front of the train. At the foot of the mountain, Kleist wanted to let its corps filter past it once again before it entered the fight.

He had the captured ammunition wagons destroyed. Three battalions and a squad were to remain on the high ground and guard against Dresden.

It may have been — it must have been — serious thoughts with which Kleist kept up, from which he was later to receive his glorious epithet. Like the sailor, when he repels from the land and entrusts his vessel to the uncertain waves, he will have raised his gaze to the handlebars of the battles before leading his troops into the battle raging at his feet. Forward then with God on the enemy! —

People have been fighting for a long time down in the Thal. The news of Kleist's decision had considerably invigorated the spirit of enterprise in the Bohemian headquarters and gained more adherents to the attack, as intended.

However, while the discussions about the attack point were still ongoing, Vandamme himself had taken to the attack, as on the left wing of the allies against the ground at the Eggermühle the day before.

However, on the other side of the battlefield, two Austrian divisions proceeded in an attacking manner, so that Vandamme had to form a defensive flank at Strisowitz. This assault on the French leftist wing occurred after Toll's suggestion, with the idea that it would reach out to Kleist rather than the mountains.

The reciprocal forces kept their balance when the appearance of Kleist decided the battle in one fell swoop.

Vandamme had anticipated the imminent threat and quickly taken his countermeasures, sending back cavalry first. Lieutenant Colonel v. Blücher, who proceeded quickly with his regiment and the riding battery, was able to take another 6 guns unexpectedly, but was then himself hit by a surprise assault of the enemy cavalry on the Tête of the 10. Brigade thrown back. This rejected the enemy in turn, the hussars pursued, the guns were taken again. However, the clash was generally detrimental, as it caused a stay and forced the Prussian corps to develop early.

The infantry of the 10th. The brigade formed in three meetings on both pages of the highway and proceeded to Vordertellnitz. The infantry trains of a regiment had to cover the right flank of the mountain against infantry, which was shown at Liesdorf.

Vordert-Tellnitz was still free of the enemy, Ober-Arbesau, slightly occupied, was taken. The reserve cavalry sought to form on the plain north of this place, Kleist pulled batteries out of the marching column and settled them at the height of Vordert-Tellnitz, also took up position there to run the battle.

Below we give the vivid description of Bernhardi,¹⁴² but not literally. There are some additions made on this side. "When the first shots were fired, the Franzosen believed that reinforcements were coming. Everything was revitalized, the drums were swirling, the trumpets were smashing. Like many a general, he would have been desperate to see the situation suddenly change. Vandamme immediately decided to sacrifice all his artillery to save the rest. The largest part of the artillery was to remain in the position near Kulm and hold off the Russians and Austrians. Vandamme himself wanted to throw himself with the cavalry and the main mass of the infantry at the Prussians to break through to Nollendorf. 20 battalions of his left wing had to make an immediate sweep, occupy 8 of them Nieder-Arbesau and keep them to the extreme, 12 go back to Liesdorf immediately at the foot of the hills above Schanda, while between the two the cavalry chased backwards on the highway with despair. Barklay's dithering and French batteries gave these troops the necessary edge.

The Prussians managed to take Ober-Arbesau, Nieder-Arbesau persisted in claiming the Franzosen, but in turn could not win Ober-Arbesau. An undecided battle weighed in here, which became increasingly difficult to conduct as the individual battalions disintegrated into lines of fire. On the right wing of the Prussians there was no less fierce and controversy in just as confused Weise as the enormous urgency of the circumstances entailed.

The Franzosen brought guns that soon became superior to the Prussian artillery. In fact, the Franzosen initially had the superiority here, since at first only the 10. Brigade (Pirch). The 11th and 12th were separated from Pirch by the cavalry that followed.

The cavalry tried to turn left and reach the area of Arbesau, from where it would connect with Colloredo. The cavalry was followed by artillery to take positions between Arbesau and Auschine.

French chains of marksmen sought to embrace the right wing of the Prussians on the wooded hillbacks, whose position became increasingly difficult.

There were 7 battalions of the 11th. Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel v. Jagow, but hardly in the best order, since some of the people had to push themselves individually on the highway past the cavalry or holding batteries. Three battalions were immediately sent to the bypass on the right flank, the four others were set up across the highway: — but since more and more swarms repeated the bypass, it was not possible to establish equilibrium or to tilt the wagon shell completely in favor of the Prussian troops; these backed away against the highway, guns with shattered Laffetten remained, others threw over in the Chaussee graben — the confusion was on the rise.

When the prince August of Prussia with the 12th. When Brigade descended the hill, Lieutenant Colonel of Grolmann warned him that the enemy of Nieder-Arbesau was also threatening the Prussian left flank. The prince sent two battalions of Silesian army to attack the village. They were decisively repulsed and also dragged away two other battalions that followed them in support while the enemy followed.

All the officers' efforts to restore order were fruitless. The prince himself jumped off the horse, grabbed a flag of the second Silesian regiment and advanced. A few hundred men gathered around him and followed him.

Now, however, the French cavalry, Brigade Mont-Marie at the top, fell on the highway, completely blew up the not yet ordered battalions of the prince August and chased past the

¹⁴² Bernhardi, Toll III. pp. 210 and ff.

Prussian batteries, which pulled down in the column on the highway, up to Nollendorf. In these circumstances, there was no question of unification and order, as new piles of French horsemen, led by General Corbineau, blew up on the street and overstepped everything that came in their way. The infantry still on the street swerved to the right and left of the highway. The fleeing French horsemen drove down the driving guns of the remaining artillery and stabbed the horses dead.

The three battalions left on the crest of the hill had now descended as far as Liesdorf and were standing alongside the highway on the backrest of the hill, but they could not shoot to avoid hitting Freund and the enemy at the same time.

How much artillery was still standing on the highway in Marsh Column when the French cavalry stormed by cannot be ascertained. It could have been the majority of the batteries. But we look more comprehensively at Weise for our cavalry, which was primarily called to defend the artillery and if it was north of Arbesau, but was not too far away. It is only reported that a Landwehr cavalry regiment, at another source the Brigade Mutius, attacked infantry at Arbesau. Moreover, the cavalry of the ground could not have done anything about it, but, by its threatening position, it would have provided support for the Prussian leftist wing.

In Bernhardi's case, we still find that the Colonel of Röder, who commanded the cavalry, went himself to Colloredo in Austria and led its leader to take his approach to Nieder-Arbesau, which would have been very useful. This absence of the Führer may also have been a reason for the inaction of the cavalry. If the terrain only paid a visit it to a certain extent, the situation was created for the rider's weapon to be easy and greatest successes.

During these events, the Russians and Austrians made the general attack, which was now met with no serious resistance.

The monarchs¹⁴³ had observed the battle from the Teplitzer Schloßberg with telescopes (1 1/2 to 2 miles) and soon after 10 o'clock troops were spotted, coming from the hills, took up positions across the highway at Arbesau and started artillery fire.

They disagreed, (again, a sign that Kleist was not required to travel to Nollendorf) Toll immediately claimed that it was Kleist and had Barklay say it was time to attack. As a result, when Barklay, as I said earlier, took to the assault, it was too late to save Kleist from being overrun and to destroy Vandamme completely. After all, the success of the current attack was a great one. The right wing of France was completely disbanded and rescued itself in small troops in the woods, in order to gain a few stretches of forest and Ebersdorf, the French cavalry, apparently so terrible for the defenseless Prussian artillery, was received at the height by the battalions of General Zieten, shot apart and had trouble rescuing itself in dissolution.

What was in the middle between Kulm and Arbesau. and could not avoid right, not left, had to stretch the rifle. 10,000 men were captured here with vandamme. All French artillery fell into the hands of the victors, some 80 guns. Several eagles and flags were taken.

The monarchs who had rushed to the battlefield after Sobochleben witnessed the enemy's irregular flight.

The loss on this side was relatively small, at Kleist only 1500 men.

We had left this when he tried to form a larger battery at Tellnitz, which could be of great

¹⁴³ When we Citiren "the Monarchs", we only ever mean Emperor Alexander and König Friedrich Wilhelm

value for the safe debouching of the corps. But before one reaches the other, a sudden and impetuous enemy forces him here and there into incoherent measures of instantaneous defense on a case-by-case basis. It is not possible for Kleist to carry out a particular plan properly in any way, but it must simply indicate the overall management, whether it wants to or not. The opponent is taking the initiative completely. Kleist, who moved in to attack the enemy in the flank and back, sees himself in the shortest possible time limited to the most passive defense.

The 10th Brigade is attacked by superior forces, Kleist itself demonstrates its reserves, the 11th. Brigade supported, but the overwhelming from the mountains is unstoppable. More and more, the enemy infantry are approaching the artillery at Tellnitz, so that they suffer tangible losses and a portion of the guns must be taken back into the street department. At this moment, the French cavalry storms in, forcing Kleist and its entourage to chase back before and with it on the highways. Probably only when the first bullets of the Zietschen battalions smashed into the horseman's mass and it healed and bent out, Kleist's adjutants managed to lead him down a small forest path from the street.

Almost to the same point at the height of Nollendorf, from which he started the march into battle in the morning, he had arrived in an athenless ride. He had seen the French cavalry squadrons buzzing past, crushing everything that blocked their way, robbing the guns on the street of the crew and service, throwing down part of the Protzen from the highway in involuntary impact. At the same time strong infantry on the mountain in the steady progress and unstoppable outflanking of its right wing. Your own infantry in the Thal are in turmoil in the village battle.

The general thought he was defeated rather than victorious, and in fact he was. General Diebitsch met him, who was far ahead of the reconnoisseur. He knew the general situation and was able to congratulate Kleist on the great success he had helped to bring about.

After learning about the state of affairs, he rode back into the Thal with his adjutants to order his troops.

It is often said that the general met his king on the battlefield. General v. Voß, however, in his handwritten communications, states that this is definitely not true. He writes:

"The information contained in the Wagner Lexikon about how Kleist received the Order of the Black Eagle is incorrect.

I rode with Kleist after the end of the battle of Kulm from Nollendorf on the highways to Kulm to the advance troops to the 4th. The Hussars regiment, which was on the highway forward Tellnitz, and asked the general where he wanted to go, as he was very exhausted like all of us. I suggested riding to Arbesau, which the general approved. When I got here, I had a peasant's parlor cleaned up in the village that the inhabitants had abandoned, and Kleist stayed here for the night with his adjutants. The König sought Kleist on the battlefield to deliver the Order of the Black Eagle star, which he took from the breast of the Crown Prince, on the battlefield. But since he did not find the general, the König rode back to Teplitz. At night, Kleist was ordered by the king to come to Teplitz the next morning. I did not accompany the general to Teplitz on the 31st, so I did not witness the meeting on that occasion. But I can tell you about these scenes what an eyewitness, the late general and minister of Thile I, who had the presentation of the military cabinet at the time, told me. When the König saw Kleist rise from the horse, he had the ribbon of the Order of the Black Eagle given to him, and went towards Kleist at the door of the room

with the open ribbon to hang it on him. Kleist, in his great humility¹⁴⁴ and unpretentiousness, repelled this, telling the king, "I cannot accept this award, Your Majesty, for I have not earned it." The König replied, "Don't bother!" Kleist replied: "Your Majesty overestimates my merits, I cannot accept this award, Your Majesty does not know what condition my army corps is in and what I have lost, I do not know this myself.¹⁴⁵ Rather, I must ask that Your Majesty have my conduct investigated so that I can justify myself." The König knocked over the General's ribbon by exclaiming, "Stupid stuff!" Kleist then repeated again: "Your Majesty overestimate my merits, there are men in my corps who have done the same in their relationship, and whom I commend to Your Majesty's mercy," naming personalities. In particular, he probably emphasized Grolmann's merit and with all good reason. The same man maintained prudence in the worst confusion and supported his general in the best Weise. He always threw new forces at the desperately pressing Franzosen. He also arranged for Prince August of Prussia (12. Brig.) on the attack on Arbesau. Towards the end of the battle, he was shot through the body, but with the help of the Teplitzer bath was restored until the battle of Leipzig. Pour le mérite He received the and the Russian Order of Georg 4th class. The order in counsel for Kleist was:

"Yesterday they gave the army a complete victory by a bold and happy maneuver. I rush to thank you for this with intimacy, and to send you My Order of the Eagle, which you may receive as a sign of My continued benevolence. In order to make you aware of everything that happened yesterday, I would like to inform you that I have received on the battlefield the news of an important victory won on the 26th of May by the General of Blücher, and a battle won by the Crown Prince of Schweden on the 24th. Announce these messages to your army corps, thank My soldiers for every effort they struggle with, and name to Me those who, according to your beautiful example, have earned excellent merit for Me and for the Fatherland. Teplitz, 31 August 1813.

Friedrich Wilhelm.¹⁴⁶

On the Austrian side, Kleist (16. /9.) received the Maria Theresa Cross. Natzmer still writes:

"Count Kleist v. Nollendorf received his nickname from the battle of Kulm. He was a man of noble character, free of vanity and ambition, affable, most generous. As a soldier strict, his kindness of heart often determined him to leniency. Of unwavering bravery he was level-headed in action, but not inclined to bold decisions by free drive. At the start of the battle, he could be impatient and fierce, but became calm as soon as the first shot was fired. He had a decisive skill in pulling himself out of bad circumstances, which was all the more glorious here, because the troops subordinated to him were only poorly trained and equipped. His glorious contribution to the Tauroggen Convention is well known.¹⁴⁷

The Kleist Corps bivouac near Arbesau and Tellnitz, the Zieten detachment bivouac near Peterswalde against Dresden. The corps counted about 23,400 men with 6,000 horses in Plotho that day, so it had already lost over 18,000 since the war restarted.

Here the losses had not been in vain. The battle of Kulm was of the greatest political importance. The victory news from the Katzbach and Groß also went on the same day."

¹⁴⁴ Now that Kleist understood the importance of the battle of Kulm and its march, it was modesty that made him reject it. It seems unlikely to us only because such humility has become alien to us.

¹⁴⁵ As everybody knows The losses were small, but had to appear large at the large resolution. Kleist was also able to assume that its artillery, although not lost, would be incapacitated.

¹⁴⁶ Leave papers from the field marshal. The order in counsel does not exclude the meeting in Teplitz.

¹⁴⁷ Natzmer, I, 153 et seq.

Beer in to boost confidence. But they could not be as immediate and resounding as the triumph of Kulm, in which the troops of the three main powers of the coalition had the same share, and which took place under the eyes of the allied rulers and army leaders. Now even Austrian diplomacy had to believe in the certainty of success; Metternich finally broke off negotiations with Frankreich. Wherever there was wavering and anxiety, there was now a happy feeling of confidence. "On the day of Kulm, the laurels of Dresden withered, and the wavering coalition stood upright again." After the battle of Dresden, Fouqué, to talk to Groeben, wrapped himself in his cloak in silence and prayed quietly:

Lord God, your will shall be done! I sinful human child I unfortunately cannot understand him, I am too stupid and blind But I lift up to you in trouble the painful head And think late and think early: There look who believes this side.

Now he sang enthusiastically:

The Battle of Kulm.

The victory swung its golden wings
Through the Kampfesthal.
Und Wie Altäre Glüh'n Die Hügel
In his beam.
Wallen of the high mountains
Full sacrifice, splendor
Meanwhile, still individually Donner sound,
Echo of battle.

Hart you wrestled, heavy and high
Some hot days,
Now it is, your brothers, it has succeeded,
Victory is awake!

Over sounds of Schlesien's heights
Get out of the marrow,
As Preußens, Schweden's banners fly,
Strong in honors.
Like a fugitive Franzenhaufen
Before the German sword
Heartbreak shake, sway, run
From a German stove.

Could you capture the rich blessing?
From near and far?
Aren't you almost killed before that,

You people of the Lord?

Before that shakes through you holy trembling,

He can and will.

Kneel down under thunderstorms of fruit

And pray still!

Napoleon had lost 80,000 troops since the armistice, Frankreich was already bearing the burden, and above all the human sacrifices imposed on it as now by the Conscription.

In order to give his situation a decisive twist on the Besser, he wished to hit Blücher especially once, but the old Haudegen got up earlier than he did and swerved when the Imperial Eagle extended his catches after him. Meanwhile, Ney left on the 4th. Beat train to Berlin at Dennewitz.

Unable to capture Blücher, Napoleon again turned against the main army. When he faced her, however, he was unable to decide to attack.

Once again, he himself thinks of marching on Berlin, but also abandons this intention and decides to deliver a great battle to the allies in the plains of Leipzig.

Meanwhile, Blücher has struggled to cross Elbe, putting dithering Bernadotte and the cumbersome Bohemian army back on the move. Now the army masses from all pages are rolling towards the battlefields of Leipzig. —

Catching up with the events in the Bohemian army, September brought it first a longer standstill and then back and forth movements at the foot of the mountains, also some outpost battles.

Kleist's corps remained at Teplitz until the 5th, its headquarters was in the Bergschenke.

On this day he received the order to march to Altenberg on the large Dresdener street. His avant-garde under Zieten, which stood near Nollendorf, was to take action against Hellendorf. It was intended to rekognoscure Dresden with the whole Barklaysh army, this popular maneuver of Schwarzenberg's war art. Zieten's mission took him to a different road from the one the corps was supposed to take. Since he had almost all Fusilier battalions with him, the corps was deprived of his light infantry, a circumstance that was important in the tactics and training at the time. Kleist therefore made urgent representations that it would like to reunite its advance troops with him, otherwise he could not form an avant-garde. But his efforts were initially in vain.

Zieten pushed the enemy outposts back into the woods of Gieshübel via Hellendorf, on the 6th via Gieshübel to Zehista, on the 7th he occupied Pirna and Zehista.

Kleist had meanwhile reached Altenberg, but because of the very poor roads, the reserve artillery was left in the Thal.

Now, however, Napoleon itself took action, the Barklaysche Army Restheil was recalled; Zieten was pushed back by the enemy, reached on 9. Nollendorf.

At the same time, Kleist departed via Fürstenau, leaving only one detachment on the main road near Altenberg. He was now almost united.

Wittgenstein was also near Nollendorf, the Austrians mainly in the area of Aussig. So they could at least be used for battle if necessary.

On 10 September Wittgenstein and Kleist were ordered back to Teplitz, where the whole

Bohemian army was assembled and awaited the assault for several days. Kleist's corps was at Rosenthal, its headquarters was in Soborten. Graupen and Mariaschein were occupied by the Guard. Zieten, still in the proportion of the guard, held Kulm and Arbesau.

The enemy appeared with three corps on the crest of the mountain, also occupied the Geyersberg, which was not seriously defended. Napoleon, however, did not attack, but left without a fight. On the 13th, the allies saw themselves again in possession of the mountain debouches.

For the 14th, a so-called major rekognoscirung was decided, namely the Russians and Prussians should hold the Defileen in front and the Austrians left-holed against the enemy flank operation.

Following this, Barklay stated on the 13th from Soborten that General Wittgenstein would attack Nollendorf that day, Kleist would like to have the infantry and part of the cavalry of Prince August, who was on the leftist wing, advance over Ebersdorf to Schönwalde, in order to cover both the leftist wing of Count Wittgenstein and the right wing of the enemy. Prince August wants to contact Count Pahlen, who will command the avant-garde of General Wittgenstein.

"If the detachment takes Schönwalde, it pushes outposts against Breitenau and moves against Nollendorf" or is in contact with this place, if our troops have already occupied it.

By the way, a part of Pahlen's avant-garde also goes to Schönwalde. In conjunction with the designated Russian troops, the brigade under Pahlen will then form the general avant-garde of the army. The remainder of Prince August's troops and his artillery are to go to Nollendorf on the highways. General Zieten's avant-garde resigns to the corps as soon as it is no longer necessary."¹⁴⁸

A second order stated that the Zieten Brigade of Wittgenstein should step down under Kleist's orders, also occupy the position of the prince of Württemberg and the post at Geyersberg, and advance their light troops against Ebersdorf and Fürstenwalde.

This eternal confusion of Prussian and Russian troops, in which, for the reasons mentioned earlier, the Russian leaders were usually given command, was for all circumstances, for the battle management as well as especially for the feeding and maintenance of the battling skills, of the most unpleasant consequences and probably also occasionally brought friction of the commanders.

Barklay de Tolly once complained about General Zieten and asked Kleist to make it known that he was under the orders of General Pahlen and that his attitude towards him would have been unforgivable.

The idea was probably to let the Russians and Prussians share in the same fame as in the losses and to express the brotherhood of arms externally through this mixing, perhaps to increase the competition of the troops. However, both were achieved to a high degree by the Silesian army without breaking the tactical units. A clear reason why this took place with the Bohemian army and only with this one is not apparent. In any case, the Kleistsche Korps has been the most affected. —

Prince August carried out his assignment of 13 September, which he received late, to the Theil and arrived in Ebersdorf at 13:30 p.m. The terrain was difficult and did not allow the enemy's strength to see.

On the 14th and 15th, this detachment and the associated Russian troops spread high and

¹⁴⁸ War Archives of the Great General Staff. Messages from the enemy and orders at the 2nd Corps, September/October 1813. This command is only given in excerpts.

slowly advanced against Dresden. Napoleon, however, had once again changed its intent and wanted to offer the Bohemian army battle again. His renewed action led on the 15th to a clash near Hellendorf with the Wittgenstein advance troops. The same people went back to Nollendorf before the overpowering. The movement initiated on the 14th with the Austrian arm"against the enemy's right flank was now to be carried out on the 16th. As a result, while Schwarzenberg was still unaware of the resumption of the offensive by Napoleon, he issued an order to Barklay, while the Austrian army marched on the enemy's main communication, with the Russian - Prussian army, namely Wittgenstein and Kleist in the avant-garde, to prevent the enemy from debuting in the plain of Teplitz, or if he proceeded with supremacy, to retreat to Bilin and keep the Defileen of the Biela, until the Austrian army from Marienberg, where it first marched, would give the matter a different turn.

Schwarzenberg follows instructions for Wittgenstein and Kleist. In the same, he determined, encroaching on the sphere of command of his underleader Barklay, that Wittgenstein should observe the terrain from Ebersdorf to Olbernhau with the majority in Dux, Kleist the route from Ebersdorf, Graupen eastwards to Niedergrund on the Elbe.

But now Wittgenstein stood with the majority of his troops in the Kleistsche section and vice versa, and also at the enemy. So the corps had to more or less detach and march into disarray. A command that will have lured even the quiet Kleist sometimes a harsh word on the tongue.

These commands, as well as the following ones, offer very little of general interest. They are here only to give a pity to how these circumstances lay in the Bohemian army, which during this campaign belonged to Kleist, enjoyed the dubious distinction. He will certainly often have been eagerly thought of by comrades in the Silesian army and wished away from the dullness and obscurity of Schwarzenberg's command.

The intended instruction determined the nearer that Kleist should run the route from Niedergrund a. /Elbe to incl. Ebersdorf and Ober-Graupen, the bulk between Nollendorf and Eula. He was to keep in touch on the right bank of the Elbe with the Field Marshal Leutnant Bubna and through him with the Blücher Army. "If there are advantages in attaching something to the enemy, then these are to be used, but without ever putting anything at risk (!) In the event that the enemy should make an incursion into Böhmen with all his might, this corps withdraws to Aussig, possibly unites with the troops of General v. Bennigsen or of Blücher, which are in march, and debouches through the bridgehead of Tetschen, which is proposed to be built as quickly as possible, or it withdraws into the low mountains and defends it in association with Wittgensteinschen as long as only ever possible and until the returning army of Marienberg is able to prevent the enemy from further advancement.

Schwarzenberg only ever looks backwards. The battle of Kulm did not give him enough confidence. He is afraid of meeting the emperor himself.

Barkley orders Kleist, according to Schwarzenberg's disposition, to march with two brigades to Nollendorf and replace General Wittgenstein there. He was also expected to occupy the route from Schneeberg via Eula to Aussig fairly soon.

A brigade was to be left to observe and defend the paths leading over Geyersberg and Graupen. The same was to be regarded as a reserve in the event of a withdrawal to Teplitz and Bilin.

All side routes should be spoiled and covered by sheaths and small detachments. It would also be desirable for the post in Nollendorf to be made more durable by means of ski

jumps and blows. In addition, he left all details, such as the deployment of the avant-garde troops on the way from Gieshübel, Breitenau, Eula and near Ebersdorf to the insightful leadership of the general. Wittgenstein would remain with Kulm today as a soutien.

Kleist then issued the following disposition:

"The 10th and 11th. Brigade immediately, marching to the right, in march to Nollendorf, where they stay and await further orders. The eleventh brigade marches ahead of the tenth.

The troops under the command of General v. Zielen all gather between Sobochleben and Kulm, and the 10th and 11th. When the brigade arrives there, each battalion that belongs to it invades the column, so that the brigades are reformed as they were originally. The 4 squadron Neumark Dragoon Regiments and the 2 companies of Riflemen remain with the 11th. Brigade attached. The foot battery located at Major General v. Zieten is the 10th. Brigade as a reserve. The riding battery, however, pushes to the 9th after the columns are over. Brigade and will pick up General v. Klüx and have her assigned to the march directorate.

The Reserve cavalry, excluding the Silesian uhlan Regiment, which was established at the 9th. Brigade bumps, follows 10. Brigade and also takes the march to Nollendorf.

Half a pioneer company stays with the 9th. Brigade, all other pioneers in the corps follow the 10th. Brigade and remain with the same until they are assigned another assignment.

The 9th Brigade under Major General v. Klüx remains here all to observe and defend the paths leading over Geyersberg and Graupen, and the General v. Klüx will receive even closer orders for conduct because of this.

The backup artillery stops in front of Teplitz.

The troops have to march at least with the food they have today. However, the convoy wagons will remain at Teplitz until further orders are given and, after consultation with the Austrian catering officials, they will be ordered where the food will be taken from. The 9th However, the brigade and the reserve artillery still draw such from Teplitz.

As soon as the 9th Once in their position, the two squadron Brandenburg cuirassier Regiments, after they are relieved, join the reserve cavalry in the marching direction on Nollendorf.

The determination of the headquarters will take place in Nollendorf, to which each brigade will send an adjutant."¹⁴⁹ Signed by Kleist.

Klüx received the promised special instruction.

Kleist advanced from Soborten at 11 a.m. When he arrived in Nollendorf, Pahlen was pulling out in front of the enemy. Kleist soon realized the enemy's strength and considered a fight on the high with the Defilee in his back to be too unfavorable to take it at all. It would also have been against his instructions.

He therefore, by giving Zieten the Arrieregarde to which Russian cavalry still pushed, immediately resumed the march behind Pahlen. Zieten held the position at the Nollendorfer Church until the withdrawal was completed. Then he followed, by once again stopping at Tellnitz and stopping for a short time, to Kulm and in the evening he stood at this place, where Kleist had its headquarters.

Kleist's retreat was in keeping with Barklay's intentions. An order of the same called him back with the majority to the old position at Rosenthal. Nollendorf should be defended

¹⁴⁹ War Archives of the Great General Staff.

stubbornly only by an barrier guard. However, this order was only issued in Kulm at midnight, when Kleist had already returned from its own resolution.

Schwarzenberg now realized that the enemy was serious and did not let the Austrians march off to the left. He once again united everything to the battle.

Zieten stopped in front of the position against Tellnitz. At Kulm, the 2nd Russian Corps. Behind Kulm Wittgenstein and Kleist. On the right wing near Striesowitz the 1st and 2nd Austrian Corps. The Russian-Prussian reserves live in Reserve near Soboch.

Schwarzenberg also issued a long-standing disposition in the event of an assault from Nollendorf, which he was now certain to expect.

The same guy really found a pay a visit. Zieten was ousted by Tellnitz and Arbesau.

At 3:00 a.m., Kulm was attacked. Schwarzenberg, however, had a counter-attack from the flank, whereupon Napoleon withdrew again. He went to Pirna, where he remained from the 19th to the 21st.

Schwarzenberg praised in the order for the 18th the renewed proof of the bravery and good harmony of the Lord Generals of the allied armies. As prisoners said, the emperor wanted to enter the plain on the 18th. Schwarzenberg mistakenly anticipated the assault and issued a supplement disposition for it.

The Bohemian army could well have needed a period of recovery. Especially the corps of Wittgenstein and Kleist were strongly taken by incessant marches, combined with outpost battles. Consistent rainy weather was added, and eventually the long stay in the same area had almost exhausted the means of support for the troops. Versorgung had to be taken four miles away.

Schwarzenberg therefore gave the army a few days' rest in preparation for a new offensive. Bennigsen¹⁵⁰'s arrival should also be awaited.

Kleist went back to Soborten, the advance troops slowly moved forward, Zieten occupied Nollendorf for the so and so dieted times. The corps were laid apart more for better food, the army expanded to Dux.

On 26 September, Bennigsen's reserve army approached the Bohemian army, and the advance was decided upon anew. Not least because Blücher had crossed the Elbe near Wartenburg and took away the timid strategists of the Great Headquarters.

On the 27th, Kleist assembled its corps for the following advance at Soborten and Mariaschein and marched on the 28th to Dux, headquarters of Otteggk Abbey, on the 29th via Brür to Kammern, headquarters Hareth, on the 30th was Rest.

The army was to go over Commotau and be in Marienberg on the 5th. Schwarzenberg learned with certainty that the enemy had moved to Leipzig and decided to follow.

Kleist and Wittgenstein were to go to Zwickau to support the numerous patrol corps on this side, which had been successful in the Altenburg area, and possibly to break the link between Erfurt and Leipzig themselves. Kleist's stages were:

1 October Kommotau, Eidlitz headquarters.

2. Kríma.

3. Via Preßnitz to Weipert. On that day, an outpost battle with the 2nd French Corps found pay a visit.

4. Annaberg. Outpost battle with the 5th French Corps.

¹⁵⁰ With the Russian reserve army.

5. Via Schwarzenberg to Schneeberg. Wittgenstein arrived in Zwickau that day.

6. The two corps merged in Zwickau. Outpost battles at Flöha.

7. Quietness in Zwickau. A detachment went to Gößnitz. Altenburg was supposed to be attacked that day, but Poniatowsky had already cleared it.

8. Zwickau deadlock. The Great Army arrived in the area between Chemnitz and Penig.

On the 9th, the direction was generally taken to Leipzig. The Corps of the Left Wing

They turned northward. Kleist came to Altenburg, avant-garde Windischleuba.

On the 10th, the enemy advanced on Borna, and Wittgenstein met him. The battle broke out. Kleist sent the Brigade of Zieten to assist, which proceeded as far as Frohburg without coming to the intervention. In contrast, Kleist's cavalry still came into contact with the enemy and in pursuit reached Flösberg and Steinbach.

On the 11th, Schwarzenberg also arrived in, Altenburg. Kleist and Wittgenstein were to go to Borna, remain there on the 12th and only advance their avant-gardes, while the army spread more to the left. Schwarzenberg still hoped to use maneuvers to convince the enemy to give up Leipzig.

On the 13th, the leftist shift was resumed, the army already extended via Zeitz to Weißenfels. Kleist came to Espenhain. —

The Bohemian army had thus moved to 2 miles from Leipzig, in other words to such a close proximity that the concentrated Napoleon could attack it with ease and superiority if it was not prepared for such an attack.

Schwarzenberg still wanted to expand further to the left. Apart from the fact that nothing could be achieved with maneuvers at Napoleon ("you don't bypass an army of 400,000 troops" he had said at the beginning of the campaign), further expansion and left-hand pushing also contained a real danger. The monarchs therefore resisted Schwarzenberg's plans and caused the army to be more united and the main masses to come to Pegau as did the headquarters.

The advance troops were pushed closer to Leipzig. Kleist's corps came to Magdeborn, its headquarters to Dechwitz. To his right the Austrian corps Klenau was advanced against Liebertwolkwitz.

Both were preceded by the cavalry of Count Pahlen over Magdeborn. This general led 18 squadrons of Russian hussars and a riding battery. Since the terrain near Leipzig made the appearance of strong cavalry masses likely, he had been allocated 10 squadron von Kleist, namely Neumärkische dragoons, East Prussian cuirassiers and Silesian uhlans, as well as the riding battery No. 10. He was also to receive a Russian cavalry division. However, since this had not yet arrived, Pahlen asked the General Kleist for the remainder of his cavalry, which he also provided with 16 squadrons, namely: Brandenburg and Silesian cuirassiers, the 7th and 8th. Landwehr-cavalry-Regiment and also the riding battery No. 12. With this mass of 6000 horses Pahlen went over sheep-farm Auenhain. Markleeberg and Wachau were found occupied. Between this place and Liebertwolkwitz, the long lines of an equally strong cavalry appeared. Again, a Russian general commanded, although of the 44 squadrons, 26 were Prussian.

To him commanded Murat.¹⁵¹

His emperor called him a "beau sabreur" and trusted him, apart from his tigerous bravery, once the battle was under way, not to have any great 'leadership talents.

¹⁵¹ Bleibtreu, Napoleon near Leipzig.

He commanded a good force, the cavalry Corps Milhaud, the old dragoon regiments who had come from Spain with Marshal Augerau, and the Polish lancers of the Poniatowsky Corps. But the horses were taken hard and tired of endless marches. The attacks were ridden only while trotting.

Murat's cavalry was thrown. He himself, in his comedic costume, was in the middle of the fray. A green velvet skirt, karmoisin red corduan boots, Mamelukensteigbügel and a crooked Damascener formed his striking equipment. He rode a courageous Arab mold, overloaded with tassels and strings.

Thus the Leutnant v. d. Lippe found him from Kleist's Neumärkische dragoons and threw himself at him. König fled, but Lippe did not let go of the persecution until enemies surrounded and killed it. —

On the 14th, only the weaker part of the army of Murat was opposite the Bohemian army, on the 15th morning Napoleon, who had at last stayed in Düben without decision, arrived and soon after him his corps arrived at Leipzig.

Schnell ripened in him the decision to attack the Bohemian army with supremacy. Preferably right away, but he had not yet assembled his troops in the morning. He had to wait and decided on 16 October to keep the line Markleeberg - Wachau - Liebertwolkwitz and with several corps to beat the enemy right wing decisively. Of these corps, which were to participate here, some were still in the north, where they had so far observed only weak forces against themselves.

Everything depended on whether the Silesian army came in or not. If Napoleon managed to gather the intended troop mass at Zuckelhausen and use it uniformly, the Bohemian army was probably defeated on the 16th. But Blücher intervened, so Napoleon could only count on one corps at the decisive point.

Napoleon did not believe that the Silesian army could come the other day because he did not wish it to. Even as four rockets on the 15th. Arriving in the evening from the area of Halle, in response to a similar signal from the Bohemian army, Napoleon wanted nothing of it. Nor did he have the chance which Schwarzenberg's leadership offered him, in that he asked Blücher to go over Merseburg to reach out to the main army behind Leipzig, only the battle merry wanted to seize the enemy, now that a considerable supremacy against the same was almost gathered-and in fact only waiting to touch the corner, not let go unused. He marched straight on Leipzig and, in the most glorious battle that the Yorkish Corps had in that war, held the Corps of Marmont and Souham at Möckern and defeated them in a final victory.

For example, in the battle of Wachau, instead of three corps, only Macdonald could lead the offensive on the right wing of the allies and not achieve a resounding success. —

Schwarzenberg had also decided to attack on the 16th. Until the morning of that day, he believed that Napoleon would let itself be maneuvered away by deceiving itself about its strategic fragility. Thus, he still held out the prospect, albeit tactically, of a move in Napoleon's right flank to bring its decision to pull out to maturity. He united for this purpose, especially on the former Saxon Langenau counsellor, which could not have known the nature of the "Aue", to 30,000 men in the wooded terrain between Elster and Pleiße, in which they could not move and be held by weak enemy forces at Konnewitz. Furthermore, he had 20,000 men west of the Magpies on Lindenau.

The Prussian - Russian guards, who also wanted to draw Schwarzenberg into the floodplain, held Alexander back by a power spell as a reserve at Rötha on the right bank of the Pleiss. The conversation about this point between the Kaiser and Schwarzenberg

had been quite intense. "With the Austrians he could do whatever he wanted," Alexander finally said, "the Russians would only stay on the right bank of the Pleiss."¹⁵²

In all, only 65,000 allies remained on the terrain from Kröbern to Fuchshain for the disponibel raid.

Napoleon had 109,000 troops at their disposal across the street from Markleeberg to Holzhausen, under a unified leadership, while the attackers, who had to pay for the costs of Schwarzenberg's theories with their blood, were not even brought forward and beaten off at the same time, but successively.

Four columns were formed. Column 1 under Kleist against Markleeberg, Column 2 under Eugen from Württemberg against Wachau, Column 3 and 4, Prince Gortschakoff and Klenau, both against Liebertwolkwitz. The intermingling of the Prussian - Russian troops reached its highest level. A Prussian brigade was assigned to each of the columns, beginning with the 12th, 9th, 10th and 11th wings.

Thus, Kleist had of its own troops only the brigade Prince August of Prussia under his command, 225 officers, 6000 troops, with a squad of Silesian uhlans.

In addition, the 14th Russian Division of Helfreich, 2,500 troops, the Russian cuirassier Brigade Lewaschoff and two squadrons Lubno-Hussars, still 1,200 troops were at his disposal. All in all, 10000, while his corps, having received some replacement team in early October, counted 23435 heads, with 716 officers and 5182 horses. The special disposition that so dismembered the Kleistsche Korps came from Wittgenstein.

All the columns were so far apart that they could not support each other directly, most of all the third and fourth columns. Between the two, Count Pahlen should therefore proceed with the Prussian - Russian cavalries to liaise.

The enemy stood in several lines in succession. He had occupied the front heights and villages only weakly, but behind them he stood in deep masses to lead the defense more actively.

The honor of opening the battle fell to the Kleist column. Between 8 and 1/2 9. At that time, her avant-garde encountered French squabblers between Krostewitz and Markleeberg, who moved to this place. Behind the same was Poniatowsky with the 8th. Corps.

Kleist formed its Prussians on either page of the street, with the Helfreich division on its right, and the cavalry in reserve. He had two battalions of the 9th. Attack Brigade¹⁵³ under Lieutenant Colonel Löbel Markleeberg. From the manor on the left bank of the Pleiße, Austrian gunmen supported the assault by gunfire across the river.

The place was taken after fierce shooter battles and the Franzosen respectively Polen was forced into a small oak forest, which was 800 steps north of Markleeberg. Here they sat down again, while the Prussians, who were pushing a little too quickly, came into the fire of the batteries, which had now reached the height northeast of the village, and were simultaneously attacked by Polish lancers. About 100 men were captured.

The Prussians had to return to Markleeberg, which they initially held. The Helpy Division, on the right hand side of the road and unprotected by the village, came earlier into enemy artillery fire than the Prussians and faced an infantry that strengthened quickly and considerably. An attempt to proceed over the ground, which extends from Markleeberg to Wachau, proved to be unworkable. On the contrary, the Franzosen themselves soon

¹⁵² Wuttke, Leipzig battle

¹⁵³ From the 6th Reserve Regiment, commanded to the 12th. Brigade.

proceeded more aggressively and pressed on the right flank, which was still unconnected to the second column. A battery of 10 guns gave the infantry some support, but came in danger of being taken.

For these reasons, Kleist drew part of the 12th. Brigade turn right to take a position between Markleeberg and Auenhain.

From the outset, the Kleistsche Column shows an advanced wing in Markleeberg and a bent-back right wing that does not advance, stands more or less in the air and struggles to assert itself. Markleeberg was lost and recovered several times, but at last remained in the possession of the Prussians.

The second column, Prinz Eugen, hitting the fray a little later than the first, initially took Wachau, but was unable to keep the place in the swaying battle. However, the troops were able to settle in a position south of the village, in hollow paths and bushes and in turn prevent any Debouchiren from Wachau. Prince Eugen fought with the most heroic stamina to see if everything around him sank to the floor. He deserves the honor of the day first and foremost. If the position was broken here, the day was also lost.

Standing up was difficult alone. Gun to gun crowned the heights between Wachau and Liebertwollwitz, and a real hail of bullets blew down continuously on Eugen's troops. They were contested by the Ninth. Brigade, v. Klüx, beyond praise. —

The 3rd Column, coming from Störmthal, attacked Liebertwolkwitz before the 4th approached, and was thrown back after the University Forest. The Prussian 10th The brigade was in reserve.

When later the 4th When the column arrived, Liebertwolkwitz was taken and the Kolmberg to the right. While the situation is getting better here, the difficulties on the left wing are growing.

Prince Eugen had already lost half of his Russians and Prussians, and had used up all his reserves. Kleist only held on to Markleeberg with difficulty. His right wing was pushed back more and more on Kröber since the Franzosen were definitely owned by Wachau. Here, too, the fight was back and forth. A direct assault by enemy infantry was turned down by Colonel von Schwichow with several right-wing battalions. In the further course of action, however, as in the morning the conquerors of Markleeberg, he was strongly taken by the enemy and then attacked by the Polish cavalry.

The Brigade Lewaschoff, regiments Klein-Rußland and Nowgorod, threw these and intervened in the infantry battle repeatedly with good success. On the whole, however, the allies here came into a declining movement.

Between Elster and Pleiße, the Austrians were also unable to make progress.

Napoleon, as stated above, had not been able to carry out its actual plan, as Blücher had detained the Marmont and Souham Corps in the north. Nevertheless, victory beckoned him. He realized from the Galgenberg that it only took a small pressure to make the thin and reserve-lacking lines of the enemy center give way. So he formed a huge wedge to break it.

Napoleon wanted to take the decisive step with all the cavalry against the pierced position of the Prince of Württemberg near Wachau. Infantry was to follow to complete and capture the achievements of the Horsemen as Drouot's gun reserve reinforced the overwhelming mass of artillery.

Again, it was Murat who was to command the imposing horse masses, against 9,000

horses.¹⁵⁴

It is not up to us to describe the details of the next horseman's struggle. The huge thrust had no resounding success, as the Eugenic troops stood like the walls and those cavalry brigades, which advanced to Guldengossa, were rejected by rushing Russian and Prussian cavalries and still infantry.

The monarchs had ordered the Russian-Prussian reserves to Guldengossa, and these came just in time to break the strength of the Reiter rush and to keep the Guldengossa, which was severely threatened by the French infantry.

However, the Emperor Alexander had also called on Schwarzenberg to take the Austrian reserve back to the right bank of the Pleiße, and the latter, having realized that the floodplain was not advancing, did so.

These troops, the cavalry division of Nostitz and the infantry divisions of Bianchi and Weißenwolf, arrived at conquers when the Kleist forces at Markleeberg had reached the end of their resistance. The Auenhain homestead was already in the possession of the enemy. Kleist's right wing was forced out of communication with Prince Eugen, and the defenders of Markleeberg could be cut off at any moment.

A new assault with overwhelming force, with the fresh infantry of the Corps Augerau, with the cavalry Corps Kellermann and the Guard cavalry Brigade of the brave Letort, approached and threatened to destroy the day's labor.

Here too, the aid mentioned by the Austrians came at the right time.

The battle was maintained, mainly by the devoted bravery of the 2nd and 1st. Column, no victory for either part. When the last cannon shot fell at 6 o'clock, the Bohemian army stood in the line of Konnewitz (which it did not have), Markleeberg, Auenhain, Guldengossa, Groß Pöbнау, Leiffertshain. From Kleist's forces, the 12th. Brigade, relieved by the Hungarian regiments of the Bianchi Division, near Cröbern. The 9th and 10th. Brigade, which the latter had intervened at Gossa at last, at this place, the 11th, which had not come to special activity, at Pöbнау, the cavalry in Störmthal.

The outposts were very close across the board, at Auenhain and Gossa — as is recounted — to 100 steps, which sounds very unlikely. In any case, the troops all had to bivouac and more or less ready for battle. Kleist stayed the night at 12. Brigade.

It was a rough and rainy autumn. On 14. In the evening a heavy rain had wiped out the watchfires, the 15th had also been a wet cold day. The troops spent the nights outdoors in the cold and had to fight every day in wet clothes. Also ant 16. it had not been better, it had rained with interruptions, the air was cool. The night of the same, the closeness of the enemy increased the arduousness of the situation. However, the food was inadequate and there was also no time to make a special effort. Although it was ordered, as on the 16th, that the troops should boil down before departure, the march was often so early that the majority of the team moved out soberly to strenuous combat. If it had been "a battle for the estates of the world", then in the hot days of Leipzig some weaker power would have failed, but it was "the most sacred", what our fathers protected with the sword. They actually put the last breath, the last drop of blood on the big thing. —

Napoleon clearly overlooked the situation and did not ignore its disfavor. In the north, Blücher stood at the gates of the city, through which and then further on a single long dam-defilee the retreat had to take place. He knew that allied reinforcements were coming, which would throw a significant numerical overweight in the bucket. He could not expect

¹⁵⁴ Data range from 4 to 12000.

a better result from a renewal of the struggle, since he had not won on the 16th under relatively favorable circumstances, even if St. Chr and Reynier still came in.

If he still didn't leave on the 17th, it was because he didn't want to give up without really being beaten Deutschland. Why shouldn't he, the victorious battle emperor, who alone made up an army, once again trust only the favor of the goddess of victory, who was so often graceful to him?

Why not dare to throw it when the efforts of 30000 people were of no interest to him? Even chance often plays a big role in the war, the card could perhaps still beat for him!

If, however, he remained inactive on 17 October and did not attack, deliberately worsening his situation, it was firstly because he no longer felt strong enough to carry out an attack without the allies having previously had their heads tied to his strong position. The enemy had to give nakedness before it could happen. But even more decisive for his waiting was the mission of the captive General Merveldt, whom he had sent to his father-in-law with peace proposals. The success of this program gave him decisive hopes, and in it he was mistaken, as he had to learn on the evening of the 17th.

Kleist hurried, as he was no longer needed at Cröbern, to gather his troops in the morning and united the 12th. Brigade with the 9th and 10th at Guldengossa, also took with the Prince August of Prussia quarters in this place. The 11th The brigade and the bulk of the cavalry remained detached.

The monarchs renounced the attack on the 17th because the Bennigsen Reserve Army could not fully arrive until the night of the 17th/18th. They gathered with Schwarzenberg the generals at the height south of Guldengossa, where the situation was discussed and the order for the attack of the 18th was issued. In general, for the actions of the Bohemian army, the troops were combined as they stood at the time and given the previous direction. Bennigsen's army was given the general direction to Holzhausen.

Some of the troops on the left bank of the Pleiße and the left bank of the Magpie were ordered to come, now that their stay there promised great success. The Prince of Schwarzenberg still could not rise to the height of the situation.¹⁵⁵ He did not feel up to the feared emperor, the thought of completely beating him or even destroying him lay so beyond the possibility that he could not grasp him. Heavily, the responsibility weighed on him. In his letters, he bemoans his difficult fate. With his decision to withdraw the Giulay Corps from the Lindenau area, he built a golden bridge for the enemy, and he was also certain of the correctness of the sentence that this had to be done. The lion, which has already been struck down by the bullet, is only tentatively approached by some hunters, Schwarzenberg bowed before the stronger spirit of Napoleon, even if the emperor had only a handful of troops, and felt inferior to him, as the story of 1814 also shows. —

Kleist was present at the meeting of the generals. He proposed that the 600 steps north of Gossa, which was still occupied by the Franzosen, be attacked overnight. The allies were then able to organize themselves much better for the attack the other day and saved victims of human lives. However, the proposal was rejected, but the height was cleared without battle afterwards.

When Napoleon saw his hopes for negotiations fail, he took a more concentrated line backwards in the early morning of the 18th, closing the gap between the two parts of the army that fought separately on the 16th, in the Löbnig, Probstheyda, Stötteritz, Stüntz, Schönfeld line. Its frontal extent was thus limited to 1 1/2 mile, not too much for 140,000 men supported by strong artillery. The line-up had two fronts colliding at right angles at

¹⁵⁵ At Leipzig, political motives may not well have led him to act weakly.

Probstheyda.

The altitude at which this village lay, dominating to the south and with a good firing field to all pages, crowned by the village that was well defended, had an extraordinary strength. Here you could really say that Probstheyda was the key to the position. If this place was lost, Napoleon's position was rolled up after both pages. Accordingly, Napoleon had accumulated large numbers of troops here. The village and the altitude should primarily keep the second corps Victor. Farm (adjacent to the manor) Behind it, in the second line, was the fifth corps Lauriston, in the third, close enough to intervene, the Guards at Thonberg.

The weakness of the point was that it was at the angle that it emerged. It could be taken under crossfire by a large number of artillery, which were set up on the one hand between Zuckelhausen and Dösen using the monarch¹⁵⁶ hill and on the other hand between Zuckelhausen and Zweinaundorf, and here particularly effectively, and worked for so long that a concentric, uniform attack had to succeed. If, however, such artillery preparation were not renounced, one did not wait until the semicircle was closed and thus attacked so to speak experimentally this fortress in the field of any page, then the troops that were put on it were sacrificed and only superhuman bravery could lead to temporary successes, which, however, had to be made up for by the strong French reserves at once.

This is the story of the Cliché Corps for that day, because it, like its brother in arms, the noble prince Eugen, was given the job of taking Probstheyda, the same troops who fought at Kulm and Nollendorf, had bled the most at Wachau.

There was only one Prussian corps in the Bohemian army, the Kleistsche, each time it fought in the first rows.

The division of the troops for the 18th was such that only weak forces remained at Lindenau and Connowitz, while on Dösen and Löbnig 45,000 Austrians were to go ahead. The second column, 55,000 men under Barklay, was to take Wachau and Liebertwollwitz. In the further course of action, she had to come across Probstheyda from both places. The third column 65,000 men went to Holzhausen. At this was the 11th Prussian Brigade.

At the top in the north, Blücher attacked the Sacken farm (adjacent to the manor) Corps, a suburb of Pfaffendorf, and was able to persuade the Crown Prince of Schweden, through the release of the Langeronian Corps, to cross the Partha at Taucha and then intervene in the battle. The iron ring was now closed for good, and was meant to crush Napoleon's might.

The great drama of the Battle of Nations started, accompagnirt by a Donner of guns, as it should not be heard more horribly in those times of war.

The sun tore up the curtain of the previous trotting days and lit up the first day of the new budding freedom of nations.

The troops advanced with drumbeat and music. Everyone was aware of the magnitude of the moment.

The second column Barklay consisted of the Russian - Prussian Guards, the first and second Russian corps, the cavalry of Count Pahlen and the 9th, 10th and 12th Prussian Brigades. The greater part of the troops, including the Prussian, was commanded in particular by the Count Wittgenstein, so that Kleist, in addition to the commander-in-chief Schwarzenberg, even had two Russian generals over him. Again, that strange instruction! Why wasn't Kleist at least directly under Barklay? What is the point of an intermediate

¹⁵⁶ Afterwards so called.

body whose intervention is not known? This column was again divided into two columns which proceeded parallel to one another and combined before Probstheyda. On the right, Count Pahlen went with the main mass of the cavalry to Liebertwolkwitz. He was followed by the first Russian corps. On the left, Kleist marched on Wachau, with the second Russian corps and reserves behind him.

Kleist set out very soon, as soon as he saw the enemy's departure from his position. At the Tête he took the cavalry and three batteries.

The advance over the battlefield of Wachau, on which the murderous battle of the 16th had raged, was terrible.

At first, the enemy did not stand up seriously anywhere. He cleared both sheep-farm Meisdorf and the Monarch's Hill as soon as the Prussians developed some battalions.

At 10 a.m., Kleist reached the heights before Probstheyda and realized that the enemy had taken a full stand in the battle. He therefore stopped and set up a battery of 50 guns on the heights of the street Meisdorf - Probstheyda, to which later in the course of the battle Austrian batteries on the left wing connected. The cavalry was hidden behind the artillery. On the right hand, the tête of the third column had reached the battlefield. Especially the 11th. Brigade approached Zuckelhausen, so that the second army corps could be considered united for the first time before the enemy.

While the battle started here, the Austrians reached Löbnig on the left wing, but were thrown back over Dölitz and Dösen later in the battle. —

No attack was made at Probstheyda until about 2 o'clock; according to the directives issued, it was to wait until columns 1 and 3 had penetrated. Killed in action But Column 3 could not take Stötteritz earlier than it was until Probstheyda, and so Alexander¹⁵⁷ ordered the assault. His argument was true, but one could not have done without the preparation of the attack, if one wanted to do it before the time.

Not even the artillery of the first and second Russian corps, which stood behind the monarch's hill, was preferred.

So a struggle took place, as it was characterized at the beginning, a useless consumption of troops without foreseeable success. It was clear that the Prussians, who were even allowed to step up here under the gaze of their beloved König, would fight like the lions, and the bravery of the assault on Probstheyda is unsurpassed in the history of the war. But what did all this help?

The place was bordered by mud walls, gardens and ditches, in which the skillful French tirailleurs could well settle. The same people had occupied the houses, especially those that stood above the walls and set themselves up for defense by smashing gunholes into the walls and roofs. In the village street there were closed reserves, also some guns had entered, which could sweep the entire lane in length. There were also guns on the northwest corner of the village, which held the main front under flanking fire. The southeastern entrance was barricaded. On either page, the wings of the mass battery, whose gun count is usually given as 300, leaned against the village.

In the village were especially the 2nd, 4th and 18th. Infantry Regiment commanded by General Vial.

When Kleist received the order to take Probstheyda, the Prussian artillery had not been able to place a breach in the clay walls, although it was only 5-600 steps away. Kleist designated the 10th. Brigade to attack the village's elongated, southwest-facing Lisière, the

¹⁵⁷ Aster, Leipzig II, 163.

12th against the eastern entrance. This latter brigade was able to cover part of its approach in a blind spot, but then, as the reports say, when it stepped into the enemy fire zone, it was so overwhelmed with karattan pockets just outside the village that it had to return with great losses.

The 10th had more success. Brigade. The 9th Landwehr regiment in the first meeting crossed the clay walls despite the fierce fire, but then faced a second wall, which was 50 steps behind the first and as it seems could not be exceeded. However, the landwehr discovered a door through which they were able to enter the village and gradually conquered the western part, also throwing out the special reserves.

When these successes were seen, Prince August ran for another storm and, with Colonel Leutnant v. Funk, took the lead of the 11th. Reserve regiments. The extraordinary bravery of the Prussians really managed to penetrate the village, but at that time was the 10th. Brigade is already in the process of being subjected to far superior forces. The prince of August is forced out by General Rochambeau at the same moment that some battalions of the 11th Infantry are leaving Zuckelhausen. Brigade at the village entrance. But they can no longer turn the battle and must go back with the prince August.

At the same time, French and Russian cavalries collide between Zuckelhausen and Probstheyda.

Probstheyda is owned by the Franzosen.

The General Victor rides into the village to order the necessary reinforcements. He congratulates General Vial on his perseverance. The moment he talks to him, he is contusioned by a cannonball and killed.

Prince Eugen has made another attempt to take the place. When the Prussians have to give way, he has the 3rd Russian Division of Prince Shakhovsky go ahead. It also penetrates where the 10. The Brigade has broken the course, but is also unable to hold its ground. Emperor Napoleon is honoring the Prussians to visit the place they are storming so intensely. He has often tasted evidence of their bravery, as he otherwise only knew with his own troops. He fears another onslaught, and by preparing the lines of his position in the fierce fire, he summons the 2nd Division Curial of his old guard to put a firm stop to the hot-blooded Prussians if Noth should do so.

However, no more attacks were paid a visit. Schwarzenberg believed the battle had been won and did not want to use blood to force the fruits of the triumph, which would later fall to him without a fight.

A two-time attempt by the Franzosen, in turn by Probstheyda, was rejected with karaoke fire.

So here, and on his right wing, Napoleon had stopped. His left was defeated and pushed back to the gates of Leipzig. Blücher was so confident that he had the York Corps set off for Halle in the evening to pursue him. Napoleon ordered the retreat, which was first undertaken by the cavalry and the Guards. Part of the corps had to stop to secure it.

The Prussian brigades, which had led the attack against Probstheyda, had gone back into a terrain depression, 800 steps from the place. Here the outposts also stopped overnight, between Zuckelhausen and Probstheyda the 11th. Brigade, at Monarch Hill, 9th. Behind it, the other brigades camped and rested from the bloody struggle. The firing at the outposts did not stop until 1 o'clock, so that everything remained ready for battle. The night was very dark, but you could tell by the wake-fire how far the Franzosen had pushed back. Twelve villages burned, so that one could read letters by the light of their fire.

As brave as the troops were, so were the losses. We give them summarily for the three days of the Leipziger battle:

9th Brigade	106	Officers,	3218 men,
10th "	43	"	1054"
11th "	15	"	300 ..
12th "	55	"	2,810 "
Res. -Cavalry.	25	"	50 "
Summa	244	Officers,	7882 men,

That's about the third. Man. Kleist had only 15,300 remaining of its originally strong corps.

He received (on November 25, 1813) especially for Leipzig the Russian Order of St. George 2nd class, as Barklay says in the accompanying letter, for the excellent zeal with which he worked against the enemy in the last incidents. On the Austrian side, he was awarded the Commander's Cross of the Order of Maria Theresa. Grolmann received the Order of the Rothen Eagle 3rd Class. He had proven himself so excellently that Kleist asked König to transform the provisional employment as Chief of the General Staff into a permanent one, which was then also granted on 27 November before Erfurt. —

A lot of patrolling took place during the night to determine the opponent's departure. Alexander drew Schwarzenberg's attention to his concern. What happened in this respect, however, was too little, as already indicated earlier. On the whole, on the 19th, only marches were to be made, and the five parts of the army of Blücher, Bernadotte, Bennigsen Hessen-Homburg, Wittgenstein and Prinz von à each received a gate of the city of Leipzig as a directing point for their advance.

Under the cover of darkness and later of fog, the Franzosen also started to evacuate their advanced positions early in the morning and withdrew to the surrounds of Leipzig in order to keep them as far as possible until noon. Rheinbündler and Polen were mainly the ones who, under Macdonald and Poniatowsky's leadership, would wear their skins to the market to help the Franzosen.

At Probstheyda, the Franzosen began to leave at 2 a.m., and at 3 a.m., the site was found free of patrols. Before the march, they hid the town in Brand, regardless of the fact that several hundred Franzosen and Prussia lay wounded in the houses. The human emotion must have been greatly blunted by the ongoing butchery if it could be carried away to such a gruesome measure for no reason. Kleist held its ground as it passed the burning village in the advance which it immediately began, and if possible rescued what was still to be salvaged.

By the way, it was now possible to observe that the fire of the Prussian and Russian artillery had also had a devastating effect. Dead and wounded lay in crowds on the battlefield, and in the position of the French batteries stood many gunned-down monkeys. Thirty cannons were found buried.

At 8 o'clock the Kleistsche Korps reached the height at the Tabaksmühle, from which Napoleon had accompanied the battle of the 18th. Soon afterwards, Emperor Alexander and the König of Prussia, who had already passed Probstheyda at 7 am, arrived there. König declared its satisfaction to the 2nd Army Corps, then the monarchs rode the front of the brave 9th. Landwehr regiment, which had entered Probstheyda on the 18th. The same had lost 15 officers and 515 men and had fallen from 950 men to 435.

The Kleistsche Korps failed to fight, except for two battalions that took part in the

storming of St. Peter's. The suburbs were taken by other columns at 11 a.m., and the entrances to the city at about 12 noon.

The monarchs rode to the city, and the Cleistian Corps moved into Bivouac near St. Peter's Square at 2 a.m.

90000 Franzosen rescued the Emperor from the horrible Leipziger battle. Schwarzenberg's measures to achieve greater results came too late, and the further disposition of the use of the armies no longer tat the withdrawing emperor any harm. When he was lucky enough to have Hanau behind him, he had nothing to fear. He arrived in Rhein undamaged. But he had to go there; the liberation of Deutschland was fought for near Leipzig.

The Bohemian army slowly advanced westward, over those battlefields where Prussian war glory was once buried. What sentiments may those officers who once fought in Jena and Auerstädt have seen her again? The next march took Kleist off Erfurt.

Kleist's stages were on 20 October Peres near Rötha, on 21. Shocks, 22. Eckartsberge, 23rd Rödersdorf. 24th Past Weimar to a camp near Ulla. 25th Rest there. 26th Around Erfurt to Shateroda. 27th Gotha. Here, Kleist was ordered to surrender 3 cuirassier regiments and 1 battery to stakes, and to take over the blockade of Erfurt with the corps.¹⁵⁸ He returned to the fortress on the 28th and took his headquarters in Büseleben. The brigades took up positions, the 9th in Vieselbach, the 10th in Gisperleben, the 11th in Alach and the 12th in Egstedt.

The large number of fortresses to be besieged, 200000 Franzosen still in northern Germany and Polen trapped in them — claimed such a large amount of guns and ammunition that in many places they had to wait a long time for it. This is also the case with Erfurt. Prussia in particular had almost no stocks of heavy artillery.

That's why Österreich wanted to send guns to Erfurt. When they arrived, Kleist decided to bomb the "Petersberg", which, with the "Cyriaksburg", was the main strength of the fortress. The crew of the fortress was 5,000 men, but the healthy crew consisted of only 2,000 men.

Some heavy batteries were completed by November 5. On the morning of that day, probably to disrupt the work, the enemy made a break-out with 2 battalions against Ilvershofen. The place was taken and fires were started in some houses. The enemy was driven back to the city after the outposts received reinforcements. On this side, the battle cost 35 men.

On 6 November, at six o'clock in the morning, the bombardment began in thick fog. Mainly the citadel of the Petersberg was shot at, where important supplies were known to lie. Soon several buildings were also burned there, including the large cattle shed. More than a hundred houses in the city were also reduced to ashes.

In the evening, the fire was stopped and could not have been resumed because the ammunition had already been shot.

Kleist therefore readily agreed to offer a ceasefire, which the commander, Divisional General d'Alton, already made on 7 November. The ceasefire was initially concluded for 48 hours, then extended to the 12th and finally to the 20th, so it lasted a total of 13 days. D'Alton only wanted to prolong the siege through the cease-fire, as his material powers were extremely limited, and used the time mainly to collect contributions of money, firewood and cloth from Erfurter citizens. From his point of view, he was very skillful.

¹⁵⁸ The events before Erfurt are given according to Plotho, 1813, II. 550

Kleist, for its part, drew artillery and ammunition from Theresienstadt and Baiern and made the most intimate confinement. On 20 November, at the end of the armistice, he began siege work. When d'Alton saw Ernst, he concluded a convention on the same day, after which he had to vacate the city on January 6, 1814 and leave with the weak crew after the Petersberg and Cyriaksberg. Until then, there should be a ceasefire. Kleist granted him very favorable conditions, he probably did not know the conditions in the fortress and the strength of the occupation, even if his siege means were very low. The convention was approved in higher places. The main advantage was that Kleist's corps was freed up for field operations. The barely attackable Petersberg could be observed by a few thousand men.

On December 29, Blücher received orders to march across Langensalza, Erfurt, to Marburg after occupying Cassel and leaving behind a detachment to contain the Citadelle.

Kleist designated Major General v. Jagow with: 2 Reserve Infantry Regiments, 3 Landwehr Infantry Regiments, 2 Landwehr cavalry Regiments, 1 Battery, 1 Pioneer Company for the blockade of St. Petersberg and set out with 14,000 troops. To secure the supply and the addition of equipment etc., he had formed four replacement battalions, one each by brigade, which also remained behind.

On 6 and 7 January, Kleist was in Gotha, on 8 January in Cassel, and was ordered to leave Marburg on 14 January and march on Koblenz, arriving on 20 January.

In the meantime, General v. Röder had already crossed the Rhein with the reserve cavalry.

When Kleist arrived in Marburg, he already found Blücher's order to advance immediately. He went in two columns via Giessen, Wetzlar, Limburg, Montebaur and via Heerborn, Hadamar, Ehrenbreitstein on to Koblenz.

V. The Campaign of 1814.¹⁵⁹

To be sure, Prussia had borne half of the costs of the war in the campaign of 1813, but offensive Geist found its food exclusively in the Silesian headquarters.

It seems like an outward sign that this smallest of the three continental allied states is now fully on top of the movement when the old Marshal Forward is the first to cross the Rhein. This step was of great political importance. With him, the defense really becomes the offensive. We want more, says the Rhein, than just liberating the fatherland; we want to crush and wipe from the ground the revolutionary son who dares to take the God-bless authority under his feet throughout ancient Europe.

The transition was only possible with Caub. It was executed with as much care as boldness, and would retain its celebrity in the history of war forever, even if it had not been executed so romantically just on New Year's Eve.

Once over, the Silesian army moved quickly, on the 12th their Têtes were already standing in front of Metz.

Kleist, as is well known, was still far behind. It was not until the 17th that General v. Röder arrived at Trier with 800 horsemen, while Kleist arrived at Rhein. York now included Metz with two brigades and dispatched one brigade to Luxemburg, one to Diedenhofen. Blücher advanced on Nancy.

The main army slowly and carefully groped for the Langres Plateau. Österreich wanted to negotiate here, but Alexander and Friedrich Wilhelm pushed through the advance to Troztes, where unification with the Silesian army was to take place.

But, before it was done, Napoleon marched to throw itself at its most dangerous adversary, and perhaps beat him alone.

Blücher stopped at Brienne, but Napoleon abandoned him again, fearing he would also have to deal with the main army, of which he was ill-informed.

On the other hand, he was not allowed to debut with any retreat and took a stand-by position at la Rothière, in which Blücher, supported by two corps of Schwarzenberg, attacked him.

The emperor defeated here had to go back after all. Schwarzenberg slowly followed Troyes and sent Blücher to Vitry to get rid of this driving force, pretending that the food could not be procured. Once Blücher was gone, the main army remained at Troyes, although the enemy was defeated.

This standstill, and especially the separation of its adversaries, gave Napoleon the freedom to act, all the more so because it had lost touch with it.

Thus, he managed to unexpectedly throw himself with 30000 men of excellent troops on the separate corps of the Silesian army. Once again, his incomparable army genius showed himself in the highest glow. Nowhere else in the history of the war has initiative and field mastery been able to double the armed forces as here.

Like the storm wind, it seems elastic, as in the days of the young General Bonaparte, and sweeps the Blücher Corps almost off the ground.

According to la Rothière, he was close to making peace, and the successes of the February days immediately straddled his hopes again. He thinks he can still bring the superiority of the coalition to a halt, to our good fortune.

The defeat of the Silesian army saved Europe from an untimely peace, and its bloody

¹⁵⁹ Almost exclusively used: Ollech, General of the cavalry v. Reyher, Supplements to the Mil. -W. -Bl.

sacrifices were not made in vain. —

In the midst of the catastrophe, Kleist also steps in to prove itself brilliantly in a difficult situation.

When he arrived at Koblenz, the same man had found the Rhein heavily iced, so that the flying bridge was not usable. He therefore began to translate the troops on barges and larger vessels on the 18th. This caused very great difficulties during the ice and consequently cost a lot of time. It happened that barges were driven downstream for two hours, although they were pulled by farmers to increase safety and speed.

On the 19th, the ice was reduced, so that the flying bridge (ferry) could be used again. The same boat was running faster than the barges, but it took only a few troops. The crossing points were Neuwied and Ehrenbreitstein. On the 24th, when not all troops had been translated, the order from Blücher arrived, on the 26th. Triers. This was no longer feasible, but to comply with the order, Kleist marched with the 10,000 troops he had over there and arrived in the area of Triers a day later, when he had been given up.

That left the 9. Brigade v. Klüx and part of the cavalry and artillery under Count v. Haacke, which were to follow.

In Trier, there was again an order from Blücher, after which Kleist was to advance in seven marches to St. Mihiel and arrive there on 2 February.

The general therefore marched on without stopping on the left bank of the Moselle over Grevemachern.

You had to pass Metz and Diedenhofen to get to the Pont à Mousson - St. Mihiel. Both fortresses were besieged by cavalry, Diedenhofen especially by General v. Röder. The fortresses forced the corps to make detours, which naturally caused a loss of time. Diedenhofen Fortress attempted to bombard the passing columns, but without success.

On 1 February, the corps took up quarters between Diedenhofen and Metz, in Maizières, Hauconcourt, Hagendingen. On the 2nd the march was continued to Woippy, then turned right to bypass Metz, and at Gorze the Moselthal was again reached.

Here came the news that the bridge at St. Michel had been blown up and that the general was to march on St. Dizier. He reached the third Thiaucourt, 4th. Commercy, 5th. Bar le Duc, on the 6th the area of Vitry, headquarters St. Mard sur le Mont, on the 7th. Chalons, where on 8. The corps was in desperate need of calm after the uninterrupted marches. Here the Russian corps Kaptsevich, 8000 strong, arrived.

Blücher thus received two corps of reinforcements, though not strong, but intact, and had a marching plan drawn up, according to which all the Silesian corps were to unite forward. He was allowed to assume his left flank as secure by the Wittgenstein Corps, Napoleon was pursued and detained by the main army.

The merger point was Montmirail. The front corps had made short stops to allow Kleist and Kaptsevich to arrive, which were to arrive at Montmirail on 10 February. York was conducted on Château-Thierry, three miles north of it. The cavalry of the Corps of Sacken, which was on the main road on the Tête, should also observe in addition to forward on Nogent sur Seine, i.e. in the left flank, because Blücher had learned that this side of the patrol corps had left this area and perhaps already knew that Wittgenstein had marched off the Aube. So everything was done to secure against a strategic surprise.

On the 8th York arrived with his Tête Château-Thierry, Sacken Montmirail, Kleist was as known in Chalons to await Kaptsevich. Olsuviev marched to Etoges, with him Blücher.

Chalons is 8 miles from Montmirail, 10 miles from Château-Thierry. Between Montmirail

and Chalons, 5 miles from the latter location, is Etoges, near west of Etoges Champaubert. The army was extremely fragmented.

Napoleon had brought together 70,000 troops at Nogent through reinforcements from Spain and Paris, some of them demoralized troops, with desertions starting to join. Only a tactical success could lift them again.

Now the Silesian army was the more dangerous and at the same time weaker opponent, and their situation also seemed to offer the possibility of beating them separately.

Napoleon had 40,000 troops against the main army and went with 30,000, the best he had, to Sézanne to face Blücher. The small army was very well composed for rapid and decisive operations. It included 8,000 old guard, 6,000 young guard, the 6th. Corps Marmont 6000 men, Guards cavalry Grouchy 6000 horses, 1st and 2nd. Cavalry corps of 2000 horses and 120 guns. To this end, he was able to use the Macdonald, who was opposed to the Silesian army, and arrange for his participation.

United, Blücher could have confronted him with 57,000 men. (York 17000, Sacken 19000, Olsuviev 4000, Kleist 10000, Kaptsevich 7000).

On 9 February, Marmont, who was at the Tête, was able to attack Olsuviev, but he hesitated, giving Blücher the opportunity to save its army from imminent defeats.

If he remained only with his initial plan, he could pull together three corps at Montmirail in time and, evading backwards, unite this army section with the corps of Chalons behind the Marne at the latest in Reim. Pay a visit of this, as he had no news of the Emperor's approach, he let his front corps advance even further by ordering Sacken to go to Meaux to cut off the Macdonald, who was retreating from York. "Sacken's flank was completely secured by Olsuviev, Kleist and Kaptsevich."

This flank protection was to be achieved by Kleist and Kaptsevich marching to Champaubert, where Olsuviev was standing, and these three corps then proceeding towards Sézanne. Since Kleist and Kapzewitsch could no longer reach Champaubert, the Corps Olsuwiew with his 4000 troops at the latter place was overrun, so the flank protection stopped and Sacken could be attacked at Montmirail in the back and involved in the worst battle, from which only York's initiative saved him to some extent.

Von Kleist The Corps and Kaptsevich arrived in the area of Vertus on the 9th, where Kleist and Blücher took their headquarters. For the first time, Kleist was under the direct command of Marshal Vorwärts, at the same time the only Prussian troops that the general had at hand. The reason why the two corps did not reach Sézanne, or even Champaubert, to defend Sacken's flank was an order from Schwarzenberg to Blücher: to approach Kleist more to the Aube, in order to defend Wittgenstein's corps on the right bank of the Seine against attacks by the enemy. For the so and so many times, did it happen that the main army, which suffocated in its strength, was unable to secure itself and claimed Blücher's support, or did Schwarzenberg want to wriggle a corps out of the hands of the enterprising marshal in good degenerate to put greater shackles on him? Schwarzenberg, more so for political reasons in 1814, never took a step or sacrificed a man to help Blücher. However, in the most friendly self-denial and in the interest of the good cause, he willingly complied with all similar requirements. In 1815, his allegiance to "his brother Wellington" also decided on the campaign.

Again, Blücher did not hesitate to comply with the order, but did not know the danger in which he himself was hovering, and marched Kleist and Kapzevich on la Fère-Champenoise.

When they had marched away, he received the first message on the 10th morning from

Wittgenstein that the Emperor himself was going to Sézanne and would probably attack him. Kleist and Kaptsevich, the former once commanded, were not recalled, as their march could significantly help to shed light on the advance and the enemy's intentions. York and Sacken were immediately given orders, according to Vertus (5 1/2 respectively 6 1/2 mile), or if this is not possible, to deduct to Château-Thierry.

So Kleist and Kapzewitsch marched with the avant-garde on the 9th. In the evening via Bergères to la Fère-Champenoise. Their march on Champaubert was thus abandoned. General Zieten, as he has often done, had the avant-garde. As early as the night of 9/10 2 am, he was able to report that the enemy was standing with several thousand men at Sézanne. Prisoners gave larger numbers.

On the 10th In the morning at 10 a.m., Zieten reported with certainty that Napoleon had arrived in Sézanne on the 9th between 5 and 6 a.m. and that it was to carry strong forces with it.

Kleist, who had now also arrived at Fère-Champenoise with the corps, had outposts exhibited in the Pleurs-Linthes line and stopped with the Gros at Connantre. The reconnaissance now revealed even more specific news, and the enemy attacked General Zieten slightly. Kleist now reported to Blücher: "It is confirmed that the Emperor Napoleon is in Sézanne with 30 to a maximum of 35,000 troops. Most of these troops consist of the Imperial Guards. The two-sided outposts have occupied Pleurs and Linthes. The enemy attacked both wings of this side's cavalry this morning, but has returned to position and has occupied Gaye."

Blücher thought it could take York back. However, it was too late.

Leading the way to Fère-Champenoise, he convinced himself that even the movement on Sézanne was no longer feasible and had Kleist and Kapzewitsch go back to Bergères near Vertus by night (three miles). As expedient as this was provided that York and Sacken still reached Vertus, a day had been lost with the march back and forth and Olsuwiew had been destroyed in the meantime. Kleist and Kaptsevich could have supported him otherwise, and at Champaubert 21,000 men would have fought against Napoleon, pay a visit 4,000.

The corps did not arrive in Bergères until after midnight and undoubtedly needed rest. Cavalry detachments at la Fère and Etoges watched the enemy. Blücher still believed it could unite, and stayed at Bergères on the 12th. Here he received the news of the meeting at Montmirail and the withdrawal of the corps over the Marnes. In his indestructible confidence and in the feeling that he had become the second person to be drawn out of critical situations only through battle, he reached on the 13th. Marmont, whom Napoleon had abandoned when he went to Montmirail. He probably knew that the emperor could unite with Marmont at any moment or had already reunited. The critics did not approve of this decision, which was in the spirit of the old hero but which led to the unfortunate battle of Etoges.

In the morning, Blücher issued the following brief disposition:¹⁶⁰ "The avant-garde of Corps v. Kleist, under the command of the Lieutenant General of Zieten, attacks Etoges. 3000 men of the corps of Kaptsevich followed by a light battery to support the avant-garde. Von Kleist The Corps and Kaptsevich follow, the former on the right, the latter on the left, marching in two columns next to each other on the highway. his Excellence will be at the top of these columns."

Kleist had 17 1/2 battalions, two battalions and three cavalry regiments, of which a

¹⁶⁰ Ollech, Reyher pp. 269.

Landwehr regiment had only 160. These cavalry regiments came to the avant-garde.

After the latter marched away, the Count of Chalons, Count Haacke, met one with two cavalry regiments and three batteries. In addition, Kapzewitsch surrendered two batteries. In Summa he had 17 1/2 battalions, 5 cavalry regiments and 7 batteries, 8500 infantry, 1400 cavalries. Total: 9900 men.

Back was General v. Klüx with troops who had not finished the Rhein crossing in time — we saw Count Haacke arrive earlier — and one battalion each, who had remained in Chalons and Vitry to secure the stages.

Kaptsevich had 7,000 men and now three batteries. With 16,900 men and 90 guns, Blücher went ahead.

Marmont, who had long feared this assault because he was still isolated, cleared Etoges after a short gunfire and moved via Champaubert to Fromentières. This place is 1 1/2 miles from Montmirail and 3 miles from Bergères. Blücher now stopped the troops, they had done an average of 2 1/2" mile.

The avant-garde remained to the west, the Gross to the east of Champaubert. The outposts are close to each other. Blücher remained in Etoges, and all pages confirmed that York was already over the Marne.

But Blücher and Gneisenau believed that Napoleon had marched off after the Seine, when in fact he had turned back from Château-Thierry to Montmirail after the news of Blücher's march.

Blücher continued its successful action against Marmont on the 14th, but the Emperor arrived in Montmirail at 8 a.m. with 14,000 infantrymen and 8,000 cavalrymen. Marmont still counted to 5000, he could bring at least 27000 men in the battle. He massed between Montmirail and Vauxchamps to surprise the previous opponent by suddenly appearing with dense crowds.

Marmont also vacated Vauxchamps, which Zieten occupied with the avant-garde, although he moved 1 1/2 miles from his estate. Now Napoleon has had Marmont's troops in front and start firing. He wanted to deal with two north, one cavalry corps south and knock everything down in front with the infantry. A Blücher side detachment also reported the advance of strong cavalry on this side of the right wing. Probably the Russian Soutien, which was at Janvilliers, almost a half-mile northeast of Vauxchamps, Zieten's next support.

He only recognized his situation when the battle for Vauxchamps had begun. To retreat, to be surrounded and destroyed, had happened at the moment. Zieten broke with two rifle campaigns and was able to report its own defeat to Blücher. He seized the Russian Soutien and brought the remains of his three cavalry regiments.

Blücher met him now. He had¹⁶¹ run the bulk three hours later than Zieten, and now took up position at the height of Janvilliers on either page of the street and drove his artillery.

However, it soon became clear to him that he could not take advantage of Napoleon, whose presence had become known. In particular, the Franzosen's great superiority in cavalry was clearly discernible and had to give rise to grave concerns. If one was beaten in the open field, a retreat was equal to certain destruction in view of the enemy horseman masses. It was different when you left undefeated with unshaken troops, that is, immediately, and arrived in the protective forest of Etoges in good tactical posture, in which the cavalry could do nothing more.

¹⁶¹ That's how safe he felt. Ollech, Reyher pp. 273.

But 1 1/2 miles had to be covered, a hard test for the weathered, badly fed and badly dressed troops.

Blücher quietly and confidently made the orders that the extraordinary case required. He initially had all the heavy and most light batteries sailed on the highways to Etoges. He sent an officer ahead to summon the remainder of the Olsuwiev troops and let them occupy the edge of the forest of Etoges. Every handful of people gained importance in this pressing situation. However, this arrangement could not be executed in the given time.

The 12th Brigade then marched off the highway, the 10th. The brigade followed to the north, the Kapzewitsch corps to the south of the highway, both in a cross field in densely opened columns.

Napoleon pushed hard. If his infantry had wings, it would have been around Blücher. So it mattered whether the cavalry could stop him or not. Grouchy reached far north in this intention and hoped to move the enemy's withdrawal into the forest. You could see from the columns the accompanying cavalry, and how it was gaining an ever-greater lead.

In the back, Nansouty's cavalry threw himself incessantly at Kaptsevich, causing him to stop several times. But then Blücher also stopped to let its Russians get here and not to let themselves be betrayed by certain doom. As a result of these delays, Blücher became increasingly likely that the French cavalry in front of it would reach the forest. He therefore sent her the Count of Haacke with his three cavalry regiments, which were thrown by Grouchy. This now set up 3 regiments across the street and the bulk of its remaining cavalry north of it in a flanking position.

In the woods, only the 2 rifle companies of General Zieten had arrived from Blücher's infantry, which probably poorly occupied the Lisière, but could not expel the cavalry.

Blücher seemed cut off from facing a safe confinement with men like Gneisenau, Kleist, August, Grolmann. Kleist's infantry offered the terrain some advantages in that the 10th Brigade had to cross a zone of small lakes, in which it found some protection against attacks. But gradually, these conditions ceased to be favorable to her again. Soon it had to be a matter for the two corps to make their way over a free terrain in the middle of the enemy cavalry to the protective forest.

The critical moment finally arrived. In the front, back and both flanks, everything set in motion to attack the cut-off Prussian infantry.

The battalions moved closer together, the tambours beat, the music played.

Some battalions began to sing defiant war songs. With Hurrah, they moved forward to fight their way through.¹⁶²

Here it was to keep the head up and cold blood! It was expressed here that men led the troops for which every Musketeer was ready to go to his death. A vibrant rampart formed around Blücher, around Kleist.

Now the French cavalry attacked. The battalions held and fired at 30 steps. The cavalry rolled back, the infantry continued their march. New attacks followed and were repelled.

The Kleistsche infantry, clenched in solid quadrangles, averted a complete defeat. It saved Blücher and the other heroes from captivity, and thus perhaps Europe from incalculable consequences, which was worth even more. The forest was reached. Here, in the darkness, there was a confused mess of Russians and Prussians of all arms going to Etoges.

Only a part of the French infantry followed, however, and only as far as Etoges. She had

¹⁶² Ollech, Reyher pp. 276.

herself reached the end of her powers and had accomplished unheard of things in daily, even nightly marches, connected with battles.

The Prussians and Russians went to 1 1/2 mile east of Etoges, part of which had made 5 miles that day. From there, the march continued to Chalons, where Blücher had ordered the reunification of the Silesian army. Kleist had lost 70 officers, 3,900 men and 7 guns, Kapzewitsch had lost 2,000 men and 9 guns. The 2nd Korps had learned quite thoroughly how hot the Silesian army was, but also gained full trust with this one battle of Blücher.

11,000 men had only remained for the marshal here, but he retained his confidence and did not despair. "If I go back a step further, the great army is following suit with such willingness that we would all soon meet again at Rhein."¹⁶³ He did not doubt for a moment a good outcome and longed for the moment when he could seize the offensive again. In this strength of mind, the heroic steps next to König Friedrich, in it lay the roots of his military ability.

Napoleon failed to push Blücher any further, which he could have done despite his own weak hand, believing that he had indeed annihilated him, as he had successively defeated the corps of Olsuviev, Sacken, York, Kleist, and Kaptsevich. After all, Napoleon had achieved a lot and received the rewards of its astonishing activity.

He regained the full trust of his people, who were already in decline and no longer believed in his star. The soldiers, who had been received with indescribable cheers when they entered Château-Thierry, rejoiced. Napoleon took advantage of the excited mood and provoked a bitter attitude by the inhabitants through fierce proclamations. The National Guard in the Marnethal was deployed. Exalted minds saw in mind already a withdrawal of the Allies from Frankreich, as the Franzosen had experienced in Rußland in 1812.

The change in mood was clearly noticeable. Until now, the troops had mostly cantoned and received plenty of food from the innkeepers, the superintendent's office only needed to help.

Now that situation has changed. Some of the inhabitants took up arms, the cattle were driven away, villages and small towns abandoned. The lost soldier was ambushed and killed. The reports stopped coming through.

The requisitions that became necessary relaxed the discipline, and the troops were not inclined to proceed very lightly in view of the attitude of the population. The war became crueler.

In addition, there were frequent cases of illness due to the rough season and poor clothing. The footwear could not resist the wet loamy ground and was in dismal condition. Efforts and deprivations reached their peak.

The stop in Chalons, which Napoleon paid a visit by its failure to follow the army, was an urgent need.

On the 16th, the Yorksche Corps arrived there, soon after the Sackensche Corps. It was the troops of the cliché, respectively Yorksian corps an indescribable Freude to be united. They had never been with Prussia since the armistice. They had the impression that they could no longer face anything evil, since two Prussian corps were with each other.

The old comrades-in-arms of Riga, York and Kleist happily shook hands with each other. Otherwise, York's mood was bad. He grumbled the strategists at Silesian headquarters that they had put the army in such a vilified bad position. He did not want to continue fighting under such a high command and would rather lay down the command so that the 1st and 2nd Army Corps, which were both so weak, would form a single one under Kleist's

¹⁶³ Ollech, Reyher pp. 276.

command. And if he could not leave, he would rather be under Kleist than commanding general, where the troops would only be sacrificed uselessly, etc. Blücher knew his iron-eater York with the hard crosshead. He refused his request in the most honorable Weise and York calmed down, which was probably mainly Kleist's merit.

"Old loyal Kleist," Droysen writes, "could know more about what had happened and what had been missed, and in his milder degenerate he will not have failed to explain what had happened."

The Silesian army had lost about 14-15,000 men and 27 guns. Through the use of detachments and supplies, it was possible in Chalons to make up for this loss almost completely. The corps was also reorganized according to the principle that a battalion could not be under 400 men strong.

Kleist initially formed only a single brigade, the 10th (under Major General v. Pirch I.), seven battalions, two rifle companies, one battery, and reported to the König on the 16th that he had only 3,000 infantry, over which Prince August would take command on the day of a battle.

Here in Chalons arrived the ill Colonel v. Krauseneck, later General of the Infantry, who had been appointed brigade commander in the Kleistscher Korps. Since the brigade assigned to him was almost exhausted, he remained without command and was in the battle near Laon in Kleist, later in Blücher's staff.

On the 19th, Blücher again agreed to the offensive and on that day really marched south, as Schwarzenberg, now also pushed by Napoleon and defeated in smaller battles, called him to help.

Army unification paid a visit at Mery on the Seine, where Blücher arrived 9 miles from Chalons on the 21st. The Corps of Kleist had already been advanced on the Chalons-Arcis road on the 18th and had arrived at Nuisemont on that day with the headquarters, on the 19th Sommesous, on the 20th. Vilette near Arcis sur Aube, 21. Droup Ste Marie. Schwarzenberg could have attacked Napoleon's 60,000 troops with nearly triple superiority if he had wanted to. He was not persuaded to do so, however, and ordered the retreat to Troyes. Blücher should cover the same by holding Mery.

The stay here was one of the most deplorable days of the campaign. The area, which was in itself treeless and poor, was completely drained out, so that it lacked the essentials, even bread, spirits and wood, a delicate shortage, as it was during these days that the cold was more severe. Straw had to be searched for the bivouacs who knows where. Entire houses were torn down to extract wood and straw from the roofs. It is said that Dort and Kleist in Droup St. Marie, where they had taken up residence from the 22nd, were at risk of seeing the roof above their heads torn off and carried away, of course by those who did not know that the generals were living in the house.

On the 22nd, there was also a small battle at Mery, in which only parts of the I Army Corps were involved. But Mery, where a great conflagration broke out, was abandoned. On that day, fire also started in the Kleistschen Lager.

While the main army went back to Langres and the Congress of Chatillon met, Blücher was only thinking about how he could break away from it and march again on Paris. Grolmann suggested marching north, joining forces with the Bülow and Wintzingerode corps advancing from Belgien, and then resuming the advance independently and, if necessary, alone. The Field Marshal immediately wrote to Emperor Alexander in this spirit and, before he was officially granted permission, began the march.

Kleist and thus Blücher received some reinforcements. On the 24th, General v. Klüx

finally arrived and brought 5 battalions, 2 rifle companies, 1 battery and 20 squadrons. When he finished the Rhein crossing, he had been detained to deny Luxemburg and Thionville, where only cavalry had been. Then the fourth German Bundescorps replaced him and gave him the freedom to march after his corps.

Kleist again had 13 battalions, 40 squadrons, 9 batteries = 9800 men. He formed the 9th. Brigade (v. Klüx), 10. Brigade (from Pirch), Reserve cavalry (from Zieten), Reserve Artillery (from Lehmann).

Blücher crossed the Aube River with his army at Anglure on 24 February and Sèzanne to Champ-Guyon and Esternay on 25 February. On that day, an avant-garde battle with Marmont paid a visit. Blücher had hoped to surprise and crush him, but failed. Marmont evaded the imminent catastrophe in time.

On the 26th, the army went via Rebais to the Doue area, on the 27th at la Ferté sous Jouarre via the Marnes.

On that day, Blücher received the official news that he was free of all ties to the main army and could act independently. The army was rejoicing at this event, which gave such a bright prospect. Blücher also felt completely strong enough to go to Paris. With Bülow, who had already arrived at Laon on the 24th, he had to have 100000 men together within a short time, that was enough to cope with the emperor alone.

On 27. In the evening, the army was such that Kleist, who had crossed the Marnes, was with his bulk near Grandchamps, Blücher's avant-garde under Katzler in front of him at Lizy am Ourcq. York and the trains still at la Ferté to protect the bridges.

The Russians, Sacken and Kaptsevich, in Trilport across from Meaux, which was occupied by the enemy. Near Meaux stood the combined corps of Marmont and Mortier.

Since the Russians could not easily cross the Marnes with them, Blücher decided to take his whole army across the river at la Ferté, by designating for the Russians, apart from the bridge at the latter location, a little further west at Ussy, and then, crossing the Ourcq, to roll up the position of the marshals behind the Marnes from the flank.

There was nothing to fear from Napoleon, who stood at Sèzanne's; he considered the marshals too weak for an offensive, so that he issued the disposition for 1 March at the same time as that for 28 February in advance.

However, he had underestimated the activity of the marshals, who were also constantly cheered on by Napoleon to act when he healed his army as he tat it. Also, the terrain was so intersected by the frequently curved Marnes and their inflows that, at short direct distances, a unification of the separated forces was only possible by circuitous means, i.e., with time expenditure.

For the 28th, Blücher specifically ordered that Katzler move towards Meaux against the Théroouanne brook recognosciren, Kleist from Grandchamps to Lizy am Ourcq. Until a half mile south of Lizy, Sacken was to march after the Marne crossings, Kapzewitsch was to be followed to the bridge at Ussy, York was still to be stopped at la Ferté.

The general procedure was then planned for the next day.

The enemy's initiative thwarted these dispositions. General Katzler, passing through the Théroouanne to Varedes, met there columns advancing from Meaux. Too weak to resist in the open field, he went back to the Théroouanne and took a position at Gué à Tresmes. Behind Katzler, who now entered the direct relationship of an barrier guard, Kleist's corps marched on.

The position on the Théroouanne, however, was bypassed under the protection of overlying

heights in the right flank and now did not appear strong enough to defend it. Moreover, Kleist, rightly considering that its recovery mission had been accomplished, decided to proceed with an orderly withdrawal. "Reyher tells of the same, that he was executed with the most complete peace and security, as in the Exerciplatz."¹⁶⁴

When Kleist reached Lizy, the situation remained unchanged. Lizy, however, lay in his left flank, and he believed that in the close contact with the enemy, in which he was already, he could not walk across the Ourcq without considerable losses if he made a flank march. He therefore departed northward for May, but had the bridge at Lizy destroyed to protect the Russian cantonnements.

Kleist's corps was thus separated from the Silesian army and the unification of Blücher with Bülow on the western bank of Ourcq was initially not feasible. Kleist's own corps had suffered virtually no casualties, but Katzler lost 8 officers and 474 men. Kleist let him retire first by taking a recording position and forming a new barrier guard under Zieten. He returned to Mareuil, Marmont to May, and Mortier to Lizy.

When Blücher von Kleist received the news of his actions, he decided to attack the marshals on 1 March and gathered the York, Sacken and Kapzevich corps at Lizy's at 10 a.m. But it was not possible to cross without a bridge in the face of the enemy.

A mile north at Crouy this did not succeed either, because here too the bridge showed itself broken off. York was advanced further north into Fulaines overnight to connect with Kleist, which it did.

Kleist had received orders to support the originally projected assault against the Marshals by retreating to Neufchelles, but did not attack, as Blücher did not come to the enemy. The marshals themselves behaved passively.

On March 2, Kaptsevich was to attempt to cross the river at Gesvres across the river from May. This, too, proved unworkable. Kleist was to recognosciren against the place at the same time and tat this with three regiments of cavalry and two riding batteries. He followed five battalions to take in.

After the start of the cannon, the enemy developed 9,000 men and 20 guns and did not appear determined to abandon the crossing without serious combat.

Blücher now abandoned all attempts against the marshals. At the same time, when he was planning to take action on Meaux, he had intended to seek unification with Bülow and Wintzingerode on the west bank of the Ourcq, where the road between Soissons and Villers-Cotterets favored the same.

A single measure of strategic imprudence, the detachment of Kleist, had been in place for three years. days, but at the same time with very difficult weather and road conditions.

He had to abandon his plan, all the more so when Napoleon's cavalry-Tête appeared before him at la Ferté, and sat down on a backward street that led via Oulchy le Château on Soissons.

The orders for the rear concentration were given on the same day. The last one was supposed to be Kleist and marched off at 10:00 in the evening, only to get a bivouac at la Ferté-Milon.

Kleist passed the Ourcq at Mareuil. Over there, however, his corps crossed with the column Kapzewitsch, so that he had to stay and defend the Defilee with the barrier guard against the advancing enemy. The bivouac was taken near Neuilly.

¹⁶⁴ Ollech, Reyher, Military Weekly 1870. 365.

The bulk of the French army arrived at la Ferté sous Jouarre, Château-Thierry Victor.

Blücher decided on 3 March, because he was not oriented beyond the circumstances of Soissons, to go over the Aisne in order to be able to complete the union with Bülow and Wintzingerode safely. He formed two columns. Kleist's infantry and artillery, behind them the corps of Kaptsevich, were to go via Blanzy, Barry to Buzancy, Sacken and York on the road from Oulchy to Soissons. In Buzancy, depending on the information received, troops would be instructed to cross Aisne. All the cavalry and riding artillery were to be left at the Ourcq until the morning of 4 March.

It was very convenient that at this very moment Soissons capitulated and opened its doors. The whole Silesian army was now able to pass through Soissons from Buzancy and cross the Aisne without difficulty. Behind the same were bivouacs.

Thus, the union with the troops from Holland was completed. The generals Bülow and Wintzingerode had ridden against the field marshal, under whose orders they were to step. They welcomed each other kindly, and in Soissons they stopped at the tête of the Blücher column to see the troops defile. Bülow, dressed in a shiny parade uniform, was astonished to see the condition of this army. "Torn off, barefoot or with torn shoes, the leather stuff dirty, the weapons uncleaned, the horses skinny, the crews with the unmistakable expression of deprivation and fatigue: — so they passed by. Bülow's troops had lived like masters in the Netherlands! But how much the Silesian army had endured so far, and how much it had done as an indestructible core force! Under this faulty cover was the awe-inspiring Prussian brave soldier spirit. "When the march was over, Bülow said like a doctor who looked the patient in the dark: "People will enjoy some peace!"¹⁶⁵

Varnhagen v. Ense tells of this encounter that York and Kleist, who had already been displeased, would have been even more irritated by being with Bülow, and less so against Blücher than against the men who led him in his illness. "What are you guys," Bülow would have shouted to the old comrades at the first intimate gathering, "that you should be commanded and consumed by the subordinates of the headquarters, by the burned brain of Gneisenau, by the face of Müffling, by the Grolmann, and as they are all called."

The nature and fortunate successes of Bülow make such a statement possible. After the battle of Ligny, he, too, the victorious general, will have realized that selfless subordination is the first military virtue. —

Blücher now had 110000 troops on hand, Napoleon could only unite 45000 south of Oulchy, but the allies still believed him 100000 strong.

On 4 March, the Blücher army stood north of the Aisne on either page of the Soissons-Laon road.

Kleist had marched deep into the night on the 3rd, and on the 4th, after biwakirt for a few hours at Soissons, moved into cantonnements at Arizy.

On the 5th was calm.

Meanwhile, Napoleon turned right to Fismes and Berry au Bac on the Aisne, while he left Marmont and Mortier facing Soissons.

Blücher learned of this movement and concentrated on its leftist wing with the intention of attacking Napoleon during the Debouche over Aisne. However, as a result of late orders and poor road connections, the troops' movements were so late that Napoleon was able to cross the river unhindered and beat 20,000 Russians at Craonne.

¹⁶⁵ Ollech, Reyher, Military Weekly 1870. 374, Supplement.

Kleist had set up a line-up on the 6th between Filaine and le Royer. On the 7th, in the morning at half past 9 o'clock, he, like York, was ordered to march across the plateau from Martigny to Festieux. It was too late, the corps didn't arrive until 4:00 in the afternoon, and Craonne was lost.

The Russians complained that they should have beaten alone. Droysen could not determine to what extent the intention was to spare the Prussians in order to have something in their hands when the peace was reached.

He has found in the Kleist and York materials only very specific reproaches about the arrangements of the headquarters, both in large part and in detail. On the morning of the slaughter day, the march from York and Kleist to Festieux was no longer useful.

Droysen goes on to say that the Blücher headquarters are being accused of indecision and insecurity these days.

"It was there that the drafts were so far bold, the execution was resolute and the last major goal was firmly set. It was the driving element of the grand coalition. Neither the thoughtful petty mastery of diplomacy nor the concern of the corps leaders for the food and preservation of their troops had managed to stop it in the boldest pursuit of the boldest plans, in the ruthlessly energetic use of the means of dispute erred.

Gneisenau, the soul of the Blücher headquarters, the incomparable, seems to have been transformed by Craonne and Laon in these days — for example, since the union with Bülow. The opposition between the troops, the futility of the last tremendous efforts, the oppressive feeling of restless and fruitless wandering, the brilliant results of the gentle Bülow warfare — made the strong Geist wrong with his own ideas after uninterrupted tension. He was these days: "scattered, sullen, undecided."

There is no denying that the Silesian army suffered partial defeats three times in a row as a result of fragmentation, so in the sadly famous days of February, so with Lizy, although there was no serious battle here and the Echec was more of a strategic one, so with Caronne.

It is therefore not surprising that discontent reigned in the ranks of the corps generals and even Kleist healed their mood, but without losing sight of the well-being of the whole through personal impressions. His military virtues were in the brightest of light just these days, while York's conduct obscured his fame.

The idea of merging also reappeared. It was omitted, however. Kleist had, as it were, subordinated itself to General York without any specific order and, as it were, historically for this entire period. "There have never been two generals who have stood next to each other for so long and got along so well with each other." Where this understanding took its duration, we do not have to deal with it. The generals fit together so well because they had the same political and military views, but the opposite temperament.

When Joris Adjutant, Schack, once recounted General Kleist's affection for his troops, York tat the paradoxical remark that he was indifferent to what the troops thought of him if they feared him.

Blücher led the corps to Laon on the 8th and took up position for battle. The Corps of Langeron, Sacken and Wintzingerode behind the Laon-Crépy road, the Corps of Bülow on the heights of Laon, York and Kleist between the heights of the city and the suburb of Vaux (on the northeast corner of Laon), the cavalry of the leftist wing on the road to Chambry. Outpost advanced on all roads.

Of the right-wing corps, only Wintzingerode was in the first place, so that Sacken and

Langeron were available as spares.

Kleist took its headquarters in Vaux.

The front line of the position was a mile, so it was abundantly short and paid a visit a deep outline or assault procedure. And Blücher also intended, as he declared on the 9th morning, not to remain defensive, but, as the enemy advanced, to attack in turn, although Napoleon was still estimated at 70,000. Much contributed to this illusion that he moved to the now following battle on two marching lines, which were 1 1/2 miles apart.

Then Blücher fell ill on the 9th with eye inflammation, so that he could not appear before the troops, at a moment when the long desired union had been completed and the forces were ready for the offensive. But the main army, too, finally had a win, albeit not a significant one, thanks to Friedrich Wilhelm's intervention, gained.

Langeron, the eldest general, of course the Russian is older than the Preuße again, could not replace the Field Marshal, so Blücher nominally retained command. But Gneisenau, who commanded in his name, dared not use the utmost. His mood and attitude has already been marked. York, more than ever, raised its unbridled objection, Wintzingerode was angry about Craonne, and Bülow thought it could see more clearly.

"Kleist alone preserved its calm, conciliatory nature, with it the result of natural benevolence and outstanding education."¹⁶⁶

Napoleon wanted to pursue with 40000 men on the 8th, the idea of a new battle was far away from him, he knew nothing of Bülow's approach. However, he pushed forward only a short distance that day and planned to move in on the 9th in Laon. Ney was supposed to raid Etouvelles in the morning, which he did. Ardon was also taken. The assault on Semilly failed due to opposition from Bülow forces. That's how the battle started.

Between 10 and 11 o'clock the fog sank. From the windmill mountain near Semilly, Gneisenau estimated the approaching enemy at 30,000 men. Thus, according to his calculations, there were still 40000 men missing who had to perform soon. Gneisenau therefore left the reserves intact, while Bülow and Wintzingerode with 41,000 troops had to suffice. But these, too, have not been fully used. No one wanted to bite right, and Napoleon was spared defeat. The fight ended in a draw.

In the afternoon 3 o'clock the enemy finally appeared in front of the left wing, before Athis. It was only the only corps of Marmont, but Gneisenau now believed that the anticipated 40,000 Franzosen still missing were proceeding here, and directed the corps of Sacken and Langeron to where York and Kleist had already 24,000 troops.

These two generals, however, were surprised to see that Marmont remained isolated at Athis. However, reinforcements could also be made the next day, and weaker forces at this place threatened in a Weise the retreat line to Marle and Brussels that they could not be left there well.

At York headquarters, the serious nature of this situation was discussed. Schack said it would be best to raid the Franzosen at night. York immediately took up the idea and made the necessary arrangements with Zieten and Kleist. Zieten made it undertake to find a way with the cavalry even at night, and Kleist instantly responded to the friend general's plan by subordinating himself to the elder without selfishness.

Now Count Brandenburg was sent to Laon to obtain the consent of the Field Marshal. Already on the way there he met the Earl of Goltz, who gave the same order. Sacken declined to participate.

¹⁶⁶ Ollech, Reyher, Military Weekly 1870. Supplement p. 405

York said, "As soon as it is completely dark, Wilhelm attacks the village of Athis. The Horn division bypasses the village on the right. The 2nd Corps advances to the right and left of the highway, seeking to gain the enemy's left flank. General Zieten attacks the enemy in the right flank and in the back with the united cavalry. The advance takes place in closed columns and with silent silence until you get to the enemy. No shots should be fired. The only way to attack is with the bayonet."¹⁶⁷

At 7:00 in the evening, Everything competed.

Marmont's small corps was still under arms between Athis and the highway, the guns in front of them. The night was starry, yet the raid was complete.

Prince Wilhelm attacked Athis, Katzler followed to the left, Horn quickly moved to the right of the village, while Kleist silently followed up and on the highway. As soon as the Franzosen fired, the Prussian battalions broke into the enemy's ranks with loud hurrah, and the tambours took the storm step. The newly formed Arrighi division fell apart like chaff. The artillerists flaunted and tried to save their guns, but only a few succeeded. The bayonet completed the confusion and dissolution of the French battalions caused by the surprise; they turned to flee. Beyond the village, Zieten took the cavalry to the wild pile and cut into the unresisting crowd. Katzler attacked enemy cuirassiers in the dark and took four guns.

In all, 45 cannons, over 100 ammunition wagons and 2,500 prisoners remained in the hands of the lucky winner.

Only at Berry au Bac could Marmont bring the debris of his corps to a halt.

The cavalry pursued, the infantry moved Biwak at Athis; Kleist and York took accommodation in an intact house of the village.

"York had found a Freund in the savage pursuit of these days; his heart warmed up when he saw the man of Nollendorf standing next to him, always clear, sure, on the matter. For a while, the Heurichs were surprised to learn that the tough old man had drank brotherhood with his comrade Kleist after old Germanic warrior customs."¹⁶⁸

The beautiful success was bought cheaply, 600 men was the loss, which had preferably cost the battle for Athis.

At 11:00 a.m., Blücher received the news of that win. The headquarters now knew that a second strong column did not exist on the Strait of Berry au Bac, that Napoleon had stood with the bulk against Laon.

But even now, Blücher's disease prevented Gneisenau from using all the forces to destroy the enemy, which had to be done if Napoleon stopped.

And he stopped in the blindness of the player. In vain he attacked again, but he was saved by the disposition of Gneisenau, which, assuming that Napoleon would pull out, unfolded the corps and, after realizing his error, could no longer summarize it in time.

York and Kleist were marched on Berry au Bac, then stopped en route and finally ordered back to Laon.

Napoleon escaped annihilation, but with Laon the campaign had taken its decisive turn. Napoleon's might was broken north of the Aisne, 17,000 men had cost him the second operation against the Silesian army. He could no longer replace her.

Late that night, York arrived back at Athis, Kleist at Aippes, both certainly not in the

¹⁶⁷ Ollech, Reyher, Military Weekly 1870. Supplement p. 410.

¹⁶⁸ Treitschke I. 547.

rosiest mood. On the 11th, a day of rest was given and not followed. Gneisenau tried again to hand over the command to Langeron, who did not want to take it. However, on its own initiative, Gneisenau was unable to decide what to do. He thought that he had to keep the army intact for Blücher or for his successor.

Even Grolmann, Kleist's chief of staff, who was very much at Gneisenau, could not achieve anything, Müffling said: the Napoleon raid on the 7th was outrageous, but the 10th was the most outrageous. All the generals' ideas did nothing. The soldiers believed that Blücher was mentally ill and that the most bizarre rumors were about him.

During this time, the known incident with York occurred, which left the army and could only be brought back with difficulty.

The army's inaction was dangerous enough. The longer the decision was delayed, the more doubtful it became. If Napoleon had accommodated its people and dared to offer the same as Prussia did a short time ago, the outcome would have been unpredictable.

It was not until the 14th that Blücher's signature under the orders reappeared. The corps were further dismantled in recent days in order to be able to feed them better. The maintenance of the troops, had become very deficient due to the halt of operations. Kleist and York felt little of the improvement, however, as they could not think of more distant fouragizations at Corbeny and Berry au Bac, along with several thousand horses of General Chernicheff, in the constant expectation of an assault. —

Napoleon reorganized its army in Soissons and received the last reinforcements there. He doubted whether he would still be able to meet the Silesian army in the field, and seriously thought of dodging and maneuvering the tactical decision.

Then the appearance of the St. Priest's Corps drew him to Rheims, where he could achieve a slight success and at the same time threaten the rear connections of the Allies.

Near St. Priest was the Jagow Brigade of the Kleist Corps, which was involved in the catastrophe. She had marched from Erfurt with 12 battalions and 8 squadrons, crossed the Rhein near Koblenz in mid-February and arrived at Simmern, Saarbrücken, Nancy, Vitry Chalons, where she was under the command of Blücher under St. Priest. The same became 12,000 strong.

No sooner had she reached the theater of war than she had to leave 2,500 men, half of her troops, in the unfortunate battle near Rheims. St. Priest, who was himself wounded, lost a total of 4,000 men and 11 guns.

The reinforcements that Jagow provided amounted to only 2,500 men. Kleist was thus 13,000 strong after unification.

After three days of silence, Napoleon turned against the main army. Blücher concentrated the Seinige again south of Laon, in order to follow him possibly in support of Schwarzenberg.

Marmont stopped at the Aisne. York and Kleist fought with him on the 18th over the crossing at Pontavert. Marmont moved to Fismes, where he reunited with Mortier, who came from Soissons.

Napoleon's intent to hit the main army corps on a flank march and possibly beat them individually failed. He took Arcis sur Aube, but then turned to the adventurous one. surgery to Osten, from which he expected a magical effect.

She almost had the same one. Schwarzenberg already set his corps on Vitry in march and dared hardly hope that he would be able to present himself to Napoleon to the limit. That the emperor himself put himself in the greatest danger, at first no one thought of it in the

large headquarters. His march on Vitry was less threatening than Bourbakis's celebrated *expédition dans l'Est*, which was looked up at Versailles's headquarters in such cool blood. Yet Napoleon almost pulled its allies out of Paris. Alexander's intervention, which feared that it would not be able to move in first in Paris, prompted the acceptance of Toll's proposal that Napoleon should only be persecuted with cavalry, incidentally everything should march on Paris.

Until this decision, which was taken on the 24th, the movements in the Silesian army had been the following.

The corps of Hort and Kleist went on the 19th over the Aisne to Fismes. The marshals pulled out on Oulchy le Château, followed by Katzler. On the 20th, the Vesle was crossed at Courlandon, on the 21st, York came to Fère en Tardenois, Kleist to Cramaille east of Oulchy.

The marshals crossed the Marnes at Château-Thierry.

Blücher concluded that they should unite with Napoleon to provide battle to the main army. He wanted to support Schwarzenberg and had three corps go to Chalons. York and Kleist should follow the marshals directly. The general direction is Arcis.

Only Bülow stayed behind to take Soissons and soon threaten Paris.

On 23. In the evening, Blücher learned of Napoleon's march on Vitry and the battle of Arcis. He stuck to the decision to go to Chalons to possibly force the emperor to fight. The hope of such a thing revived him anew.

York and Kleist initially did not cross the Marnes, as they had no pontoon tram and had to build a trestle bridge.

Marmont and Mortier, after no page in touch with the enemy, were given such a sense of security that they also set off on Vitry. On the 24th In the evening, these marshals stood at Vathr, two miles south of Chalon, and behind them reached York and Kleist, which had finished the bridge, Montmirail. Kleist and There took their headquarters in the same manor from which Napoleon had conducted his beatings in February. Then they received the news that the two marshals at Fère-Champenoise had been beaten and decimated. They decided at once to transfer the retreating remnants of this corps, of whose proximity they had not known, to La Ferté-Gaucher on the way to Paris.

Droysen goes on to say, and this is the commemoration alluded to by Treitschke at Laon: "The two generals then chatted into the night, both alone in the wide hall, sitting in front of the fireplace. Around midnight, a late dispatch of the Field Marshal arrived, the disposition for the day already experienced; but it showed the advance of all corps on Paris. So finally the decisive turn to the last destination: a doubly happy destination for those who had remained in Preußens even in the sad times of humiliation and had saved the old pride of the Prussian name for better days. They liked to remember the years of Jena and Tilsit, the campaign in Kurland, where as now they had kept faithful and brotherly to each other.

Why is this reminded of? The two Alten brotherhood here and drank the You and You with a cup of Thee to each other. The next morning, it became known in both corps — as such, especially in the dark York — and seemed peculiar.'

The next morning, they marched on la Ferté-Gaucher. At the top the first corps, then mistakenly Weise the Bagage, first behind this the second corps. An order came along along the way. Blücher, to go to la Ferté sous Jouarre, which, however, assumed different conditions when the war situation on the spot gave it and was therefore not followed.

York, in agreement with Kleist, remained on the same track. La Ferté-Gaucher had a weak enemy division of the General Company. York had them expelled by the Horn division and persecuted the returnees. In la Ferté, the Prinz Wilhelm division, 3,800 strong, remained alone. At that moment, Kleist had not yet arrived, Mortier's head arrived. Since he found the place occupied, he bypassed it south, and York, with its 3,800 troops, was not strong enough to go out of his position to attack him and make him stop. Marmont, who followed behind Mortier, also turned south in time and turned to Provins. It arrived in Paris via Nangis and Melun. The good fortune of the war had saved this corps.

York and Kleist stayed in la Ferté on the 26th.

On the 26th, Napoleon finally realized that he had made a gust of air and turned backwards to Paris. In the general approach that followed, Blücher took the corps of York and Kleist as an *avant-garde*. They arrived on the 27th. Trilport, 28th. Villeparisis between Meaux and Paris. Here, the General Compans had to be thrown back in a forest and town battle lasting several hours. Kleist personally led its 9th and 10th. Brigade and finished the battle by conquering a Ferme.

The Silesian army would have arrived on the 29th. Paris and, after a light battle, probably take them. The retreat of the main army and the wish of Emperor Alexander to enter at the head of his guards cost a new battle.

The Silesian army had to make way for the main army and sit on the street of St Denis.

Before that, however, the corps should have the Freude to see their König, which had not become part of them during the entire campaign. Under Blücher's orders, the Yorkish Corps was to the right and left of the street to greet the monarchs, while the second corps was still largely in the battle position of 28 March.

"Since Soissons, the first Corps not gained in paradisiacal appearance. It was difficult for the king to overlook the defects that caused the most bitter distress of circumstances. He turned his exclusive interest to the news of the previous day's battle. Kleist was able to provide the most accurate information about the same."¹⁶⁹

In the afternoon, the rightward thrust of the troops was paid a visit, so that on the 30th at the battle of Paris four corps were again far from the battlefield that their intervention was doubtful.

In the main army, the Rayewski Corps fought almost exclusively, in the Silesian army York with 10,000, Kleist with 8,000 troops. Also the Prussian Guards.

York and Kleist were to attack Montmartre via la Vilette and la Chapelle. They had 1 1/3 mile until then and received the order only between 7 and 8 am. They immediately set out. The two generals, who did not have a good map of the surroundings of Paris, rode ahead with their sticks to orient themselves in the terrain.

The troops arrived at 10 a.m. York placed General Katzler and Wilhelm against la Vilette and directed Horn and Kleist north around the village. These troops were to attack La Chapelle and the Montmartre from Aubervilliers. It took a long time for this movement to be completed under the enemy's flames, and even longer for Langeron, on the far right, to advance against the western side of the Montmartre.

After the enemy position was sufficiently taken under artillery fire and the troops moved into the battle line everywhere, with the main army Pantin was taken by the Prussian guards, was at 3 o'clock to the storm. Horn took la Chapelle, Kleist dropped the rifle

¹⁶⁹ Ollech: Reyher, M. -W. -Bl. 1,873rd Supplement p. 489.

immediately afterwards and took the top of the five Mühlen.

The Montmartre killed in action was. Paris capitulated.

All troops bivouac in front of the defeated capital. In the second semicircle, the watchfires encircled — as once did Leipzig — the conquered. How much hard work had a weak warfare still been imposed by the That power and the genius of Napoleon, before the decision of the battle of nations was sealed here on Franconian soil!

York and Kleist stayed on the Montmartre; they had a litter made for themselves to the page of the foremost house, and watched through the night, wrapped in their cloaks. The son of the revolution lay on the ground, overthrown mainly by the power of the Prussian sword. To the cheers of a crowd that believed they were free, the allied monarchs moved into Paris on March 31, Friedrich Wilhelm surrounded by its senior generals. Only Blücher was missing, he could not attend because of his eye condition.

On 1 April, Kleist was called all the way to Paris to attend the consultations taking place there and moved its relegation quarters to the city. The corps was commanded by the most senior general, Prince August.

On April 2, the Yorkschen und Kleistschen Korps was honored to move into Paris. They were led over the Pont d'Jena, had marched on the Mars field past their König and then moved on the road to Orleans in Cantonnements near Longjumeau. Here they stayed until April 10, then was dislocated even further, the 2nd. Corps came to the department of Somme. —

A rich blessing of awards now poured over the army that did so great. Friedrich Wilhelm rewarded its generals.

On April 1, Kleist pour le mérite received the Oak Leaves to and became the head of the 6th. Regiment, which he had had mostly under his command.

"In order to publicly recognize and reward the distinction with which you led the troops under your command to victory in the last battles, I hereby appoint you as Chief of the 1st. West Prussian infantry regiments and soon award you the Order of Merit with Oak Leaves in the conviction that you like to wear the same. Paris, 31 March 1814.

Friedrich Wilhelm.¹⁷⁰

From the Emperor Alexander, the general received a sword decorated with diamonds.

The Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Berlin had already appointed him a doctor with several other generals.¹⁷¹

When it was decided that the Bourbons would return, Kleist, on behalf of the monarchs, was sent to Ludwig XVIII to deliver the message.

On 12 April, Kleist signed the following order for the day:

"The König's Majesty has called me to Paris and the sphere of activity assigned to me there separates me from my troops for some time. Although I hope to return soon, I take this current split as an opportunity to thank the army corps that has been led so far for the aspire to a fee and perseverance with which they insisted on danger and renunciation until the end

¹⁷⁰ Leave papers.

¹⁷¹ On 27 July 1814, Graefe proposed to the Senate that the Chancellor of State, Blücher, Kleist, Tauenzien and Gneisenau be offered the honorary diploma as Doctors of Philosophy. On 3 August 1814 Böckh gave the ceremonial speech. Solger then proclaimed, as Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, the newly created Doctors Hardenberg, Blücher, then Tauenzien, York, Kleist and Bülow. The founding of the Royal Friedrich-Wilhelm University of Berlin, Rudolf Köpke, Berlin 1860. (2009)

that has now been achieved."¹⁷²

On May 3, Ludwig moved in, and the peace was signed on May 30. The same person brought Kleist the appointment as General of the Infantry.

Immediately afterwards, the booths were raised:

"Through your high credit for the happy development of the great matter we just advocated, you have committed yourself to the fatherland constantly. I wish to give you active recognition of this by raising you and your descendants to the county, with the name of Kleist of Nollendorf. Soon, my first concern will be to give you yet another piece of evidence of my insight by giving you and your descendants a possession in lying estates. H.-Q. Paris, 3 June 1814.

Frederick Wilhelm. Von Kleist To the General of the Infantry."¹⁷³

In pursuit of this order in counsel, the domain offices of Stötterlingenburg and Wülperode, situated in the Principality of Halberstadt, and over 1,000 acres of forest were transferred to Kleist by the Oberförsterei Abbemode. The whole had an area of 3649 acres 141 square ruthen,¹⁷⁴ in the fertile area there a beautiful property. Kleist never lived in Stötterlingenburg all the time. district councillor His son *spent several years in Halberstadt*¹⁷⁵, then sold the estates in 1855/56 and bought the estate of Knauten in East Prussia. Difficult tenancies and separation made it undesirable for both owners to take over the administration themselves. —

After the most important matters were sorted out, the König went with Blücher and York to London, so that Kleist was given command of the remaining troops.

While still in London, York received the appointment as commanding general of all troops and fortresses in Schlesien, as well as Bülow in Eastern and Westpreußen, so that Kleist was definitely appointed commander-in-chief of the Prussian army, which took its standing quarters at Rhein. Moreover, since the federal troops were still joining, the quieter Kleist had probably been chosen with some intention for this post, which had to be more suitable than the fierce York, all the more so because the circumstances to be dealt with were not always military, but also political. York was offended by this provision, as Kleist, who stood under him, was given greater command while, he said, he was to do "bulldozing." He was also injured by the fact that, like Kleist, he received only 200000 thalers, while Blücher and Hardenberg received 450000.

Kleist took his headquarters in Aachen, he must have been here in early July, according to a letter from Marwitz dated July 9, 1814, stating that he had to make a trip from Anhalt to General Kleist in Aachen.

The Prussian corps stood:

I. (v. Pirch II.) near Lüttich, II. (v. Zieten) near Verviers, III. (v. Borstel) near Aachen.

In total, including the federal troops and the 14,000 Saxons, 80,000 troops were to remain in Frankreich.

The remaining troops marched home. Kleist's fatherly benevolence and his winning kindness achieved, without force, that all the dissimilar and reluctant remained in the right track, and the former enemies, where they came into contact with each other,

¹⁷² *50th anniversary of the history of the Royal Prussian 2nd Posen Infantry Regiments No. 19 1813 to 1863, R. von Leszczyński, Luxemburg 1863, pp. 132 (2010)*

¹⁷³ Leave papers

¹⁷⁴ A welcome message from the current owner of Stötterlingenburg, Mr Lambrecht.

¹⁷⁵ *2018: Reformulated, as the son lived there for a long time. See its biography.*

separated without friction. Especially the Saxan troops, which were not always handled correctly by Thielemann, had a great reverence for him and, as long as they were under his command, showed the most correct attitude.¹⁷⁶

Incidentally, the Occupation Army gradually sank to half its strength through the dismissal of the Landwehr and the volunteer hunters and other departures. After all, there was plenty for the commander-in-chief to do.

We do not know whether Kleist was able to see his family again after the long war. The same man had remained in Frankfurt during the war years and had seen the debris of the great army, wrapped in rags and women's clothes, returning from Rußland and many Russian troops passing through. It had been preserved from any other hostile visit.

In September, the Congress of Vienna met, which was not to end until nine months later. The Saxan question was the most difficult, Metternich initially gave an undertaking that Prussia would receive all of Saxony and on 11 October agreed that the country, which had previously been under Russian administration, was occupied by the Prussians. On 8 November, Prince Replin handed over the administration to the Prussian General v. Gaudy and Minister v. d. Reck. The König had appointed Kleist as governor of Saxony.

"I have decided, in agreement with the allied monarchs, to take over the provisional occupation and management of the Kingdom of Saxony, which was until now brought about by the Russian page, and I want to transfer the General Command in Saxony, which the Prince Replin led, to you in the future, in the complete conviction that I cannot trust it with a more dignified and better hand than yours, etc. Since your relationship with the army does not pay a visit the departure, the Major General of Gaudy will first take over the first occupation of the country. etc."¹⁷⁷

Wien, 23 October 1814.

General von Gaudy received a specific instruction, which was attached to the above order in counsel in writing. We recognize once again the great trust of the König in its ever-proven servant Kleist. However, he never took up the post of governor in Saxony, at least in this form.

Metternich later withdrew its first commitment, and the project of a division of Saxony emerged. Would the Prussian generals (York, Bülow, Kleist, Gneisenau, Massenbach) also like to address the Chancellor with a threatening address: "Where would the Prussian monarchy be if we had blindly obeyed the cautious Cabinette?"¹⁷⁸ Prussian politics was in such an unfavorable position that insisting on their justified demands would have led to war rather than the succumbing of the Austrian - French party. The outbreak of hostilities was close enough.

Friedrich Wilhelm's vigorous intervention in favor of a policy that went with Rußland saved at least most of Saxony and compensation such as Thorn and Koblenz for the Prussian state.

Among the many personalities who followed the outcome of the negotiations on Saxony with understandable tension was Thielemann. He also provided Kleist with news of the

¹⁷⁶ Letter of 9 September 1814 to Freiherr v. Thielmann on the addresses of the Saxan Brigades sent by his letter of 2 September 1814, printed in Beiträge zu der biography des Generals Freiherr von Thielmann, Albrecht Graf von Holtzendorff, Leipzig 1830, p. 259 (2012)

Von Kleist Measure against the Elector of Hesse, The Demobilization and the Remobilization of the Kurhessian Army Corps in August in 1814, Freiherr v. Dalwigk, Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hessische Geschichte und Landeskunde, Vol. 29, Kassel 1905, pp. 15 (2013)

¹⁷⁷ Leave papers.

¹⁷⁸ Treitschke, 1640.

affair, and on October 30, when the Kingdom was due to become part of the Prussian administration, he wrote from Koblenz:

"At last Saxony's fate has been decided, although the situation remains provisional! I'll send you the transcript of Stein's letter to me, my dear general.

God now give his blessing that the minds will be calmed, — quite devilish machinations have been tried to arouse commotion and turmoil.

I also wish to say that my destiny will soon be definitively decided, for you will admit to me that my situation as a Russian general under a Prussian government in Saxony is very strange.

I'm sending an officer for safety's sake.

From the bottom of my heart, yours

Frh. v. Thielemann."¹⁷⁹

His fate was favorable enough. He ended his career as commanding general of a Prussian army corps. —

¹⁷⁹ Leave papers

VI. 1815 and exit.

The curtain had not yet come down on the great play of intrigue by the Congress of Vienna, when it became known that Napoleon was returning and all the outstanding questions were quickly resolved. Like the pigeons, when the hawk descends beneath them, the laughing and dancing diplomatic society fell apart, but this time to quickly summon up energetic resolve.

Kleist heard of Napoleon's landing on March 10.¹⁸⁰ His troops lay scattered between Rhein, Mosel and Maas, a brigade on the right bank of Rhein near Wesel. This fortress, as well as Luxemburg and Jülich, were unprepared for the war.

Napoleon's return did not frighten the prudent general. It seemed to him like an adventure from which he expected no great success. After all, it was necessary to consider a temporary success. He was therefore the next person to take his measures without hesitation,

Without orders, he gathered his small army near Jülich and Aachen, summoned the Westphalian and Bergische Landwehr and armed the fortresses.

He contacted the prince of Oranien, who commanded 20,000 Englishmen and Hanoverians and gathered them at Ath. The two generals agreed to unite on the Meuse and possibly to adopt a joint battle at Tirlémont.¹⁸¹

Although the Dutch government demanded cover from Brussels, Kleist responded very aptly: "Il s'agit de l'Europe et pas de Bruxelles!"

It was decided to establish three large armies: 200000 Austrians on the Upper Rhine, 150000 Russians on the Middle Rhine, 210000 troops under Blücher and Wellington in the Netherlands.

The latter happened on the trip from Wien to Brussels, Aachen, where he talked to Kleist about the strategic situation. He wrote from Brussels on 5 April that he had found very sad conditions there and that he believed there could be no resistance. He called on Kleist to unite with him unhemmed.¹⁸² As this was in the general intentions, Gneisenau approved

¹⁸⁰ The following period up to July 1815 is described in great detail with analysis of comprehensive source material by v. Pflugk-Harttung, *The Prussian Army and the North German Federal Forces under General v. Kleist 1815*, Gotha, 1911. (2007) The Buch is available as a digitized version. <http://www.v-kleist.com/FG/Nollendorf/Nollendorf1815.pdf> (2015)

Memorabilia from the Life of Leopold by Gerlach, Volume 1, Berlin 1891, p. 5: "Between the two wars I stayed with General Müsling in the headquarters of the Count of Kleist-Nollendorf, who had become very fond of me and had a lot to do with me. He told me that Bonaparte had landed in Frankreich in Paris, where I stayed for a few days, Bonaparte was still seeing and returned to Aachen under a number of perils with the message: "Everything whoops towards him and demands the recapture of the left bank of the Rhine." (2020)

¹⁸¹ **Letter from the Prince of Oranien to General Kleist of Nollendorf, Brussels 22 March 1815, in Frederik der Nederlanden en zijn tijd, François de Bas, III, Part 2, Schiedam 1904, p. 139 (2011)**

On 19 March 1815, General Graf Kleist von Nollendorf from Aachen wrote to the König of Prussia: "The British army in Belgien is neither strong nor in particularly good shape. Twenty-two battalions, highly incomplete English battalions including the German legion, carry 20 pieces of bad artillery and are barely 15,000 of the worst English troops. The Hanoverian Corps has a single battery with it. There is hardly any mention of the Belgians, which is a miserable run-up." Quoted from Schwertfeger, *Geschichte der Königlich Deutschen legion 1803-1816, Erster Band, Hanover and Leipzig 1907, pages 561-567 (2007)*

A letter from General v. Röder to General v. Kleist, Brussels, 3 April 1815, about a conversation with the König of the Netherlands is reprinted in *Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neidhardt von Gneisenau*, Hans Delbrück, Volume 4, Berlin 1880, pp. 484 (2014)

¹⁸² **To General Kleist.**

B BRUSSELS, April 5th, 1815.

GENERAL,

I arrived here during last night; I have spent the day in endeavor to make myself master of the state of affairs. The reports respecting the situation, number and the intentions of the enemy are always excessively vague : but

the plan and the march started when all troops were assembled, around mid-April.¹⁸³

Kleist did not participate in the march because he was given a different command.¹⁸⁴ It should be avoided, if possible, for the Blücher Army to have corps leaders who were older than Gneisenau in terms of rank, since this relationship had led to intolerances for Laon, for example. Thus, of the old generals, only Bülow went along, which one did not want to renounce and which also had to operate as leader of the reserve corps probably mostly independently.

Kleist was commissioned to form the North German Army Corps, as it was most suited to the position of a federal commander. Initially, about 16,000 troops, mostly Hessen, were to be drawn together at Triers to fill the void in which the Russian army would later move in.

Apart from Hessen, the following states had to place their troops under Prussian command to the North German Bundesarmeecorps: Weimar, Dessau, Schwarzburg, Waldeck, Bückeburg, Oldenburg, both Mecklenburg. Each state had the right to appoint the commander of its contingent. Apart from his adjutant, Kleist was the only Preuße in this colorful corps, in which clothing and armament, commandos, signals, in which everything was different, which caused the leadership no small problems.¹⁸⁵ By the way, the corps was not put to the test of a battle; it was only used for sieges.

When Marshal Blücher came through Aachen, the Prussians had already left, Kleist had left for Rhein. He then traveled on to Lüttich, where he took quarters on the 19th in the

it appears to me we ought to be prepared against a surprise (coup de main) which he might be tempted to try at any moment.

There can be no doubt that it would tat an immense advantage to him to make us retrograde with the troops which we have in front of Brussels; to drive before him the King of France and the Royal Family, and to compel the King of the Netherlands, with his establishments newly formed here, to make a retreat. This would be a terrible blow in public opinion, both here and in France : and, according to his usual management, (allure,) the news of his success would be known throughout France, whilst tat of any reverse tat might happen to him would be concealed from everybody.

After having placed 13,400 men as garrisons in Mons, Tournay, Ypres, Ostend, Nieuport and Antwerp, I can get together about 23,000 good troops, English and Hanoverian; amongst them about five thousand excellent cavalry. This number will be increased in a few days, especially in cavalry and artillery. I can also bring up 20,000 Dutch and Belgian troops, including two thousand cavalry; the whole having about sixty pieces of cannon.

My opinion is, tat we ought to take measures to unite the whole Prussian army with this allied Anglo-Dutch army in front of Brussels; and tat, with this view, the troops under Your Excellency's command should, without loss of time, march along the Maese, and take up cantonments between Charleroy, Namur and Huy.

By this disposition, we shall be sure to save this country, bo interesting to the allied powers : we shall cover the concentration of their forces on the Rhine; and we shall escape the evils which would inevitably result from a sudden retreat in our actual circumstances. At the same time, Your Excellency would be just as able as you are in your present position, to march your troops to any point required by the service of the king; and we should have for our numerous cavalry a field of battle as favourable as any in the rear of Brussels.

Tat I beg Your Excellency to take these reasons into consideration, and to let me know your determination; in order I may decide what measures I ought to take in case I should be attacked, if Your Excellency should judge more fit to remain where you are.

I ought to apprize Your Excellency, tat the king of the Netherlands has given orders for providing your troops with all they may want upon their advance into this country.

Wellington.

From: A voice from Waterloo. A history of the battle, on the 18th June 1815 By Edward Cotton, 1849 (2007)

¹⁸³ Beitzke 1815, II. 11.

¹⁸⁴ "If you didn't take Blücher, Gneisenau, Kleist, Bülow and others could make claims. All of this was circumvented by simply adhering to the seniority order, while at the same time satisfying the popular vote demanded by Blücher. If the König appointed another commander, and he was unlucky in the war, Hohenzollern would have been saddled with all the responsibility. After all, König did not want to drop Kleist now. He therefore separated the leadership of the federal troops from the Prussian field army and transferred them to Kleist." v.Pflugk-Hartung, p. 53 (2007)

¹⁸⁵ Beitzke 1815, II. 34.

middle of the Saxons. Here occurred those known occurrences that are too unpleasant to touch to do without Noth. Kleist was not there to intervene; it is likely that he would have prevented the riot. He had the trust of the Saxons, who knew that he was also against the healing, to the extent that he could do with them what he wanted. At least that's how Varnhagen v. Ense writes.

Kleist was at this time on the trip to its new troops,¹⁸⁶ which were not yet assembled at Triers, but rather in cantonnements on the right Rhein - shore from the Lahn to the Sieg. Cavalry-captain In his company was the év. Katte.

On 26 April, he visited the Hessian troops under Major General v. Müller, who had arrived at Langenschwalbach: 1 grenadier, 4 Musketeer and 1 Jäger battalion, 1 Hussar regiment and 1 6-pound foot battery.¹⁸⁷

He found her in a relatively good condition. Their Geist would be a good one, and they did not seem reluctant to be under Prussian command.

On this trip, Kleist was also in Mainz, where he visited the Archduke Carl, the victor of Aspern, from whom he was received very graciously and drawn into a longer conversation about various items. In Mainz, he also learned that the Nassau troops, who were also to join the North German Federal Corps, would march to the Netherlands to join the regiment, which was already in Dutch pay. Her duke did not want her fought under Prussia. In its report to the König, Kleist noted that the proceedings had been very unfavorable throughout the region, especially in Neuwiedschen, which was very Prussian in its mind and had anticipated coming under the Prussian government in the present circumstances, so that it would no longer have to bear the sale of people to other powers. Archduke Carl would also have expressed his astonishment at this, all the more so because he had had 3,000 rifles delivered to them in anticipation of unification with the Prussians.

A few days later, Kleist saw the Thuringian Brigade and on 30 April reported from Neuwied that the Battalion Weimar was the best, soon to be the two hunting companies of the Prince of Anhalt-Bernburg.

Other members of the brigade included: a battalion composed of Anhalt-Dessauern and Köthenern, the Schwarzburg battalion from Rudolstadt and Sondershausen, the Gothic battalion.

The commander was Colonel von Egloffstein. The armament and regulations were French. Kleist decided not to make any changes, as the time was short and the dislocation was extensive. Provisioning was not yet organized.

In the midst of the corps formation institutions, Blücher was ordered on May 8 to march to Trier with the troops already assembled. The order was not pleasant for Kleist, as the corps was not yet operational.

He was also to move to a food-uncovered area, where the shortage of provisions had to become even more noticeable. 13,000 infantry, 2 regiments of cavalry, 2 6 pounds of batteries have been assembled so far. The contingents of Oldenburg, Waldeck, Lippe, Schaumburg and Detmold were on the rise.

Kleist departed on the 11th, crossed the Rhein at Koblenz and arrived in Trier from 16 to 18 May. Through a dislocation on both banks of the Saar and Mosel, the corps was to

¹⁸⁶ War Archives: Acta, Berichte des Generals v. Kleist über den Zustand des Norddeutsche Bundescorps, 18 April to 19 June 1815.

¹⁸⁷ On the prehistory: The disarmament and the remobilization of the Kurhessian army corps in August in 1814, Freiherr von Dalwigk, Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hessische Geschichte und Landeskunde, Volume 29, Kassel 1905, pp. 15 (2011)

cover Trier and Luxemburg. To the left were two infantry divisions and a cavalry division of the Baiern.

On the way to Trier, Kleist had visited the remainder of the Kurhessian troops, namely the infantry regiments Elector and Solms, a dragoon regiment and a battery. The latter were in good shape.

In Trier, Kleist received an order in counsel of the 20th, through which he received, in addition to the North German Federal Corps, the command of his old second army corps, whose commander General v. Borstel had been removed from his post.

In acknowledging receipt of this command, Kleist said:

"I will strive for this new proof of yours. Majesty favour deserves to show me, and as I firmly believe in the second army corps in advance, I can also hope with confidence that the federal troops will also support me vigorously through their conduct in the fulfillment of my duties."

In the meantime, the contingents of Waldeck, Schaumburg and Detmold had arrived and been formed into a regiment of 1,200 men. This was followed by two companies of Bernburg Landwehr, three companies of Detmold Landwehr, two battalions of Hessen and the Oldenburg Infantry Regiment.

The corps had now gained considerable strength and was able to depart for Arlon on 16 June, but under the command of Lieutenant General v. Engelhard.

Kleist could not take part in the march and could not take over the command of the 2nd Army Corps. He began to suffer in early June and developed jaundice, which eventually degenerated into a cold fever.¹⁸⁸ Although he hoped to be restored soon, he felt compelled to return to Aachen.¹⁸⁹

The König said:

With lively participation, I have seen from your letter that sickness forced you to go to Aachen. I am concerned that, with your eagerness for service, you will also allow yourself the necessary rest. You may be left as long as necessary to restore your state-precious health, I have transferred the federal troops under your command to Field Marshal Blücher and, with the lack of cavalry and artillery, have left them to be brought to Gutzlinden by the other army corps."¹⁹⁰ —

Kleist was therefore unable to take part in the brief campaign of 1815. When he was restored, he went to his family in Frankfurt a/O. for further rest. The good citizens of the city did not miss the opportunity to welcome him festively and with a poem, as the ideal train of the time, the 31st August 1815, entailed. However, the poetic performance of the author falls so far short of his good will that an imprint here would miss the intended purpose. As the headline says, the poem is "reverently consecrated by all the inhabitants of the city." If it has been so poor, however, one cannot escape the cheerful impression that what we would like to call "domestic poetry" ("everyone creates their own songs today") has indeed made considerable progress since the beginning of the century. It is the widespread reading of our classics, especially of Goethe and its "self-confessings", which also call upon the "equal souls" to make confessions — which have sharpened our sense of the beauty of expression and form in language to such an extent that there is now a legion of "private poets" who are able to dress a useful thought in beautiful words. — His stay in

¹⁸⁸ The certificate of the senior rod surgeon Dr. Starke is printed by J. v. Pflugk-Harttung, p. 271. (2007)

¹⁸⁹ Bis Hier Kriegsarchiv d. Groß General staff.

¹⁹⁰ Leave papers

Frankfurt was not long. his Her Majesty the König summoned Kleist to Merseburg to assume general command in Saxony. On his departure from the city he had become fond of, he wrote the following letter to the mayor:

"My other appointment as commanding general of the province of Saxony, which takes me away from Frankfurt, causes me yours. Well-born to ask, in order to cover the contribution I have made to various charitable institutions, to accept three attached city bonds of value 1000 thalers as property for the city hospital.

I should be very pleased if this charitable institution, which is so much to the credit of Frankfurt's citizens, could be enabled to provide more support to some of the sick.

The days spent in Frankfurt will always give me a pleasant reminder, as well as the love and respect so often shown by pages of the respectable inhabitants, me and my family, will always enliven me with sincere intimate insight.

It will be yours. Well-born, I would like to share these sentiments with your fellow citizens and to commend me for the continuation of your very valuable memory.

Yours. Well-born, however, I ask you to keep in particular my complete respect and amicable devotion.

Frankfurt a/O., 27 October 1815."

The mayor published this letter in the Frankfurter "Patriotic Weekly" with the following introduction:

"By means of the subsequent letter to the Lord Mayor, the Royal General of the infantry, now also commanding General of the Province of Saxony, Mr. Count Kleist of Nollendorf, Excellency, gave our poor hospital a thousand thalers as a present.

His glorious memory will be sacred to our descendants who will not enjoy the happiness of his personal benevolence.

We will diligently apply to all to make the philanthropic intentions of His Excellency come true.

Our deepest reverence, the deepest attachment and the most fervent wishes for the well-being of His Excellency and His highly revered family, as well as for the prolongation of His thatched life follow him to his new stay. The thanks for this generous act will never be extinguished in the hearts of any philanthropist in our walls."¹⁹¹ A/O. Frankfurt, 30 October 1815. The magistrate.

The General's staff in Merseburg consisted of the following officers:¹⁹²

A. General Staff:

1. Colonel v. Schütz, boss.
2. Whether. -Lieutenant v. Pfuel.
3. Prem. -Lieutenant. Count Stillfried.

B. among the adjutants:

- 1st Maj. v. Katte.
2. Rittm. Count Schweinitz.

¹⁹¹ We believe that we should all give news concerning the private life of our hero, all the more so because his life description, as it could not have been otherwise, is almost completely filled with "war and war cries" and will therefore often have a limited interest for the non-military. It is also in keeping with the Geist of family history if it also cultivates the more insignificant details, which are indifferent to the wider public.

¹⁹² Mil. W. Bl. v. 27 July 1816.

3. Captain Voß.**Sec 4 -Lieutenant. Roeder.**

The provincial government saw in the appointment of Kleist, preceded by the reputation of its virtues, a telling demonstration of the care of its new König. His task was a difficult one, as half of the province had only been united with Prussia since the Treaty of Paris. Again, opposites had to be reconciled and communicated. The extent to which he has succeeded, the way in which Kleist has far exceeded the expectations of his König, is demonstrated by the attitude of this half-annexed province when Kleist left office after only five years of activity. We'll meet the same girl later.

Unfortunately, illness made it difficult for him to perform his professional duties. As early as January 1816, his earlier suffering returned with such ferocity that he wrote down his dismissal petition under the first impression of it, as can be seen from the still preserved concept. Then he crossed it and came in for a longer vacation.

"Your. Royal Majesty's orders to obey, I had immediately gone to Merseburg in early November to take over the General Command entrusted to me most highly. With zeal and effort I have run the business and hoped to have established my health so far that I can also fulfill my duty with enthusiasm. — Unfortunately, experience has not confirmed this, because on the last day of the year I suffered another outbreak of jaundice, which made me sick and had to look after the room. This setback, which affected me, despite having taken care of everything that could bring it about and lived particularly moderately, proves to me that I must avoid any mental effort for a time in order to restore my body, which at my age should already be connected with difficulties, to the proper strength. In order to achieve this as far as possible, it is highly necessary, at the advice of the doctors, to subject me to a serious bathing cure again this year, with the removal of all shops. So I'm asking yours. Royal Your Majesty insists on granting me a four-month holiday when the good season returns. I hope with confidence that such a new cure will put me in a position, yours too. Royal To dedicate my services to Majesty. This is at least the wish of those who sign in loyalty and in the deepest reverence, etc."¹⁹³

The holiday was granted on January 20, with the König leaving the determination of the time to the doctor and his own wishes. The stay in the bath must then have had a very good effect, because the now following four years the general was able to dedicate uninterrupted his service business.

The manor in Merseburg, whose large halls were newly furnished for this purpose in 1816, had been ordered as an official residence. However, he did not remain in sublime seclusion, but entered into a lively relationship with the urban districts. So he founded the resource that still exists today by advancing money with others to build it. His image still hangs in the resource hall today. Above all, however, he was kind and accommodating towards everyone, so that the whole population, even those districts with whom he could not socialize, paid him love and reverence. He was a poor man, and his charity dried many tears in Stillen. The whole province felt the way Merseburg felt. When the general came to Halle on his first inspirational trip, where he had fought in 1813, he was praised as a protector of the city. The Hallenser poet did a little better than the Frankfurter, so his verses may find a place here:

The General of the Infantry, Count Kleist of Nollendorf, the heroic protector of Halle on 28 April 1813 the Gememderath of Halle in the name of the grateful city.

¹⁹³ Leave papers.

**In our walls be glad welcome!
Greetings, O winning hero!
Taken from the hard-feeling, strange yoke,
A tyrant had joined us,
Let's welcome the heart of Freud escaped,
You, the guns of glory so high,
And think gratefully of the hot hours,
They, as protectors, here so gloriously invented you!**

**We saw a lot of the days filled with pain;
Killed in action Loyalty to us was a tough lot!
Always far and further fled the grief target!
Only fruitless the complaint seemed to fade away!
Always bloody were claws of our vulture,
And still only wore the Saale wave game
So Thrän as sigh, towards the beach of the Elbe,
To the Prussia of your fatherland.**

**From there freedom dawned shine!
Then we shook our chains joyfully!
Our children flew to save us,
With a happy aspire to a fee to the bloody gun dance,
Ready to go to the graves and better bed,
As if to return home without a victory wreath.
And angrily the enemy called it crime,
And already drew out the sword to take revenge.**

**There you moved in with your brave flock,
Desired hero, to our open gates.
The old field music was Erklingen
A lovely sound to our ears!
The old weapons called wonderfully
It fills our hearts: "Now we are not lost!"
And whatever else you like about us:
We were hoping to pass, pious.**

**It was a day that broke in, fatal.
Full of gun thunder and full of bloody wounds!
Already stormed wildly towards the enemy army!**

**Hell's ghosts seemed untied!
They threatened us more and more ruin!
But you were gloriously invented,
As our protection in increasing danger:
You stood rock-solid with your faithful flock.**

**An atonement sacrifice was the enemy's blood,
What you used to color our silent Saale.
Much bravery had rested unreconciled
In this shameful bereavement hall!
You were the first to fill Heldenmuth
On her graves wore the sacrificial shell,
Who casts their shadows, unjustly taunted,
Reconciled through Preußens's new glory!**

**So sahn wir glorreich dich von hinnen ziehen
And thanks and blessings followed you.
How far you wore your shiny panier:
We never stopped glowing for you;
And saw full of lust, to always beautiful decoration
The glory of the wreath blossoming around your forehead,
When You Were Victorious in Böhmen's Thaler
And crushed the most hated satrap.**

**Heil to you, O hero! Auf immer kühner Bahnen
Help you achieve our longing goal!
From fight to fight your flags flew,
Until the tyrant's throne fell into dust!
You helped the throne of your König ancestor.
Glorify in the brave weapon game!
You helped him collect his loyalists again!
Halfst, that we also enjoy being anew.**

**And again today we see you whining!
It's been three years since that hot day!
And today the city welcomes you sunny,
You once found her full of just lawsuits.
Today, every heart of the Freude opens up
And do homage to you with every happy slap;**

**And pay a visit the flame that was so awful,
Shines a milder one today on our thanksgiving altar.**

**She blazes up brightly for a pious celebration
The day you dedicate us to the feast day.
In eternity your name remains more teuer to us all!
And when a singer praises Preußens Heroes,
And call with pleasure the noble name Kleist,
Elicits the most beautiful tone of the golden lyre
And speaks enthusiastically, as none spoke:
So he hardly speaks after what we feel!**

Throughout Kleist's entire service, care for others runs like a thread. Correspondence from all these years, which we do not want to go on, provides evidence of this. He did not shy away from addressing the highest persons in such matters, as evidenced by a handwritten letter from the Emperor of Rußland pledging to him to plead for the widow of the "Colonel de Siegroth". The letter, Warschau, Oct. 16, 1816, concludes:

D'ailleurs, vous oblige personnellement, général, c'est réveiller en moi le souvenir des qualités éminentes que vous avez déployés au champ d'honneur: pendant cette période mémorable où j'ai fraternisé avec tous ceux, qui comme Vous, obéissaient à la voix de la patrie et du devoir.'

Two more small events, which report on the general's kindness towards his military subordinates, are mentioned here.¹⁹⁴

In 1817, a young barrister volunteered with the battalion in Merseburg, who experienced the kindness of the general as well as many others in a very special way. When the same man one day took up the post which the general had in his auditorium, the performing undercoffin forgot to inform him that at this time the post would always be served a breakfast which the same man was allowed to eat while on duty. Now, when the attendant brought the sandwiches and a glass of wine, the volunteer asked what that meant. When the servant replied that it was breakfast for him, he refused to accept it while he was standing in the post, and, despite all the servant's assurances that all the posts would accept it regularly, he remained at his refusal.

As soon as the servant left, the general himself came out and asked: "Why don't you want to take breakfast?" "Excellency, because I'm not allowed to do that in the service," was the answer. "But what if I order you to do it?" the general continued. "Not even then," the volunteer replied, "until I am replaced." "But if I replace you?" "Then it is something else, Excellency," was the answer, "then I am no longer on duty." "You know your service well, although you have not been there for long," continued the general, visibly delighted by the young man's behavior, took the shotgun from his hand and put it in Ecke with his words: "So, now you are replaced, now sit down with me and have breakfast!" He then talked with him for a long time about his official and personal circumstances, after which he inquired with great kindness. Then he learned that the young man was completely destitute and in fact had to live almost exclusively from the treatise granted to him by way

¹⁹⁴ Pleasant announcement of Dr. F. Weineck, Rector of Lübben, to whom they have been handed down by his father, currently young barrister and volunteer in Merseburg.

of exception. The general then went back to his room, but came straight out and gave the volunteer considerable financial support. Soon afterwards, he made sure that the young lawyer came to the war secretariat and was employed there for daily subsistence allowances. —

At that time, the same battalion had a less than benevolent commander. In the dusty, sunny and rather distant Exercise Square, the same exerciser often exercised the battalion in the summer until late noon and wondered if the people on the return march did not sing.

One day it was very late again and the crews were overly strained when they saw some riders in the distance, first the General Kleist, whom they soon recognized by his light voice, with which he shouted to the commander from afar: "Major v. N., does the devil bother you that you rush the people around like that? Let them march home at once!" The old gentleman had noticed with surprise that at such a late hour there was still nothing to see of soldiers in the city and then sat himself on the horse to save his people from undue effort.

He will not have done it without reason, because through the long years of war he had not become accustomed to touching the troupe with glacé gloves; that he himself made the effort to ride out, that is the telling thing about this small episode. —

In 1817, a monument was to be unveiled on the battlefield of Kulm. The König delicately ordered Weise to attend the ceremony.

"Bearing in mind the glorious effort you made four years ago to help defeat the enemy completely in the battle of Kulm, from Nollendorf, and to avert the great danger in which the daring enterprise of the French General Vandamme, in other successes, could have transferred the allied Bohemian army, I do not refrain from informing you that the installation of the monument to the heroes fallen in this strange slag will be celebrated on the 30th August cr., as the anniversary of the same, near Arbesau, on the art road passing there. I have decreed that the commander of the 1st Guard regiments and a commando of a sub-alterno officer, 2 non-commissioned officers, 2 tambours, 2 pipers and 20 grenadiers of this regiment are ordered there for the same; and since your attendance at the ceremony would have to contribute greatly to the enhancement of the same, I would be pleased if your business paid a visit you to attend it personally.'

Carlsbad, 30 July 1817.

Soon after this command, a letter from Colonel Leutnant v. Roeder, commander of the 1st Garderegiments, a man who, by the way, had also formerly been under Kleist and whose brother was at Kulm killed in action. In the same year, the order in counsel of the installation of the monument and the route for the commando was announced, including that there would probably be an Austrian battalion in Kulm with whom to agree on the celebration. The speech would be given by the court preacher Eylert, who is currently in Teplitz.

On the 29th of August the detachment arrived in Kulm, and in the evening also in Kleist, who had the princes Schwarzenberg and Clary greeted in Teplitz by the chief of his general staff. On another morning at 10 o'clock, on a wonderful morning, he went to the post office of Arbesau, near which the veiled monument stood. A large crowd wandered on the highways from Teplitz to Kulm, it was like a pilgrimage to a sacred place. The place for the monument is well chosen, the Ore Mountains with its villages and monasteries, overlooked by the Nollendorfer heights, forms a pleasant and effective background.

Next to the monument was the Prussian detachment and an Austrian from the 6th. Jaeger

Battalion, the Austrian Generals Fürst Bentheim and v. Lutz, the Colonel Fürst Windischgrätz and v. Wernhardt, General-Adjutant at Schwarzenberg, who was prevented from appearing by illness himself, and a lot of Prussian and Austrian bathers from Teplitz, as well as Fürst Clary.

After Kleist arrived, on a drum sign, the service started with the chant: "Now thank God." Court preacher Eylert gave the ceremonial speech, in which he pointed out the importance of the day and its decisive influence on the gloriously finished campaign and begged in the final prayer the blessing of heaven on the allied princes, their armies and peoples.

After the speech, the detachment presented the rifle, and Kleist put on his Majesty the König, and Her Imperial Majesties from Österreich and Rußland a three-time hurrah.

"The hero of the day," we follow here Eylert, "was the brave and man-friendly Kleist, from which Fouqué says that he breezes down from the top like a mountain stream, with the sword in his fist forwards into the battle of the fields and at the same time gazes from time to time at his snorting and foaming rose to distract it, so that his hoof would not tread a thier crawling in the way."

"Indeed," continues Eylert, "aspire to a fee and Demuth, fortitude and kindness were united in this hero, and no one saw him capable of so much, so plain and simple he went along with it."

After the ceremony, a dinner organized by the Prussian authorities gathered the more outstanding participants, about 100 people, in the manor of Kulm. The teams were also festively entertained. Kleist toasted on the prince Schwarzenberg and the Count Ostermann-Tolstoy, on the Austrian and Russian troops and on the memory of all the warriors remaining in the battle. —

In his position as commanding general, Kleist still received many awards as Theil. So he received (28 Oct. 1817) a porcelain table service.¹⁹⁵ The chief accountant of the Royal Porcelain Factory was sent to Merseburg specifically for the purpose of unpacking and setting up the whole thing.

On 19 April 1818, he was awarded the Grand Cross of the Order of the Lion by the Elector of Hessen, and the next year he was awarded the bust of Queen Luise. The accompanying letter states:

¹⁹⁵ König Friedrich Wilhelm III wanted to reward some particularly deserving commanders for their successful warfare. However, since they were already decorated with all high Prussian orders, this award was made through a dinner service as a gift of honor. A dinner service was offered to Prince August of Prussia, Prince Wilhelm of Prussia, Prince of Hessen-Homburg, General Count Yorck of Wartenburg, General Count Kleist of Nollendorf, General Count Tauentzien and General Duke of Wellington. A plate of the service of the Count Kleist of Nollendorf is in the family archive, the photographs show this plate and the coat-of-arms on it. (2007)

"The König's Majesty is particularly pleased, yours. Excellence as an immediate witness Highest of his happier past to know in possession of this expensive image.

Yours. Excellency I shall not express this alone, but rather much cordiality and kindness in the name of Sr. Majesty, but I think yours. Excellence knows the well-founded and proven attitudes of König better for you than I would be able to renew them for you. I would therefore just like to say that the König has expressed its Freude several times with real participation: to have found you here during your last stay as well and cheerfully."¹⁹⁶

In 1819, the Grand Cross of the Baden Military Order of Merit was awarded, and the Grand Cross of the White Falcon House Order was awarded by the Grand Duke of Weimar, the same decoration that Blücher had worn so far.

The König noted by paying a visit the proposal that the award was as honorable for him (Kleist) as for the memory of the deceased (Blücher).

In 1818, Kleist intended to make a trip to Österreich, especially Wien. In response to his request for leave on 23 August, the König replied that he had no objection to the intended trip, the useful purpose of which he would like to acknowledge, but wished Kleist's presence if he and the Emperor of Rußland passed through the General Command on their trip to Aachen. Wien would also have less interest in him in the absence of Emperor Franz.

Kleist must have made a new request to this effect, because on 8 September it was again told that König did not consider a trip to southern Deutschland this year to be advisable in political terms. In an accompanying letter, Witzleben comments on this view, saying that Kleist is also aware of Österreich's suspicious policy from experience and that the trip of a man of his military reputation and rank at a time when the monarchs are gathered in Aachen could arouse mistrust and interfere with the negotiations.

Kleist took a keen interest in the spiritual life of its time. He observed with interest and understanding everything that literature and art produced.¹⁹⁷ He also followed the political movements of his time with a bright eye. It was only natural for him, according to the traditions of his family and his mature outlook on life, that he was politically on the right page. Words such as "Reaction, Blocking Party, Medieval Countrysquire's Way," cheap arms in the hands of the adversary, — could not prevent him, insofar as his military position permitted or entailed, to stop the carriage of political progress; nevertheless, as at all times, with the applause of the unjudgmental crowd, they found themselves ready enough to tear him down the hill and drive him rudderless to an uncertain destination.

Today, the men of the right are fortunate to be at the forefront of the most important issues of state redesign. Rarely will such things be theirs, most of the time they will have the less grateful role of marching in reserve and not pulling, but letting themselves be pulled. The constant in the apparitions of flight and change, about which the struggle of right and left always revolves and what will forever give the direction for the divorce of the parties, is the recognition or denial of divine and God-set authority, and in this point there is no difference between the conservatives of then and today.

¹⁹⁶ Leave papers.

¹⁹⁷ "The Graf Kleist was an enthusiastic Freund of the Leipzig Theater and came to Leipzig once or twice a week from nearby Merseburg to visit the theater. He often showed me the warmest, what an excellent pleasure he would find in the performances and artists; a fine, sensual art connoisseur, he took the most active part in classic plays such as 'Donna Diana', 'Das Leben ein Traum'; only about this he often expressed bitter complaints that the poor roads from Merseburg to Leipzig, which were not even linked by a highway at the time, embittered his theater pleasure." Thirty-four years of my theater direction in Leipzig, Darmstadt, München, Karl Theodor by Küstner, Leipzig 1853, pp. 31 (2010)

It is to be regretted, but to be explained, if those in the movement of the German youth did not recognize the healthy core that our recent historiography, having experienced the fulfillment of the political desires of those days, easily peeled out. But even the young people usually express their wishes in effervescent, over-reaching Weise! Could a German youth believe he was serving the fatherland by staining his hand with assassination! —

The hyperhumanistic view that a political crime might not deserve condemnation, at least a milder assessment, had not yet risen. Even the free-spirited Görres said that she would be disapproved of by the whole of Deutschland if her motives were also approved.¹⁹⁸ Sand had come from Jena, where freedom of speech and teaching had developed to a large extent under Carl August's liberal government, so that the university there seemed to be the hotbed of the revolutionary spirit.

The act moved Kleist, in whose military district Jena was located in the middle of the city, closer than if he had been a distant spectator, and occupied him so vividly that he felt compelled to write a letter to König.

"A shuddering object causes me to seize the pen, and to submit these few lines to Your Royal Majesty for the highest examination and consideration. Receive yours. Royal Majesty herself with forbearance and kindness, they are the effusions of a heart devoted to his beloved monarch and bear the feature of honest and order-loving sentiments.

The murder of the person of the Council of State v. Kotzebue is only too clear evidence of the principles that have been devoted to instilling for a period of several years in the young; and as the same must have taken root, this murder, committed by political enthusiasm, which could not have taken place without a processing of the minds of pages of revolutionarian-minded professors; this continued processing of minds, however, must bring about a complete transformation of all existing order of things. —

Unfortunately, these confused revolutionary minds have been used by governments to achieve political ends, without considering that this could not lead to any desired results alone, but that it exposed itself to the risk of giving these men a power over their minds, against whose abuse one would end up fighting only a powerless battle. Despite the warnings of reasonable men, the opinions of these exalted minds have been treated with gentle consideration, so as not to harm public opinion, as they have generally said, and it is for this fantasy that governments have let themselves be taken out of their hands. —

In the splendid Haller work on the restoration of political science, of which the third part in particular deserves to be read with attention by every ruling prince, in the said third part the following truly very true remark is contained:

"There is no more knowledge, no more truth. — All are just opinions, and I cannot understand why you should learn or prove anything else and not take the top officials or the teachers of the world out of the first mob. Vice and crime are also based only on opinions, at most they are still called aberrations. Thus the estate of the princes is no longer based on their power, but only on the good opinion that they should establish their government according to the will of the people or rather according to the so-called public opinion, that is, according to the opinion of the Jacobin papers and journals. I cannot and must not comment further on this matter.

Now, however, the Jena University is the most excellent venue for these upside-down exalted minds. The murderer of Kotzebue has migrated from there via the so famous Wartburg to Mannheim to carry out the atrocity, to which, as already mentioned, only a high degree of political enthusiasm can have brought him. It would therefore be possible

¹⁹⁸ Müller, Political History, pp. 16.

for this act to create an opportunity to destroy this revolutionary hornet's nest without further violent measures, when the Emperor of Rußland and all the other princes of Deutschland recalled their citizens who were studying there and issued a general ban that no one else should attend this university. A measure that is truly justified by the atrocities committed by one of its members.

Jena, located in the small Duchy of Weimar, would then fall itself, and this vigorous action would serve as a warning to the other colleges, and would certainly dampen the exaltion and revolutionary ideas of the professors. On this Weise, the unfortunate Kotzebue could perhaps be regarded as a sacrifice that will be eroded by providence in order to finally put an end to an evil that would otherwise have to spread more and more and lead to great scenes of horror.

Can yours. Royal Majesty the abolition of this Jena fireplace, as the true seat of the disease effect, so I am convinced that it is a great step towards the return of order, which every prudent, legal man, must desperately desire. That conviction could only have prompted me, yours. To bother Royal Majesty with these lines.

Every father must be grieved by this revolutionary mischief, for what man, who thinks wisely and is sincerely devoted to his monarch, will see his child entrusted with indifference on universities to men who seek, by means of perverse terms, to break all ties of order and obedience to his ancestral sovereign and the state.

Verily, it is high time to stop this atrocity, and yours. Royal Majesty will thereby acquire a permanent immortal fame."¹⁹⁹ The accompanying letter to the General-Adjutant v. Köckritz reads:

"The horrific Kotzebue murder has led me to write to His Majesty's König. May I ask you, my dear Freund, to make it the same, but I ask you, in the strictest sense of the word, to make it one-handed, because it is only written for him and I ask you, my dear Freund, to ask König to destroy it after it has been read. Do not believe that I am afraid of a dagger drawn on me, no, certainly not, just another communication can help nothing. König itself must decide and act on this. There is no need for an answer, and if it were to take place, it would only be possible for it to be done by the king himself, so no one else would need to know about it. —

If heaven wants to protect us from the moment when you have to offer your breast to a dagger for affection for your König, then I also want to offer myself unshaken to the same!

Have you, my dear Freund, read Hallers's Restoration of Political Science? It is truly a Buch to be heeded by regents. The preface is written in a special style, it has something so tearful and mystical that deters, you don't have to pay attention to it alone. The content of the book is excellent and contains especially the third part appreciable things and you can read it separately from the others. If you have not read the work, I will send you the third part, which you will work through all the more easily because I have read it with great attention and referred to the most important places with Rothstein. This Buch will certainly have your applause."²⁰⁰ Köckritz replied on 5 April 1819:

"Your letter, my venerable Freund, I surrendered faithfully in accordance with your instructions, in addition to that addressed to me. After both were read, I was called back to the room, and was ordered to write to you, noting that his Majesty with your sentiments and opinions, my Freund! all accord thought; He would take His measures, and let thank you very much. I have the Buch I mentioned myself, the third part is the most excellent,

¹⁹⁹ Leave papers.

²⁰⁰ Leave papers.

and the König also has it. Our motto remains the old custom: Fear God! thue right, and shy no one! Respectfully I remain in life and death your faithful Freund

v. Köckritz.²⁰¹

Soon afterwards, Wittgensteins wrote:

"his Your Majesty sent me a letter a few days ago, which is yours. Excellence to the Most High; his Your Majesty has not only done justice to its well-intentioned and true content, but this writing is also the only reason for the order in counsel you will read in today's paper. From yours. Excellence's letter, by the way, has not been made a communication and its Your Majesty kept the same in his own custody. I believed I was committed, yours. To report this excellence in confidence, as such results encourage and, in a way, oblige other well-intentioned remarks."²⁰²

Wittgenstein also wrote, also on 10 April 1819,²⁰³ that he had heard that Kleist had purchased a dagger that had been found on the way from Halle to Merseburg. According to the description, he was similar to a man who had recently been lost in Berlin. He asks him to send it to the viewer without indicating the contents of the package. Kleist immediately complied with this request, whereupon Wittgenstein thanked him with the remark that he wanted to keep it as a souvenir. He was tall enough to expedite a second puke.

"The dear Lord knows what one actually intends with the purchase of such weapons, but in the past, in Deutschland at least, one did not wear them. I may want to find out where it was made, but it will not be easy, as it has no sign."

He then writes something else:

"I obediently thank Count Boholz for communicating his remarks; I am interested to be informed of them. his Your Majesty gave the Minister of Justice the order 8 days ago to treat Count Boholz, since he is a Prussian Unterthan, because of his public challenges according to the severity of the laws and it is because of the proceedings against the same initiated the necessary. If I were your friend. Excellence expressed my feelings about everything you read and listen to, so I would have to write a Buch. We cannot complain when things are as they are at the moment, unfortunately; in fact, they have not wanted to do otherwise, and unfortunately we are to blame for some of the calamities we are seeing at the moment.

If the opportunity arises to express your view to the King with frankness, go on: even if this does not always bear fruit, these views are not entirely lost.

The Erfurter newspaper is always very sad and some of the things that come from there give me the conviction that the real so-called zeitgeist has taken root there." There can be no doubt that Kleist has now fully endorsed the following measures of response, as it had itself suggested. We discussed at the beginning of these communications that this opinion was the right one for him.

In 1820, the death of Schwarzenberg, which took place on 15 October in Leipzig, led the general to this city. The prince was only 48 years old. His warfare, partially hampered by political considerations, had been much and sharply rebuked in the Prussian army, while his knightly character was not denied general recognition. When, therefore, the General-Adjutant v. Wernhardt invited Kleist to the funeral "in the spirit of the transfigured,

²⁰¹ Leave papers.

²⁰² Leave papers.

²⁰³ Leave papers.

whose high respect for Kleist was known to him and in the name of the Austrian army", he did not hesitate to heed this call. He was currently in Erfurt, where on 17 October the 8th Division maneuvers were finished and the other day were to end with a religious celebration of the battle of Leipzig. On the morning of that day, the news arrived. - Kleist attended the ceremony, commemorating the deceased and then went to Leipzig. There, Schwarzenberg's body was carried on 19 October at the same hour from the same gate, in which he had moved seven years earlier as the victor.

Kleist followed between the two sons of the immortalized immediately behind the coffin, or as the papers put it, "the sons by the hand of his comrade-in-arms and friend, General Kleist v. Nollendorf."

Returning to Merseburg, he reported the event to the König, whereupon the latter expressed his agreement with what had happened, all the more so because Kleist had thus fulfilled a duty incumbent on the Prussian army, "in which the memory of the high virtues and merits of the immortalized prince, as a man and general, will be imperishable." Incidentally, he learned that "his tender and dignified behavior had turned to his court a very obligatory opening of pages of the Austrian Cabinet." It had become a political courtesy, which was acknowledged via Metternich — Prussian envoy Krusemark. —

But the general's military career came to an end. In 1821, he no longer felt strong enough to be able to head his service business and came to his dismissal. It became very difficult for the king to consent to it.²⁰⁴

The first such request, dated 28 March 1821, was rejected on 5 April by his His Majesty noted that he would be very close to seeing a general leave the army who had contributed so much to the happy outcomes of the last wars, and whose prudent behavior, even during the years of peace, deserved so much of the good mood of newly acquired provinces. The König killed in action offers him a holiday to

Kleist, however, repeated its request. He assures that if he could have done the Most High Service any good, he would consider it sacred duty to stand up for his To sacrifice Majesty and the Fatherland with the effort of the last forces. A war could perhaps have given him the necessary tension for some time, peace, although in some respects less attacking, required some qualities, which were lost to him at his age with a noticeable reduction in physical forces. He served 44 years and had already made the resolution in his first years of service that, with a noticeable decrease in body strength, he would no longer want to appear what he had been in the past. This feeling is just as bad for the service, as extremely oppressive for a veteran soldier. "Your. Majesty will therefore be most graciously forgiven if I repeat the request of all inferiors to retire. I dare to say that the military facilities in the local province, which at first seemed to the citizens to be hateful, have now been consolidated for several years, so that it will no longer be so difficult for everyone else to obtain a satisfaction that could only be disturbed by other things, even things that remained strange to me."²⁰⁵ etc.

The König, however, was not yet satisfied; he had the General v. Witzleben (17 April 1821) write again how it pained him to lose the general from service. The departure of such a man must have a double detrimental effect on public affairs and lose the government in

²⁰⁴ The Buch "Die Autographensammlung Alexander Meyer Cohn's", Berlin 1905, contains the following description of a letter: Letter from Merseburg of 1821 to General Henckel von Donnersmark. He says goodbye because he's tired of the endless struggle against wrong facilities, about Gneisenau etc. - "The nicest thing or rather the saddest thing is that we'll get a lot of field marshals all at once... Two invalids are already there, now a bank otter and an eye patient are added." (2009)

²⁰⁵ Leave papers.

public respect when such men leave. Witzleben then finally asks whether there is not any external cause that makes him say goodbye. In the same sense, Lieutenant General v. Hake had to write, specifically with reference to the conclusion of the Cliché Letter, in which it was suspected that special circumstances had led him to take the step. However, Kleist could completely deny this. He wrote (22 April) to Major General v. Witzleben that he had been dealing with goodbye thoughts for several years. In the past years, he had allowed himself to be prevented by the change of the Ministry of War and the transformation of the Landwehr, in order to avoid the appearance that external causes were to blame.

However, the fact that there is really nothing special must be demonstrated by the confidential communication to him that he (Kleist) has rented a flat in Berlin under a foreign name since December and has been paying since 1 April in order to have a different accommodation for himself and his family.

And to General v. Hake (April 26, 1821): He had no personal reasons and was probably only incomprehensible against his will. All he wanted to say was that if the civil facilities were to cause malaise, he and every other general would not be able to prevent it.

So König finally had to decide to let its faithful servant go. He did this with the most appreciative words:

"As reluctant as I am to see you divorce from My ministry, and as pleasant as it would have been for Me to grant you every relief in your sphere of activity, I do not want to be further averse to your renewed request to retire. As evidence of my recognition of all that you have worked and accomplished for the best of the fatherland over such a long number of years, I hereby not only bid you farewell as a Field Marshal, but also grant you a pension of 3,000 thalers annually, which the Ministry of War will instruct you to do. I will be delighted if the tranquility of shops has a beneficial effect on your health and contributes to the prolongation and amusement of the evening of your life. In the lasting memory of your merits, I will also sincerely participate in your continued well-being in your future circumstances. In the meantime, your position as commanding general of the 4th Army Corps, while retaining the command of the 8th Division and the residence in Erfurth, is to be assigned to the lieutenant general of Jagow, to whom you must refer the troops subordinate to you so far.

Berlin, 5 May 1821.'

As a result of this order in counsel, the now Field Marshal handed over the command to the Lieutenant General of Jagow, whom he ordered to Eckartsberge for talks on the 17th. Incidentally, he immediately turned to him for this, who was only to receive half the allowance of a commanding general, because the same could not get by with it during his missions from Erfurt.

Kleist bid farewell to the army by publishing it in the Military Weekly.²⁰⁶

"The Majesty of König des Monats, under the 5th, suspended my repeated request to be allowed to retire, and I will be leaving my previous business circles in the next few days.

By dedicating this ad to my comrades-in-arms, especially those who have been closer to me in recent memorable campaigns, it is my deepest duty to express my heartfelt thanks for so much evidence of friendship and affinity. I hope to be as confident in the goals of my career, the respect and love of those who worked with me, as I will maintain my friendship and respectful memory for you in all circumstances.

Merseburg, 24 May 1821.

²⁰⁶ June 2, 1821, pp. 1847

Kleist v. Nollendorf.'

There was extraordinary grief in all the districts who were to lose the general. First of all, there are the military authorities and the regiments who are complaining about his departure. Divisions commander Graf Hagke in Magdeburg writes:

"The army is losing one of its most distinguished, most revered generals, the IV. Army Corps and its paternal, highly esteemed, deeply loved leader."

Even more significant for the assessment of the people of Kleist are the statements made by the civil authorities. The Landrath of the Querfurt district, Dankelmann, deplors Kleist's departure on behalf of his district inmates, to whom he was "father, counsellor and consolation", Landrath v. Bismarck praises the management, which was distinguished by loyalty. The Royal Higher Regional Court of Naumburg has received so much evidence of trust, goodwill and kindness that the discontinuation of business relations can only affect the same painfully.

The Merseburg government emphasizes the support that Kleist has given it to promote estate and to incline the citizens of the new government.

The Oberpräsident regretfully sees him divorced from an efficacy that was as advantageous for the army as for the province, to which she was initially also directed, long since earned him the most general reverence and gratitude.

According to the Thuringian rangs, the district chairman, Mr. Hagke, the separation from the state of Saxony had filled everyone with anguish and softened the König's gentleness and wisdom only by electing one of his most distinguished army leaders, who with this brilliant quality, which is the only thing, combined the virtues of the citizen, to be the head of all military affairs. "Now, everyone high and low is affected by the premature exit." It is a sacred and indispensable duty of Hagke to express the gratitude of the rangs to Kleist. Von Kleist Unforgettable would remain the magnanimous and human-friendly, à-led administration. On 8 June evening, the Field Marshal also took leave of the Merseburger citizenry. The same gave him a torchlight procession and presented him with a silver mug, as well as the diploma as an honorary citizen, which touched and gratefully accepted everything Kleist. On the day of departure, another poem was presented:

Sr. Excellence the Royal Prussian General Field Marshal, Count Kleist v. Nollendorf, presented with reverence on the day of his departure by all the municipalities of the city of Merseburg and their superiors in 1821.

Happy is when many forces
An auspicious goal,
If you become a laudable business
The individual came together;
But seldom does man like hiding
Rejoice in lasting happiness.
What united must be divorced,
What separates, be connected.

But how, if out of our midst,
Not touched by wishes and requests,
With unexpected, quick steps

**Fate leads a noble,
Who stayed with us for a long time,
Healing every happiness increased,
And lovingly healed our pain,
And do you like to suffer for good?**

**This is what is happening now!
We see with grief,
With a deeply wounded mind,
Like walls orphaned from the city
The friendly protector is pulling.
As soon as we escaped the storm,
Long blown with wild Grimm,
As the mildest of the suns
After a brief glimmer sets.**

**Wounds that are too deep are punched,
Als Unter Würth'gem Waffendrang
In the fateful days
The Donner of the gun sounded.
As of devastation terrible horrors
Vaporized by bloody fields,
And those peacefully silent gray
The big wild hoof is stomping.**

**I guess it sounded from here to the farthest border
The cheering cry: we are liberated!
And as if after Lenze had been opened
Happy the realm again,
And all the clouds trotting are disappearing:
So drew the hope of graceful appearance,
In the proclamation of the desired word,
Into each breast exhilarating.**

**There you drew from bloody wars,
Decorated with laurels on your forehead,
Here, as the scene of beautiful victories,
Where only your favours will be happy.
Here you asked the König for leniency,**

**Who was always a gentle ruler,
In ever present image,
Father of the fatherland.**

**What a Hostile Doom
We've always been assigned bitters,
Any wound and distress
Have you softened and healed.
And all those who were worried,
You shouldn't be sad anymore,
You wrote the most revered name
Blessing in a thousand souls.**

**You're divorcing now! Wohlan, bring it this way
We wish you a heartfelt goodbye!
May it also go loudly to heaven,
If it remains a weak witness,
Like our heart with a secure bond
Your memory firmly encloses,
And in the vast Saxony
Eating a feeling for you. —**

**So walte denn des Himmels Güte
Mild over you and your house!
She pours every graceful flower
Loving for your paths!
We are strengthened by the hope of better times,
Which does not snatch misfortune from us;
But you should be accompanied by the call:
Long live and happily ever after, Father Kleist!**

**Verily, a unanimous and full chorus of high recognition, to which we have nothing to add.
The right man had stood in the right place.**

Kleist itself may have found it hard enough to leave such circumstances. The entire army also took his departure as a loss. His old comrade-in-arms York von Kleist writes²⁰⁷: "The departure is certainly a great loss for the army. Kleist is a calmly thoughtful, sensible man. A man who knows exactly the internal conditions of the state and the armed forces, who, even though he could not always counteract by an open opposition in the now confusing period of time, would certainly have taken every estate to do and to avert evil. I have

²⁰⁷ York to Valentini, June 26, 1821, at Droysen.

always thought of Kleist as the best man to lead the Ministry of War" and York's verdict was one-sided, he opposed the reform of the army on a somewhat democratic basis, yet the verdict of the old Haudegen is honorable for Kleist. Many letters were received, including from August, who, under Kleist's orders, "has had so many opportunities to witness his glorious deeds." The Duke of Coburg hopes to see him at his court no less often in future. Prince Wilhelm the Elder regrets his departure. Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm writes:

"Dear Field Marshal! You could hardly have given me a more painful message than that of your farewell. The more unexpected she came, the more painful she met me. If I had heard of your wish earlier, I would have written to you quite urgently asking you not to do it at all, or at least not to do it so quickly; however little I imagine the weight of my vote, this step would have given me the reassurance of having done what I could to save the army from losing its most distinguished leader. The new dignity that his Majesty bestowed upon you, and on which I offer you my warmest congratulations, is a degenerate of consolation, for if it ever goes forward again, she calls you the leader of the army.

By the way, take my best thanks for your letter and let me be recommended to your friendship. Farewell, and the sooner you'll ever prefer goodbye, dear Count. With the most heartfelt respect and friendship your devoted best Freund²⁰⁸

Friedrich Wilhelm, Crown Prince."

Also his Majesty our Most Merciful now ruling König had the mercy to send a handwritten letter to the Field Marshal:²⁰⁹

"With what feelings I heard the notification that your request for release from the army was approved by the king, I cannot describe to you. But your consciousness will tell you with what sorrow the whole army, and therefore to what increased degree I too, sees you divorce from their midst, to whom you possess the love of the same in such a high and well-deserved degree and who owes you so much. That's why your memory will never be extinguished in the army that so often led you to victory, in the people that you helped to regain independence and honor. —

May the desired rest have the happy consequences for your health that you expect from the same. Always count on my intimate friendship.

Wilhelm, Prince of Prussia."

Kleist settled in Berlin and lived there with his family and friends. He did not remain a stranger to political matters, but, as in the past, pursued all events in this area with lively interest.

As a result, he was once again pulled out of his calm. "It is with special conviction that I appointed you a member of the Council of State and today ordered that you be introduced into it at the opening of the next sitting. Berlin 18 September 1822.'

The meetings began on 19 November. Soon after, the minister of Voß died. "For a long time there was doubt as to who should replace him. At last, the conservative Marwitz writes, they fell into Kleist. But as if the long delays and the fact that for so many years viable and noble men had been kept away were to be punished rather severely, they were afflicted with liver inflammation, which he succumbed to before his promotion was pronounced." It is said that Kleist should have improved the administration on some of the recent problems in Hardenberg. The choice of his person was perfectly justified.

The illness to which he succumbed is said to have been a liver disease. On February 15, he

²⁰⁸ Leave papers.

²⁰⁹ Same

was struck by a sudden malaise in the theater, so he had to leave the theater. Two days later, he fell asleep gently and painlessly.

The whole country sincerely mourned him, countless were the evidence of participation that went to the bereaved families. His Freund York (March 14, 1823) said, "I was deeply shocked by the death of my friend Kleist. Yes, I am losing a proven old Freund, and the state has made an irreplaceable loss by the position assigned to the Blessed One." (At Droysen.)

The Berliner Zeitung von Staats- und gelehrten Sachen (Vossische) published the following poems on 8 March:

Obituary at the grave of the Royal Prussian Field Marshal, Count Kleist of Nollendorf.

Slowly rushes the earnest funeral,
Säuselt more seriously in the cypress grove,
Grief sounds the dark hour of death,
Depths of pain in loyal friends;
More seriously, her blow echoes from afar:
Even the noble Kleist! He's not anymore.

Great He was - an example of high virtue,
Noble, chivalrous bravery!
Freund and the enemy, the old age and the young,
Did homage the love and humanity,
His high mind bright gaze
For the noble König, people happiness.
So, in war — so, in graceful peace
He lived for König, fatherland!
Favour and love were humbled to him,
Who liked to wail laurel wreaths for him.
Even the noble König Friendship Look
Smiled so much joy and happiness to him.

O! drum resounds of pain dull lament
Bang and grieving in the cypress grove,
Tears follow the sarcophagus,
Noble men in a closed row,
The mind and heart connected with him,
Ernst and grieving at the edge of the tomb.

Thank you for your love, your loyalty,

**Noble man, still in the ground, lap
Gloriously shines of reunion, consecration
Sooner, later, through the moving lot!
Gentle rest float around your bones,
God's reward will delight your Geist!**

—DT from Schlesien.

When I read how the General Field Marshal Kleist v. Nollendorf, the noble earthly remains, were accompanied to the Vault on February 20:

From the dome heavy and bang u. s. w.

Schiller.

**A sacred stirring will be active in the heart. —
You noble hiker on the last way,
Oh, way too soon, but you've made the run,
We are left with the pain, you are unlocked.**

**Beloved and revered by all rangs,
Agreed where we send Prussia customer,
To your glory, the grief laments
To you, the fatherland of the noble-sized son!**

**You tenderly faithful Freund in your midst,
Proven in battle and counsellor in wisdom, aspire to a fee and custom,
And your good König's much-tested Freund,
Faithfully united with and with posterity through your life.**

**The blessing of your life rests on all districts,
In whom you have worked, and who praise you gratefully,
And high transfigured him God upon every dear head,
Your husband and father are now robbed of it.**

**The star from its hero's breast — gently radiating
To the heir of your name he is in the Erdenthale! - -
Yes, truly noble becomes and remains your resume,
Count Herrmann, you always look up to your noble father.**

Neutrebin in Wrietzen.

The school inspector Hintze.

As these poems, which were better intentioned than successful, indicate, the funeral celebration had taken place on 20 February with great participation from all districts of the population. The earthly shell of the sleeping man was buried with the military honors to which a field marshal is entitled in the Berliner garrison church, where he rests next to his ancestor, the field marshal who died on 22 August 1749.²¹⁰

In the castle garden of Merseburg, in which the field marshal had been so happy to stay, the citizens of this city set up his bust, cast in iron, in 1825, proudly saying: "This hero and philanthropist was also a Merseburger citizen."²¹¹ Incidentally, they had sought permission to collect contributions throughout the province. The monument bears the inscription: "The Field Marshal, Count Kleist of Nollendorf, commanding general in Saxony, his admirers 1825."²¹²

In Köln, too, there is a statue of the Field Marshal, a full-length depiction of life size. At the monument Friedrich Wilhelm III he is one of the four corner figures.²¹³

In Berlin, a new street leads the name Kleiststraße and empties into the Nollendorfplatz. When the project of rebuilding and expanding the Marienburg to a national monument appeared, one of the battlements was to be named the Field Marshal. The most beautiful monument he has set himself in the memory of posterity, which unreservedly calls him the noblest of the nobles. —

²¹⁰ In the Halberstädter Blätter von 1823 ab Stück Nr. 17 vom 25. April 1823, pp. 257 bis 320, a "Ehrengedächtnis des gestorstorbenen Generalfeldmarschalls Herrn Friedrich Ferdinand Heinrich Emilius, Grafen Kleist von Nollendorff" was printed, which in particular also contains detailed information on his conduct as landowner. Copy of the Gleimhaus Halberstadt. (2024)

²¹¹ The photo on the left shows a copy, which is placed in the castle park in Merseburg. The original von Rauch is located in the Museum of Cultural History in Merseburg. (2007)
Von Kleist Rauch had already made a bust in 1819 to order from the Crown Prince. A cast was to be erected in 1822 in the Lustgarten in Potsdam. Christian Daniel Rauch, Friedrich and Karl Eggers, Vol. 2, Berlin, pp. 161 (2009)

²¹² In the Landeshauptarchiv Sachsen-Anhalt in Magdeburg is the 1823 file of the government of Magdeburg on the raising of money for the monument (Rep. C 28 I f Nr. 1991) (2007)
The cost of the monument was 971 Rthlr. 25 Sgr. 7 Horse., Official Gazette of the Royal Prussian Government of Magdeburg 1827, pp. 113 (2012)

²¹³ Located on the hay market in Köln. Inauguration of the monument in 1878 according to designs by Gustav Blaeser. Rebuilding from 1985. (2007)

The widow of the perpetuated remained in Berlin first, probably for the education of her son, who was only 18 years old when his father died. In 1830 she moved to Halberstadt, where her son became Landrath. She lived with him in a large house, but with a separate economy, because the son had married. So they lived together, if not continuously, but in daily, cordial traffic. Outside the house, she had little contact, as she was more reserved than communicative. Her main joy was her grandchildren. But when Hohenzollern came to the city, they did not fail to visit the widow of the loyal public servant in their house. When her son moved to the countryside, she rented a house in Halberstadt, in which she left gently and without illness on 14 March 1838. In addition to his son Hermann Heinrich September 1804, died 28 March 1870, the Field Marshal left behind a daughter Hermine Henriette Helene Leopoldine, born 19 August 1785, died 3 March 1840 in *Charlottenburg*, who married Frankfurt Oder Baron von Lavière on 12 April 1815 in *Timon/Victor*, born 12 February 1782 in *Aschersleben*, died 10 June 1850 in *Berlin*, at last in 24. Infantry Regiment, to *Charlottenburg*.²¹⁴ His son died in infancy on 26 October 1795 on Berlin. ----


We are at the end of this rich and blessed life. It was a joy of the heart, a moral pleasure to accompany such a flawless character on the cliff-rich path that leads to glory, and to find such a unanimous recognition of his beautiful humanity among all contemporaries, as it rarely becomes part of a mortal.

And probably rightly so! For none of the virtues that grace the noble man has he lacked, as a warrior he is only surpassed by a few.

Kleist was a man of spotless purity, full of kindness, faithfulness and cordiality, noble and benevolent in both public and domestic life. With true solemn bravery and chivalry, he combined an infinite mildness of mind and a consummate social education. Against those who were made to suffer, he maintained his convivial liberty, but never brought dignity to him; against the poor and the poor he had kindly condescension, which always bore the feature of participation.

When we search for the roots of the sublime greatness of his character, we find that in his heart's most secret folds, the lie never found a place, that the basic feature of his being was the truth, without which there are no great men and men.

²¹⁴ Officer master list of the Leib-grenadier Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm III (1. Brandenburg) No. 8, Hugo Kroll, Berlin 1899, pp. 288 (2013)




Mit Genehmigung der Verlagsbuchhandlung E. S. Mittler u. Sohn in Berlin.

Lith. Anst. v. L. Kraatz, Berlin.


Karte des Schlachtfeldes von Kulm

30 August 1813.



0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Meile
nach Schritt

KARTE DES SCHLACHTFELDES VON LEIPZIG.



Appendix 1

From Dresden to Nollendorf.

August, 1813.

Presentation,

held in the Military Society on 6 February 1889²¹⁵

of

Georg von Kleist,

Major in the Great General Staff. With a map sketch.²¹⁶

Standing on the castle hill near Teplitz and letting your eyes wander over the terrain, which is densely covered with settlements, spreads towards Kulm, the view is bounded by the manifold ridge of the Bohemian Ore Mountains. Consisted of dense deciduous forest or silent fir trees, the sharply sloping eastern foot of this ridge forms a dark and effective background to the landscape that stretches in front of it.

On the morning of the 30th August 1813 König Friedrich Wilhelm and Emperor Alexander with the Generalissimus of the allied armies. Schwarzenberg, and a shining rod at that height, and watching the battle scenes that the binoculars drew closer to her eye, the peaks of the mountains were still shrouded in thick fog²¹⁷. A true reflection of the political and belligerent situation!

It was not yet known what had happened or was still happening behind that opaque curtain, nor did it seem that the destiny of significant parts of the army was abandoned to an uncertain future, the army that, after the difficult days of Dresden, was only a blunt instrument in the hands of its already fragile Meister.

One more blow, and Napoleon's confident words threatened to become the undesirable truth that he recently addressed to the Saxon General v. Gersdorf when he received news of Österreich's accession to the coalition: "Pah! Once they were badly beaten and they relented again."²¹⁸

Without Österreich, however, even the heroic Scharnhorst shared this view, success was unthinkable. Things were really on the edge of the sword.²¹⁹

Then the sun broke through the fog veil of the mountains, and out of uncertain contours, the Nollendorfer Chapel's tower first rose slender and clear, a landmark like seldom seen for many miles into the country.

Gradually, the lower slopes were also divided, until one could see that part of Nollendorfer Straße that leads down from the edge of the forest to Nord-Tellnitz.

It was 10 o'clock over when bayonets suddenly flashed here and a dark column of marches descended into the Thal.

"The Prussians are it" exclaimed Toll joyfully moved, who on the right wing of the battle

²¹⁵ Supplement to the Military Weekly, 1889, issue 3, p. 101

²¹⁶ Not printed here.

²¹⁷ Corr. Arch. III E.6.

²¹⁸ Bernhardi, Great Memorabilia III. 108.

²¹⁹ See *ibid.* III. p. 45.

line supervised the meaningful execution of the Barklaysche Disposition and now sought to bring everything to attack into rapid flow, while on the farther Schloßberg only gradually broke the conviction that it really was the II. The Prussian corps was the one that intervened in the fight.²²⁰

When this was established, the monarchs rushed to the battlefield in quick motion, for that was victory, salvation, enemy downfall, all in one fell swoop. Want to become what Kleistsche Korps wanted, its mere appearance at that memorable height of Nollendorf had already been decisive.

If one could even speak of a purely strategic victory, it would be here. The history of the war offers the strange spectacle that the part of the army that brings the victorious decision does not walk over the battlefield with flying flags, the reaper that brings in the ripe harvest, but is itself overrun and breached in its middle.

For us Prussians in particular, it is therefore less interesting and exciting to follow the bursting of the violence, which is raw in the true sense of the word, but rather to follow the intertwined threads of the operations, to see how the strategic knot protects itself and how the humble hero of this tragedy smashes it.

In order to be able to clearly overlook the war situation on the eve of the 30th August, we must look back to the days of Dresden.²²¹

When Prince Schwarzenberg decided to take the offensive into Saxony in order to relieve the Northern Army with the Bohemian Army, he started from the preconceived and arbitrary assumption that he faced stronger enemy forces on the left bank of the Elbe, and indeed in the Chemnitz-Freiberg line. He therefore chose Leipzig as the general target for his approach and, counting from the left wing, had columns 5, 4 and 3, all consisting of Austrian troops, run from Joachimsthal, Preßnitz and Kommotau on Annaberg and Marienberg. The larger part of the Russians and the Prussian Corps Kleist were second. Column of Brück on Sayda before, while the 1. Column, some 30,000 Russians under Wittgenstein, was marched on the great road from Teplitz via Peterswalde against Pirna to defend the right flank of the force during its advance. Like the 2nd, this column was under the command of Barklay de Tolly, who commanded all Russischen and Prussian troops as a special army department. For the Prussian Corps, this resulted in the peculiar situation that the commanding general and the Austrian commander-in-chief had the instance of a Russischen general inserted. A ratio of which one can brazenly say: "Once and never again!"

On the 22nd of August the march to Saxony was started and on that day the decisive step was taken over the main ridge of the mountains. But no sooner had this happened and the army arrived in the Sayda-Marienberg-Annaberg line than news arrived that Napoleon, with its main forces, was still in the Lausitz and that only one corps of Gouvion St. Cyr was²²² standing on the left bank of the Elbe. They were mistaken. Further action on Chemnitz and Freiberg now seemed to be a blast of air, while a march to conquer Dresden was a promising and consequential undertaking. And indeed, it was after Napoleon's own concession, which saw Dresden as the central point of its defense system, and which had said that its greatest concern was not to be cut off from Dresden and Elbe. He was less

²²⁰ See *ibid.* III. 246/47.

²²¹ See the attached map sketch. The same, according to the map of George. Institutes in Weimar (1809), designed and compared with various older plans, attempts to reproduce the main road connections with historic fidelity. D. Verf

Pay a visit of the card not shown here, reference to the cards before page.

²²² This news, when it arrived, was no longer correct in that Napoleon had already left for Schlesien.

affected by an interruption of the connections with Frankreich.²²³

The decision to turn to Dresden was therefore a very correct one. But the degenerate of the execution raises legitimate concerns. It already carries the seeds of the later failures, it prepares continuously the difficulties that should oppose the army in its later withdrawal.

The march of an army in the direction of its flank is one of the most difficult strategic movements, not only because the mass of the army parts marching in a broad front must be moved for a time on the baseline with a substantially limited number of streets, but also because the displacement of everything is necessary, what is pulling behind it as an equally necessary and undesirable *impedimentum belli*, and finally because of the laying of the stage lines, through whose veins fresh life blood flows to the army.

When the Deutsche Army began such a movement on 26 August 1870, it encountered great problems even in the path-rich Frankreich, as a part of the less-than-path Argon Forest fell into the marsh area. The arduous marches of the Guard and IV. The army corps over Fleurus on Dombasle will certainly be vivid in the memory of all participants. It was said that good marching orders should be edited, the marching times precisely regulated, if the marching goals were to be achieved at all. Trains were even temporarily left behind. However, as soon as the texts were turned and made a step forward in the new direction, the army immediately spread again over a larger number of marshes.

More difficult than in the Argonne were the road conditions at the height of the Ore Mountains, where an excellent assignment of command was opposed by a thoroughly deficient command mechanism. While in 1870 initially only the Maas Army with its three corps was turned and the III. In 1813, following the army in a sense in the second meeting, it was all about taking 175,000 men in the new direction of march at once. Above all, however, at this time the big buzzword of separate marching and united striking was not yet spoken. A principle that is now common to all educated officers was known only by a few at the time.

The Austrian-Russischen general staff officers of the large headquarters were not among these few. They have united the army to march, only to bring them to battle in parts. They have cost the troops all the rigors of bad command, such as column crossings, waiting at the assembly stations for up to seven hours, late, even nightly intrusions into the daily bivouacs to a crawl, leaving them almost to starve.²²⁴

The main reason for these phenomena was the decision to lead the army on the shortest route via Frauenstein and Dippoldiswalde on Dresden.

A glance at the map shows that in Dippoldiswalde almost all the road connections leading from the army's marching area to Dresden unite in a bundle in order to unfold again fan-shaped on Dresden. This circumstance, which should have led to the search for as many links as possible, which bypass the intended location — in which Weise constructs continuous railway lines — proved more powerful than the insight of the strategists. As if drawn by the arms of a great magnet, 150,000 troops were assembled on a 1 1/2-mile-wide area near Dippoldiswalde on 24 August, although on that day some army remnants remained echelonized backwards.

The efforts on this march were great. Once, as soon as the large Hohndorf–Sayda–Rechenberg street was crossed or deserted, only simple connecting routes were found, and secondly these led over a larger number of watercourses, which could only be crossed with difficulty as deep, sharply incised ravins, especially by the artillery. This phenomenon is due to the fact that the general slope of the mountains to the northwest takes place here. This direction is followed by the many small streams that rise on the crest of the mountain. The better paths also follow, partly in the valleys, partly

²²³ Gonvion of St Cyr P. 367.

²²⁴ Radetzky, Biographical sketches pp. 193 and Kr. Archive III E.3. Kleist to the König 24. 8.

along the ridge. If you abandon this direction in favor of a more northern one, you have to cross all those Ravins who accompany the march on Leipzig with difficulty.

Above all, it was a great mistake that the only highway between Freiberg and Dresden was not used any more than it was, because only 25 000 troops from the retreating left wing under Klenau were placed on it. And even this relatively small number of troops did not even allow the road to Dresden, but turned to Tharandt in the interest of greater cohesion of the troops. This caused the march through the almost two-mile-long forest of Tharandt on a true murder route, on which seven hours of marching time were needed in one hour.²²⁵ As a result, on the 26th, Klenau arrived too late on the left, when Schwarzenberg had planned a degenerate of decisive assault, and on the 27th, too late to prevent the Meczko catastrophe.

The reason that Wittgenstein, who is too threatened by Napoleon's presence in the Lausitz, has to be approached is mentioned as a co-determining factor for the meeting near Dippoldiswalde. However, how one thought to support the former across the rough mountains is not said.

The accumulation of troops near Dippoldiswalde, of course, allowed only a gradual flow. One reason for the failures before Dresden lies in this gathering of troops at the wrong hour. The other, however, is to be found in the ambiguity and indecision of the army leadership. Poor weapons can bear an army to some degree, and poor leadership destroys the best. That's a truth from horrible Ernst.

Schwarzenberg did not possess the purposeful and iron will of the commander. But it would be unfair not to consider, when judging his achievements, that his headquarters, in its multitude²²⁶, still far surpassed that of the old Duke of Braunschweig, whose character-heads recently mastered Clausewitz. Indeed, even there is a similarity between the two that, like Braunschweig had its Hohenlohe, Schwarzenberg had its Barklay, who, in the shadow of his imperial master, loved to pursue his private strategy.

An instructive example for all coalitions of the future!

In the case of the big company in Dresden, the government made the first grave digger. It fizzled out, or more correctly, it got stuck in the clay.

On the 25th of August, only, as the Disposition says, "an advance on Dresden" took place with 60,000 troops. An attack was refrained from after long late-hour debates. On the 26th, while some of the troops bled to death "in demonstrative terms", despite the experience of the previous day, the real assault was again scheduled for 4 o'clock, until which time Napoleon arrived with three corps and established the equilibrium of the battle. The purpose of the wait was to allow all troops to arrive before Dresden. This purpose was neither achieved nor the troops who had arrived were all used for the attack. On the 27th, only a more cohesive line-up was taken in order to be able to better counter the now imminent assault by Napoleon.²²⁷ The initiative had slipped away from the weak hands of the commander-in-chief and returned to the camp of his great adversary.

In the afternoon of the 27th, the previous failure, the poor condition of the troops and the threatening news coming in from Pirna-Königstein led to the decision to withdraw, which was still due to the same. Days began.

The most compelling of these reasons was the appearance of Vandammes at Königstein. It has been said before that Wittgenstein should proceed via Peterswalde to Pirna in order to secure the right flank of the army. In his first order in this regard, Schwarzenberg had emphasized the importance of this road with some clue, which had to be maintained under all circumstances, because otherwise a retreat of the army behind the Eger would not be without risk, if adverse circumstances were to make it necessary.²²⁸ It is unfortunate that

²²⁵ Radetzky, Biogr. Sketches pp. 198.

²²⁶ Moreau, Jomini, Toll, Diebitsch, Knesebeck, Radetzky, Langenau, if present, also Barklay and Wittgenstein. Plus the monarchs.

²²⁷ See Kr. Archive III E. 22 and III. C. 3. Dispositions and orders of the main army.

²²⁸ Corr. Archive III C. 3. Dispos of the main army for the 22nd August.

this dispute is not being followed by a specific order not to pass over Elbe, but merely by an order to maintain the position of Nollendorf, a position that does not deserve its name. One notes with concern how much Schwarzenberg looks backward in an instant when he wants to begin a major offensive operation.

After all, he had correctly recognized the place where he was sensitive and vulnerable. It remains incomprehensible why on the 25th he ordered the appointment of the main forces from Wittgenstein to Dresden and — through the authority of Barklay — only gave up on him to leave behind a 'corps d'armée' for the blockade of Königstein and the Debouches there, i.e. about 12 000 troops according to the Russian organization. This much weaker corps is now faced with — a strange contradiction! — the firm order was given to thwart any crossing of the enemy and at the same time to try to destroy the bridges.

In Heil for the allies, Wittgenstein placed the prince Eugen of Württemberg in this difficult position. The determination in carrying out the recognized as right and the wide military gaze of the only 25-year-old prince saved the army from tough tests. He deserves the first full credit in these memorable days. But only a later time crowned him with it,²²⁹ the Russischen reports simply concealed the hated German name.²³⁰

As you know, when Napoleon failed to get Blücher to battle, it first came up with a grand scheme to use all the troops in Königstein across the Elbe and against the flank and rear of Schwarzenberg. With this in mind, he had repatriated his main forces to the Lausitz and stood on the 25th August near Stolpen north of the Königstein. Here, however, he received in the evening 11 o'clock the certain news, which his officer Gourgaud conveyed to him according to his own opinion, that Dresden would fall on the 26th.

With an elasticity of mind reminiscent of his best days, Napoleon immediately abandoned his grand scheme and had already issued orders to leave for Dresden at 1 a.m.²³¹

Vandamme was reinforced to 40,000 troops and left at the Königstein with the order to move the Bohemian Army road to Berggieshübel and Hellendorf. Gr started the crossing on the 26th, which as such, since it was under the protection of the Königstein, could not be prevented. Likewise, the 12,000 Eugen prince did not have the resources to prevent the spread of the Franzosen across the broad bank of the Elbe. He was content to keep the most important street of Pirna on Dresden, and tat this by stubborn opposition in the Krietzschwitz-Struppen line. In this direction Vandamme could not advance, but he could carry out his transition undisturbed and had on the 27th united all his troops on the left bank of the Elbe. Parts of it were already advancing against the road of Berggieshübel. At the Prince's request, on the 27th morning, the first guard division Yermoloff at Pirna was made available for support, but at the same time the command on this wing was given to Count Ostermann-Tolstoy, whose mental disposition of the general cause could become almost perishable, to say the least. Even now, only about 20,000 Russians have been twice the number one and were in a position where one could hardly hope to regain the Berggieshübel Strait and push themselves between Vandamme and Böhmen.

This situation in Königstein was indeed threatening enough for the army off Dresden. On the 27th, the same line had stood mainly on the Leubnitz–Räcknitz–Plauen route. North of the Plauen reason only weak forces, and on the right wing in the plain where Mortier spread with the young guard, even a small Russische army department under General Roth.

From this setup, the withdrawal was to take place eccentrically in three columns. The Klenau Corps with three other divisions would go to Freiberg, the bulk of the Austrians from Räcknitz via Dippoldiswalde to Altenberg, the Russians and Prussians, who had

²²⁹ Mil. weekly 1837 and Frh. v. Helldorf, Zur Geschichte der battle bei Kulm, v. Danilofsky, Denkwürdigkeiten v. 1813.

²³⁰ Corr. Archive III E. 4. According to Barklay's report, Ostermann did everything alone.

²³¹ As this march was carried out, the artillery on the road, the infantry partly in wide columns next to the road, going over floor and stone, that is one of the most strange marching achievements of modern war history.

stood on the right wing near Leubnitz, via Dohna, Zehista and from here on the large street of Berggieshübel.

From this disposition initially departed Klenau, who, with some justification, did not want to entrust himself again to the forest roads of Tharandt, since he had to assume that the Franzosen would reach Freiberg on the highways long before him. He therefore set off from Rabenau to Pretschendorf, which was in itself quite appropriate. Only this way was taken away by the troops of Dippoldiswalde as an outflow road, so that in the further course everything was pushed on Altenberg, a circumstance that should become meaningful. One can clearly see the consequences of the first bad disposition in the advance.

But even on the right wing, the disposition was not carried out. Barklay considered the route via Berggieshübel to be too threatened and decided to lead his column from Räcknitz on Dippoldiswalde.²³² Wittgenstein with a Russischen Corps and the Prussian 9th. Brigade (v. Klüx) should take a position on the heights near Räcknitz to secure the trigger and then follow as an barrier guard. This reached after the connection of an Austrian division a total strength of about 30 000 men.

There has been much discussion as to whether Barklay acted as such, either on his own or as a result of external encouragement. Bernhardt comes to the first result and proves that Toll did not influence him. Space does not allow the question to be explored. It should be mentioned that there is a battle report in the war archive, which is unsigned, but which in all probability, like the others, comes from Barklay, in which it is said that the general, with the general disposition of his emperor, had received the power not to comply with it.²³³ May this be as it pleases. There was no direct request or even command to deviate from the original command. The responsibility for his actions therefore remains entirely on his shoulders. But Sem's decision, if it were fully implemented, would have meant that 120,000 men used one road in a row, which in its nature amounted only to an old country road according to our ideas. A veritable rat king of troops would have emerged in Dippoldiswalde, and it was simply inextricable. A strange irony of the goddess of war, moreover, wanted the eagerly awaited and now despised Austrian column magazines to arrive just as the troops began to march through this place.

Whether Barklay acted against his better discernment, or whether the words time and space were not in his lexicon, only the complete opening of the archives will make it clear. His performance was not worthy of a great general.

If one were to give an officer today the war situation of the evening of the 27th August as a document for a strategic mission, one would demand that he should dispose of at least half of the Barklaysch army remnant to attack Vandamme, indeed that he should be willing to strike a battle against the possession of the Strait of Berggieshübel, only to ensure the retreat of the rest of the army.

Not enough for Barklay to decide in the opposite way, he even freed Ostermann to move to Dippoldiswalde via Maxen. This procedure requires no further criticism, which simply meant giving Vandamme the freedom to do and leave what he wanted. It would take all the persuasion, the harshest performance of Prince Eugen, to stop Ostermann from marching to Maxen. Only by placing himself in the breach and taking on the task of bearing the cost of the day with his corps, in order to spare the Guard Division the touch with the enemy if possible, did the Prince succeed in binding Ostermann and Yermoloff to the road of Berggieshübel. And he managed to do the bigger thing, with a wicked assault, to change the front and push the Franzosen so far off the street that the guards behind

²³² In Streffleur v. 1863 there is an essay: "The Battles of Kulm on the 29th and 30th August 1813", which is said to be written using the original Austrian sources. It states in p. 154 that the nature of the unprovoked byways led to the provision "that the majority of Russians, under General Barklay de Tolly, should at least follow the road of Peterswald and, if necessary, open it by force". This announcement, if authentic, is very onerous for the general.

²³³ Corr. Archive III E. 22.

him could pull out. The latter also came through almost unpicked, while the Prinzen Korps near Berggieshübel was largely blown up.

In any case, he had achieved that on that day the mountain road was still held, that Vandamme did not reach the Thal, there to simply receive the masses of the Bohemian Army swelling out of the Defilen.

While the situation in Weise was unexpectedly more favorable to the allies, the worst had not occurred in Dippoldiswalde. On the 27th, during the battle, Schwarzenberg had already set some troops backwards, and on the other hand the Prussian Corps did not go to Dippoldiswalde. General Kleist made the simple arithmetic that if he wanted to follow the Russians in the same way, he would stop outside Dresden at least until midday on the 28th, enduring a superior assault, and perhaps not make any headway. He therefore obtained the withdrawal on Maxen.²³⁴

The Kleistsche Korps marched from the area of Leubnitz via Lockwitz on Maxen, without the 9. Brigade whose other use has already been mentioned. Under General v. Zieten, an army guard was formed from the Fusilierbataillon, as the custom of the time entailed, which, incidentally, has "long been preserved" in the army. On the Prussian marching road, the Russische detachment of the General Roth, which had not yet joined its own troops from the far right wing, was still attached.²³⁵ Zieten's guard had to hold off the only weakly pushing enemy correspondingly longer, so that these troops could also pass the Defilee of Lockwitz. The passage of the same took a longer time for the sake of the bad and softened path²³⁶. From the Reserve Cavalry, the East Prussian Cuirassier Regiment under Colonel v. Wrangel²³⁷ was still assigned to the Arrieregarde. The colonel had — by the way — the regiment placed on a limb and the squadrons took large intervals to deceive the enemy, and was not attacked by the ensuing enemy cavalry.²³⁸

The persecution was not a lively one at all. Napoleon had anticipated a renewal of combat rather than an allied withdrawal for the 28th, so it was late in implementing the strategic pursuit. Nor did he turn his attention entirely to it, but turned his attention, by going to Pirna, back to the operation after Berlin, which seemed to him to be the decisive one in this campaign. Then he also thought he had done enough by the action of Vandammes, which he had replaced by Mortier at Pirna.

Above all, he himself was no longer the gigantic of former times.

It is the merit of the Yorckian book to have described the man in his development, in his becoming, as in the gradual decline, as a unified harmonious personality. Here he had already passed the peak of his ability, he had consumed too much of the capital. Even his Prometheus nature could not exceed the limits that are set for all earthly. Likewise, the marshals who, without unified leadership from the top, succeeded the allies' army columns were no longer Alten. They did not put the last touch of man and horse on the pursuit and therefore did not advance as fast in the soggy ground as the beaten ones, to whom the reversing movement lent the usual wings.

Thus Murat Freiberg, Marmont reached the area north of Dippoldiswalde. St Cyr Lockwitz.

²³⁴ So according to the files of the War Archives (III. E. 6 Kleist's Relation). In Grolman's obituary (Supplement Mil. W. Bl. 1843) is stated that this barclay would have drawn attention to the unthinkable of his disposition and for the Kleistsche Korps the withdrawal over Maxen and Glashütte would have obtained. Grolman rushed with this happy message in Kleist's headquarters and then also stayed with this, because he did not feel at his place in the Barklayschen headquarters. Grolman was chief of the General Staff at the II. Army Corps, but was ordered to Barklay headquarters immediately after the ceasefire was lifted. He has now resigned to his former post and has witnessed the withdrawal of the corps without knowing the day and hour of his arrival at Kleist.

The mention of his biographer is not in accordance with the archival news. (See also further *the following page*) However, the latter are not always complete either, so that it can be right for that reason.

²³⁵ Corr. Archive III E. 22.

²³⁶ It had been raining since 26/27. At night,

²³⁷ Wrangel was commander of the brigade.

²³⁸ Corr. Archive III E 35.

Vandamme, on the other hand, was already extremely threatening at Hellendorf. Kleist's corps moved into a camp between Maxen and Hausdorf, and the guard stayed at the height of Maxen. General Roth, following the Russians' instructions, had gone on to Dippoldiswalde. In Hausdorf, Kleist received a letter from Barklay,²³⁹ apparently as a result of a question asking him to make his way through Glashütte to Teplitz if the same was "really" usable for troops and artillery. This would be very desirable, since the route from Dippoldiswalde to Altenberg would be heavily manned by troops. In any case, Kleist must arrive in Teplitz tomorrow, i.e. on the 29th.

The general reported that he would take the imaginary path and attempt to reach the high mountains on the 29th and possibly advance the avant-garde cavalry against Teplitz. Kleist had justified doubts as to whether he would be able to march to Teplitz in one day, after he had learned the nature of the roads and made only 1 3/4 miles at all on the 28th August.

So the 29th August broke out.

The opposition which the prince Eugen of Württemberg, despite unfavorable terrain conditions on the heights of Nollendorf, opposed to the advance of Vandammes was again so delayed in its descent into the Thal that the assault on the position now taken by Ostermann at Priests behind the Stradabach could only start at noon, and not with all forces, since several French brigades were still standing behind in the mountains.²⁴⁰

The map clearly shows that the position at Priesten was the last one that could be taken if the debuting of the troops on the Geiersberg, Graupener and Altenberger streets was still possible. Despite this very obvious insight, the prince of Eugen would not have succeeded alone. To stop Ostermann if König Friedrich Wilhelm had not intervened vigorously. The monarch was only able to convince the Russians of the need for renewed resistance by telling them that their own emperor had not yet arrived in Teplitz from Altenberg.

After the Prince of Württemberg, the König of Prussia has therefore also made a highly deserved contribution to the common cause. His intervention was the second condition for the battle's success at Kulm.

Once stopped, the Russians stood firm with unwavering bravery. Small reinforcements went to them during the battle, considerable in the evening.

On the main retreat road, Wittgenstein and his guard of the army held the heights near Altenberg. The mass of troops and vehicles gathered at this place moved uninterrupted, day and night, on all accessible roads down into the Thal, the barely usable pass of Graupen, as did the Geiersbergstraße, just as filling as the main route via Zinnwald.

For the Kleistsche Korps, the march of the 29th was even more arduous than that of the previous day.²⁴¹ The crossing of the deep ground at Glashütte required an effort of several hours, and only by the infantry grasping into the wheels was it possible to move the guns and other carts out of the otherworldly slope after crossing the Müglitz river. The guard, caught up again by the slowly advancing enemy here, had to cover the passage through the Defilee in a longer battle, in which Lieutenant Colonel v. Blücher made a brilliant attack with the Schlesischen Hussars. Leaving early at 2 a.m.,²⁴² the corps arrived at Fürstenwalde in the afternoon from 4 a.m. and had taken up to 16 hours to march three miles. That makes, incidentally, about 45 minutes to the kilometer!

No persecution was paid a visit beyond Glashütte, so that the barrier guard at Liebenau could remain undisturbed.

During the march, Kleist had its right and left flanks cleared up, after the latter page by a Cossack regiment under Major General Biron of Curland,²⁴³ which had found its way to Hausdorf and sought the connection to its own troops. When Prince Biron had reached

²³⁹ Corr. Archive, Correspondence of the Higher Generals. See *note on the previous page*. This word 'really' must refer to a question, perhaps Grolman's proposal.

²⁴⁰ Corr. Archive III E. 8 French report.

²⁴¹ Corr. Archive, Relation and Operations Journal.

²⁴² Corr. Archive III C.9.

²⁴³ Report of the same in Kr. Archive III E.7.

Streckenwalde on his march as a side cover, his patrols told him that the enemy was marching with infantry and artillery on the road from Dresden to Teplitz. He therefore gave up the further march on Peterewalde and turned via Ebersdorf to Geiersbergstraße, in order to reach the Thal by this way. When he found this road completely clogged and lost, he tried the Graupener Weg. Again, the same picture. He therefore went back to the Geiersberg and moved up and down the fully grafted road to Ein klettering in the Thal. It took him an hour to make the move.

Since we were not as familiar with the barbaric language of the Muscovites as we are today, Kleist had given the prince 30 dragoons to report. Furthermore, since the prince explicitly states in his account that he had sent notices to the general, it is reasonable to assume that Kleist was informed at an early stage of Bandamme's advance and of the blockage of the streets. When, therefore, at about 3 o'clock, Count Schweinitz, officer of the König, arrived at Kleist during the march between Glashütte and Fürstenwalde, with the order that the corps should descend into the Thal as quickly as possible, it was already clear to Kleist that he could no longer reach the battlefield that day. During his ride over Graupen, Graf Schweinitz had to convince himself that the order that ex had given was not feasible. He had also found both ways completely blocked by the Russian throng by vans, provisions, broken guns. He realized that Kleist, who could not arrive with the Tete at Fürstenwalde before 4 a.m., who had to rest and cook Weise there, would not reach the passport before evening. But the general did not want to take it upon himself to see his corps in the darkness on the way from the constitution he described, as this would have been tantamount to dissolution. Also, he could only arrive at the Thale when everything had already been decided.

In this spirit, he had his König reported.

He had hit the right thing. The original report by Prince Biron of Curland gives a sure Anhalt for what the corps would have become if it had attempted relegation that day. Even long after the battle, when the Cuirassier Brigade under Colonel v. Wrangel marched up the Geiersberg again, it still found significant obstacles on the same. Above all, a visit to the path itself, which has been preserved in its old state, teaches how easily the same can become permanently unusable. In itself a very useful land route of about eight steps wide, it also offers no steep embankments except where it makes a sharp knee after crossing a small saddle behind the ruins Geiersberg.

Frequently exposed rock gives it a solid dam even in wet weather. However, its location on the slope, which it slowly climbs, means that it is almost always Defilee, with the slope falling steeply on one page, while on the other the mountain backrest rises sharply, conditions that do not exist only in the lowest part. Pedestrians and individual riders can in some places, as experience has shown, climb a laborious path through the trees next to the road. If there was a serious deadlock, it was only through a radical operation, by the vehicles falling off the slopes, that air could be drawn.

So, for better or for worse, Kleist decided to stay in the mountains for one more night, however untempting this had for him, because in front of him a blocked path, behind him the enemy, his situation was very reminiscent of that of the mouse in the trap. The news about the impassability of the paths increased, and it was gradually concluded that the same would not be free on the other day.²⁴⁴

So when the corps moved into its bivouac at Fürstenwalde, the real question to ask the general was what to do tomorrow?²⁴⁵

Kleist had taken up residence with Grolman in the small inn of Fürstenwalde. There, the brigade" and regimental commanders were personally ordered to receive orders at about 9 am.²⁴⁶ A comprehensible tension dominated the tempers. Adjutants and orderiy"Officers

²⁴⁴ Corr. Archive, Relation and Operat. Journal name.

²⁴⁵ For the description of the events in Kleist's headquarters in Fürstenwalde, knowledge of the depictions of Aster and Bernhardt is assumed.

²⁴⁶ Corr. Archive III E. 34. 31.

came and went as we see it on the planks of the stage when a big decision is being prepared.

Unfortunately, the most interesting scenes of this play were played behind the scenes. Kleist's consultation with Grolman found pay a visit without witnesses. After the same ended, the general stepped out of his room among the assembled officers and announced his decision to go over Nollendorf in the back of the enemy. Enthusiastic cheers greeted this manly word.

It was a lot that the Geist's fresh initiative broke ground unweakened. Not so much that the officers had preserved it, but that they still had the confidence in their troops, which faced a difficult task, perhaps a very hard test. It is also part of the completeness of this image of the history of war that we depict the inner state of the troops, that we bring to light not only the scientific consideration of the right and wrong in the leadership, but also those changing factors — the moral ones — which have such a huge influence on the outcome of all the fighting.

It has already been said that, from the day of the invasion of Saxony, the efforts and deprivations of the Bohemian army were extraordinary. For the Prussian and Russischen troops, this had already been preceded by considerable marches on the crossing of Böhmen. In the diary of the 8th The regiment of the Landwehr notes that on 19 August, during a march that lasted until 2 a.m., the regiment had to leave 400 troops behind. All but 50 find complied in the next few days, although the marches remained strong all the time, a sign of good spirit. But one thinks of Napoleon's saying that the first quality of the soldier is: to endure discomfort and deprivation, bravery only the second. The Landwehr formations, which made their debut here, did not yet possess this first characteristic. Sixteen battalions, each forming four regiments, were assigned to the II. Army corps assigned to the new formation, so that each brigade had to receive a regiment, thus a strong third consisted of landwehr. Noble enthusiasm and grim hatred of the enemy burned through the hearts, but the lack of training and steeliness of the body made itself felt sensitively among the Wehrmänner, among whom were represented from the seventeen-year-old youth to all ages. The external circumstances did not help to ease their troubles. The short Litewka, partly linen trousers, the lack of coats²⁴⁷ made the daily biwaks a source of noth. Instead of the insufficient tornister, the small bread bag had emerged, which of course did not pay a visit the carrying of any convenience. The suit was completed by a low shoe, which was without ankle boots (so called the gaiters) only in loose connection with the legs. The line and reserve regiments stood better in clothing than the landwehr, but also for them the test on which the August days set them was a hard one. And this is particularly due to the lack of food. It can be stated with certainty that all wagons, except the actual combat coaches, the medical, money and powder wagons, had to be left south of the mountains.²⁴⁸ Kleist had at least wanted to carry the bread columns and, as he says, arranged them in such a way that they could not cause marching disturbances. However, by the displayed guards of General Barklay, these were also held back at the entrance of the mountains, a rule of law about which Kleist complained bitterly to his king and which also punished itself in the most sensitive Weise.²⁴⁹ The 9th Landwehr regiment claims in fact that from the 19th to the 31st of August they did not receive any bread,²⁵⁰ the 8th reports from the 24th that the last two loaves had been distributed to the companies and the last two cows slaughtered.²⁵¹ In addition, all regiments are suing for bread shortages.

²⁴⁷ Usually, the fourth part is called missing. Corr. Archive III C.9.

²⁴⁸ Corr. Archive III E. 28. 30. 31. 33. 34, III. C.3

²⁴⁹ Corr. Archive III E.3. Kleist to König. 24. August.

²⁵⁰ Corr. Archive III E. 30.

²⁵¹ Corr. Archive III E. 34.

What one did not carry in this area, one did not have,²⁵² The higher mountain country is so poor that a writer in bad joke says that the inhabitants are the most docile citizens, since they would always be in the slow starvation. Moving on to Dresden, where the country is getting richer, the food supply was like a drop on the rocks, due to the dense concentration of troops and the fact that they stayed there for several days. And sometimes the little that was available was not taken. Self-help was rightly severely suppressed, but an orderly requisition system was still not known. In all the files relating to that period, I have read the word 'requisitioning' only once. So it happened that on the 22nd of August, although there was already a shortage of food on the first day of the invasion, a potato field close to the camp was spared and actually not touched.²⁵³

When the unhappiness of Dresden reached its highest level, a prolonged rainy season started on the night of 26-27 August, which made the bivouacs almost unbearable for the ill-dressed, half-starved soldiers. That night, and especially the following night, it was that, under cover of darkness, hundreds of country guards snuck into the villages only to be able to find a shelter once, and as a result were taken prisoner in large numbers.²⁵⁴ During this time, it was that the physical fatigue of many was so great that they could no longer lift their feet out of the knee-deep clay floor and sank, exhausted, where they stood.²⁵⁵ Half the troops went barefoot, many soldiers even threw their shoes away voluntarily, only to make any progress.²⁵⁶ Napoleon is indeed right in its proclamation of bravery; a regiment of the same Landwehr, which was close to dissolution here, was praised by a slogan order for its brave conduct in front of the enemy.²⁵⁷ The arduous retreat of the 28th and 29th under the impression of the unfavorable outcome now already the third battle could not help to raise the troops physically and morally. I am not in the habit of claiming that the clichéd troops at Fürstenwalde were nearly as exhausted and starved as the Hohenlohesches near Prenzlau.

However, as in a very different way, as deeply affected by the unlimited sacrifice, Geist must have been the freedom fighter, that Kleist could be sure that the prospect of coming to the enemy would revive all forces. There is only one voice about this, through the descriptions of that time, that the troops had only the desire, after so much futile effort, after so great deprivation, to finally come to the body of the hated, to repay him, what is endured for him.

Yes, the people had become insurmountable after they had sworn to be all — what lies in this word! — to put on his honor.

So what had Kleist and Grolman negotiated? How did they come to this meaningful decision? The archives are silent about this. There are no written records of the 29th and 30th. The later written battle report is quite short and gives only the decision and as a motive the blocking of the paths. Nor do the leave private papers of General Kleist contain any information as to whether there are still Grolmann records of them, I am unable to state. On the other hand, at a later stage, a number of the persons involved recorded their knowledge of the subject in the file. This gives us a definite idea of how familiar Fürstenwalde is with the general war situation.²⁵⁸

Based on this knowledge, one can develop the general's decision logically and critically illuminate it.

²⁵² The Prussian soldier's iron portion amounted to Kr. Archive: rusks on 3 days of 1 lb, breads on 1 day of 2 lbs, salt 14 Loth, rice 1 lb. At the 9th. Brigade had to be attacked on the 22nd August the iron portion Kr. Archive I.C. 25.

²⁵³ Corr. Archive III E. 34.

²⁵⁴ Corr. Archive III E. 26 and 34.

²⁵⁵ Corr. Archive III E. 30.

²⁵⁶ Corr. Archive III E. 34.

²⁵⁷ Corr. Archive III C. 9 Parole Order of 28 August.

²⁵⁸ Im Kriegs-Archiv III E. 11. are information from Thile, Uttenhofen, Wrangel, Reitzenstein as eyewitnesses, furthermore judgments of Brandt and Hoepfner. Letters from Voß and Groeben from private sources have also been viewed.

At Altenberg, in the west, even stronger forces on this side, Wittgensteins Arrieregarde, were known. There was therefore no risk of this page, and no thought of avoiding it, for example. After all, the troops of Altenberg had even blocked paths that were not theirs. Over Altenberg, however, it was also too late to the battle, and finally it is not apparent from the maps whether a usable route from Fürstenwalde to Altenberg was available at all. Any movement in a westerly direction was therefore ruled out.

On the other hand, one could at least make an attempt with the Geiersbergstraße. It was not yet in a position of constraint to do something else. The rather dull pursuit had stopped at Glashütte and the corps gained a 1 1/2 mile lead. Maybe the enemy didn't follow at all on the 30th. If you set off at dawn, took pioneers to the Tete and energetically started clearing the street, diverted part of the infantry to the Graupener Weg, let a part climb down next to the Geiersbergstraße, since it was now light, a degenerate of success was to be expected. The general could cling to those chances if he wanted to.

But it remained very questionable whether the corps, even if it managed to come down from the heights with artillery, did not take so much time to arrive too late to battle. The decision to use the prescribed route would therefore have been nothing more than a decision to act almost safely. But decisive action is the basis of all war successes.

Omission and omission burden a leader more than a miscarriage of resources. These words, which make up the final sentence in the glorious introduction to our field service order, were as true then as they are now.

If we look at the general who was asked the question of whether he wanted to let the rather difficult circumstances of his situation grow over his head or cut them through with vigorous action, we find that he was 50 years old here at the most decisive moment of his life, i.e. was in full possession of his mental and physical powers. Even those who are inclined to make the highest demands on a low age of commanding generals will be satisfied by these 50 years. And if one objects to the fact that the French Marshals were often even younger, one must not overlook the fact that their youth had the experience of a long series of campaigns at their page. And in this respect, the war years certainly count twice.

But our general also had war experience. He had already participated in the campaigns of 1792 to 1794 and earned during the latter as a young general-staff captain in the battle of Upper Ursel pour le mérite.

In 1806, as a member of the Royal Headquarters, he saw the downfall of the army, certainly not without drawing serious lessons from this period. From 1809, at the head of the Lower Silesian Brigade, he trained his infantry in the sense of his friend Yorck, who can be called the tactical teacher of the Prussian infantry, in the scattered fencing style and then moved with him into the campaign of 1812, in a long series of engagements at Eckau, Wollgund, Zennhof and in the so-called battle at Bauske to prove himself as a skilled and determined general. He fought only aggressively and each time victorious, the Rothe Eagle Order 1st and 2nd class were a high award for the major general.

He did even more important service through his share in the Tauroggen Convention.

In 1813, we first find the general at the head of an independent troop corps of Prussians and Russians off Wittenberg. With the same, on April 28, he successfully defended the Saale crossings at Halle against a superior foe. On the day of the battle Groß-Görschen of, he stopped the avant-garde of the French army marching on Lindenau for a long time and made Napoleon Groß-Görschen realize only belatedly that he had to seek the main power of the allies at. On 19 May, his defense of the heights of Burgk was the highlight of the bloody battle near Bautzen.

The previous excellent services of the general were the reason that after the armistice, the command of the Second Army Corps was transferred, which proved itself valiantly in front of Dresden in the battle for the big garden. Before the beginning of the battle, the comandrant had gathered his officers here, exhorted them to devotion and told them that

he would stand up for everyone with his person, who would suffer a failure, for example as a result of too much boldness.²⁵⁹

One could not expect a weak decision from a general who spoke like this and was so war-tested as described.

Since there was no way forward on the previous route and there was no way out to the west, it was obvious to look towards Osten. From there, we knew very well from the news of our own patrols, as well as from the news that orderly officers brought from the Thal that the Corps Vandamme had descended into the Thal via Peterswalde and Nollendorf and was there in an undecided fight against the Russians.

However, there was uncertainty as to whether troops would follow or follow behind Vandamme. However, it was considered likely.²⁶⁰ However, the cavalry patrols sent to Nollendorf and Peterswalde last night did not report any of the enemy. This was not right, because in the evening until well into the night only the last brigades arrived at Vandamme. However, it is also a question of whether the patrols to Nollendorf and Peterswalde really have come, because the cavalry was completely ironclad, in the saddest condition,²⁶¹ and the reconnaissance service was only at the lowest level at that time. When you call Katzler, you call it an exception.

The direction in which one could turn against the enemy now depended primarily on the road connections. However, the only route that was known to lead east of Fürstenwalde down into the Thal was the large Berggieshübel–Nollendorf–Kulm route.

In fact,²⁶² the headquarters only had the old Müllerian map, with which Friedrich the Great had already marched through Böhmen, and from which little more can be seen than the Ore Mountains separating this country from Saxony. On streets only the Nollendorfer and partly the street Dresden–Altenberg–Teplitz are marked. Nothing between the two. There were not only the often-mentioned Graupener and Geiersberg Trails, but also small trails down through the valleys of the Strada, Sernitz and Telnitzbach into the plain. These were completely unknown. However, since there are also only narrow wood discharge paths which lead down with a steep fall and completely wedged into sharply incised valleys, their use by larger compartments would have been excluded. When exiting into the plane, which had to take place in the area of the enemy, even weak departures could have prevented the debouchieren. Individual troops of fleeing Franzosen managed to escape on these paths during the battle.

For the March of the Kleistsche Korps, only the large street was considered, and from inquiries and the information of the patrols it was learned that a useful route to Nollendorf led via Streckenwalde. This is also shown by the Müllersche Map, that a march there moves along the crest of the mountain and probably has no watercourses to cross. So what if you went to Nollendorf and enemy troops moved from Pirna? However, the existence of the corps was at stake. Two moments, however, made that fact seem less threatening. Former troops could not be feared to find themselves at Nollendorf, rather a column in the march. However, the appearance of a Prussian corps from Streckenwalde had to come as a complete surprise, so that it was perhaps possible to throw the column in the first attempt and despite it to make its way into the Thal.

But if you left early — never an early departure was justified — you could hope to be in front of the enemy in Nollendorf. If one gained a lead of only two hours, the greatest danger was overcome.

That was certainly the way in which the fight took place. If not in the Thal, then on the heights. They participated in the general decision, because the troops detained above could not support Vandamme. And if it had been a desperate struggle, it is never in vain. I would have wished him to the brave Hohenlohe, who was only misguided at Prenzlau. If a

²⁵⁹ Corr. Archive III E. 27.

²⁶⁰ In fact, Mortier also advanced on the 30th from Pirna, but as a result of orders received late only as far as Berggieshübel. The author.

²⁶¹ Corr. Archive III E. 27.

²⁶² According to Thile, Kr. Archive III E. 11.

material success can no longer be achieved, a moral gain for the following "families" comes out, which bears hundreds of fruits. We have not consumed the hearts of loyal Prussians for years and stood up on the true trains of Heldenmuth, which also showed the unfortunate year 1806! I would just like to remind you of Prince August, the brave prince of Zollern, near Prenzlau.

The possibility of a struggle for despair and annihilation was also present here, but we have seen that in addition to the black bullet there were also white bullets in the game, which moved this possibility into the distance and, above all, promised great success. Incidentally, the decision to go to Nollendorf was not a miracle and not only conceivable by inspiration, but also grew out of the war situation.

Evidence of this view is also the fact that a similar idea had been put forward at the same time at headquarters. When Schweinitz learned that Kleist could no longer descend from the heights and that the other day might not find its way freely, it decided to call on him to support his own assault by moving in Vandammes.

For this purpose, Colonel von Schöler was sent to Fürstenwalde with the task of causing Kleist to move into the enemy's rear whenever possible. A particular route was not prescribed or proposed. Nor could this be done from the green table without knowing the conditions on the ground.

When Schöler arrived in Fürstenwalde, the decision to go to Nollendorf had already been made.²⁶³ His message could only strengthen the general in the same way, as part of the responsibility was thus relieved from his shoulders. Also, Schöler still did not bring good news about the outcome of the fight in the Thal. When Vandamme came forward, the debouchiren from the Geiersberg was more dangerous than via Nollendorf.

Colonel von Schöler is said to have informed Kleist that he intended to send the König. General Barklay, who had sent the Leutnant v. Boss to Fürstenwalde, was also informed of the decision.

The news of Kleist's plan first evoked the right lust and joy for attack at the bottom of the Thal. —

Another question could be drawn into the realm of reflection: who first pronounced the name Nollendorf? It is actually pointless to discuss this question. However, as it happens elsewhere, it cannot remain completely untouched here either. There is no such thing as a secure Anhalt to answer them, and there will probably never be, as the well-known conversation took place without witnesses. The story most guaranteed, at last again by Oldwig v. Natzmer's memoirs, is that Grolman raised the glass at the dinner of the staff, which took place together at a late hour according to the general's habit, and said:

"Gentlemen, let us get up and drink health on the revered general's behalf. May heaven crown the heroic decision he made to march on Nollendorf with the happiest success. It is a decision that has come solely from the chest of our revered general, in which no one else has any part." The final sentence of the speech is due to the fact that when Kleist announced its decision, Grolman was asked by the officers present who had found this way out. Now, one says that Grolman was too modest to claim credit for the decision, but that its results and successes were not yet known, to which one can rightly reply, and that the almost proverbially modest Kleist would have received the praise of this speech, for it was supposed to be, not accepted if it did not belong to it. One may well come to an opinion of one's own for such psychological reasons, but not to establish the facts. As long as nothing else is found, this table speech speaks more for Kleist than for Grolman's mastery of the genius idea.

Nevertheless, individual writers make use of this entirely for Grolman, according to the author of the aforementioned obituary, which contains many verifiable mistakes and is also, soon after Grolman's death, only to be regarded as a fleeting sketch.

One can see two reasons which have led to a, one might say, tendentious treatment of the question. One is that, while Kleist enjoyed the general affection and respect of the army, it had many adversaries among the younger generation's driving forces, a fact that is also

²⁶³ Bernhardt, Toll III, pp. 235.

evident in the harsh judgment that Clausewitz has given to the König's former adjutant general.²⁶⁴ And this opposition arose from the fact that Kleist belonged to the conservative party in the army, whose right to exist and necessity will not be closed to anyone who does not want a sudden approach, but a steady development process and who considers it necessary that the good foundations of the old times be taken over into the freer forms of the new ones.

The second reason is to be found in Grolman's personality. He is trusted more, so it must have been him who spoke the magic word.

We have already identified Kleist as a capable general, as it has subsequently proved its worth in the case of Leipzig, Etoges, Laon and Paris.²⁶⁵ In its external appearance it was of stately figure, but still only of medium size! Large vibrant eyes, a sharp bent nose and a wide strong chin gave his face the expression of wisdom and determination. He was dwarfed as soon as Grolman stepped next to him. There are still some among us who knew the latter and saw him as commanding general in Posen. Only one voice rules over him: every customs a König! ingenious, more ingenious than Kleist, of immense energy and boldness. If the thought was not of him, he has found an enthusiastic representative of him.

It would be little in the spirit of the humble immortalized field marshal if I were therefore to claim the plan for him alone without any definite proof. The imperishable deed belongs to him.

Whoever commands execution and bears responsibility deserves the glory, and rightly so. Blücher is no less big because there was a Gneisenau next to him.

However, a decision that jeopardizes the existence of a corps of troops with the prospect of great success always remains manly boldness, and the Kleist Regiment of Nollendorf proudly looked to the general whose name it was given. —

The order issued on the evening of the 29th August corresponded to the prevailing difficult conditions in the most expedient Weise.

The troops were to be ready in the morning at 3 o'clock near Fürstenwalde, on the way to Streckenwalde. Everything that was in the troops apart from the necessary combat training in wagons²⁶⁶ was to be destroyed. This was also the case with the artillery's ladder cars, on which they carried their spare wheels, drawbars, etc.; but some of the most necessary pieces were to be carried on the guns themselves.²⁶⁷ The Arrieregarde was given the very right purpose of marching from Liebenau via Schönwalde on Peterswalde as a left-wing cover. Here it was to stop the French troops advancing from Pirna. However, if another advance of enemy page did not pay a visit, she was to join the corps on Nollendorf after a short stay.

It should be noted in advance that this latter case occurred and that Ziethen and its battalions were just approaching the south lisière of the woodland near Jungferndorf when the first French divisions, which had broken through Kleist's center on and off Nollendorfer Strasse, were rising. At his resistance, these also disintegrated, he completed the dissolution of the last closed French troops.

²⁶⁴ It is regrettable that Clausewitz did not also draw the future general into the district of his assessment, thereby giving a fairer image of the man whose overall achievements mark him as one of our best army leaders.

²⁶⁵ Clausewitz, in his book "The Campaign of 1813 to the Armistice," calls Kleist an eminent general at the battle of Bautzen, who earned special fame and acclaim that day.

Thiele (Corr. Archive III. E. 11). Kleist has lagged behind Grolman in military prowess, but no one can deny that he was a brave soldier, willing to go to any bold venture.

Uttenhofen (Corr. Archive III. E. 11). "Kleist had only one aim: to get behind the enemy. This was the straightest way to get there. His followers followed him in jubilation."

Count Groeben writes: "Anyone who ever thought of the Leonid flock on the eve of the Thermopylae will have a role model of the night at the Kleistsche Headquarters, etc."

²⁶⁶ As a result of the abandonment of the catering columns, a number of preloading carriages had been set.

²⁶⁷ Corr. Archive III E. 31.

The march, scheduled for 3 a.m., was delayed until 5 a.m. because some troops arrived too late at the assembly site. It is likely that this was the Silesian Hussar Regiment, which was at the barrier guard at Liebenau and was now to take over the avant-garde. An infantry avant-garde could not form the corps, as all light battalions were at the guard. A further delay was caused by the distribution of reserve artillery to the brigades, so that each brigade now had two batteries, one light and one heavy. They did not want to have a long continuous column of artillery during the march, so that small stagnation would not get into the unmeasured. This distribution also had the advantage that if parts of the corps were cut off, they could fight an independent battle on their own, equipped with all weapons. The reserve cavalry followed behind the foremost brigade and was to "break out as soon as possible on the left" and proceed as a special column.

In this formation the march was started. The path that it was about was nothing more than a narrow dirt road, so you could hardly march in sections. However, he led along the crest of the mountain without any noticeable incline or slope, without a dam or cut. In addition, the ground here is no longer purely loamy, but has a strong admixture of sand, so that even on rainy days the movement is not particularly difficult, you can also march with individual regiments next to the path, if the sections have no space on the same.

The march may have been more arduous only where the path marked on the map crosses the forest and a small, sweltering ground. The formation in sections could not be maintained here either, which will have resulted in the extension of the column which the reports refer to.

After all, this route via Streckenwalde to Nollendorf will have been better than all the routes the Corps has recently taken. And it also covered the 1 1/2 miles in about three hours.

Nollendorf was found free of the enemy. A column of French munitions unsuspectably accompanying them on their way from Peterswalde was surprised and taken by the hussars. A sign that the enemy did not expect an assault from this page. From Peterswalde, nothing else had been reported by the enemy and thus the heaviest part of the company succeeded.

At the same time, too short a stop was made at Nollendorf to allow the troops to be organized and unraveled. Remaining in the marching column was not very likely to start, given the situation between two fires, and so it was marched brigade by brigade.

The general rode high up at the Nollendorfer Chapel, but nothing in the grounds in front of him reveals the presence of the enemy, if not for the sound of the battle rolling up from afar.

The forested slopes on the right hand side completely conceal the part of the battlefield on which the first battles took place. Even Kulm and the Horkaberg cannot be seen from the chapel and you can only see these places when you get to the big bend of the highway. However, a part of the area lying on the Debouche of Vordertellnitz can be overlooked, and the general is to assume afterwards that the development of the troops from the almost half a mile long road defilement would probably not encounter serious obstacles.

With good confidence, he was therefore able to command the arrival of the troops at 9 1/2 o'clock, which rushed in a tight, opened column without gaps and with a quick step on the battlefield.

The battle, which had started at 7 a.m., was at this time such that the violent assaults of the French right wing were rejected with great effort, while the right wing of the allies had taken the lightly occupied Striesowitzer heights and was in progress.

After all, Vandamme still had considerable force, as Kleist would soon learn, and the allies' superiority over the French was only 8,000 without the Prussians.

Vandamme might have been defeated even without Kleist's intervention, and the magnitude of the success could only have been achieved by attacking him now. Just as Vandamme realized the same, he gave up the battle at once, and sought only with the utmost cold-bloodedness and boldness to salvage what was to be salvaged. Nevertheless, his corps, which had left Königsberg with 40 000 Marines, was destroyed in the military sense of the word, and this was, as it were, under the eyes of Napoleon and his army, which, defeated at Dresden, was already under the sign of beginning dissolution. The coalition has broken its guns.

What an envelope! The triumph of Großbeeren freed the minds from anxiety, the day on the Katzbach raised them to hope and Freude, neither of which reaches the significance of the battle of Kulm, in which the three nations fought shoulder to shoulder and gained trust in each other and in the common power. Even the tentative Schwarzenberg began to believe that

Centenary of the Wars of Liberty Breslau 1913

Catalog of the historical exhibition

Room 7: Kleist of Nollendorf, Bülow of Dennewitz and other army leaders (excerpt)

1st Field Marshal Count Kleist of Nollendorf in full figure, life-size, in the background the area of Nollendorf. Oil painting, designated: W. Herbig.

Freiherr von Eckhardtstein, Reichwalde O.-L.²⁶⁸

2. Kleist from Nollendorf, engraving from Velyn to Melle de Noireterre, Paris 1814. Baroness von Eckhardtstein was born Countess Kleist of Nollendorf, Klein Biesnitz near Görlitz.

3. Kleist of Nollendorf, small bronze statuette, modern working. Baroness von Eckhardtstein was born Countess Kleist of Nollendorf, Klein Biesnitz near Görlitz.²⁶⁹

4. Kleist's report to König on the share of its army corps at the battles near Dresden and Kulm. (Sheet 11b: Order to advance over Nollendorf, which decided to destroy Vandammes.) Hands-on signature. Bergschenke near Teplitz 2 September 1813. War Archives of the Great General Staff, Berlin.

5. Prince August of Prussia to Kleist: regrets his departure from the "active service". Hands-on signature. Berlin May 15, 1821. Baroness von Eckhardtstein was born Countess Kleist of Nollendorf, Klein Biesnitz near Görlitz.

6. Prince Wilhelm the Elder of Prussia to Kleist: Congratulations on his appointment as Field Marshal; regrets that Kleist has left the service. Handwritten writing. Berlin 16 May 1821. Baroness von Eckhardtstein was born Countess Kleist of Nollendorf, Klein Biesnitz near Görlitz.

7. Parts from the "Iron Cross Service" from 1817, donated by König Friedrich Wilhelm III to General Kleist, with the Kleist coat-of-arms. (See Room 2, No 11). Freiherr von Eckhardtstein, Reichwalde O.-L.

²⁶⁸ *The painting, painted by Wilhelm Herbig, is located in the Stadtgeschichtliches Museum Leipzig in 2009. Addition 2014: The family decided in accordance with family day protocol 1889, to give the regiment Graf Kleist of Nollendorf the copy of an image of the Graf Kleist of Nollendorf.*

²⁶⁹ *The statuette is located in the Kulturhistorisches Museum Görlitz. There is a plaque on the base with the following text: The Baroness Thekla of Eckardstein, born Countess Kleist of Nollendorf, in grateful veneration for the 125th anniversary of the regiment d. 14.10.1897. The officer corps of the grenadier Regiment Count Kleist of Nollendorf (1st West Prussia.) No. 6 (2009).*

General

*Battle at Kulm von Kleist: General surprised by the breakthrough of French cavalry
(30 August 1813)*

Original by Professor R. Knötel

8. Miniature image of Empress Elisabeth of Russia, marked: Benner.

Gift to Kleist from Nollendorf.

Baroness von Eckhardtstein was born Countess Kleist of Nollendorf, Klein Biesnitz near Görlitz.

9. Address in Versen, to Kleist of Nollendorf "on his return to Frankfurt consecrated by all the inhabitants of the city Frankfurt a. d. O. the 31st August 1815." Printed on silk.

Baroness von Eckhardtstein was born Countess Kleist of Nollendorf, Klein Biesnitz near Görlitz.

10th address in Versen, dedicated to Kleist of Nollendorf "the heroic protector of Halle on April 28, 1813 from the municipal council of Halle." Presented on 28 April 1816. In gold embroidered cover.

Baroness von Eckhardtstein was born Countess Kleist of Nollendorf, Klein Biesnitz near Görlitz.

11. Address in Versen, "to the General - Field Marshal Mr. Count Kleist of Nollendorf on the day of his departure presented reverently by all the municipalities of the city of Merseburg and their superiors". Merseburg, published by Franz Kobitzsch, 1,821st

Baroness von Eckhardtstein was born Countess Kleist of Nollendorf, Klein Biesnitz near Görlitz.

Appendix 4*Characterization of the Count Kleist of Nollendorf by Carl of Clausewitz.*²⁷⁰

Von Kleist The Colonel. He, the future Field Marshal Kleist of Nollendorf, was then expeditious Adjutant General of König, thus in a sense State Secretary for the War Department. He was a very affable, highly righteous man, who rose around a few lines above the mass of petty service pedantry, possessing an excellent social education and a very dignified being. Neither his knowledge nor his mind was comprehensive, and his life experiences did not go far beyond the ordinary.

So he was just equipped to get his job to the best of his ability without doing much in it forwards or backwards. That was not enough for a time like that of 1806, and so he saw everything collapse without having any idea that he himself was guilty of it, and without seeing the least idea awakening in himself, how it could be turned to the Besser to some extent even before the complete course of the catastrophe. An acquaintance of the author has learned that a royal cabinet command came to Schlesien from Stettin, in which an officer was granted his marriage petition. Now König was in Stettin when he rushed to East Prussia to gather the remaining forces for the new opposition, so there were certainly quite different things to do — but always to do the old and in old Weise, to excel in punctuality, that was the Geist of our then government, and outside this district of the usual was a complete emptiness.

²⁷⁰ From: News from Prussia in its great catastrophe. In kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften edited by the Großer Generalstab, Volume 2, Berlin 1889, pp. 417, 436, (2018)

Appendix 5

*Little Notices from 1806 and 1814.*²⁷¹

When Field Marshal Kleist of Nollendorf died, he left behind a not insignificant number of documents and letters. However, they did not remain in the possession of the heirs, but were taken into custody by an officer of the General Staff. Only a small remainder is still in the hands of the granddaughter of the great ancestor, in whom the Baroness of Eckardstein at Klein-Biesnitz near Görlitz, who provided him to me most graciously.

This estate breaks down into military-political and private letters. Among the former are: a letter from Friedrichs II to Duke Friedrich of Braunschweig (1779, May 3); an instruction for inspectors of the infantry of Friedrich II (1781, July 25); two letters from Lieutenant Colonel Ochs to Kleist (1806, February 17 and March 26); letters from Kleist to a number of addressees (1808, October 7); two letters from Marshal Macdonald to Kleist (1812, August 17 and 18); part of the correspondence between Kleist and Thielmann for the surrender of Torgau, including cabinet ordres, a letter from Gneisenau, etc. (1813, April). Most of these items are communicated or referred to by G. v. Kleist in the life of Count Kleist v. Nollendorf. — Thielmann to Kleist, sends a copy of Stein's letter to him (1814, October 30); Wittgenstein to Kleist in 1819, April 10 and 19. — A later letter from the Earl of Gröben with a description of the battle of Kulm. Among the documents of private content are those of Heinrich, among others. Numerous are condolences from princes and princesses when Kleist resigned from the army in 1821, letters of condolence for his death, finally a letter from Emperor Alexander I, one of the Empress Marie, the wife of Emperor Paul and others.

Of the documents mentioned, the letters of the Kurhessian lieutenant colonel and quartermaster general of Ochs to Kleist, who was then lieutenant colonel and adjutant general, offer a more general interest. Ochs, a clear-headed and German-sentient man, was in correspondence with Kleist because of his conversion to Prussian service. He wishes nothing more than to be able to "prove himself useful in any degenerate". The letters lead to the momentous period between the battle of Austerlitz [565] and Jena. The first, from Cassel on February 18, 1806, shows how Ochs thought about Preußens's misguided stance and how he sees Heil Deutschland in the division of the small states and thus the defense of the whole. The behavior of Angereaus seems very suspicious to him. Deutschland should stand by and watch Frankreich's war with Britain. He then comes to the much discussed transformation of the army, namely in the sense of making the armies mobile. In order to learn about these things in other ways, Ochs wrote to a Bavarian officer who was his friend, who gave him frank information, which he sent to Kleist. These Bavarian statements are now quite worthy of note in her degenerate. Information is obtained about the internal organization of the Bavarian army in brief form, as well as judgments about the French army and its allies in general. Significant are the words: "We (the Bavarians) are very impressed by the Franzosen, but the Würtenbergs and Baader are not at all." You have the particularism of the time in the most blatant form.

In the same direction points the small piece, which is taken from the almost unknown "Memories from the years 1812-15" by v. Tyszka (p. 310 f.). It also shows the fundamental difference between the Austrian and the North German military systems during the liberation wars.

In his first letter (1806, Feb. 17), referring to the battle of Austerlitz, Ochs said: "I was very sorry, because I believed that there could never be a better time for Prussia to give peace to the world and restrict all foreign arbitrariness over Teutsche Völcker. I see in spirit the successor in Haag again, and I see that only the Teutsche and no stranger gave the Teutsche Fatherland a certainly necessary, more reasonable and better constitution. I alone saw in vain and we all saw that a German was desperate too soon. It may be because of that. Perhaps the other path is not so militarily brilliant, but it is no less good. Only large, arrogant states will bring us prestige, happiness and calm, and I hope that there will be only one voice on

²⁷¹ *Historical Quarterly XIV Born in 1911, pp. 564*

this, and that no one will respect all the others, although there are thousands of considerations. What do the smaller states help us, and what does it help you that they are allowed to call themselves states? Angereau now practices tolerating the little gentlemen in art in Franckfurth, in the Wetterau and everywhere. Truly it is outrageous and yet it is no different as long as these small states will exist.

A large part of the Angereau Corps moved on the 13th out of Franckfurth and into the Wetterau, and it is said that Angereau will take a permanent position between the Lahn and the Maine and move its [566] headquarters to Wezlar. All our news agrees that a considerable power in the Mainz area, mainly on the right bank of the Rhine, has concentrated and is still gathering. What this means, we, as the uninitiated, are a little embarrassed about it. Although all Kurhessian places with accommodation have been partially spared, but with the requisitions completely spared, and we calmly rely on Preußens protection, alone the things could become different again, and then we would be, since we are standing in front of the door, so to speak, in the house, almost lost.

The idea of not being able to defend oneself in changed circumstances and of having to give oneself up in this way is intolerable to me, and I therefore wish that we should now remain good friends and that something should also be recovered for us, for the sake of arrondissement, from the general shipwreck of the German Empire.

The new English ministry does not yet seem to be inclined to peace. England cannot possibly admit that the French retain Italy and Dalmatia. All Levantine trade is immediately lost for England, and the East Indian possessions are in a dangerous situation. England's existence is linked to it, and before it admits it will be a tough battle for some, and will mobilize everything to weave the more northern powers into its own interests. Whether we Germans will do anything to get into the French and British trade squabbles is, I very much doubt, but we must put ourselves in a position where neither nation can tumult us in our own house and cause disaster. — Only then, when we become and can have peace, will we Germans be independent peoples, and there is only one way to achieve this goal, and it is not difficult to achieve the same — large arrogant states, military natural borders, mimics me on all shields.

The many commandments that our armies still carry so far have recently been the subject of a great deal of noise. There is no denying it, and it will be yours. It must not have been overlooked that we are difficult to make mobile and difficult to move. A change has to be made, but the best way to make it is not so easy with the mancherley considerations, which are as good here as they are in politics. I was commissioned to draw up a plan for reducing the burden of the local troops. I did it . . . There's a lot of talk about officers walking. But the German is not prepared for this, and you have to let him at least a horse to ride in order to get him in a good mood. Of course, I want to save the tents entirely, but upper skirts are set in advance; just as I abolish half of all training and reduce the heavy artillery by a considerable amount. [567] Again, the unremitting prerequisite is that our line infantry, almost every sniper, should learn to shoot and aim from the limb for his man, and also hit him (in the closed or non-closed order). If we have our infantry only at this peak of total (m)unity, then I renounce the larger part of our cannons, and we march so easily to Paris, or where we otherwise wear favorites, when one went to Wien the other day.

If it were possible to give me some reassuring information about the advance of the Engereau — to give me comfort, I would ask for it."

On March 26 of the same year, Ochs from Cassel said that he had approached one of his friends in the Bavarian Army, who was formerly in Hessian service and was a free and fair-minded person. He replied, which von Ochs encloses in the excerpt: "The bayerschen furnishings are very similar to those of the French ones, and one must be surprised that the honest Bavarian has been able to transform himself in such a short time." He believes that the furnishings, based entirely on the requisition system, are extremely limited on one page, as are too many limitations on the other. It harms the spirit of the German armies. "At the Lahn and at the Mayn everything is as before, and you don't see any institutions that could

indicate the much desired return to the fatherland . . . Of course, you have to say with my Bavarian friend: "God forbid us for this guest! even their friendship is too teuer!"

The appendix reads:

'Excerpt from a letter from a royal Bayerschen officer of 13 March 1806.

It gives me great pleasure to be able to tell you something more about our train and catering services. The Regulatory field contains the following provisions.

A cavalry Regiment à 4 Esquadrons has a 2-horse Medicine Trolley, a 2-horse boot and other fittings and mounting parts Trolley and a 4-horse Officer Bagage Trolley. An infantry battalion, of 5 companies, has the same, and has pay a visit of boots, loaded shoes.

All officers from the captain down walk with the infantry. Each cavalierist must carry oats, meat and bread for 24 hours. No Kessel will be done well for the cavalry. The infantry have to carry the Kessel and for 24 hours of flesh and bread themselves.

The Reuther as the pedestrian may not more than 2 shirts, 2 Prussian Socks, 1 Gilée, 1 Hoosse and 1 Prussian Lead shoes with you.

Since all the troops have cut the hair round, so every morning the head is washed and no Fresir stuff is necessary.

[568] No officer from the colonel down may place more than one bag of coats on the Bagage wagon. Nor is he allowed to carry more than a uniform or tail coat in his coat bag.

Every commander of a force may requisition everything necessary, but must make the strictest report of this.

In a friendly country you take the food as well as on enemy soil; only in the first case you give receipts about it.

The cavalry usually cantonirt, or bibouacquirt near villages to requisition the needed Kessel. The infantry must bibouacquire almost always and wherever possible in forests.

All wagons, which carry some corps except the designated Regulatory, are confiscated by Gens d'armes or Reutte hunters (who perform this service with us) and each commander is strictly responsible for it.

An officer who remains behind because of fatigue dares to be dismissed immediately. A common man is severely punished and loses his wages.

All patients must be transferred to the flying hospital after 24 hours. When a regiment moves to the affair, every squadron or company requires a two-horse wounded wagon. Every dead person is managed as quickly as possible at page.

A staff officer of the infantry receives: a colonel 4, lieutenant colonel 3, major 3 and adjutant 2 rations.

For a lieutenant general, 1 four-horse bagage car, a two-seat two-horse chaise — for a general major, 1 two-horse bagage car is done well. Since now of our army 24 battalions lines infantry, 6 battalions light infantry and 24 squadrons in all 32 m. Man in the field, had 2 general lieutenants and 6 general majors, so you can easily think how extremely few wagons and horses we have had. For the Cassa and the Commissariat 6 four-carriage and for 2 flying hospitals 32 four-carriage were intended

Neither the Franzosen nor we carried a tent.

Our degenerate to wage war costs the regents little, but God forgive the grain of the land we roam. On the whole, however, it is better if only a few strokes are devastated than if, as a result of a long-lasting war, all the provinces are finally evacuated.

There is no need to think about rest days, and 9 to 12 hours are covered every day. Even if it is not necessary, the troops have to make such long marches to keep them in practice. Initially, it was a tough one, but for the last few months we have been competing with the French.

[569] The soldier has an extraordinary amount of freedom, but this also gives rise to looting quite a lot. In particular, the Franzosen are highly rambling in drunkenness and in all degenerates of trucks. Religion is just a ridiculous word to you, and stealing is called requisitioning. To the most hideous scenes these people can — laugh! ! ! I have seen entire battalions drunk, and certainly more than 10,000 trainees have followed the army, which then, of course, spread all the atrocities of devastation around them. Subordination is little in

the French off-duty, strict duty. But with us the strictest at any time. Due to the many wars, the French soldier is the bravest one can imagine, but so feral that they have also looted some places even in Bavaria.

We are very much impressed by the Franzosen, but not by the Würtenbergs and Baader. Of course, they did not shoot, and only transported prisoners; but that was not their fault. The Würtenbergs were even worse than the Franzosen in Austrian and were therefore not respected by us. Killed in action The Baden soldiers do not seem to have any part in the war, because until Braunau, where they only came, they lost half of their team through desertion.

The French are still in the area, but they hope to go home at the end of this month. God give them a happy journey, because as much good as they have done for us, so many costs they make for our country. East Reich is paying us 16 million to cover the cost of the war, and there are still some very considerable arrears.

Some riots have broken out in Tyrol, which is why three battalions of infantry are marching there. So we now have 11 battalions and 4 squadrons in Tyrol.

Now, some of our artillery. You will find that this is entirely in line with your ideas. It is divided into whole and half batteries in the army, and acts for itself, also has its own cover. The artillerymen do not carry rifles, and the cover consists of one or two squadrons or companies, depending on the terrain. At the top of the avant-garde there are constantly reeding canons, the loss of which one cares little if only one achieves its purpose with it. The fact that we always operate in batteries was decided by Ulm and Austerlitz and saved us at Iglau. The Austrians and Russians had fragmented their cannons too much and with us 12 to 20 pieces moved on a point, about which one made big eyes and usually ran away. You know the Austrians, but that is nothing compared to what we saw from you earlier."

Cavalry-captain Also with the Austrians, namely in 1814, the Prussian, v. Tyszka, deals when he tells:

[570] "As good and well-behaved as the Austrian military is, it still has a lot of pedantics from the stiff Kamashen period, which is quite noticeable to those who are not used to it. The stick is still the invigorating principle for the common soldier. Therefore, the corporal carries on a strap in the buttonhole his hazel stick, with which he, like the sergeant who carries a cane, can give his subordinate for suit and similar small mistakes without inquiry three strokes. These blows falling on the soldier are doubled by the hands of the higher superiors, so that he often receives a few twenty for the same thing from all of them together. The predicate "Ihro Gnaden", with which the officer is addressed by the soldier, struck me less, because it is custom in Austrian: everyone who has a whole skirt on his body, and makes a noble expression to call Ihro Gnaden". The author then points out the low level of knowledge, even of higher-ranking Austrians, and believes that the Bavarian military has little respect for the Austrian, even Austrian officers are referred to by Bavarian as "koschtbeutel", after the sandbags that the infantrymen carry around. The Prussian officers were considered proud of their Austrian comrades.